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The overall aim of the thesis is to realise a better, more holistic understanding of the 
management of smouldering crises and progress knowledge regarding the ‘latent 
conditions’ which underlie adverse patient safety incidents in healthcare 
organisations.  In so doing, this thesis will move the debate concerning both the 
management of smouldering crises and patient safety in healthcare 
 
The dominant approach in crisis management theory has been to consider crises 
from an organisational perspective.  In spite of more recent developments in the 
understanding of smouldering crisis which causally attribute the emerging crisis to 
limitations in management’s perspective, knowledge and capabilities, there has been 
insufficient emphasis upon understanding the contributory behaviour of grassroots 
level.  Furthermore, whilst theory is empirically based, this has almost exclusively 
been founded on narratives offered by those who occupy senior management 
positions at the expense of considering employees who are closer to the crisis 
incubation point. 
 
Errors in medicine are rare.  However, the consequences of adverse patient safety 
incidents can be devastating.  In the healthcare sector, legislative and policy 
initiatives in the UK during the early part of this century placed patient safety high on 
the agenda.  Consistent with the dominant paradigm in crisis management theory, 
systemic human error is seen to underpin adverse patient safety incidents.  
However, whilst progress has been made developing an understanding and 
addressing aspects of the causal route to such incidents through ‘latent conditions’, 
the degree of understanding regarding contributory behavioural factors has been 
more limited.    
 
This thesis rebalances the approach taken to date in the crisis management and 
patient safety literature by looking at smouldering crises from a less limited 
perspective than previously.  It does so by exploring the views of individuals at 
grassroots level within an organisation.  Adopting a qualitative research methodology 
and through purposive sampling, the research study utilises typical patient care 
scenarios in order to explore and understand the behaviour of employees in their 
workplace.  The accounts of participants’ working life are examined using narrative 
analysis and the findings are crystallised in the author’s model of professional 
workplace behaviour, the ‘Faces of Self’. 
 
The author asserts that the limitations of management perspective, knowledge and 
capabilities which are responsible for the escalation of smouldering crises can be 
ameliorated if management are sensitive to and effective in the management of the 
organisation’s climate.  In addition, effective improvement of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
‘latent conditions’ by policy makers, leaders within organisations and management 
generally will create a more effective, motivated and satisfied healthcare professional 
in the patient care setting and negate some of the conditions in which the adverse 
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Chapter 1  An Introduction to the Thesis  
 
This chapter is an introduction to my journey and the intellectual path of my 
thesis and establishes the scene for the remainder of this document.  The 
chapter will begin by stating the aims and objectives of the thesis before 
explaining my personal motivations and defining moments in my journey.  The 
business context of this work is then examined before an overview of the 
research methodology is set in place.  The chapter concludes by presenting the 
structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1 The Aim of the Thesis 
 
The overall aim of the thesis is to realise a better, more holistic understanding, 
both theoretically, and practically, of the management of smouldering crises and 
progress knowledge regarding the ‘latent conditions’ which underlie adverse 
patient safety incidents in healthcare organisations.  In so doing, this thesis will 
move the discourse concerning both the management of smouldering crises 
and patient safety in healthcare. 
 
Crisis management developed as a discipline in an era of large-scale, socio-
technological disasters such as Chernobyl, Three-Mile Island and Exxon 
Valdez.  The dominant approach in management theory has been to consider 
crises from an organisational perspective; crises were largely seen as failures of 
management systems (Smith and Toft 2005) rather than being symptomatic of 
pervasive behavioural factors.  In spite of more recent developments in the 
understanding of smouldering crisis conditions which partially address this 
limitation and causally attribute the emerging crisis to limitations in 
management’s perspective, knowledge and capabilities (Smith 2005a, 2006c 
and Smith and Toft 2005), there has been insufficient emphasis upon 
understanding the contributory behaviour of grassroots level.  Furthermore, 
whilst theory is empirically based, this has almost exclusively been founded on 
the narratives offered by those who occupy executive and senior managerial 
positions at the expense of considering employees who are closer to the crisis 
incubation point.  
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Everyday the healthcare sector effectively and safely treats almost 1m patients 
(NHS Choices 2011) and whilst errors in medicine are rare, the consequences 
of adverse patient safety incidents, which are symptomatic of a smouldering 
crisis, can be devastating (Department of Health 2000a).  In the healthcare 
sector, legislative and policy initiatives in the UK during the early part of this 
century placed patient safety high on the agenda.  Consistent with the dominant 
paradigm in crisis management theory, theoretical development has recognised 
that systemic human error underpins adverse patient safety incidents.  
However, whilst theoretical and practical progress has been made developing 
an understanding and addressing aspects of the causal route to such incidents 
through ‘latent conditions’, the degree of understanding regarding contributory 
behavioural factors has been more limited.    
 
This thesis rebalances the approach taken to date in the crisis management 
and patient safety literature by looking at smouldering crises from a less limited 
perspective than previously.  It does so by exploring the views of individuals at 
grassroots level within an organisation.  Given the emphasis on patient safety, 
the specific business environment chosen is the healthcare sector where the 
management of smouldering crises, in the context of error in medicine, has 
become a key concern.  The behaviour of individuals working in the healthcare 
sector is pivotal to understanding why, in organisations where the raison d’être 
is patient care, errors occur which are symptomatic of a smouldering crisis 
situation.  
 
1.2 Thesis Objectives 
 
In order to achieve the overall aim of this thesis, I specified the following 
objectives.  A review of the degree to which these objectives have been 
achieved is undertaken in Chapter 9. 
 
Objective 1 – To explore what is understood about organisational crises and 
how far this explains the evolution of smouldering events which incubate over 
time in the behaviours at grassroots level. 
 
An Introduction to the Thesis 
3 
 
Objective 2 – To investigate how this knowledge is translated into meaningful 
advice concerning how smouldering crises can be best managed. 
 
Objective 3 – To understand the contextual setting for this thesis as a means of 
establishing healthcare as a valid area of study of smouldering crises. 
 
Objective 4 – To explore the knowledge regarding patient safety and investigate 
the extent to which this knowledge ameliorates adverse patient safety incidents 
in healthcare. 
 
Objective 5 – To design and implement a research study in order to investigate 
and explore how and why individuals at grassroots level in healthcare behave, 
at times, in such a way that their actions lead to the errors which are indicative 
of smouldering crises. 
 
Objective 6 – To contribute to the normative debate regarding smouldering 
crises and patient safety 
 
This section has been concerned with stating the aim and objectives of the 
thesis which have provided my direction and discipline in terms of realising a 
better, more holistic understanding of smouldering crises and patient safety 
throughout the thesis journey.  The next section will explore the pivotal role 
played by my personal motivation and defining moments in the thesis in 
influencing both the statement of the aims and objectives and the movement 
towards their achievement. 
 
1.3  The Journey Towards the Thesis 
 
At the outset of my journey, even before this thesis was conceived, events were 
happening which would drive me towards the desire to better understand why 
crises occurred.  Within the journey itself, as my learning progressed and my 
knowledge and confidence grew, I would make judgements which, upon 
reflection, were defining and decisive moments in my pursuit of a contribution to 
knowledge.  This section is concerned with both. 
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1.3.1  Personal Motivations 
 
Beverley Allitt was a well loved nurse on Grantham and Kesteven’s Children’s 
Ward when she killed four of her charges and seriously injured another nine 
(Askill and Sharpe 1993, Davies 1993, Wooster 1994).  She was tried and 
convicted of the murders and is held in Rampton Secure Hospital.  However, 
the Public Inquiry into the events at Grantham and Kesteven’s Hospital, the 
Clothier Report (Department of Health 1994), also attributed responsibility for 
the deaths to failures of management and communications in the hospital 
suggesting that these contributed to creating the conditions in which Allitt could 
attempt to cause harm. 
 
At the time of the Allitt trial in the early 1990s, I was completing an 
undergraduate degree in business studies.  My final year studies included a 
module on strategy where contemporary issues were considered from a 
strategic perspective.  One such issue was crisis management.  The literature 
tended to focus on high risk technologies and was dominated by the definition 
of crises, by the environmental context for organisational crises and by 
prescriptive crisis management responses for managers.  While I found these 
dramatic, high profile cases fascinating, I was less convinced by the approach 
suggested in the literature and I was keen to understand how and why these 
incidents happened.   
 
Following the completion of my degree, I was offered the opportunity by a tutor 
to research the case of Beverley Allitt from a crisis management perspective.  
While it was clear that Allitt was ultimately responsible for the deaths and 
injuries sustained, it appeared that there were also issues in terms of how the 
organisation operated.  I became sensitised to cases in healthcare that shared 
the common characteristics of organisational crises.  Some of these were 
deliberate acts of evil committed by individuals determined to cause harm such 
as Allitt and later Harold Shipman, the Hyde GP (Department of Health 2001a).   
However, whilst I continued to reflect on events such as these, I also became 
more aware of other prominent incidents such as the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
Children’s Heart Surgery case (Department of Health 2001b) which seemed 
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symptomatic of the systemic failures at the heart of the crisis management 
literature.  What I found particularly fascinating about the events at Bristol was 
that the organisational crisis had smouldered, unacknowledged, for a period of 
time, in the daily, often unintentional, behaviour of healthcare professionals.  I 
became absorbed by the notion that in organisations where the raison d’être 
was ‘first do no harm’, humans, through no apparent evil intention, were 
committing errors that were causing injury to those in their care.   
 
Almost concurrent with the above I discovered that the Department of Health 
had undertaken a significant project aimed at examining the nature and impact 
of injuries caused by clinicians in healthcare (Department of Health 2000a).  
The Department of Health’s Organisation with a Memory (2000a) found 
evidence of serious adverse events with a potential liability for clinical 
negligence claims in excess of £2bn.  The Report called for more openness in 
dealing with adverse events and established a universal system for the 
reporting of these.  The report also recognised the role of a blame culture in 
preventing this openness and sought, over the longer term, to remedy this.   
 
This report further persuaded me of the timeliness and legitimacy of focusing on 
organisational crises in healthcare, particularly those which were incubated over 
time in the behaviours at grassroots level.  In addition, there appeared to be a 
compulsion to develop knowledge in order to better understand why crisis 
events happened and to identify ways in which their progression could be 
halted.  I wanted to be part of this by contributing to academic knowledge and 
influencing policy makers and management, generally and in the healthcare 
sector in particular. 
 
1.3.2  Defining Moments 
 
Throughout the progression of this thesis, I made many decisions; some very 
practical, others more philosophical.  The reasoning for many of these decisions 
and the ensuing decisions themselves are documented within the subsequent 
chapters of this document since they occupy a part in the journey of my thesis.   
However, I felt it also important to establish the details of judgements that I 
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made which played a more significant role in altering the course of my research 
and the development of my contribution to knowledge.  These were decisive 
and defining moments in my work which, I reflected, represented key turning 
points in the development of my thesis.  Specifically, they were concerned with 
the recognition that the incubatory period of a crisis represented what I have 
termed a ‘smouldering crisis’, the critical and contributory role played by 
management’s limited perspective, knowledge and capabilities in allowing 
crises to smoulder, the role of ‘latent conditions’ within systemic error and 
finally, the empirical limitations of a grassroots perspective. 
 
At the outset of the review of existing literature on organisational crisis, the 
identification that, whilst throughout the management literature there was an 
emphasis on large-scale, high profile crises, crisis-like incidents could smoulder 
within an organisation was a significant turning point for me as it paralleled with 
my area of interest and, most importantly, identified this interest as a legitimate 
area for further research.  Section 1.3.1 explained my personal reasons for 
embarking on this thesis and highlighted that, in medicine, there appeared to be 
distinctive types of human errors from those which were deliberate acts of evil 
committed (such as the cases of the nurse Beverley Allitt and the GP Harold 
Shipman) to some which were more representative of systemic failures.  Given 
the research I had already undertaken into the case of Beverley Allitt, my 
original thoughts were to develop crisis management knowledge by exploring 
further the motivation for such negative behaviour in an environment where the 
raison d’être was ‘first do no harm’.  However, I became sensitised to what 
appeared to be the concealed incubation of systemic management failures of 
what I later define as smouldering crises.  Notwithstanding Ackroyd and 
Thompson’s work on ‘misbehaviour’ (1999), it did not seem feasible to me that 
healthcare professionals who entered a caring profession, would be motivated 
to embark on behaviour which would adversely affect their patients.  Thus, 
these considerations led me to shift my focus to smouldering crises and, in so 
doing, review the role of motivation within my work.  As a consequence from a 
position where the motivation for behaviour was planned to be a central theme 
within the thesis, I judged that my focus would be the exploration of behaviour 
within the organisations.  What is interesting, though, is that despite considering 
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that motivation would not occupy a prominent position in my thesis, taking the 
‘world as I see it’ perspective of the healthcare professional in my approach to 
data analysis (the details of which are covered in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 and my 
construction of the ‘Faces of Self’ model), highlighted the significant 
underpinning that motivation had on the positive behaviours of individuals in the 
healthcare sector (Georgellis and Tabvuma 2010, Moody and Pesut 2006). 
 
In reviewing knowledge concerning smouldering crises, the work of several 
authors (Elliott and Smith 2007, Smith 2005a, 2006c, Smith and Toft 2005) was 
particularly useful to me as it defined the nature of management behavioural 
failures in the systemic problems that led to smouldering crisis conditions.  
Although aspects of the literature recognised ‘operator error’ as being the 
catalyst in the incubation of crisis conditions, the work of these authors levelled 
responsibility at management’s limited perspective, knowledge and capabilities 
limitations.  Furthermore, particularly within the literature concerned with 
smouldering crises, there was a movement towards improving knowledge so 
that management perceptions and interventions in these situations would be 
more effective and thus, the potential for the management failures associated 
with crisis conditions would be curbed.  So whilst knowledge regarding 
smouldering crises had led me, in the first place, to consider unintentional 
behaviour in the working environment, the recognition that operational decision 
making and response had a significant bearing on the degree to which a crisis 
smouldered focused my attention on the pressing need to improve the 
management behavioural limitations that had been observed in the literature. 
 
My attempts to better understand human error led me to seek and find further 
explanation in Reason’s work (1987, 1990, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2008).  Reason 
(1987, 1990, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2008) made a clear and critical distinction 
regarding the causal factors in error situations that management could influence 
(the ‘latent conditions’) through organisational systems and processes, 
compared to those it could not (‘the active failures’).  This was highly significant 
for me since, like the management literature on smouldering crisis, this placed 
responsibility for errors at the behest of management.  Furthermore, within the 
business context of this thesis, I also identified that despite the challenges of an 
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error prone working environment and in spite of an acknowledgement that 
complete error-free healthcare was not an aspiration, the healthcare sector in 
the UK, under the auspices of the National Patient Safety Agency, had begun to 
take action to combat human error in medicine, so-called adverse patient safety 
incidents.  This, for me, demonstrated the validity of investigating patient safety 
in healthcare and persuaded me to consider the significant influence that ‘latent 
conditions’ could have on the behaviour of an individual working within an 
organisation’s systems and processes. 
 
Within the exploration of the literature on patient safety, I found that knowledge 
concerning the nature of management behaviour underpinning systemic failures 
was less prominent, particularly in the policy driven literature as was a holistic 
understanding of the healthcare professional at work.  Furthermore, in reviewing 
existing literature I observed that, to date, empirical evidence in terms of crisis 
management was centric towards the narratives of executives and senior 
managers and theoretical development exhibited a tendency to concentrate 
‘hard’ knowledge.  This seemed to me to be incompatible with the emerging, yet 
notable, movement to look at developing knowledge of a ‘softer’ more 
behavioural nature from those who were closest to the point of crisis incubation 
(House of Commons 2009, Smith 2005a, Smith and Toft 2005).  These 
observations led me to conclude that patient safety in healthcare could be better 
managed (although probably never fully realised) if those who managed the 
organisation’s systems and processes both achieved and acted upon an 
enhanced ‘behavioural’ perspective based on the views of those who were 
closest to the error incubation point.  
 
Thus, the combination of these observations from a critical review of existing 
knowledge directed my research methodology and placed the focus of my work 
in improving management’s perspective, knowledge and capabilities in 
smouldering crisis conditions through a better understanding of the contributory 
behaviour of grassroots individuals in the working environment who were closer 
to the incubation points of systemic failures.  This is summarised in Figure 1.1 
below.         
 













Figure 1.1 The Journey of this Thesis: Key Turning Points, The Research Study 
and the Contribution to Knowledge 
 
Finally, I have outlined above how my work is placed within the limitations that I 
identified in the crisis management and patient safety literature.  This directed 
the research focus towards developing a better understanding of the behaviour 
of grassroots individuals in their daily working life in order to generate a deeper 
knowledge base from which management could better deal with crisis and 
patient safety incubating conditions.  However, in isolating the area of study as 
the grassroots individuals, I also considered whether my thesis and thus the 
associated contribution to knowledge could be positioned within the knowledge 
based of ‘identity’ literature (for example Lawler 2008, MacIntosh 2003, Pask 
2005).  Furthermore, by contextualising my study of grassroots individuals 
within the healthcare sector, I contemplated whether my work could also be 
placed with the literature concerning healthcare management (for example 
Goodwin, Reinhold Valerie 2006, Melanie and Mansour  2005, Walshe and 
Smith 2006).  I reasoned that broadening the contribution to embrace both of 
these areas would not be appropriate as this would locate aspects of my work 
outside my area of interest and may compromise the strength of the synergies I 
was identifying between crisis management and patient safety.  However, 
positioning this work in the body of knowledge concerning identity and 
healthcare management is identified in Chapter 9, Section 9.6 as an area for 
further research.  
 
The Nature of Smouldering Crisis Situations 
 
Limited Management Perspectives, Knowledge 
and Capabilities in Smouldering Situations 
The Role of ‘Latent Conditions’ in  
Systemic Error 
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This section has shown how this thesis evolved into a study concerning the 
nature of smouldering crises, seen as control-breached management failures 
(Smith 2005a, Smith and Toft 2005), and specifically the contributory role 
played by grassroots individuals.  The underlying rationale for this was a quest 
to provide deeper knowledge for academics and managers in the management 
of smouldering crises, particularly patient safety crises, for as Smith (2005a p2) 
stated ”Under the conditions of crisis, managers need to ensure that they make 
sense of what is happening to the organisation”.  The next section is concerned 
with examining the business context of this thesis. 
 
1.4  The Business Context: Healthcare in the UK and the NHS 
 
The NHS is the largest publicly funded healthcare organisation in the world and 
the main healthcare provider in the UK.  Ranking only below the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army, the Wal-Mart supermarket chain and the Indian 
Railways in terms of the number of staff it directly employs, the NHS employs 
1.7m people half of which are clinicians including 120,000 hospital doctors, 
40,000 general practitioners (GPs), 400,000 nurses and 25,000 ambulance 
staff.  These staff deal with 1m patients every 36 hours.  Launched in 1948 on a 
budget of £437m, the NHS now utilises £100bn of public money, 80% of which 
is distributed to local Primary Care Trusts (NHS Choices 2011).   
 
The NHS is controlled by the Department of Health through 10 Strategic Health 
Authorities which in turn supervise the NHS trusts in their respective areas.  
Healthcare in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is run through their own 
administrative areas.  In terms of patient care, the NHS is separated into two 
parts.  Primary care, involving GPs (General Practioners), dentists, pharmacists 
and optometrists, is where most patients go in the first instance to receive 
treatment.  However, more acute care (secondary care) although commissioned 
by the Primary Care Trust is delivered, either on a planned or emergency basis, 
by for example acute care trusts (hospitals and specialist care facilities) and 
ambulance trusts (NHS Choices 2011).   
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The NHS also controls agencies outside its main structure including the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) which is responsible 
for setting quality standards and, pertinently for this thesis, the  proposed NHS 
Commissioning Board which will embrace the National Patient Safety Agency 
whose responsibilities include the management of the National Reporting and 
Learning Service (which collects, analyses and actions patient safety 
information) and the National Clinical Assessment Service (which ensures that 
individual clinical practice is safe) (NHS Choices 2011 and Department of 
Health 2010).  
 
When Aneurin Bevan launched the NHS on July 5 1948, its foundations were 
that it should meet the needs of everyone, was free at the point of delivery and 
based on clinical need, not the ability to pay.  These foundations remain in 
place today and have been extended through the following principles to provide 
standards that, today, direct Government policy concerning the NHS.  Firstly, 
the NHS aspires to the highest standards of excellence and professionalism.  
Secondly, NHS services must reflect the needs and preferences of patients, 
their families and their carers.  Thirdly, the NHS works across organisational 
boundaries and, in partnership with other organisations, in the interest of 
patients, local communities and the wider population.  Fourthly, the NHS is 
committed to providing best value for taxpayers’ money and the most effective, 
fair and sustainable use of finite resources.  Finally, the NHS is accountable to 
the public, communities and patients it serves (NHS Choice 2011).   
 
However, governing the NHS since its inception has not been smooth and is 
characterised by successive Government’s attempts to address the perennial 
difficulties of managing funding and resources through workforce and patient 
delivery reforms (Ahmed and Cadenhead 1998, Brown, McCartney, Bell and 
Scaggs 1994, Smith 2004, The Telegraph 2011a, 2011b) and summarised in 
the following quotation from the Institute of Medicine “Healthcare today is 
characterised by more to know, more to manage, more to watch, more to do 
and more people involved” (Walsh and Antony 2007 p108). 
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In 1997 the new Labour Government promised a new future for the NHS 
advocating the creation of a hybrid strategy taking the best of previous 
initiatives.  The internal market was abolished and the future was to be based 
on partnership and performance aiming, as it did, to address financial, human 
and asset resourcing, affect devolution and establish priority standards.  
Attention for the first time focused on patient safety and amongst its core 
principles was to work continuously to improve quality services and to minimise 
errors by ensuring that all those providing care worked to make the NHS a safe 
place.  The culture would be supportive and engender learning from mistakes 
(despite the Finlayson (2002) and West’s (2006) observations that a culture of 
blame remained intact in healthcare generally and the NHS in particular).  In 
addition, the NHS vowed to support and value staff by amongst other things 
recognising that professionals would exercise their judgement (NHS Choices 
2005).  The Improving Working Lives initiative aimed to provide a better 
workplace for NHS staff as workplace research suggested that the erosion of 
autonomy, rigidity of hierarchy and organisational confusion were amongst the 
causes of stress (Department of Health 2000b).  In addition Creating a Patient-
Led NHS (Department of Health 2005a, p24) advocated staff having more 
authority and autonomy in order to “reduce professional divides and 
bureaucractic systems and inflexible processes”.  The current Government in its 
White Paper, Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS (Department of Health 
2010) has vowed to put patients first through better choice and consultation, 
outcomes rather than process based accountability and improved safety and 
patient experience.  Furthermore, the Government plans to decentralise 
commissioning decision making and budgetary management to local level and, 
effecting a 45% reduction in management costs, will redirect this money to 
frontline services.  It is clear, thus, that healthcare in the UK, and the NHS in 
particular, has publicly placed patient safety high on the agenda.  The literature 
review in Chapter 3 will explore the knowledge base supporting this direction 
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1.5  Methodological Overview 
 
I have explained that the contribution of this thesis would complement the 
normative theoretical corpus by taking a more holistic and inclusive approach to 
understanding what happened in smouldering crisis situations and why, and 
contribute to the debate regarding patient safety and, in so doing, enhance 
management knowledge in the prevention of management failures that led to 
patient safety smouldering crises in healthcare.   
 
Thus, in order to examine the gap in the knowledge concerning the 
management of smouldering organisational crises and patient safety, the 
research methodology focused on investigating and exploring the behaviour in 
the workplace of those at grassroots level in healthcare where there was the 
potential to cause a smouldering crisis through human error.  Accordingly, the 
specific questions for the research study associated with this thesis were 
identified as being 
 
1. What influences grassroots healthcare professionals in the work setting? 
 
2. How does this affect how they behave in their job roles? 
 
3. What effect does the behaviour of grassroots individuals have on their 
peers?   
 
4. What effect does the behaviour of grassroots healthcare professionals 
have on patient care and how might this behaviour in the workplace lead 
to patient safety errors which are symptomatic of smouldering crises? 
 
The research strategy centred on taking the structural phenomological 
approach of the critical theorist.  I identified with the critical theorist philosophy 
and saw particular validity in an approach which explored contemporary 
pervading routines and their relative impact on the behaviours of the 
“disempowered” in organisational settings.  In line with perceived limitations in 
the behavioural perspective of both the management of smouldering crises and 
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patient safety knowledge, the research adopted a qualitative approach 
considering several strategies before adapting the principles of critical incident 
technique to working life scenarios since this was considered to be most 
appropriate to the investigation.  In determining the working life scenarios, I 
chose to take a patient oriented approach since this was highly influential in 
defining the work of healthcare professionals.  Two scenarios were identified, 
one based on an acute patient care need and one based on a routine patient 
care need, and the research questions were sensitised to the perceived 
limitations in existing knowledge regarding smouldering crises and patient 
safety.   
 
Several research methods were considered but discounted for both reasons of 
relevance and practicality before I decided to collect the data by conducting a 
series of interviews using a semi-structured topic guide which was based on the 
working life scenarios.  A purposeful approach to sample selection was taken 
with participants being selected due to their ability to provide information that 
was important to the research that could not be provided by others and resulted 
in completed interviews with 20 participants, 2 of which were conducted on a 
one-to-one basis and 9 of which were conducted on a paired basis.    
 
A narrative approach was taken to the analysis and I developed the final 
analytical framework through a series of 5 stages involving the development of 
descriptive and interpretative coding which is shown below in Figure 1.1.   
 




Figure 1.2 Sequential and Evolving Narrative Approach to Analysis 
 
1.6  The Structure of the Thesis 
 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 detail the literature-
based context of the thesis and associated research.  With data from the 
empirical study being presented in Chapters 5 and 6 and the theoretical 
arguments following in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the theoretical context of organisational crisis which this 
thesis develops and charts my analytical journey through the management 
literature on organisational crises.  Specifically, I undertake a critical review of 
the literature’s approach to the definitions of organisational crises and crisis 
types in order to arrive at a definition of organisational crises for this thesis, the 
smouldering crisis.  The chapter continues by exploring the suggested root 
causes of crises, focusing on human error since this is seen as a dominant 
cause of systemic smouldering crises and is central to this thesis.   An 
assessment is then undertaken concerning how the literature suggests that 
organisational crises should be managed, focusing on specific aspects which 
were felt, by me, to be pertinent to smouldering crises and thus, this thesis.  
Stage 1 




• Hand Coding 
Stage 4  
• Descriptive Coding 
Stage 5 
• Interpretative Coding (Version 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
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Finally, I conclude by exposing the limitations of existing literature and 
identifying the focus of the empirical research of this study. 
 
Chapter 3 explores the patient safety context of this thesis.  Patient safety was 
defined by Vincent (2006) as “the avoidance, prevention and amelioration of 
adverse outcomes or injuries stemming from the process of healthcare” (p14).  
The chapter focuses on reviewing the subject of human error in healthcare from 
an applied literature perspective before proceeding to explore patient safety 
within the healthcare context.  Whilst the chapter demonstrates the complexity 
of the subject, the seriousness with which the healthcare sector views human 
error in medicine and the associated intent of healthcare organisations to 
understand and learn from error incidents, I conclude that there are areas of 
limitations which provide additional direction to the empirical research of this 
study. 
 
Chapter 4 details the methodological approach taken in this thesis within the 
context of my critical theorist’s philosophy.  Whilst the relative merits of 
quantitative and qualitative data collection methods are considered within the 
context of the aims of the thesis, the chapter provides an account of the 
qualitative research choices made and the methods used to collect and analyse 
the data for this thesis.  Throughout the chapter specific attention is given to the 
cohesive development of the empirical research and how the challenges of 
conducting research in the healthcare sector were managed. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 present the empirical data which resulted from the qualitative 
research within a framework of emerging themes.  In undertaking the final stage 
of the research analysis, common themes in which participants expressed their 
working life were observed.  Within these themes, participants were expressing 
their working life from two perspectives.  The first perspective, presented in 
Chapter 5, concerned participants’ observations regarding aspects of their 
working life which were shaped by management and the organisation and 
influenced how they felt and behaved at work.  The second perspective, 
presented in Chapter 6, concerned participants’ views about themselves and 
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their peers and the ways in which these influenced how they felt and behaved in 
the work environment.   
 
It was my view that the data in Chapters 5 and 6 were building blocks in 
developing this understanding but it was vital to centre the data around the 
dynamics of a healthcare professional in order to create a stronger insight into 
the individual and their behaviours in the workplace.  This evaluation is 
presented in Chapter 7.  Chapter 7 presents my perspective on the healthcare 
professional, their motivation and behaviour as the three ‘Faces of Self’; The 
‘Duty Self’, The ‘Professional Self’ and ‘The Collegiate Self’.    
 
In Chapter 8, the interrelationships between the ‘Faces’ are explored as a 
means of creating a more complete understanding of the healthcare 
professional.  Whilst strong undertones of an orientation for patients are 
exposed as a source of strength in the interrelationships, working conditions are 
identified as a weakening factor.  The nature of these inhibiting working 
conditions is explored through the literature on organisational climate.  The  
chapter proposes the contributory value of the thesis in terms of patient safety 
and the management of smouldering crisis situations.  In the first case, I assert 
that improvements in the organisation’s climate will address weaknesses in the 
fulfilment of the ‘Faces of Self’ that lead to adverse patient safety incidents.  In 
the second case, I also assert that it is necessary for the normative theoretical 
corpus on organisational crises to embrace the knowledge that is found within 
the discourse on organisational climate if the limitations in management’s 
perspective, knowledge and capabilities are to be addressed thereby curbing 
the potential for smouldering crises. 
 
In conclusion, at Chapter 9, I reflect on the progression of the thesis before 
proposing the contribution to knowledge in the areas of smouldering crises and 
patient safety.  In addition, I consider the practical implications for managers, 
reflect on the achievement of the research objectives, elaborate further on the 
limitations of the study, identify areas for further research and conclude with 
some brief personal reflections. 
 





This chapter has set the scene for the thesis by stating the aims and objectives 
of the thesis before explaining my personal motivations and defining moments 
in my journey.  The chapter also examines the business context of this work  
before presenting an overview of the research methodology and the structure 
for the remainder of this document. 
 
The next chapter will present my analytical journey through existing literature 














Chapter 2  A Review of Existing Literature on Organisational Crises 
 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the theoretical context of 
organisational crises which this thesis develops.  The aim of this thesis is to 
advance the understanding of the management of smouldering crises, 
particularly those concerning patient safety within a healthcare organisation.  In 
order to do this, it was necessary at the outset to explore previous literature on 
crisis management where the emphasis was on organisational crises.  Chapter 
3 which follows will examine the existing literature on patient safety. 
 
This chapter presents the author’s analytical journey through the crisis 
management literature.  In Section 2.1 a critical review of the literature’s 
approach to the definitions of organisational crises is provided.  However, the 
characteristics of crises were felt by the author to be only part of what defines 
an organisational crisis.  The definition of a crisis was also contextually based 
on specific types of crisis.  Hence it was felt by the author that a definition of 
organisational crisis for this thesis could not be properly proposed until the 
literature concerning the taxonomies of crises had also been explored.   
Therefore, Section 2.2 examines the taxonomies of organisational crises offered 
by the literature and concludes with a definition of organisational crises for this 
thesis, the smouldering crisis.  Section 2.3 considers the notion of smouldering 
crisis which is central to both the perspective and research context of this study 
whilst section 2.4 explores the suggested root causes of crises, focusing on 
human error since this is seen as a dominant cause of systemic crises.  Finally, 
Section 2.5 assesses how the literature suggests that organisational crises, 
particularly those of a smouldering nature, should be managed.  
 
The conclusions drawn from the author’s review of the literature were that the 
origins of existing theory were to be found in high profile, large-scale crises, 
viewed from an organisational perspective where organisational crises were felt 
to be human failures within management systems and solutions were often 
technically based (Smith and Toft 2005).  The author perceived that this 
perspective had several limitations.  Firstly, the emphasis on the high profile 
culmination of crisis conditions neglected rising concern in the literature 




regarding the evolutionary pathway of a crisis and the significant causative 
behaviour of managers therein (for example Smith 2005a).  Secondly, whilst the 
dominant cause of organisational crises was recognised as systemic error, the 
focus on addressing the causal route through improved management systems 
diverted attention away from developing the understanding of the associated 
contributory behaviour of those at grassroots level.  Finally, the empirical base 
for the development of theory was founded on the narratives of executives and 
senior managers at the expense of taking a more holistic approach by 
additionally considering the views of employees who were closer to the crisis 
incubation point.  These identified limitations are where the author places her 
work, specifically the research study association with this thesis and the 
contribution to knowledge. 
  
2.1 Defining Organisational Crises 
 
As explained in Chapter 1, this thesis is concerned solely with organisational 
crises so it was necessary, at the outset, to critically explore the literature in 
order to arrive at a definition of organisational crises for this thesis.  However, 
this proved to be problematical for researchers (for example Jacques 2010, 
Keown-McMullan 1997, Pearson and Clair 1998, Roux Duxfort and Metais 
1999,) and a major dilemma for the author for a number of reasons.  In the first 
instance, incidents that severely challenge organisations are of interest to a 
diversity of fields including psychology, sociology, political science, economics 
and management research.  Pauchant and Douville asserted in their 
multidisciplinary review of crises (1992) that this resulted in definitions of crises 
which were diverse and biased towards particular fields of study, a view with 
which others (for example, Smith 1990, 2006b) concurred.  Whilst the author 
acknowledges the influence that work in these fields has had in the 
management literature on crises, the review of literature for this thesis 
concentrates on exploring crisis management from the perspective of the 
management literature.  In the second instance, in reviewing the management 
literature it was apparent that incidents which severely challenged organisations 
were labelled in a variety of ways, predominantly disasters and crises.  Whilst 
there were some similarities in the inherent characteristics of these incidents, 




for example the resultant high human impact, there were also areas where they 
were distinctly different, for example whether the incident was caused by nature 
or man.  So the term disasters appeared to be bestowed upon natural incidents, 
whereas the term crisis was generally applied to outcomes that were caused by 
humans.  Therefore, given the emphasis within the thesis on human behaviour 
and error, the author reasoned that the literature review would concentrate on 
examining the definition of man-made organisational crises in the management 
literature. 
 
Shrivastava (1993) in his paper examining crisis management theory and 
practice advocated that the term crisis should be applied to “disruptive 
situations … where human choice could make a fundamental difference to the 
future” (p24), a view with which Fink (2002) and Roux-Dufort and Metais (1999) 
sympathised.  Calloway and Keen (1996) and Keown-McMullan (1997) 
concurred in recognising the transformational nature of a crisis as a turning 
point in organisations.  Pearson and Misra (1997) developed this argument in 
their consideration of the distinctions between everyday business problems 
which could be disruptive and transformational organisational crises.  An 
organisation was experiencing a crisis, they suggested, when its capabilities 
were ‘hyper-extended’ and crucial yet novel decisions and actions were being 
instigated. 
 
In examining the literature concerning how a crisis should be more explicitly 
defined, the author identified that the discussion had a tendency to centre on 
identifying the more detailed characteristics of an organisational crisis.  The 
author found that these characteristics could be organised into five main areas.  
Firstly, there was a general consensus in the literature that organisational crises 
were systemic situations which affected a number of aspects of an organisation 
and its environment.  Secondly, the resultant impact caused major damage to 
the financial and physical resources of an organisation and had the potential to 
destroy an organisation’s reputation and image.  Thirdly, crises occurred 
unexpectedly and whilst not containable, required a rapid organisational 
response.  Fourthly, an organisation’s stakeholders experienced physical and 
mental harm as a result of a crisis.  Finally, crises forced individuals within and 




beyond an organisation to question their basic beliefs.  The remainder of this 
section will examine each of these aspects in turn. 
 
In the first instance, there was widespread agreement in the literature that 
crises originated in the organisation’s systems, that is the processes of its 
operations, and thus were systemic in nature (Mitroff and Harrington 1996, 
Mostafa et al 2004, Pauchant and Douville 1992, Shrivastava et al 1988, Smith 
1990, 1999, 2004, Turner 1994, Udwadia and Mitroff 1991).  Hickman and 
Crandall (1997) expanded on this, proposing a link with systems theory and 
suggesting that “the effectiveness of the organisation, or total system, is only as 
strong as its weakest link” (p 75).  Mitroff and Anagnos (2001) broadly 
supported the systemic view and advocated that crises were unlikely to occur 
when a single element of a complex system fails but were representative of 
failures across the system.  Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) concurred, proposing 
that it was a failure of the whole system that was characteristic of an 
organisation in crisis, a view echoed by Shaluf et al (2003). 
 
In the second instance, there was a consensus that an organisational crisis 
resulted in major damage to the financial and physical resources of the 
organisation (Fink et al 1971, Kouzmin 2008, Mitroff et al 1996, Mostafa et al 
2004,).  Udwadia and Mitroff’s (1991) research conducted across 60 different 
organisations emphasised that the impacts of a crisis would be felt, both in the 
short and long term, as the tangible and intangible effects evolved.  Although 
the author would argue that the research of Shrivastava et al (1988) lacked 
clarity in establishing the boundaries between natural and man-made crises, the 
finer specification of the effects of crises that they develop particularly in terms 
of the financial and physical impacts was notable.  The study of 1,000 
corporations by Mitroff et al (1988) suggested that the widespread damage 
caused by a crisis had the capacity to endanger the viability of the organisation 
on two fronts; firstly, the severity of the financial impacts and, secondly, 
reputational damage.  Keown-McMullan (1997) and Pearson and Clair (1998) in 
their reviews of the literature and Roux-Dufort and Metais (1999) and 
Shrivastava (1993) concurred proposing crises to be threatening for the 
organisation.  Barton (1993) summarised the scope of crisis damage stating 




that “the event and its aftermath may significantly damage an organisation and 
its employees, products, services, financial condition and reputation.” (p2).  
 
In the third instance, aspects of the literature (Kouzmin 2008, Mitroff et al 1988, 
Mostafa et al 2004, Pearson and Misra 1997, Roux Dufort and Metias 1999) 
emphasised how the unexpected nature of crises required organisations to 
effect an urgent response.  The notion of unexpectedness and surprise was 
linked by some research to the fact that crises were infrequent events of low 
probability (Barton 1993, Keown-McMullan 1997, Heath 1998, Pearson and 
Clair 1998) that could not be detected during the organisation’s conventional 
operations (Udwadia and Mitroff 1991).  There was widespread agreement with 
this (Hwang and Lichtenthal 2000, James and Wootten 2005, Laws and 
Prideaux 2006, Parsons 1996).  Shrivastava et al (1988) proposed that the 
suddenness of crises resulted in responses that were made at a time of severe 
pressure.  According to Heath (1998) this created an intuitive pressure for 
immediate and urgent decision making and action so that order and control 
could be restored in the organisation and damage contained.  Keown-McMullan 
(1997) agreed, considering that the ensuing need to take prompt action came 
out of a desire to contain what was happening.  Heath (1998) emphasised the 
resulting shift in behaviours stating that in a crisis “people need to quickly shift 
from normal thinking and behaviours to non-normal approaches to dealing with 
a threatening situation” (p. 5).  Mostafa et al (2004) concurred with this view 
stating that the urgency of crisis situations reduced the decision time and 
stimulated a prompt response.  Udwadia and Mitroff’s (1991) study elucidated 
further, advocating that this was a result of the extremely condensed time span 
of a crisis.  However, Smith (1990, 2005a), in citing research suggesting the 
inevitability of crises (for example Perrow 1984, Turner 1976, 1978, 1994), 
disputed the notion of surprise, believing crises to be inherent in organisations, 
unavoidable and thus to be expected.  This is a view with which the author of 
this thesis concurs since the notion that inherent systemic problems go 
unnoticed until a crisis occurs contradicts aspects of the literature concerning 
crisis taxonomies.  This is something that the author will return to in Section 2.2.   
 




In the fourth instance, several authors (Pauchant and Mitroff 1992, Pearson and 
Misra 1997, Shrivastava et al 1988) suggested that crises caused physical and 
mental harm to stakeholder groups.  Heath (1998) and Perrow (1984) 
developed the argument for considering stakeholders in the widest sense, 
emphasising that crises affected a multiplicity of stakeholders, some more 
directly than others, a view with which Shrivastava (1987) concurred stating that 
“the most profoundly affected stakeholders – and ironically sometimes the most 
easily forgotten because of their powerlessness – are the victims (of crises).  
These include workers .. consumers .. residents of communities .. even remote 
observers” (p 23).   
 
In the fifth instance, and according to Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), crises could 
cause individual trauma at a deeply psychological level simply because they 
were completely outside human perceptions.  This, they advocated, shattered 
an individual’s basic assumptions of life and were thus, according to Turner 
(1978), threatening.  However, Pearson and Clair (1998) were critical of the 
management literature’s limited perspective concerning the effects of crises on 
individuals.  The impact of crises on individuals is an important issue for this 
thesis.  However, within the context of the thesis the emphasis will be on the 
effects of human error in healthcare.  Whilst the author is sensitive to the impact 
human error can have on those who sustain injury, the focus will be on those 
who initiate or potentially initiate the errors through their workplace behaviours.    
 
In summary, there was a consensus in the management literature that 
organisational crises were systemically originated transformational events which 
resulted in major damage to an organisation’s resources, reputation and 
stakeholders.  However, there was some discussion in the literature regarding 
the unexpectedness of crises and the extent of the systemic weaknesses that 
they exposed.  The author felt that the view that crises occurred due to the 
cumulative impact of several weaknesses in the organisation’s systems seemed 
more consistent with the literature regarding the resource and reputational 
impacts of crises.  Furthermore, the author felt that this supported the 
commentary of several writers (Perrow 1984, Smith 1990, 2005a, 2006c, Turner 
1976, 1978 and 1994,) that crises were not sudden events that happened 




without warning but could also be evolving in inherent systemic problems which 
passed unnoticed in organisations.   These points are explored further by the 
author in the following section concerning the taxonomies of crises.  
 
2.2 Taxonomies of Organisational Crises 
 
The previous section was concerned with exploring the characteristics of 
organisational crises.  This was, however, felt by the author to be an incomplete 
picture in terms of the definition of crises without consideration of types of 
crises.  Although it was recognised that crises could be natural or man-made 
(Quarantelli 1988), the literature concerning crisis typologies suffered the same 
lack of consensus problematic as that identified at the outset of the definition 
section above.  As reasoned at the outset of Section 2.1 above, this thesis is 
concerned with organisational crises, therefore, it was felt necessary to restrict 
the exploration of types of organisational crises to those which were man-made 
as opposed to those which were natural. 
 
Pauchant and Douville’s review of crisis management literature (1992) utilised 
in excess of 30 different search terms in order to identify what the literature 
recognised as being types of crises.  Whilst the author of this thesis recognised 
the limited contribution this methodology had as a means of classifying crises, it 
illustrated the challenges faced by management researchers in coming to a 
consensus regarding a taxonomy of crises.  This was a view which was 
acknowledged by Shaluf et al (2003) in their review of the management 
literature and was evidenced in the diverse and idiosyncractic crisis cases (for 
example financial crises, hostile takeovers, industrial accidents, product defect 
crises, transport incidents) that were identified by some authors (Hwang and 
Lichtenthal 2000, James and Wootten 2005, Loosemore 1998, Mitroff 1988, 
Mitroff et al 1988, Mitroff and Harrington 1996, Richardson 1995, Roux Dufort 
2000, Shrivastava et al 1988, Smith 1990, 1999, Watkins and Bazerman 2003). 
 
Lerbinger’s approach (1997) was to identify, through case analysis, a range of 
seven different types of crises.  Whilst there was recognition of natural disasters 
within this classification, the remaining categories focused on technological and 




management failures.  Mitroff et al (2003), and later Mitroff (2004a, 2004b), took 
a similar case based approach but classified their repertoire of crises since 
1979 according to whether they were natural disasters or normal or abnormal 
accidents.  Mitroff (2004a, 2004b) supported earlier arguments from writers 
such as Mitroff and Harrington (1996), Pauchant and Douville (1992), 
Shrivastava et al (1988), Smith (1990 and 1999), Turner (1994) and Udwadia 
and Mitroff (1991) that a growing number of normal accidents occurred as a 
result of dysfunctionality within an organisation’s systems or were abnormal 
accidents arising out of evil human acts.  This was an influential observation for 
the author.  Whilst the origins of this thesis could be construed as being 
domiciled in the acts of Beverley Allitt, what interested the author were the 
individual behaviours underlying what Mitroff identified as ‘normal accidents’. 
 
The approach of Shrivastava et al (1988), which was also based on case study 
observations, was to tightly define organisational crises within the context of 
industrial accidents and classify them according to their respective triggers.  
Shrivastva et al (1988) readily acknowledged the limitation of this approach, 
however, the foundations of their work, and that of Mitroff et al (1988), was 
apparent in later work developed by others (Mitroff 1988, Pauchant and Mitroff 
1992). 
 
Mitroff (1988) and later Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) focused on improving the 
understanding of distinctive types of organisational crises by proposing an 
empirically-led, two-way classification based on their research inventory of 
organisational crises.   This taxonomy, which was recognised by others (for 
example Jacques 2009 and Keown McMullan 1997), focused on classifying 
crises based on their underlying causes and the relative extent of their impact.  
The proposition was that on one dimension, organisational crises were either 
caused by ‘impersonal’ technical or economic factors or by more human 
oriented factors (Section 2.4 will explore further the events that trigger crises).   
Whereas on the other dimension, the impact of the crisis might be relatively 
slight and handled within the organisation’s daily routines and systems or 
severe and “outside of the range of normal, rational human behaviour” (Mitroff 
1988, p17).   This work held similarities with Perrow’s classification of 




organisational crises (1984).  Although this taxonomy has been empirically 
developed over time and was acknowledged in the work of others, the author of 
this thesis felt that in recognising the scalar impact of crises, there was an 
apparent inconsistency with the work of others (Lerbinger 1997, Mitroff et al 
2003, Mitroff 2004a, 2004b) and the characterisation of organisational crises 
outlined in Section 2.1 above since this model recognised that a crisis was not 
solely a high impact, sudden climax of problems within the organisation’s 
systems.  According to this model, crises could also be recognised as more 
common, yet significant, occurrences.  There was a particular significance for 
the author in this finding.  As previously stated in Section 2.1, and contrary to 
the dominant characteristics of organisational crises, Perrow (1984), Smith 
(1990, 2005b, 2006b) promoted the view, pioneered by Turner (1976,1978 and 
1994), that crises could also evolve, unnoticed in systemic problems within the 
organisation.  The author believed that the identification of common, yet 
significant occurrences as crises in Mitroff’s taxonomy, added credence and 
validity to the argument that an organisation could be experiencing a crisis 
during this evolutionary period. 
 
Shrivastava (1987) in his empirical study of the Bhopal Union Carbide case 
developed the notion that relatively minor yet significant occurrences were 
representative of organisational crises.  Synonymous with the philosophies of 
Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), Perrow (1984), Smith (1990, 2005a, 2006c) Turner 
(1976, 1978 and 1994), his paradigm was based on the potential amplification 
of unnoticed yet inherent systemic incidents.  Whilst some authors (Pearson 
and Misra 1997) were resolute that organisational crises could only be large-
scale, high impact events, the author of this thesis identified a consensus in the 
literature to the notion of amplified incidents although authors utilise a number 
of terms for describing them; Quarantelli (1998) identified these as post-
accidental crises; Parsons (1996) categorised them as emerging crises, Heath 
(1998) labelled them rippling crises, Hwag and Lichtenthal (2000) recognised 
them as cumulative crises, James and Wootten (2005) saw them as 
smouldering crises and Kouzmin (2008) classified them as creeping crises.  As 
discussed previously, Smith (1990, 2005a, 2006b) recognised the significance 




of emerging crises and was steadfast in his opinion that even emerging crises 
had the capacity to threaten the existence of the organisation (1999).   
 
The literature’s empirical evidence that an organisation could be experiencing a 
crisis as systemic problems smouldered was highly significant for the author of 
this thesis for a number of reasons.  In the first instance, these incidents were 
reminiscent of the types of adverse events that were identified in Chapter 1by 
the author as an area of interest.  In the second instance,  and consistent with 
the discussion so far in Chapter 2, the characteristics of crises explored in 
Section 2.1 above could be applied to the healthcare setting in terms of 
systemic failure and wide ranging human, financial and reputational damage.  
More specifically, in organisations where the raison d’être was ‘first do no harm’, 
the fact that humans, through no apparent evil intention, were committing errors 
that were causing injury to patients in their care was unexpected and had the 
potential to shatter basic beliefs.  In the third instance, the literature (Mitroff 
2004a, 2004b) suggested a dominance of human-caused crises which had the 
potential to be contained (James and Wootten 2005). This had a particular 
resonance for the author, since it implied that there was a legitimacy in 
exploring the management of evolving crises further.     
 
As outlined at the outset of this chapter, the author’s initial intentions regarding 
the review of literature was to establish a definition of crises for this thesis.  
Accordingly, having explored the management literature concerning the 
characteristics and taxonomies of crises the author concludes that, within the 
context of this thesis, an organisational crisis is defined as a high impact 
occurrence with systemic origins which evolves over time and causes 
unexpected damage to the resources, reputation and stakeholders of an 
organisation.  Henceforth this will be referred to as a smouldering crisis by the 
author of this thesis.   
 
2.3  The Case of the Smouldering Crisis 
 
The study of smouldering crises is central to this thesis’ aim to develop the 
understanding of the management of organisational crises.  Thus, the author 




felt it was important to investigate and explore further literature concerning the 
nature and behaviour of crises as they evolved and their relative importance 
within the area of crisis management.  This section will explore each area of 
these aspects in turn, providing case examples from the literature to support the 
discussion. 
 
Smith (2005a, 2006b) explored the anatomy of crisis situations within the 
context of the organisational state advocating that generic complexity within 
organisations challenged management’s capacity to maintain order and control 
and precipitated a chaotic and unstable environment which was reminiscent of 
incubatory crisis conditions.  In short, crises smouldered, according to Smith, 
when problems that emerged within the organisation’s systems were allowed by 
management, for a number of reasons, to progress unchecked.   In so doing, 
Smith (2005a, 2006b) elaborated on the systemic origins of organisational crisis 
identified in the work of other writers (for example Hickman and Crandall 1997, 
Mitroff and Anagnos 2001, Mitroff and Harrington 1996, Mostafa et al 2004, 
Pauchant and Douville 1992, Pauchant and Mitroff 1992 Shrivastava et al 1988, 
Smith 1990, 1999, Turner 1994, Udwadia and Mitroff) by highlighting the 
contributory role of management failures during the evolution stage. 
 
Smith’s (2005a) forensic review of an evolving crisis was helpful to the author in 
specifically highlighting several points within the lifecycle of the smouldering 
crisis at which problems escalated and, drawing on Handy’s (2002) terminology 
regarding transformational moments, he designated them ‘points of inflection’.  
Smith (2005a) stressed the critical role played by operational management (as 
opposed to strategic management or crisis management teams) at these ‘points 
of inflection’ in shaping the destiny of a crisis as it developed since each 
successive inflection represented a moment when the nature of operational 
decision making and response had a significant bearing on whether the crisis 
was arrested or worsened (Smith 2005b, 2006c).  The author feels that it would 
be helpful to the reader at this point to clarify what is referred to, throughout this 
thesis, as management.  Aspects of this work refer to management and 
managers in a generic way, making little distinction between managers in 
different levels of an organisation’s hierarchy.  This is because these aspects 




could be applied to management of all levels.    However, there are points at 
which the nature of the discussion indicates a specific level of management, for 
example strategic management.  When the term operational management is 
utilised, the author is referring to middle management,  that is management 
which is concerned with the day to day control of the organisation’s systems 
and processes.  As the reader will see in Chapter 9, the contribution to 
knowledge and the management implications of this thesis have a pertinence to 
managers at all levels of an organisation. 
  
Broadly speaking, where problems were anticipated by the organisation and 
were the subject of pre-planned contingency responses, management were, 
according to Smith (2005a), able to make informed decisions and effect 
appropriate task responses.  The result was that the problem was dealt with, 
management fulfilled their responsibilities in effecting organisational control and 
the crisis was arrested.   Whilst Pearson and Clair (1998) and Smith (1999) 
suggested that the evolving nature of smouldering crises led to ambiguity in 
identifying their root causes and impacts and, as a consequence, made 
resolution difficult, Smith (2005a) argued that early ‘points of inflection’ 
presented grassroots managers with the greatest opportunity to curtail a crisis 
since they were closer to the point of origin, a view with which James and 
Wootten (2005) concurred maintaining that emerging crises developing over 
time presented the organisations and particularly the managers within them with 
the best chance for containment and the restoration of control.  This was an 
interesting argument for the author of this thesis as it indicated that there was 
validity in pursuing the perspective taken of developing the understanding of 
crisis management by studying the conditions in which crises smouldered. 
 
However, according to Smith (2005a) and Smith and Toft (2005), unanticipated 
problems within the organisation’s systems and some actions of management in 
expected problem situations held the capacity to worsen what was being 
experience within the organisation and elevated the situation beyond a ‘point of 
inflection’.   Smith and Toft’s view (2005), shared by Smith (2006c), was that the 
emergence of systemic problems and the success of management’s response 
were dependent upon several factors, some of which were focused on the issue 




of management knowledge and information within the organisation (a view 
shared by Smith 2006b), whilst others were related to the efficacy of the 
organisation’s management and defensive systems.  What follows is a review of 
these factors, aspects of which Smith (2005a, 2005b) and Smith and Toft 
(2005) identified as being areas for further research.  However, inevitably the 
discussions herein have a resonance with key aspects of the review of literature 
which appear later in this chapter.  Some features of the discussion are, thus, 
truncated and appropriate signage is given in the narrative as to where the 
discussion is more fully developed.  It is hoped that this facilitates a more clear, 
logical and cohesive discussion for the reader both here, regarding smouldering 
crises, and throughout the remainder of the chapter.   
 
In the first instance, Smith (2005a), as did Fischbacher-Smith and Calman 
(2010), challenged the rational view of management literature (Augustine 1995, 
Hickman and Crandall 1997, Mitroff and Harrington 1996, Mitroff et al 1988, 
Pauchant and Mitroff 1992, Pearson and Misra 1997, Pearson and Rondinelli 
1997) that managers would have, at their disposal, a complete portfolio of pre-
planned responses to pre-identified problems which they could effect in order to 
restore order and control within the organisation and, thus, avert any 
smouldering crisis.  The basis of his challenge was two-fold.  Firstly, Smith 
(2005a) argued that the presence of ‘bounded rationality’ (Pauchant and Mitroff 
1992) would restrict management’s perceptions of problem potential and 
therefore influence what would and would not be part of a perceived crisis 
portfolio.  The consequence of this was that management encountered 
problems which were not only unexpected but for which they had limited 
knowledge and resources to deal with effectively.  Secondly, Smith and Toft 
(2005), as did Calman and Smith (2001), Fischbacher-Smith and Calman 
(2010) and Fischbacher-Smith et al (2010), broadened the above discussion 
stating that, being based on existing management knowledge and under the 
premiss of the precautionary principle, the management of risk and control 
within organisations was incomplete since the challenge of garnering complete 
knowledge concerning every potential management process and system’s 
problem was difficult to realise.  Moreover, it was proposed in aspects of the 
literature (Fischbacher-Smith and Calman 2010, Fischbacher-Smith et al 2010, 




Smith 2006a, Smith and Fischbacher 2009 and Smith and Toft 2005), that, as a 
result of this and despite prevailing and historical risk assessment measures, 
the management of risk and control was socially constructed and therefore 
lacked objectivity.  Yet Fischbacher-Smith and Calman (2010), recognised the 
merits of taking this approach stating that “By being more precautionary in the 
ways that we ‘manage’, we may go some way towards preventing future crises” 
(p209).  Turner (1976, 1978) saw the implications of imperfect management 
knowledge as being the inherent difficulties that managers would have in 
attempting to deal with crises in this incubatory stage when unforeseen 
problems evolved, to a large extent, unobserved, because they were not 
sensitised to them.  The limitations regarding perspective, knowledge and 
capabilities of management are also covered in the discussions regarding early 
warning systems, management denial and ‘sensemaking’ (Weick 1988) which 
can be found in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2. 
 
In the second instance, and crucially according to Calman and Smith (2001) 
and Fischbacher-Smith and Calman (2010), these knowledge and information 
difficulties resulted in a chasm between the organisation’s processes and the 
smouldering crisis conditions that created in-built yet concealed weaknesses in 
which problems festered.  Smith (2005a, 2006c), as did Smith and Fischbacher 
(2009), furthered the notion that despite some organisations and the managers 
within them creating crisis portfolio driven defences in their systems, these 
defences were vulnerable and could be breached as a smouldering crisis 
situation emerged.  Referring to Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese Model’ (1987, 1997, 
1998, 2000a, 2008), Smith attributed this to a combination of factors; gaps in 
defences, assumptions that defences, which had not been tested, were 
effective when in fact they were not and the promulgation of new defences over 
time which could impair the efficacy of existing defences.  Reason and Smith’s 
work regarding these crisis inducing ‘latent conditions’ is covered in more detail 
within the context of the review of human error as a causal factor in crises in 
Section 2.4 but was identified by Smith (2005a) as an area which was in need 
of further research.  
 




In the third instance, the notion of management being able to avert not only 
smouldering crisis conditions but crises per se by adopting a probability-based 
approach to controlling expected problems through robust defences placated 
management into perceiving that all was in order according to Smith (2005a, 
2005b).  However, this perception of control and order was severely 
compromised when, inevitably, the unexpected occurred and managers were 
unable to make sense of what was happening leading to an escalation of 
events.  Weick’s concept of ‘sensemaking’ (1988), in which unexpected and 
problematic situations were exacerbated because of management’s response, 
is covered in more detail in Section 2.5.2.   
 
In the fourth instance, Smith (2005a) recognised the critical role that the 
dissemination of early problem warning information played in either averting or 
exacerbating a propagating crisis and attributed the efficacy or otherwise of the 
dissemination process to the proximity of critical players; the closer the 
informational relationship, the greater the chance for knowledge, formal or 
informal, to flow throughout the organisation and aid managers in arresting 
ensuing problems, a more remote informational relationship resulted in a 
converse situation.  Within the context of the comments regarding management 
control outlined above, the author recognised that the power hierarchies which 
were an element of control structures within organisations also presented 
challenges in terms of the proximity of informational relationships, particularly 
those between grassroots individuals and operational and senior management.  
This area was identified as being in need of further research by Smith (2005a, 
2005b) and Smith and Toft (2005) and the research study associated with this 
thesis has liberated the views of grassroots individuals in order to address 
identified informational limitations amongst managers.  The nature and role of 
early warning signals is covered in more detail in Section 2.5.1. 
 
Finally, Smith and Toft (2005), as did Smith (2006b), advocated that adverse 
events were a crucial yet challenging opportunity to create and exploit hindsight 
and learning as a means of arresting a smouldering crisis situation.  However, 
Smith and Toft (2005), as were Elliott and Smith (2007) and Elliott et al (2001), 
were resolute in their assertions that organisations commonly did not take up 




opportunities to learn from their mistakes or the mistakes of others.  Learning in 
the aftermath of a crisis situation is covered further in Section 2.5.3. 
 
Empirical evidence concerning the incidence of smouldering crises can be 
found in some of the most high profile and widely used cases to be found in the 
literature such as Chernobyl, Piper Alpha, Bhopal, Challenger and King’s Cross 
(for example Heath 1998, Fink 2002, Mitroff 2004a, Mitroff and Anagnos 2001, 
Pauchant and Mitroff 1990, 1992, Reason 1997 2008, Shrivastava 1987, 
Vincent 2006).   
 
The explosion at Chernobyl’s nuclear plant in 1986 which released radioactive 
material over Europe was found to be caused by numerous and deliberate 
infringements of safety procedures within the plant that had been occurring over 
time (Vincent 2006).  During a systems test, on what was a poorly designed 
reactor (World Nuclear Organisation 2011), the operators, who were both 
inexperienced and incompetent (Reason 2008), attempted to close down the 
unstable reactor but in so doing, caused a fire and the subsequent explosion.   
 
The direct cause of the major explosion and fire on the Piper Alpha oil platform 
in the North Sea which killed 168 men was found to be poor maintenance 
procedures and a breakdown in communications between the day and night 
shifts (Miller 1991) and, whilst the events surrounding the fire and explosion 
took just 22 minutes to reach critical stage  (Fire and Blast Information Group 
2011), the Cullen Inquiry (The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster 1990) 
found that the build up to this had developed over time in a lack of attention to 
safety on the part of Occidental Petroleum (the owner of the platform) which 
pervaded the organisation’s culture, structure and procedures (Vincent 2006).   
 
In the case of Bhopal, against a background of poor management practice, a 
highly toxic gas was accidentally leaked by operatives into the atmosphere from 
the Union Carbide of India plant in Bhopal in 1984.  In a densely populated 
area, this alone resulted in an accident with terrible human consequences, the 
like of which are still being recorded 25 years later (BBC News 2009).   
Competitive pressures in the marketplace had led the senior management of 




United Carbide of India to decide to manufacture a product for which they 
lacked expertise.  Furthermore, operationally there were human resource issues 
such as the high turnover of staff.  The Indian Government was also found to be 
culpable in its reluctance to impose safety regulations on industry, the result of 
which was exposed by the accident, and also allowing a plant manufacturing 
highly toxic gases to be built within a densely populated area.  (Shrivastava, 
1987, Pauchant and Mitroff 1992).  
 
The loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986 and those on board was 
attributed to a breach in the thermal protection system which allowed air to the 
Shuttle’s insulation causing the structure to melt resulting in a loss of control 
and break-up of the craft (Vincent 2006).  This happened despite early warnings 
from technicians on the programme of the potential for such an incident (Smith 
and Toft 2005).  However, the root causes of the loss were recognised in the 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board’s investigation to be embedded in the 
Space Shuttle programme’s culture and history.  For years the Shuttle 
programme had experienced resourcing and scheduling pressures, competing 
priorities and the engendering of practices within the organisation’s culture that 
were contrary to safety including poor communications, inadequate learning and 
a lack of cohesion across the management of the programme (Reason 1997, 
Vincent 2006).  
 
The Fennell Inquiry into the deaths of 31 people due to a fire at King’s Cross 
Station in 1987 (Department of Transport 1988) concluded that the event was 
entirely foreseeable.  There had been numerous fires at the station, although 
they had been extinguished before harm had been caused.  The inquiry found 
that safety was prioritised in terms of the operation of underground trains but 
the profile of safety in stations was poor.  Furthermore, as the event escalated, 
flaws in training, communications and co-ordination were exposed (Heath 
1998).   
 
Vincent (2006 p77) stated that “The accidents ... allude to poor training, 
problems with scheduling, conflicts between safety and profit, communications 
failures, failure to address known safety problems and to general sloppiness of 




management and procedures.”   However, whilst  these cases are shocking, 
their genesis was to be found in the events leading up to the catastrophic 
climax; inexperienced operatives and design flaws in the reactor at Chernobyl, a 
lack of safety culture, structure and procedures at Occidental Petroleum, poor 
management practice and lack of Government regulation in United Carbide 
India, a culture and history in the Space Shuttle Programme which ignored 
safety and safety concerns and finally, flaws in communications, training and 
co-ordination at London Underground.  These are origins which provide support 
for the behavioural failings that Smith (2005a), and Smith and Toft (2005) 
(supported by the work of Reason 1987 1997 1998 2000a 2008, Turner 1976 
1978 and Weick 1988), identified as being causally linked to the emergence of 
smouldering crises; the bounded rationality and denial state of managers at 
Chernobyl, Occidental Petroleum and Union Carbide which impinged 
management’s ability to foresee the problems ahead, the defensive gaps in 
organisational processes exploited by the fire on the Piper Alpha platform, the 
escalation of events through inadequate ‘sensemaking’ at Chernobyl, the 
reluctance to accept attempts to provide early warning signals and learning by 
the Space Shuttle Programme and London Underground.  The cases cited grew 
out of systemic management failures but evolved beyond the ‘points of 
inflection’ because of inadequacies in operational decision making and actions, 
they were smouldering crises. 
 
In summary, Smith (2005a) foresaw that, within the context of an organisational 
crisis, it was possible for novel situations that were beyond management 
perception, knowledge and capabilities, pre-ordained contingency plans and 
organisational defences to escalate over time into the disastrous outcomes 
identified in Section 2.1 as being the characteristics of crises.  Furthermore, 
Smith (2005a, 2005b) highlighted the research gap that existed in better 
identifying where the flaws in defences and knowledge might be.  Thus, the 
author asserts that the study of smouldering crises is critical on two fronts; in 
the first instance, smouldering crises can breach ‘points of inflection’ and evolve 
into catastrophic organisational and societal events and, in the second instance, 
there is evidence that the research underpinning crisis management is limited in 
terms of developing the understanding of the incubatory phase.  These 




assertions have shaped the direction of the research study associated with this 
thesis and identified the author’s positioning in terms of the contribution to 
knowledge. 
 
Having explored how, through ‘points of inflection’, deficiencies in organisational 
defences and management perception, knowledge and decision making 
failures, smouldering crises develop, attention moves in the next section to the 
specifics of the causal routes to crises. 
 
2.4 Root Causes of Organisational Crises 
 
Perrow’s work, ‘Normal Accidents’ (1984), appeared particularly influential in 
management literature concerning the causal route to crisis conditions within 
organisations (for example Mostafa et al 2004, Pauchant and Douville 1992, 
Pearson and Clair 1998, Shrivastava et al 1988, Udwadia and Mitroff 1991).   
 
Perrow (1984), as did Kouzmin (2008) and Pauchant and Douville (1992), 
believed that the business environment had become more hostile as a result of 
factors including industrialisation, globalisation, deregulation and the rise of the 
free market.  According to Richardson (1995) and Shrivastava et al (1988) such 
circumstances propagated the conditions for organisational crises.   
 
There was evidence from other aspects of the literature (Shrivastava 1988) that 
the underlying root causes of crises were multifaceted.   Shrivastava et al 
(1988), as did Mitroff and Anagnos (2001) concurred proposing that although 
crises happened as a result of the cumulative and compounding impact of 
environmental conditions and the development and use of technology, they 
were also the result of organisational complexity and human factors (the latter 
two of which have already been introduced as part of the discussion so far).   
Mitroff (2004a) summarised this stating that crises were a result of the 
dysfunctionality of organisations, technology and people.  The remainder of this 
section will explore the literature in the context of each of these aspects, namely 
organisational complexity, technology and human factors. 
 




Perrow (1984) reasoned that as organisations grew in size and scale, their 
operations became more complex and less isolated.  As a result, Perrow 
suggested, the process of conducting business was realised through a network 
of interdependent functions both within the organisation and outside.  Mitroff 
and Anagnos (2001) and Smith (2005a) concurred suggesting a prevalence of 
diversity and fragmentation yet interactivity.  According to Mitroff and Kilmann 
(1984) this situation was exacerbated by the ensuing impact of multiple 
stakeholders.  Perrow identified that for some organisations this 
interconnectedness and “tight-coupling” (p97) was the source of reliability 
problems.  His rationale was that greater interconnectedness created more 
interdependencies and a consequential larger number of opportunities for things 
to go wrong with less time and prospect of arresting any ensuing accidents.  
The author believes that Perrow’s arguments concerning interconnectedness 
and coupling underlie the development of the systemic view of organisational 
crises discussed in Section 2.1.  Perrow’s research (1984) suggested that for 
some high-risk industries, such as nuclear power plants, systemic industrial 
accidents, possessing the characteristics of crises, were inevitable and 
therefore to be expected.  However, some authors, for example Shrivastava 
(1987) and Smith (1990) whilst supporting the notion of the inevitability of crises 
did not restrict the observation to high-risk technologies and applied it more 
generally.  This general acceptance of inevitability was evidenced in the work of 
others (for example Hwang and Lichtenthal 2000, James and Wootten 2005, 
Pearson and Misra 1997, Pearson and Rondinelli 1998, Watkins and Bazerman 
2003). 
 
In attempting to further understand the underlying causes of organisational 
accidents, Perrow (1984) identified the significant yet contradictory role played 
by technology, aspects of which are recognised in the views of others (Mitroff 
2004a, Pearson and Clair 1998, Smith 1990).  Pauchant and Douville (1992) 
asserted that there was evidence of a broad use of the term technology; whilst 
technology was deemed to embrace manufacturing processes it also applied to 
management processes, procedures, policies, practices and routines.  Pearson 
and Clair (1998) observed the positive contribution that technology had made to 
business in suggesting that technology was responsible for great advances.  A 




view echoed in Mitroff’s contemporary and more explicit perspective of 
technology (2004a) which expressed that technology had enabled organisations 
and the people within them to exceed physical, geographical, economic, 
cognitive and time limitations.  However, according to Pearson and Clair (1998), 
Perrow (1984) and Smith (1990) some technology induced errors and caused 
serious destruction because it fuelled the dynamism and velocity that an 
organisation had to deal with.   
 
The discussion so far in this section has considered the root causes of crises in 
terms of the hostility of the business environment, the complexity of 
organisations and the paradoxical nature of technology.  Sections 2.1 and 2.2 
have already remarked on the suggestion that organisational crises caused by 
humans were of particular concern in the management literature.  Although 
Mitroff and Kilmann (1984) identified the case of Tylenol’s product tampering as 
evidence that organisations were potential hostages to human mavericks, there 
was also recognition in the literature (Kouzmin 2008, Mitroff 2004a, Mitroff 
2004b, Perrow 1984, Smith 1999, 2005a, Smith and Toft 2005, Weick 1988) 
that some crises had more humble human origins.  The remainder of this 
section will explore the management literature concerning the causal nature of 
human error in organisational crises.  However, as will be revealed, the author 
found that the depth of understanding concerning the nature of human error in a 
crisis context was limited and turned to other fields in order to seek further 
explanation. 
 
Smith (1999) advocated that human error lay at the root of crises in many 
organisations, a view echoed by Erikson (1994) when he rationalised that 
human caused crises had increased “as we humans test the outer limits of our 
competence” (p142).  Weick (1988), exploiting the concept of inevitability 
discussed in Section 2.1, proposed that this situation was to be expected 
suggesting that “human errors are fundamentally caused by human variability 
which cannot be designed away” (p308), a view which was consistent with 
Ackroyd and Thompson’s concept of intrinsic ‘misbehaviour’ in organisations 
(1999) .  Perrow (1984) emphasised the scale of this by claiming that 60-80% of 
accidents were attributed to “operator error” (p9).  However, it was Mitroff 




(2004a) who, with this in mind, elaborated on the underlying reasons for human 
error claiming that it was people, within the context of the environment, 
technologies and organisations, who enacted the errors within the 
organisation’s system that led to crises.  Perrow (1984) further defined the 
nature of human errors claiming that these could be accidental, caused by 
carelessness, ignorance or unawareness, or even all three since he believed 
that “man’s reach has always exceeded his grasp” (p11).  This was in keeping 
with Turner’s view (1978) that during the crisis incubation period there were “a 
multiplicity of minor causes, misperceptions, misunderstandings and 
miscommunications” (p216).   
 
Whilst Perrow’s quantification of human error stated above was in harmony with 
Smith and Toft’s research (2005), the origin of the human error was developed 
in their work to highlight that a “considerable proportion (of errors) are shaped 
by management’s actions and inactions”.   This was an interesting finding for 
the author since, at first sight, the concept of ‘operator error’ appeared to place 
ownership for underlying problems at the feet of grassroots individuals, indeed 
Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) recognised a dominant tendency in 
management literature of identifying grassroots ‘misbehaviour’.   However, 
Smith (2005a, 2006b), as did Smith and Toft (2005), was clear in distinguishing 
between the origins of the error and responsibility for it.  Whilst the origins could 
be found in the actions of grassroots individuals, the responsibility for allowing 
the problems to arise lay with management for it was management who shaped 
the actions and behaviours of others through the systems and processes 
designed to instil order and control within organisations.  In fact, Smith and Toft 
(2005) argued that even mechanisms designed to control behaviour within an 
organisation could prompt delinquency amongst employees as they went about 
their daily working lives.   
 
As was outlined in Section 2.3, in terms of smouldering crises, failures of 
management underpinned the incubatory stage of a crisis and led to the 
escalation of problems beyond ‘points of inflection’ to the crisis itself and its 
aftermath.  Firstly, crises smouldered as a consequence of limited existing 
knowledge of management which affected management’s perspective 




concerning problem and crisis potential.  The result of this was an inefficacy of 
contingency plans, weakened early warning communications and a capacity to 
deny crisis potential.  Secondly, within the context of control and order 
processes within the organisation, this inadequate knowledge and information 
led to gaps between the problems organisations encountered and the defensive 
processes established to deal with them.  Moreover, imperfect defensive 
processes compromised control and order and when managers were faced with 
surprise events, they were unable to deal either physically or psychologically 
with them.  Finally management failed to learn from experiences and thus, in so 
doing, contributed to the propensity for grassroots human error and 
management failure.  For the author of this thesis, the assertions of Smith 
(2005a), and Smith and Toft (2005), reinforced the emphasis placed on 
systemically oriented management error as the root cause of organisational 
crisis which were discussed in Section 2.2.     
 
Thus, within the literature, the author found that there was a strong feeling that 
unintentional human error, emanating both from grassroots individuals and 
managers, lay at the root of many organisational crises.  However, the author of 
this thesis also felt that the depth of understanding was limited since although 
the literature had identified the significance and some characteristics of human 
error, particularly that of managers, the development of knowledge regarding 
the underlying reasons, particularly concerning grassroots error, was limited.  
This was felt to be an incomplete picture and certainly was insufficient to satisfy 
the author given that the emphasis of this thesis was on smouldering crises 
where the causes were human.  Therefore, the author sought further 
understanding concerning the underlying reasons for human error per se and 
grassroots error in particular in the literature specifically concerned with human 
error.  Given the fact that this thesis takes a healthcare contextual focus, the 
literature of Reason was particularly influential, although not exclusively so, in 
the development of the author’s understanding. 
 
Interestingly, the author found evidence (Reason 1990) that the large-scale 
socio-technical crises which underpinned the development of the management 
literature also stimulated the development of human error theory.  Not 




surprisingly, similar causal factors were identified, for example, Reason (1997, 
2006) expressed that the rapid and dynamic development of technology had led 
to concerns about the level of reliability in organisations, the role of human error 
in incidents and systemic failures.  Whilst aspects of human error literature 
(Rasmussen 1990, Sheridan 2003) demonstrated a shared intent to create a 
climate of preparedness (the management literature’s perspective on this is 
explored later in Section 2.5.1), there was a heavy emphasis from writers such 
as Leape (1994) and Reason (1987, 1990, 1997, 2000a, 2008) on 
understanding the nature and characteristics of human error. 
Reason’s empirical work (1987, 1990, 1997, 2008) identified two modes of 
human error, the person approach and the systems approach, and whilst both 
of these modes considered human error from the perspective of the faulty 
behaviour of an individual somewhere within the organisation, Reason identified 
distinctive behaviours underlying each.   
 
According to Reason (1987, 1990, 1997, 2008) the person approach to human 
error laid the blame for errors on individuals who made mistakes because they 
were forgetful, inattentive, careless or just plain reckless and, consistent with 
the dominant paradigm in management literature (Smith 2006b), advocated that 
the reliability of humans could be controlled through organisational procedures 
and processes or penal actions such as naming, blaming and shaming (2000a).  
Reason’s later work (2000a, 2000b), which interestingly was presented in the 
healthcare context, was particularly critical of the person approach for a number 
of reasons.  Firstly, he considered that adopting this approach resulted in an 
unhelpful and unproductive blame culture which suppressed opportunities to 
better understand the underlying reliability issues.  Secondly, and associated 
with this, individualising the error, he believed, distanced the error from the 
organisation’s system’s context. 
 
On the other hand, Reason (1987, 1990, 1997, 2008) was more positive about 
the systems approach which accepted that humans were fallible and, as a 
result, human errors were to be expected in all organisations.  For the author of 
this thesis, this approach demonstrated some resonance with the notion of 
crisis inevitability promoted by Perrow (1984), Shrivastava (1987), Smith (1990 




2005a, 2006b), Smith and Toft (2005) and Weick’s (1988) perspectives on 
human error in organisational crises.  Reason (2000b) suggested that 90% of 
errors fell into this category, with only 10% attributable to the person theory.  
Like Mitroff (2004a) and Perrow (1984), the systemic approach to human error 
suggested that incidents occurred where the organisation’s technologies 
interacted with humans.  The underlying root causes were, according to Reason 
(1987, 1990, 1997, 2008), to be found in error traps that were embedded in the 
organisation’s procedures and processes, not at the hands of individuals, a view 
which was entirely consistent with the perspective in the management literature 
concerning the management failure causal route to crisis.  Reason (1997) 
elaborated that the organisation’s working environment created resourcing 
pressure and tension which, coupled with the fallibility of human nature, 
precipitated the conditions for “unsafe acts” (p16).  
 
From Reason’s perspective (1987, 1990, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2008) almost all 
human errors that resulted in adverse events were a combination of two types 
of errors; ‘active failures’ and ‘latent conditions’.    
 
Reason believed that ‘active failures’ were unpredictable yet recurring errors 
that occurred at grassroots level within an organisation, in close proximity to the 
unsafe act (1987, 1990, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2008) and could be classified as 
either slips and lapses or mistakes (1990, 1997).  Reason (1990, 1997) stated 
that slips and lapses were due to inattention or forgetfulness.  Mistakes were, 
Reason asserted (1990, 1997), higher order errors that happened because of 
inadequacies in the organisation’s procedures or an individual’s knowledge.  
‘Active failures’, according to Reason (1990, 1997), could largely only be 
addressed by customised defence mechanisms as they arose.   
 
In describing ‘latent conditions’, Reason (1987, 1990, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2008) 
suggested that they were the ‘resident pathogens’ originated by the intentional 
or incidental decisions of top management or instigators of procedures and 
processes which were found in the preordained conditions of a workplace and 
gave examples including limitations in supervision and training, maintenance 
failures, unworkable procedures, inadequate equipment.  According to Reason 




(2000a), these ‘latent conditions’ cultivated a permanent or momentary climate 
where the potential for errors existed because of inadequacies in people, 
processes and procedures.  The exposure of the organisation to error potential 
was encapsulated in Smith’s description of these occurrences as a ‘pathway to 
vulnerability’ (Smith 2000a, 2005a, 2006c, Smith and Fischbacher 2009, Smith 
and Toft 2005). 
 
Reason (2000a) argued that although the risk of ‘latent conditions’ could be 
proactively identified and controlled by the management of an organisation, 
there were instances where they combined with ‘active failures’ to create error 
incidents.  Reason presented this coming together of ’latent conditions’ and 
‘active failures’ in his ‘Swiss Cheese Model’ (1987, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2008).  
Reason (2000a) summarised the relationship between ‘active failures’ and 
‘latent conditions’ by stating “we cannot change the human condition (active 
failure) but we can change the conditions under which humans work (latent 
conditions)” (p769).   However, Reason (2000a, 2000b) warned that 
organisations and the managers within them needed to be aware of the 
challenges of controlling ‘latent conditions’ including increasing organisational 
complexity, the danger that ultimate human compliance with safety procedures 
brings, the replacement of one potential error area with another and the 
introduction of a complacent attitude towards safety due to the magnitude of 
defence mechanisms, themes upon which Smith (2005a, 2006b) built.   
 
Reason’s research concerning human error was extended by Sasou and 
Reason (1999) who recognised that in the majority of organisations humans do 
not act alone but work within teams.  Although stressing that this was perceived 
to promote increased efficiency and reciprocal support, Sasou and Reason 
(1999) suggested that it could also create opportunities for human error, either 
singularly or group wide, particularly in the planning and decision-making 
activities of the most apparently cohesive teams.  Their findings concluded that 
teamworking environments produced problems that led to errors and that these 
problems centred on communication, trust, resourcing and hierarchical failures.   
 




The author found that views in the management literature on organisational 
crises concerning the role played by environmental conditions, technology and 
organisational complexity, were consistent with assertions regarding the 
inevitability of organisational crises and the general nature of crises’ systemic 
origins.  There was also clear recognition regarding the predictability and 
integral role played by human error in both the prevalence and escalation of 
events that smouldered into crises.  The author found that whilst there was 
some understanding of the behavioural contribution of managers indicating their 
complicit role played in smouldering crisis conditions was a product of poor 
perception, knowledge and capability, there was a limited understanding 
regarding the associated contribution of grassroots behaviour, a view also 
identified by Pauchant and Douville (1992).   
 
The author sought further explanation in the literature specifically concerned 
with human error.   There were strong environmental correlations concerning 
the origins of crises and human error theory leading to a co-emphasis on 
underlying systemic problems and human reliability issues.  Given the emphasis 
on management responsibility for control and order in the literature, the two-way 
classification of errors was particularly useful in identifying errors where 
management had a propensity to influence the outcome (‘latent conditions’) and 
where it did not (‘active failures’).  The author found that this body of literature 
provided more insight into the nature of human error and, synonymous with the 
management literature on crises, placed ultimate causality and remedy in the 
hands of those who controlled the prevailing ‘latent conditions’ since this was 
where management both instigated the conditions in which promulgated error 
yet could best arrest it.  The suggestion in the human error literature that 
managers within organisations could control the fallibility of humans by 
addressing issues in the working environment through management procedures 
was a significant finding for the author since it provided further guidance for the 
research study associated with this thesis and the ensuing positioning of the 
contribution to knowledge.   Whilst grassroots error appeared to dominate the 
systemic problems underpinning smouldering crises, there was clear evidence 
in the human error literature that the causal route was management failures, 
particularly those of an operational nature.  However, particularly in view of 




Smith’s (2005a) arguments regarding management’s perspective, knowledge 
and capabilities, the author felt that without the benefit of a greater knowledge 
of the contributory role played by the working environment at grassroots level, 
understanding regarding the ‘latent conditions’ was partial. 
 
In summary, Section 2.3 identified smouldering crises as the focus of this thesis 
and highlighted the dominant role played by systemic human error in the 
emerging nature of these crises.  This section has further explored the root 
causes of crises.  Although there was evidence that the environment, 
organisational complexity and technology contributed to organisational crises, 
human error remained a central issue.  Through combining knowledge from the 
fields of management literature and human error theory, the author was able to 
develop some understanding regarding the nature of human error in systemic 
events.  However, the literature was limited with regard to how grassroots 
behaviour in the prevailing working conditions contributed to smouldering 
situations.  This thesis will address this gap in knowledge by exploring the 
behaviour of grassroots individuals within the thesis’ healthcare context and 
investigating how this contributes to the role of management failures and 
systemic human error in smouldering crises. 
 
2.5 The Management of Organisational Crises 
 
The discussions preceding this section have largely been concerned with the 
significant issue of the context of crises in terms of crisis definitions and 
typologies, crises incubation and evolution and the causal roots of a crisis.  This 
was important for the author since it prepared the groundwork for what was to 
follow in terms of the literature review but, more significantly, provided further 
validation and legitimisation for the need to develop the understanding of the 
management of crises, particularly those of a smouldering nature, because 
crises were a considerable organisational and managerial challenge.  
Therefore, with this in mind, the author felt it was then necessary to examine 
what the management literature suggested in terms of the management’s 
handling of these damaging situations since without this the literature review 




would be incomplete and it would also offer a further opportunity to isolate the 
area of contribution. 
 
Smith (2005a) recognised that management control through organisational 
systems was a dominant paradigm, both in practice and in the literature.  
Drawing on the management literature on organisational control, Smith and Toft 
(2005), as did Smith (2005a), proposed that managers had the expertise to 
control the actions and behaviours of individuals, themselves included, within 
the organisation and were, thus, held accountable and responsible for this.  The 
previous discussions have shown that adverse events such as smouldering 
crises breached organisational systems and jeopardised control and that it was 
widely recognised (Mitroff 2004a, 2004b, Mitroff and Harrington 1996, Pauchant 
and Douville 1992, Shrivastava et al 1988, Smith 1990 and 1999, Turner 1994 
and Udwadia and Mitroff 1991) that, although the precipitation of adverse 
events was, in the main, dominated by grassroots behaviour, the underlying 
responsibility for these problems was to be found in management failures.   
However whilst Smith (2005a), and Smith and Toft (2005), argued that complete 
control in such an environment was challenging, possibly unachievable and in 
appropriate in complex and dynamic environments, Smith (2005a) maintained 
that management were often at fault in a crisis situation and remained 
responsible for crisis containment and the reinstatement of organisational 
control at what was a challenging time.   
 
Consistent with Smith’s emergence theme, several authors including Fink 
(1986), Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), Smith (1990) and Turner (1978) advocated 
that crises progressed through a series of phases, expressed by Shaluf et al 
(2003, p 26) as an “anatomy”.  Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), as did Jacques 
(2010), suggested that the management of crises was actually concerned with 
all of these phases since they were significant both in terms of the nurturing and 
the intensification of crises - “the failure to manage any one of these phases 
well may be responsible for the occurrence of a crisis in the first place and then 
for its escalation” (p135).  Although less forensically detailed than Smith’s model 
(2005a) which was outlined in Section 2.3, the phasal view of crises has 
influenced the author in two ways.  Firstly, it provided useful direction for the 




review of the literature on the management of crises.  Secondly, as Sections 2.2 
and 2.3 stated, smouldering crises that incubate in the time preceding a crisis 
are the focus of this thesis and so it was important to explore how the literature 
suggested crises were managed.  Accordingly, the structure of this section is 
based on the major phases of a crisis (as shown below in Figure 2.1).  It is also 
felt that organising the discussion on the management of crises along these 
lines will provide a logical progression through the section which will be of help 
to the reader. 
 
 




Figure 2.1 The Stages of a Crisis adapted from Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) and 
Smith (1990) 
 
Therefore, this section will firstly explore how the management literature 
proposed that crises were handled before considering the underlying orientation 
suggested by the literature’s approach.  The author found that the managerial 
and systems orientation which had pervaded the contextual literature was also 
inherent in the literature on the management of crisis and shaped its content, 
direction and philosophy.  This was a significant discovery in the literature 
journey and highly influential in the approach to the research methodology 
detailed in Chapter 4.   
  




2.5.1 Stage 1 - Pre-Crisis Signal Detection, Preparation and Prevention 
 
The evidence presented by the management literature was that crisis 
preparation was a necessity for organisations because organisational crises 
had catastrophic impacts yet were inescapable.   Indeed, Smith and Toft (2005), 
citing Vincent and Reason (1999 p43) emphasised the need to address 
proactively the events which see the synthesis of ‘active failures’ and ‘latent 
conditions’; “we cannot prevent the creation of latent failures, we can only make 
their adverse consequences visible before they combine with local triggers to 
breach the system’s defences”.   
 
The catastrophic impacts and inevitability of crises have already been 
discussed in Sections 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4.  However, Pearson and Misra in their 
1997 paper suggested that organisations perceived that crisis management was 
only necessary when a crisis occurred and were, thus, neglectful of preparation 
in the pre-crisis period.  Hickman and Crandall (1997) concurred, drawing 
attention to the fact that eight out of ten organisations lacking a crisis plan went 
out of business within two years of suffering a major crisis.  However, Smith 
(2005a) was critical of the efficacy of such contingency plans noting that crises 
were allowed to smoulder and escalate because contingency plans or 
management’s response to unknown crisis were insufficient; “Emergence is a 
key factor in the ways in which the task demands of a crisis exceed the planned 
contingency response that the organisation has in place” (2005a p4).   Smith 
termed this a ‘crisis of management’ (1990, 2006b). 
 
Nonetheless, there was a strong consensus in the literature for the need to 
prepare for crises (Lagadec 1993, Mitroff et al1996, Pauchant and Mitroff 1992).  
Smith (1990 and 1999) stated that organisations and the managers within them 
had a responsibility and necessity to manage the risk of inevitable crises 
through contingency planning.  Kash and Darling (1998) stressed the validity of 
preparation in the pre-crisis period suggesting that “companies that prepare for 
crisis events are better able to handle them more efficiently and successfully” 
(p185).  Mitroff and Anagnos (2001) also commended the virtue of preparation 
stating that “complete prevention (of crises) is impossible ....appropriate and 




advanced planning and preparation, ... can limit substantially both the duration 
and the damage caused by (major) crises” ( p 29), a view which was echoed by 
others (Augustine 1995, Mitroff and Harrington 1996).  For Mitroff (1988) crisis 
preparation was a time critical activity and he suggested that the time to 
consider how to handle a crisis was not when the crisis occurred but 
beforehand, using tried and tested plans, concluding that “if it ain’t broke, then 
now’s the time to make sure it stays fixed” (p19).  The emphasis on crisis 
preparation in the literature appeared to the author to provide the legitimacy for 
management research into crisis preparedness. 
 
For some authors (Pauchant and Douville 1992) crisis preparation needed to be 
specifically concerned with addressing the triggers for crises such as 
organisational and technological complexity.  For example, Pauchant and 
Mitroff (1992) espoused that “crisis prepared organisations attempt to buffer 
potential threats without substantially adding to the overall complexity of their 
operations” (p 120).  However, Perrow (1984), as did Shrivastava et al (1988) 
and Weick (1988), identified that the challenge was to effect organisational 
design which emanated order and control, whilst at the same time nurturing 
flexibility and change receptivity particularly in an environment which was 
complex-inducing.   In addition, Perrow (1984) advocated that crisis prone 
technologies were deselected in order to eliminate the threat, a view with which 
Weick (1988) concurred stating that “the general strategy in crisis management 
consists of decreasing the technological complexity of productive systems and 
of simultaneously allowing the complexity of human systems to emerge and to 
be effectively used” (p51).  
 
Whilst aspects of the literature identified broader planning models (Heath 1998, 
Mitroff and Anagnos 2001, Mitroff et al 2003,), others focused on how to 
manage crises through the appointment of cross-functional crisis teams (Bland 
1995, Heath 1998, Hickman and Crandall 1997, Mitroff 1988, Mitroff et al 1996).  
The virtue of designating specific responsibility for crises to a team was 
recognised by a number of authors (Andersen 2003, Kash and Darling 1998, 
Mitroff and Harrington 1996, Pearson and Misra 1997, Watkins and Bazerman 




2003) who claimed that this would facilitate the spread of crisis management 
throughout the organisation. 
 
However, whilst this was informative, the remainder of this section highlights the 
role played by early warning signals and culture in the preparedness of 
organisations.  There are several reasons for this.  Firstly, there appeared to be 
a common emphasis in the literature concerning early warning signals and 
culture.  Secondly, although this was, in itself, an interesting finding for the 
author, it was also important to this thesis.  In the first instance, and consistent 
with Smith’s work (2005a) on emerging crises, smouldering crises which 
incubate in the organisation, giving off early warning signals as they develop, 
are the defined area of investigation in this thesis.  In the second instance, this 
necessitates the author of this thesis understanding more about how the 
management literature suggested incubation was identified.  In the third 
instance, the pervasive nature of culture would influence individual behaviour 
within an organisation which is a key research question for this thesis.  In the 
fourth instance, critically examining the literature in terms of early warning 
signals and culture was influential in identifying further limitations of existing 
theory.  
 
Considering the nature of management responsibility in the preparatory period, 
Smith (2005a) promoted the view that in pre-crisis conditions, as the crisis was 
emerging, it was the responsibility of management at grassroots level to deal 
with what was happening since the organisation did not, yet, view the events as 
a crisis and thus would have not effected a crisis management team.  However, 
Smith (2000a) recognised the managerial problem posed, at this stage, by a 
complex, dynamic and escalating event, a view that also emerged in the work of 
Pauchant and Mitroff concerning crisis preparedness. 
 
Building on Udwadia and Mitroff’s earlier study concerning the genealogy of 60 
organisations experiencing crises (1991), Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) 
conducted 500 interviews with professionals who were responsible for crisis 
management in order to determine the characteristics of crisis prepared and 
crisis prone organisations.  Whilst it is not the intention to explore their findings 




in totality, aspects of their work are explored here for two reasons.  Firstly, their 
work appeared to be influential in other literature (for example Greening and 
Johnson 1996, Mitroff et al 2003, Pauchant and Douville 1992).  Secondly, 
perhaps as a result of this, their work identifies a number of themes which were 
common and recurred across the literature.   
 
Pauchant and Mitroff’s (1992) findings suggested that crisis prone organisations 
were strategically reactive, paid little direct attention to crisis management and 
were psychologically defensive.  Furthermore, these authors found that some 
organisations lacked preparation for crises because they refused to consider 
their potential, a view that was expressed by many others (Augustine 1995, 
Hickman and Crandall 1997, Mitroff 1988, Mitroff and Pauchant 1992, Mitroff et 
al 1994, Register and Larkin 2002, Richardson 1995, Smith 1999, 2005a, 
2006b, Smith and Elliott 2000, Smith and Toft 2005, Turner 1978, 1994, 
Watkins and Bazerman 2003).  Mitroff and Anagnos (2001) emphasised the 
danger of this denial as “the worst enemy of crisis management” (p8), a view 
with which Smith (1990) concurred suggesting that it was senior management 
and experts who needed to confront their reluctance to accept that crises are 
likely to occur.   
 
In contrast, Mitroff and Pauchant (1992) found that crisis prepared organisations 
were strategically proactive and had effective crisis management units.   
Instrumental in their proactivity and efficacy was the capacity to detect threats 
through early warning signals, bolstered, argued Smith (2006b) through 
effective learning.  Smith (2005a) stressed the importance of the transference of 
knowledge and information within the hierarchy and structures of an 
organisation in order to affect proactivity and, whilst identifying that this should 
cover formal and informal informational networks, acknowledged the complexity 
of realising this in practice through “nebulous” networks (p7) generally and, 
specifically, as a problem was escalating.  Whilst this thesis does not directly 
consider informational and knowledge networks, the research methodology 
outlined as a result of the author’s perceived limitations of existing literature and 
documented in Chapter 4 delivers a study which accesses a previously 
untapped network of information and knowledge, that of and from grassroots 




individuals.  The contribution to knowledge of this thesis will improve the 
perspective, knowledge and capabilities of managers where limitations have led 
to smouldering crisis situations. 
 
The value of early warning systems in creating a state of awareness in the 
organisation was recognised in the work of others such as Coombs (1999), Fink 
(1986), Heath (1998), Laitinen and Chong (1999), Mitroff and Anagnos (2001), 
Pearson and Rondinelli (1998) and Quarantelli (1988) and was in harmony with  
Reason’s (1987, 1990, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2008) view concerning the 
significant role of early warning signals in addressing the crisis-inducing ‘latent 
conditions’ within an organisation.  However, since the work of these authors 
acknowledged that crises came in different guises, Pauchant and Mitroff also 
advocated a portfolio approach to crises preparation, a suggestion to which 
there was common agreement (Augustine 1995, Hickman and Crandall 1997, 
Mitroff and Harrington 1996, Mitroff et al 1988, Pearson and Misra 1997, 
Pearson and Rondinelli 1997).  Several authors (Coombs 1999, Heath 1998, 
Mitroff et al 1988, Mitroff et al 1996, Pearson and Misra 1997, Watkins and 
Bazerman 2003) rationalised the need for a portfolio approach because, 
different crises produced common early warning signals and required distinctive 
action plans.    
 
Despite this general consensus in the literature towards early warning signal 
systems, Mitroff and Anagnos (2001) and Mitroff and Harrington (1996) issued a 
caution that their efficacy was limited if organisations did not provide 
appropriately receptive conditions.  Mitroff and Anagnos (2001) articulated the 
problem by stating that “in complex organisations, separate individual signals, 
no matter how loud, may not be sufficient to connote a problem.  If in effect the 
signals ‘don’t connect the dots’, then we cannot and do not see a problem” 
(p111).  The author of this thesis believed what seemed to be at issue here was 
management’s capacity to heed early warning information regarding 
smouldering crises.  Whilst Smith and Toft (2005) attributed the reasons for 
management’s limitations to various factors including the complexity of 
organisations, the scale and scope of the problems faced by managers and the 
level of interconnectedness and dynamism, Smith (2002a, 2002b) postulated 




that the limitations of existing management knowledge and the associated 
chasm between knowledge, contingency plans and organisational defensive 
processes challenged the efficacy of taking such a prescriptive, contingent 
approach.  Smith (2005a) stated several contributory factors. 
 
In the first instance, management did not have full knowledge in terms of the 
span of their control since the processes and subsequent interactions were 
difficult to define with any completeness.  Smith and Toft (2005) elaborated 
stating that contingency plans were based on the perceptions of managers as to 
what could possibly happen and that this was often based on probability and 
had, as stated in Section 2.3, a ‘bounded rationality’ (Pauchant and Mitroff 
1992).  Thus, if there was little evidence that an adverse event would happen, 
then managers would have limited awareness of the potential and this would 
negate any reason to prepare contingency plans.  Smith (2005a) intimated 
further that the separation of the knowledge between grassroots and 
management could distort management’s perspective and erode organisational 
preparedness.   
 
In the second instance, the plethora of processes and interactions rendered 
complete planning ineffective, managers simply could not plan for every 
eventuality that they were aware of.  Smith and Toft (2005) were particularly 
critical that planning per se would not assist managers to better deal with 
adverse events, rather it was planning that was informed and well devised that 
was most effective.  This was, perceived a number of authors (Smith 2005a, 
Reason 1990, 1997, 2004), exacerbated by the exposure created in 
contingency plans of unanticipated conditions.   
 
Smith (2005a) stressed the importance of managers having the capacity to 
manage a crisis through effective knowledge based decision making stating that 
“under the conditions of crisis, managers need to ensure that they make sense 
of what is happening to help the organisation to deal with competing task 
demands within a potentially hostile and extremely dynamic environment.  It is 
within this process that managers have to function, collect and act upon 
evidence and make decisions” (p2).  However, Smith (2005a) argued that 




management’s limited perspective and knowledge created a gap between what 
were potential problems in the organisation’s systems and processes and 
reality.  Smith and Toft (2005) proposed that there was a need to investigate the 
incubation of a crisis further since this would provide additional information and 
knowledge that would elucidate the origins of the problems that caused 
breaches in the organisation’s systems and processes which led to the 
promulgation of a crisis event.  The methodology outlined in Chapter 4 was 
designed to provide such research and, in so doing, provide novel information 
and knowledge that, whilst not entirely eliminating these events, would further 
the understanding of smouldering crises. 
 
In the third instance, given the magnitude of interactions within an organisation 
(some across organisational boundaries), monitoring the degree to which 
processes were adhered to and taking corrective action where necessary in the 
early stages of a crisis was difficult for managers to achieve.  Furthermore, 
Smith (2005a) believed that early warning information was neither collected nor 
disseminated and that, as a result, the signals it raised were not brought to the 
attention of management so that appropriate action could be taken.    
 
In the fourth instance, Smith (2005a) argued that organisations and thus the 
managers and individuals within them placed greater emphasis on efficiency at 
the expense of effectiveness.  The result was competing and conflicting 
operational priorities which produced tensions within the organisation. 
 
Within the context of creating receptive conditions for crisis preparation, some 
management theorists (Mitroff and Kilmann 1984, Quarantelli 1988, Smith 1990, 
Weick 1988, Weick et al 1999) contemplated the nature of organisational 
culture.  In their consideration of organisational culture, Mitroff and Kilmann 
(1984) made the usual step of shifting attention from those who managed within 
the organisation to a more individualistic paradigm stating that “The likelihood 
that an organisation will anticipate and respond to an impending corporate 
tragedy is not just determined by personality and intellectual capacity of its 
leaders ... rather every organisation has ... a way of doing things ... this is where 
we will find the basis for an organisation’s stance towards the unthinkable” (p 




63).  This view is echoed by Smith (1990, 1999, 2006b) who, whilst recognising 
that this was often a neglected area, believed a receptive culture held the key to 
inhibiting incubating crises.  Furthermore, Smith (1990) explicitly proposed that 
this would be achieved by engendering bottom-up communication flows, a view 
echoed by Quarantelli (1988) and Weick (1988) and engendered in the 
research study underpinning this thesis.  Building on this notion, Weick et al 
(1999) tendered the view that organisations that dealt well with unexpected 
events engendered a state of ‘mindfulness’ where collectively and culturally 
individuals within the organisation were vigilant and could anticipate, respond 
and recover from surprise events.  However, whilst Richardson (1995) and 
Turner (1994) concurred with the possibility that an organisation may need to 
effect a cultural shift to become more receptive to crises, they also considered 
the challenges of realising this may be too great without the eradication of the 
potential for blame.  Critically, though, Smith and Toft (2005) argued that culture 
was an imprecise concept which promoted a particular perspective rather than 
reality, a point Reason (1997) appeared to endorse when he argued that culture 
could promote working conditions which tolerated systemic error.  Whilst it is 
evident from both this literature review and that which follows in Chapter 3 that 
author’s have highlighted culture as a dominant issue in organisational crises, 
the research data underpinning this thesis and the intellectual development in 
Chapter 7, 8 and 9 identify organisational climate as being more critical.  The 
feelings and beliefs that individuals hold about the internal environment of an 
organisation which is highly influential in their behaviour in the workplace was 
attributed to the organisational climate (Dawson et al 2008, Forehand and von 
Gilmer 1964, James et al 2008, Kaya et al 2010, Tagiuri and Litwinn 1968) and 
whereas culture reflected a system orientation which was ‘owned’ by the 
organisation, organisation climate was individually oriented and owned (James 
et al 2008).  The author returns to this discussion to develop it further in Chapter 
8 following the presentation of the research data. 
 
Smith (1990, 1999), as was Jacques (2010), was critical of the effect the 
emphasis on preparation had on the attention that was given to preventing 
crises.  Jacques (2010), supporting the concept of smouldering crises reflected 
that “most crises are not sudden events but follow a period of precognition and 




red flags” which could be pre-empted through the proactive measures of 
“leaders and managers” (p10.).  Using case-based evidence Smith’s earlier 
work (1990) broadly concurred, although in identifying the cause of crises to be 
management failures believed they could be eradicated through a shift in 
managerial style and culture.  However, the author found that the theme of 
prevention was not pursued in the literature to any great degree (Smith 2005b).  
In attempting to understand the reasons for this, the author concluded that the 
accentuation of the inevitability of organisational crises directed attention to 
preparedness at the expense of prevention.  However, it seemed to the author 
that this added further credence to the need to develop the understanding of the 
management of smouldering crises as in so doing knowledge regarding the 
curbing of crises within their early stages would be extended. 
 
The decision of the author of this thesis to focus on crises that smoulder within 
the organisation was explained at the conclusion of Section 2.2.   Within the 
context of this decision, the author sees value in the notion of being sensitive 
towards occurrences in and around the organisation that could evolve into a 
crisis.  However, in acknowledging the importance of early warning signals and 
the pervading influence of culture, it is surprising that despite some indication 
from Quarantelli (1988), Smith (1990) and Weick (1988) of the necessity to 
involve those at grassroots levels in crisis preparedness, the management 
literature on crises was not directed towards a better understanding of 
contributory role of grassroots individuals within the underlying systemic 
problems apparent in smouldering crises.  The approach of this thesis in 
exploring the workplace behaviour of individuals will develop a greater 
appreciation of the role grassroots humans play in the signals that managers 
need to indicate that a smouldering crisis has commenced. 
 
2.5.2 Stage 2 - Management of the Crisis 
 
According to Pearson and Misra (1997) “Quantitative data collected across the 
Fortune 1000 shows that a company dedicates the bulk of its crisis 
management resources during this phase” (p 53).  However, Heath (1998) 
stated that it is also a time of “crisis smog” (p209) typified by chaos in the 




environment, overwhelming, incomplete or confusing information, distortions in 
communications and cognitive uncertainty amongst managers and executives, 
a view recognised by others including Lagadec (1993), Mitroff (2004a) and 
Shrivastava et al (1988).  Roux Dufort and Metais (1999) summarised it as the 
“destructive phase” (p 115).  This section will consider aspects of the above that 
were prominent in the literature, notably the effective implementation of crisis 
plans, communications, the characteristics of successful crisis leaders and 
enacted ‘sensemaking’ in crisis situations.  However, this section will focus less 
on the finer detail concerning each of these aspects and more on the 
perspectives they illuminate, since this is what is important to this thesis. 
According to Mitroff et al (1996), and also Augustine (1995), a high level of 
resources was required within this phase, termed by Smith (2006b) as the 
‘operational crisis’, because the crisis itself demanded swift and specific actions 
and decisions outside of normal business operations.  
 
Prescriptively, Mitroff et al (1996) suggested that organisations needed to 
initiate the crisis management team, establish the nature of the crisis, 
communicate with stakeholders, contain the damage and recover.  Practically, 
and quite exceptionally (since the work of others such as Fink (1986) and Smith 
(1990) offered more general advice), their work was supported by an action and 
decision blueprint for practioners sequencing what should happen and when.  
Smith and Toft (2005), within the human error causal route to organisational 
crises, were critical of solutions such as those discussed above which, they 
believed, were technical and process driven in nature.  
 
Much was written in the literature about communications at times of crises by 
those who specialise in communications generally and public relations 
specifically (for example Barton 1993, Burnett 2002, Coombs 1999, Falkheimer 
and Heide 2006, Jacques 2009, Moore 2004, Murphy 1996, Ray 1999 Register 
and Larkin 2002).  It was also considered by authors such as Fink (1986) who 
saw it as a part of the crisis management plan.  In terms of substance, 
unsurprisingly, given the public profile of this stage, the literature addressed its 
content to those at the top of an organisation covering key issues concerning 
senior management such as dealing with media coverage (Mitroff et al 1996), 




establishing credibility and trust (Augustine 1995,  Mitroff and Anagnos 2001, 
Mitroff and Harrington 1996, Mitroff et al 1996, Pauchant and Douville 1992) 
and constructing effective communications’ content (Augustine 1995, Kash and 
Darling 1998, Mitroff and Anagnos 2001, Mitroff et al 1996, Pauchant and 
Douville 1992, Pauchant and Mitroff 1992).  In addition, several authors (Kash 
and Darling 1998, Mitroff and Anagnos 2001, Pauchant and Douville 1992,) 
warned that organisations whose messages were not effective at the outset 
could suffer from crisis creep which happened when “companies sometimes 
misclassify a problem, focusing on the technical aspects and ignoring the issues 
of perceptions but it’s often the public perception that causes the crisis” 
(Augustine 1995 p51). 
 
It was evident from Mitroff’s empirically tested research (2004a) that those at 
the top of the organisation were perceived to play a significant role during the 
crisis itself, a view echoed by Pearson and Clair (1998).  Whilst Pearson and 
Clair (1998) suggested that the actions of senior managers and their 
organisations were influenced by the thoughts and knowledge of senior decision 
makers during a crisis, Mitroff (2004a) utilised the theories of Jung and Myers-
Briggs to identify the four languages of leaders but asserted that crisis leaders 
possessed an alliance of all four languages and were capable of thinking and 
nurturing of the highest order.  Mitroff’s suggestions were echoed by 
Richardson (1995) and James and Wooten (2005).  However, Greening and 
Johnson (1996) considered the wider context of top management and, through 
their research and literature review, advocated that top management teams who 
were well educated, multi-disciplinary and possessed diversity in terms of age 
and tenure were more likely to be open-minded to crisis situations.  This, they 
believed, was because they were more likely to engage in critical thinking, less 
influenced by groupthink and less entrenched in their attitudes and behaviour. 
 
Weick (1988) developed the theme of the central role played by humans in 
crisis situations within the concept of ‘enacted sensemaking’.  According to 
Weick (1988), the undeniable fact was that humans engaged either 
intellectually, physically or intellectually and physically with a crisis since part of 
the impulse to make sense of a crisis came from intellectual or physical action.  




Although Weick (1988) believed that adequate enactment in crisis situations 
came from those at grassroots level feeling empowered to act, he perceived 
that empowerment increased the potential for human variability and error-
proneness.  Furthermore, Weick (1988) advocated that an individual’s reaction 
was specific to each crisis situation and the individual’s own experience and 
heritage and stressed that pressures such as high staff turnover or 
understaffing could compromise the effectiveness of enactment.  In addition, 
Weick (1988), as did Smith and Toft (2005) and Smith (2006b), believed that 
because crises challenged a human’s ability to make sense of events, the under 
researched area (Smith and Toft 2005) of ‘sensemaking’ could be inadequate, 
causing, particularly from a management perspective, an intensification of the 
crisis.  There was evidence of agreement to the notion that humans could 
exacerbate a crisis (Pauchant and Mitroff 1990, 1992, Pearson and Clair 1998, 
Smith 2005a, 2006c) since it was believed that humans, through their 
interactions, often exacerbated the impact of an error because they were not 
equipped to properly deal with it.  Paradoxically, though, Weick (1988) claimed 
that, at times, enactment, though dangerous, could improve an individual’s level 
of understanding and response to a crisis situation.  
 
This section has been concerned with how the literature suggests that crises 
are managed.  As was explained at the outset of the section, the author has 
chosen to highlight the key themes rather than explore the content of the 
literature in detail.  This was a conscious decision since what the author found 
illuminating was the perspective that crises were incidents that could, largely, 
only be dealt with by those at the top of organisations.  Whilst the author does 
not dispute the significant role played by those at the top of an organisation 
during a crisis, within the specific context of a smouldering crisis, the author 
questions this level of significance for several reasons.  In the first instance, 
sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 have provided evidence that organisational crises 
are inevitable and predominantly arise out the acts of humans working within 
the organisation.  Weick’s concept of ‘sensemaking’ supports this notion.  In the 
second instance, in the case of smouldering crises, crucially the evolving nature 
of a crisis suggested that it was the acts of humans at grassroots level and, in 
particular, in operational management positions that precipitated the triggers.  In 




the third instance, the literature regarding the management of crises has a 
tendency to focus on how managers should deal with sudden crisis events.  The 
result is that not only was the literature partial in its understanding of the 
behaviours underlying human caused crises, but it did not directly address how 
managers might use this knowledge to better deal with the management of 
smouldering crises.  Furthermore, the prescriptive, procedurally based 
approach, for example in the appointment of a crisis management team and 
provision of a blueprint for crisis management, also lacks the benefit of being 
informed by those who are closer to the crisis incubation point.  The 
understanding of grassroots individual behaviour generated by this thesis will 
address these shortfalls, improve management perspective, knowledge and 
capabilities and thereby complement existing knowledge concerning how 
managers deal with smouldering crises. 
 
2.5.3 Stage 3 - The Aftermath 
 
Aspects of the management literature were concerned with the aftermath of a 
crisis, the so-called ‘crisis of legitimisation’ (Smith 2006b), and, although the 
level of academic writing is more limited than that concerned with the previous 
stages, it appeared to the author to centre principally on resolution and 
reflection (Heath 1998, Jacques 2010, Mitroff and Harrington 1996, Pearson 
and Misra 1997, Roux-Dufort and Metais 1999, Roux-Dufort 2000, 2007).    
 
According to Shrivastava et al (1988), and also Heath (1998) and Hickman and 
Crandall (1997), crisis resolution and business continuity were affected by 
organisations mitigating the impact of the crisis with remedial action focusing on 
whatever impacts had been experienced, for example, financial recompense to 
victims for injuries sustained and process improvements for product and service 
faults.  Considering business continuity in particular, Pearson and Misra (1997) 
advocated that organisations needed to be concerned with identifying the 
minimum that, both procedurally and in terms of the products or services that 
they offer, they would have to do in order for business to be resumed.  Whilst 
the author acknowledges the literature concerned with business continuity in the 
management of the aftermath of crises (for example Elliott et al 2002), it is not 




the intention of the author to explore this any further.  The principal reason for 
this is that this thesis is concerned with the incubation of organisational crises 
through human error and, as has been outlined, the focus of business continuity 
is on resuming the normal business operations of the organisations and thus 
the contribution to the core theme of this thesis is limited.  
 
There was some agreement in the literature (Jacques 2010, Pearson and Misra 
1997, Roux-Dufort 2007, Smith and Elliott 2007, Smith et al 2000, Smith and 
Toft 2005) of a need for organisations to learn in the aftermath of a crisis since 
crises themselves were seen as moments of transformation.  Mitroff and 
Anagnos (2001) rationalised the need to learn in the aftermath based on the 
observation that many organisations, having developed plans to deal with 
organisational crises, experienced frustration when implementing plans.  
According to Mitroff and Anagnos (2001) one of the main reasons for this was 
that the plans failed to take account of the fact that a crisis occurred not 
because one part of an organisation had failed but because there were 
systemic problems within the organisations.  Smith and Toft (2005), as did 
Smith and Elliott (2007) and Smith et al (2001), highlighted the dangers of 
management within organisations negating learning opportunities since without 
effective learning, managers themselves were culpable in the evolution and 
persistence of smouldering crisis conditions.     
 
With the exception of the triage system of Myer et al (2007) and Smith and Toft 
(2005), the author observed that ensuing suggestions were generally 
organisationally oriented and process driven, for example Mitroff and Harrington 
(1996) proposed a system for auditing in the aftermath of a crisis and Heath 
(1998) suggested that organisations construct their recovery around a strategy 
for planning, gathering information, managing core operations and resources 
and contingency plans for business recovery.  Although Roux-Dufort (2000) was 
critical that few authors offered real practical advice regarding effecting 
organisational learning, Smith and Elliott (2007) explored learning in some 
detail.   
 




Smith and Elliott (2007) distinguished between process driven and deeper 
learning, identifying two, quite distinctive levels of learning; first order learning, 
as exhibited by crisis prone organisations, focused purely on enacting learning 
through changes in organisational regulations, structures, practices and plans 
and second order learning which achieved a deeper learning and ”full cultural 
adjustment” (p522).  It is interesting that whilst, the main thrust of literature saw 
learning as a process in the aftermath of a crisis situation, Smith and Elliott 
(2007) recognised that learning, of the first ‘hard’ and second ‘soft’ order, had a 
place in the pre-crisis stage and the most challenging second order learning 
occurred during and in the aftermath of a crisis, a view which is consistent with 
the transformational nature of crisis situations discussed in Section 2.1.  
Continuing the theme of second order learning, Smith and Toft (2005) proposed 
that in order to effectively learn from smouldering crises, organisations needed 
to review the way in which their problems were evaluated and assessed.  
Drawing on Weick’s (1988) notion of ‘sensemaking’, Smith and Toft (2005) 
considered that learning needed to focus on developing a better understanding 
of the role played by management behaviour in why and how problems 
emerged within the organisation.  This contribution of this thesis will enhance 
understanding in terms of the emergence of smouldering crisis conditions and 
thus present a learning opportunity for academics, researchers, managers and, 
perhaps, policy makers. 
 
Several authors (Carley and Harrod 1997, Heath 1998, Mitroff and Anagnos 
2001, Roux-Dufort 2000, Smith 1999, Smith and Elliott 2000, Smith and Elliott 
2007, Smith et al 2000 and Weick 1988) reasoned that barriers prevented 
organisational learning, identifying the recurring themes of management denial, 
a lack of ‘emotional intelligence’ and a focus on symptoms not causes as a 
means of scapegoating amongst them.  Shrivastava, et al (1988) expressed 
similar concerns regarding scapegoating suggesting that “the focus on 
symptoms rather than causes leaves organisations vulnerable to similar crises 
that can deepen and extend the original problem” (p292).   Smith et al (2000) 
recognised the relationship between scapegoating and a culture of blame, 
proposing that learning would not be achieved until a more trusting, blame-free 
culture was realised and commended the benefits this delivered in terms of 




continuous, open communications and the free flow of information (even during 
the incubatory period).   
Smith and Toft (2005) were particularly explicit regarding the underlying 
reasons why organisations and the managers within them had an inhibited 
approach to learning and thus were culpable in the evolution of smouldering 
crises.  In the first instance, they asserted that management processes within 
the organisation did not always allow time or opportunity for discussion about 
how events incubate and escalate within organisations.  In the second instance, 
and reiterating a recurring theme, Smith and Toft (2005) proposed that learning 
was not affected because smouldering crises were often nebulous.  Smith and 
Elliott (2007) identified a series of specific learning barriers some of which have 
already been mentioned in the context of other discussions such as denial but 
also added that learning was adversely affected by management’s inflated self 
belief and an inability and reluctance to learn from other organisation’s 
experiences, near misses or non-events due to “rigid core beliefs and ineffective 
communications” (p527).  Most importantly for this thesis, Smith and Elliott 
(2007) identified the significance of difficulties in accessing and handling 
information in forming barriers to learning and knowledge acquisition, 
advocating that “by focusing solely upon technical elements organisation may 
risk ignoring the human aspects of causality that are central to both crisis 
incubation and learning”.  A view with which Smith and Toft (2005) appeared to 
have some sympathy in arguing that the limitations in management knowledge 
could potentially entrench ‘latent conditions’ which give rise to error incidents in 
the organisation’s processes.  This thesis is aiming to develop the 
understanding of smouldering crisis management by exploring such human 
aspects from a novel and distinctive perspective and, in so doing, will contribute 
to learning and knowledge from both a practical and an academic perspective. 
 
The author of this thesis believes that there is evidence of an intent to learn 
from crises throughout the management literature and specifically in the 
literature concerned with the aftermath of a crisis (although there is criticism 
concerning the efficacy of learning in practice).  However, learning has, in the 
main, gravitated towards an organisational review of the processes associated 




with the management of crises.  Whilst the author concurs that there is a need 
for organisations to review the processes by which they deal with crises, to do 
this without exploring the learning that can be acquired by considering the 
behaviour of individuals within these processes results in a partial view.  
 
Despite recognition of the aftermath stage being a period of transformation and 
a learning opportunity for organisations, the literature takes an organisational 
perspective; the crisis is resolved when the organisation has made recompense 
for the crisis and it has returned to its pre-crisis state, reflection has been 
effected when the processes for the management of crises have been reviewed 
and refined.  The author does not oppose this approach, rather she considers it 
to be partial and believes that the learning opportunity presented by this thesis 
will provide a more rounded approach to the management of smouldering 
crises. 
 
2.5.4 The Underlying Orientation of the Literature 
 
Sections 2.5.1, 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 have discussed how the management literature 
addressed how organisations should deal with each phase of a crisis.  
However, the author’s observations have not been restricted simply to the 
content of what was discovered in the literature.  The author has also made 
observations about how the content implies an organisational orientation in the 
management literature concerned with organisational crises.  This section is 
about those observations and is focused on three specific issues; the approach 
to the empirical research underlying the development of theory, the nature of 
the theoretical development and the audience to which theory is addressed.  
This final section of Chapter 2 will look at each of these issues in turn. 
 
In the first instance, the author considered the approach to the empirical 
research underlying the development of theory.  The management literature had 
grown through the empirical analysis of specific cases of organisational crises.  
However, to a large degree, the empirical base of the research had been 
centred on exploring and, sometimes measuring, the attitudes and behaviours 
of those at the top of the organisation who occupied executive and senior 




managerial positions (Fink 2002, Mitroff, Pauchant and Shrivastava 1988, 
Mostafa et al 2004, Pauchant and Mitroff 1992, Pearson and Rondinelli 1998, 
Ray 1999, Register and Larkin 2002).  Whilst the author is not suggesting that 
this is an inappropriate approach, the resultant theory, which has been founded 
on particular narratives, is partial and incomplete.  In the case of smouldering 
crises, this is a significant observation and limitation as the dominant approach 
is neglectful of the narratives of those who are closer to the crisis incubation 
point.  The research approach discussed in Chapter 4 and the resultant 
contribution of this thesis will address this imbalance since the crucial limitations 
in management perspective, knowledge and capabilities identified as being 
central to smouldering crises will be improved by the knowledge provided by the 
perspective of this thesis.   
 
In the second instance, the author considered the nature of the theoretical 
development.  Despite Smith (20002a, 2002b, 2005a, 2006b) and Smith and 
Toft’s (2005) work which explored management behaviour in the smouldering 
crisis context in some detail, there is a strong orientation towards the 
organisational perspective within the development of management theory and, 
the consequence of this is a focus is on ‘hard’ knowledge.  Indeed Pauchant 
and Mitroff (1988, 1992) proposed that in crisis-prone organisations change 
occurred only at superficial level (practices, structures and plans) rather than 
the deeper level of beliefs and assumptions.  It is not the author’s intention to 
repeat the detail of the preceding sections here but the discussion in Sections 
2.5.1, 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 concerning the management of crises is suggestive that 
this organisational perspective is evidenced principally on three fronts.  Firstly, 
the theory proposed that organisations have allowed crises to occur because 
management systems and processes within the organisations had failed.  In 
addition, organisations had been neglectful in their cultivation of a culture that 
was sensitised to the possibility of crises occurring through changes in the 
business environment.  Furthermore, organisations had been unsuccessful in 
the effective management of technology, people and organisational structure 
and design.  Secondly, according to management theory, the best way of 
dealing with each type of crisis was through customised pre-planned, 
prescribed operational procedures.  Moreover, crises achieved a more 




successful outcome if they were led by an appointed leader who possessed the 
right skills and led from the front with the support of a dedicated crisis team.  
Finally, the management systems discussed in the previous two points should, 
from the perspective of the theory, be subjected to a systematic audit and 
review of processes and procedures following a crisis.  Whilst aspects of the 
literature (for example Smith 2005a, 2006b, 2006c and Smith and Toft 2005) 
raised significant and informative ‘soft’ behavioural factors underpinning 
smouldering crises, the author of this thesis is suggesting that given the 
orientation of the research, management theory regarding organisational crises 
at this present time fails to fully exploit the knowledge that could be gained from 
considering the influence that the behavioural contribution of those at 
grassroots level might have in each of these broad areas of knowledge.  This 
thesis will address the balance, particularly within the thesis’ defined area of 
focus, that of smouldering crises.   
 
In the third instance, the author considered the audience to which theory was 
addressed. Many authors (for example, Bland 1995, Burnett 2002, Fink 2002, 
Greening and Johnson, 1996, Heath 1998, Hitchcock 1998, Loosemore, 1998, , 
Mitroff 2004a, Mitroff 2004b, Mitroff and Anagnos 2001, Mitroff et al 1996, 
Parsons 1996, Preble 1997, Ray 1999, Register and Larkin 2002, Roux Dufort 
2000) overtly addressed their work to executives and managers within 
organisations.  Mitroff and Kilmann (1984), as did Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), 
expressed a common view in rationalising that this was borne out of an ethical 
responsibility and motivation to prepare organisations, and the managers within 
them, for crisis situations as these individuals were particularly influential in 
determining an organisation’s reaction and outcome in crisis conditions.  The 
author of this thesis appreciates the necessity for organisations and those within 
them to prepare and manage crisis situations but feels that this is better served 
by academics if the management literature takes a more holistic approach to 
understanding what happens in crisis situations and why.  The research 
approach discussed in Chapter 4 and the resultant contribution of this thesis will 
address this imbalance. 
 
 




2.6  Summary 
 
This chapter has presented the author’s analytical journey through the 
management literature concerned with organisational crises and has found the 
literature helpful to this study in a number of areas. 
 
At the outset, the author, like others before her, found defining organisational 
crises challenging, predominantly due to the sheer diversity of the terms 
adopted throughout the literature.  However, the author focused on examining 
the management literature concerning the characteristics and types of made-
made organisational crises in order to arrive at a definition for this thesis which 
was appropriate within the context of the study.  The discovery that whilst, 
throughout the management literature there was an emphasis on large-scale, 
high profile crises, crisis-like incidents could smoulder within an organisation, 
was significant both in terms of the author’s area of interest and the direction of 
this work.  Smouldering crises were of great interest to the author and, within 
the healthcare setting, bore all the hallmarks of an organisational crisis.   
Smith’s work (2005a) was particularly illuminating regarding the nature of 
smouldering crises proposing that these occurred when problems that emerged 
within the organisation’s systems were allowed by management, through 
negligent perception, knowledge and capabilities, to progress unchecked 
through ‘points of inflection’.  Thus, the author was able, for the purposes of this 
thesis, to define organisational crises as high impact occurrences with systemic 
origins which evolved over time and caused unexpected damage to the 
resources, reputation and stakeholders of an organisation.  
 
The literature was also helpful in providing some explanation as to the root 
causes of crises.   Whilst the impact that the environment, organisational 
complexity and technology had on the incidence of organisational crises was 
recognised, human error occupied a prominent position in the theory regarding 
root causes.  There was some understanding concerning the behavioural role 
played by managers within smouldering crises, in particular the significant 
impact of failings in management’s perspective, knowledge and capabilities.   
This was an important finding for the author and provided additional detail to a 




prevailing theme within the management literature which placed both causality 
of and remedy throughout the stages of crisis situations at the feet of 
management.  However, the author also identified a lack of knowledge within 
the management literature on crises concerning the contributory role of 
grassroots individuals and sought further explanation from literature in the field 
of human error.  Whilst this literature helped to better define the nature of 
human error, the so-called ‘person’ approach to human error in which the 
causal route for error was the individual who was closest to the error point was 
not perceived to be an appropriate perspective.  What appeared to dominate 
human error was a ‘systems’ approach and whilst the principles of this 
approach were consistent with the management literature, what was most 
illuminating was the identification of a clear distinction between the causal 
factors in error situation that management could influence (the ‘latent 
conditions’) through organisational systems and processes, compared to those 
it could not (‘the active failures’).   
 
In terms of the management of crises, the author examined the management 
literature generally and, more specifically, in terms of smouldering crises.  At a 
general level, there appeared to be a movement towards creating knowledge 
that would bring about an incremental reduction in the potential for the 
management failures associated with organisational crises.  Specifically, 
knowledge development centred on better helping organisations and the 
managers within them prepare for, manage and learn from crises, although 
once again management’s limited perspective, knowledge and capabilities were 
seen as damaging in each of these areas.  This appeared to have happened at 
the expense of crisis prevention.  
 
The author’s final observations from her review of the literature were concerning 
the orientation of this body of work.  The research was largely founded on the 
narratives of executives and senior managers and theoretical development 
exhibited a tendency to concentrate ‘hard’ knowledge.  Whilst there were some 
aspects of the literature which notably took a more ‘soft’ behavioural approach, 
this tended to focus on knowledge about management behaviour rather than 
knowledge concerning those at grassroots level. 




Therefore the author observed that there were limitations within existing 
knowledge concerning the management of smouldering crises, the defined area 
of study. 
 
In the first instance, the prevailing theme within the management literature 
identified the dominant cause of crises as management failures within an 
organisation’s systems and processes and that smouldering crises happened 
because managers had negated to build adequate defences.  The specific 
underlying nature of these failures was articulated as being concerned with 
management’s perspective, knowledge and capabilities.  Managers had a 
‘bounded rationality’ that prevented them from conceiving of the error potential 
within the organisation’s systems and, at times, impinged ‘sensemaking’ in 
crisis situations.  Furthermore, the complex nature of the organisation’s 
operations challenged management capacity to create complete knowledge of 
error potential and, thus, appropriate defences.  This was exacerbated by a 
poor approach to learning from experience.  The result was that there was a 
chasm between management knowledge and the organisation’s systems and 
processes and an incapacity to exploit early warning dissemination which 
created the ‘latent conditions’ in which errors occurred.  Since it was argued that 
the prevailing ‘latent conditions’ were where management could best arrest 
smouldering crises,  the author concluded that further exploration of these 
critical working conditions within organisations would contribute to an area 
where the shortfall in knowledge was engendering smouldering crisis potential. 
 
In the second instance, the author also observed that the opportunity to inform 
the literature through the knowledge of those who were closest to the 
smouldering crisis incubation point had largely been neglected.  The research 
underpinning the development of the literature was empirically based on the 
narratives of executives and managers and overlooked the relative contribution 
that those at grassroots level could make.  This seemed a particularly critical 
observation given the contributory role of inadequate management knowledge 
in smouldering crisis situations outlined above.  The author concluded that 
knowledge from the neglected perspective of grassroots individuals would be a 




novel approach to take and would address inadequacies in management 
perspective, knowledge and capabilities.   
  
These combined observations led the author to place the research 
methodology, which will be explained in Chapter 4, and the associated 
contribution in knowledge.  The research methodology will focus on 
investigating and exploring the behaviour in the workplace of those at 
grassroots level where there is the potential to cause a smouldering crisis 
through human error.  The analysis of the research will contribute additional 
knowledge from a novel perspective concerning the ‘latent conditions’ in which 
crises smoulder.  This enhanced knowledge base will better help academics, 
researchers and the managers, who are responsible for the conditions in which 
crisis situations can smoulder, to curb smouldering crises as they emerge and 
at the ‘points of inflection’.    The contribution of this thesis will complement 
existing management theory by taking a more holistic and inclusive approach to 
understanding what happens in smouldering crisis situations and why.  
However, before the research methodology is outlined at Chapter 4, Chapter 3 
will examine and critically review the literature concerned with patient safety. 
 




Chapter 3 A Review of Existing Literature on Patient Safety  
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to develop the understanding of the 
management of smouldering crises and patient safety.  However, as the author 
explained in Chapter 1, the chosen context for the research study associated 
with this thesis is the healthcare sector.  In this chapter the author will argue 
that the design of the research study will also facilitate positioning this work and 
the contribution to knowledge against identified limitations in the existing 
literature on patient safety.  Patient safety was defined by Vincent (2006) as 
“the avoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries 
stemming from the process of healthcare” (p14).  Systemic human error in 
healthcare, which the author will assert is symptomatic of a smouldering crisis 
situation, is viewed by both academics and practioners as one which is 
concerned with the safety of patients.  Thus, the chapter will concentrate on 
reviewing the subject of human error in healthcare from an applied literature 
perspective before proceeding to explore patient safety within the healthcare 
context.  Whilst the chapter demonstrates the complexity of the subject, the 
seriousness with which the healthcare sector views human error in medicine 
and the associated intent of healthcare organisations to understand and learn 
from error incidents, there are areas which the author perceives are limited.  
These areas, together with the limitations identified in the previous chapter 
concerning existing crisis management literature, have influenced the design of 
the research study associated with this thesis outlined at Chapter 4.  Moreover, 
the author will argue that, in addition to contributing to knowledge regarding the 
management of smouldering crises, the contribution of this thesis also has a 
particular resonance in patient safety. 
 
3.1 The Healthcare Environment: A Climate for Human Error and Smouldering 
Crises? 
 
Chapter 1 established the sectoral context of this study by presenting a brief 
situational analysis of healthcare in the UK and the NHS in particular.  This 
chapter is focused on examining the subject of human error in healthcare and 
patient safety.  Accordingly, this first section is concerned with looking more 
specifically at the healthcare sector as a sector in which human errors, which 




are symptomatic of the smouldering crisis conditions that were discussed in 
Chapter 2, prevail. 
 
Inevitably the author was faced with a wide ranging and comprehensive field of 
literature to review and therefore had to judge which aspects of the literature 
were significant for and helpful to this thesis.  Thus, the author considered it 
was necessary to establish what the environment was like in healthcare and 
why this produced the conditions in which human errors occurred.  In addition, 
the author felt it was important to synthesise these aspects (the environment 
and its affect on human error episodes ) in order to demonstrate, and illustrate 
through case examples, the connections between what was happening in 
healthcare in the UK and the smouldering crisis events that were discussed in 
the previous chapter.  These two lines of inquiry are adopted as the structure for 
this section. 
 
In undertaking the literature review, the author found a significant level of 
cohesion between aspects of the discussion in the previous chapter, for 
example the anatomy of a smouldering crisis and human error theory, since this 
literature base has informed the development of knowledge in human error in 
healthcare and the agenda for improvements in patient safety.  Whilst reference 
is made to the discussions in the previous chapter, this is performed on an 
applied basis in order to avoid extensive repetition of material.  It should also be 
noted that for reasons of clarity and to aid the reader, this section will be 
principally concerned with human error in healthcare and the next section will 
be concerned with the agenda for improvements in patient safety.  However, it 
will be evident in the discussion that there is overlap in the two areas since 
there is no such division in terms of either the concepts or the literature.   
 
3.1.1 The Healthcare Environment and its Predisposition to Error 
 
There is a plethora of studies concerning medical error.  Some examine the 
concept of human error in medicine in specific contextual situations, for 
example there are studies which investigate error in nursing care (Thompson 
2002) and operating theatres (Reason 2005).  Others look at the broader issues 




of human error in medicine, for example Mulcahy and Rosenthal (1999) and 
Vincent and Reason (1999).  Some focus specifically on the fact that errors in 
medicine compromise patient safety (Vincent, 2006, Vincent and Knox 1997), 
review the mechanisms that healthcare organisations utilise in order to learn 
from incidents (Baba-Akbari Sari et al 2006, Saravanan et al 2007, Walsh and 
Anthony 2007) and aim to address systemic issues through analysis such as 
human reliability analysis and failure models and effects analysis (Lyons et al 
2004).  Whilst others have been commissioned by the Government either 
generally or as a result of public inquiries such as Organisation with a Memory 
(Department of Health 2000a) and the Clothier Report (Department of Health 
1994). 
 
It was generally accepted in the literature that, given the characteristics and 
complexity of healthcare, errors, instigated by humans, would happen which  
compromised patient safety (Leape 1994, Sheridan 2003).  According to Smith 
(2002c), the situation was challenging to manage due to the time and spatial 
distance between the cause of patient safety incidents and their relative effects.  
In terms of further exploring the issue in healthcare, Sheridan’s (2003) 
application of human error theory (Leape 1994, Rasmussen 1990, Reason 
1987, 1990, 1997) to the healthcare sector was particularly useful to the author 
of this thesis, as it sought to consider the linkages between error propensity and 
the professional in the workplace which was a significant influence in this work.  
Sheridan (2003) highlighted the specific human error and patient safety 
challenges created by the nature of healthcare and healthcare professionals, 
the behaviour and well being of healthcare professionals and the efficacy of 
organisational learning through systemic reviews.  These key perspectives of 
Sheridan provide the structure for the remainder of this section where they are 
explored further, with supporting commentary from other literature. 
 
In terms of the nature of healthcare, Smith (2005a), as did Smith and Toft 
(2005), acknowledged the influence of non-linear organisational complexity, 
resourcing limitations and challenging communications and control on the 
propensity for error.  Smith (2005a) elaborated, highlighting the diversity and 
number of organisations, services, cultures and management styles as being 




key contributory factors in generating these complexity and control issues, a 
view with which others concurred (Leape and Berwick 2005, Reason 2008 and 
Walshe 1999).   However, Smith (2005a) accentuated that it was the 
compounding effect of these issues within the context of the unstable and 
sometimes perilous nature of patients’ conditions that created the germinating 
conditions for human errors, a view with which West (2006) acquiesced. 
Donaldson (1999 p218), as did Walshe (1999) expanded on this, proposing that 
errors were to be expected in healthcare and stating ”given the volume and 
complexity of patient care provided by a modern healthcare organisation, some 
serious lapses in standards of care are inevitable”.  Chapter 2 has already 
identified that the dominant management paradigm was for order and control 
within organisations to be at the behest of managers and that the presence of 
human errors within the organisation’s systems were seen as failures of 
management.  However, as the review of literature in Chapter 2 showed, and 
consistent with Donaldson’s view (1999), complete order and control, and thus 
zero error, was perceived to be unachievable principally due to the limitations of 
management perspective and knowledge, the chasm between knowledge and 
the organisation’s defensive mechanisms and ineffective learning.  Vincent 
(2006) illuminated further identifying that clinicians, either in managerial 
positions or on the frontline, demonstrated an intuitive propensity to deal with a 
patient’s care but needed a greater perspective in order to achieve this safely 
within the organisation systems and processes, concluding, like Donaldson 
(1999) that as a result error free healthcare was probably unattainable.    
 
Whilst the dominant view was that the responsibility for human error incidents 
lay with management, Sheridan (2003) attempted to distil the contributory 
behaviour of healthcare professionals in the workplace.  Given that the 
individual in the workplace had been identified at Chapter 2 as the focus for the 
research study, Sheridan’s work provided an interesting and informative 
contextual perspective for the author.   
 
According to Sheridan (2003) the work undertaken by humans was a composite 
of the task goals and constraints, the resources available and the individual or 
group capabilities.  However, whilst Smith (2005a) identified a need for 




significant skills amongst those who were involved in a healthcare 
organisation’s core activities, Sheridan (2003) believed that the work of 
healthcare professionals was subject to a continuous state of adaptation and 
learning and overwhelming tensions in terms of time, effort and unpredictability.  
As a consequence, Sheridan (2003) suggested that there was a need for 
healthcare professionals to simultaneously fulfil strategic criteria (such as 
organisational efficiency measures) and operational criteria (such as the tasks 
associated with getting the job done).  The result, according to Sheridan (2003), 
was that from a task perspective, clinicians became orientated towards the 
satisfaction of job goals and, as long as the outcome did not result in a clinically 
instigated unsafe act, potential or minor errors were forgotten or even covered 
up, a view with which Leape (1994) and Reason (1997, 2000a) concurred.  
Leape (2000), as did Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith (2009) and 
Vincent et al (2000), in particular noted that such working conditions in 
healthcare could threaten patient safety as “safe performance cannot be 
expected from workers who are sleep deprived, who work double or triple shifts 
or whose job designs involve multiple competing urgent priorities” (p726).  
Smith and Toft (2005) and Smith (2002c), drawing on Reason’s ‘latent 
conditions’ (1987, 1990, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2008) and  Smith’s ‘pathways to 
vulnerability’ (2000a and 2005) and the influence of organisational culture, 
believed that the extent of professional interaction and relationships, the 
adequacy of training and support processes and overt self belief were 
particularly influential in creating the conditions in which human error failures 
could occur, a view with which Parker and Lawton (2006) concurred.  As has 
already been indicated, the significance of working conditions identified in the 
literature had a particular resonance with the author’s decisions made in 
Chapter 2 and further emphasised the need to examine in the research study 
the behaviour of grassroots individuals within the environment in which they 
worked.   
 
Singer et al (2007) elaborated further regarding the working environment 
proposing that the degree to which a culture was safety oriented was a 
composition of organisational, unit and individual factors.  Singer at al (2007) 
expanded stating that senior management’s disposition towards patient safety, 




the adequacy of resources and the overall emphasis on patient safety 
contributed to the organisational factors, whilst the unit factors were specifically 
concerned with the propensity within the immediate working environment to 
embrace patient safety and, finally, the orientation of the culture towards blame 
underpinned the third, individual, factor.  Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-
Smith (2009), demonstrating a resonance with Smith (2005a) and Smith and 
Toft’s(2005) work concerning management’s error inducing limited knowledge 
and sensemaking covered in the previous chapter, took a more behaviouralist 
approach in proposing that it was both the extent and cognitive use of 
knowledge, sensemaking and communication that held the capacity to affect 
safety in clinical decision making.  Furthermore, Fischbacher-Smith and 
Fischbacher-Smith (2009) refocused the debate on working conditions and 
highlighted particular factors within the ‘latent conditions’ within healthcare that 
exerted, they believed, a significant force on error propensity amongst 
healthcare professionals; the adequacy of the regulatory and training regime of 
healthcare professionals, the level of miscommunication between professionals, 
their patients and managers, the extent to which cultural changes resulted in 
shifts in rewards and task demands and the style of management.   
 
However, it was Sheridan (2003) who recognised the personal consequences 
and associated tensions that were felt by healthcare professionals.  Sheridan, 
(2003) believed that clinicians, in dealing with the physical and emotional needs 
of their patients, were conditioned in their education and practice to engender a 
personal responsibility for and a strong sense of duty towards their patients, a 
view with which Smith, R (1999) concurred, and stated that violations were 
divergent to such aims.  Whilst the author’s research findings, explored in 
Chapters 5 and 6, were consistent with Sheridan’s views (2003), Vincent’s 
arguments (2006) regarding the need for clinicians to balance patient care 
aspirations within the broader organisational perspective identified the difficulty 
of realising this in practice.    
 
In judging the inevitable potential for ‘active failures’ at grassroots level and in 
the light of grassroots’ limited opportunity to influence ‘latent conditions’, 
Reason ( 2008) appeared to build on the work of Vincent and Reason (1999) 




and proposed an assessment for aiding healthcare professionals in establishing 
the level of risk in clinical situations.  The ‘Three Bucket’ model, which was later 
utilised as a diagnostic tool for grassroots professionals in patient safety training 
(National Patient Safety Agency 2008), viewed the propensity for error to be a 
factor of the current state of the individual (or ‘Self’), the context of the clinical 
situation (or ‘Context’) and the potential for error in the task (or ‘Task’).  In the 
healthcare context, ‘Self’ pertained to how a healthcare professional felt about 
their level of knowledge, skill, expertise, capacity to perform a task and general 
well being.  In terms of ‘Context’ the individual considered the equipment, 
physical environment, workspace, the level of support and teamworking and 
organisation and management.  Finally, in terms of ‘Task’ the individual 
reflected on their propensity for error in a task situation, the complexity and 
novelty of the task and the task process.  Reason (2008) proposed that 
healthcare professionals were trained to utilise a simple mental numerical 
system of grading the probability of error in each ‘bucket’(from 1 to 3, 3 being 
the highest probability), aggregating the scores to calculate the overall extent of 
the risk (with 9 being the highest risk and up to 5 being more routine).  Reason’s 
view (2008) was that the model would enable those who were closest to the 
error potential within a healthcare’s system, yet not able to influence systemic 
changes, to almost intuitively better gauge and avoid error situations.   Aspects 
of Reason’s ‘Three Bucket Model’ (2008) were found by the author in 
developing the contribution to patient safety knowledge.  However, as the 
author will explain in Chapter 9, the knowledge regarding the behaviour of 
grassroots health professionals derived from the research study associated with 
this thesis took a more holistic perspective of the individual within the 
workplace.   
 
In terms of organisational learning, Sheridan (2003) proposed that when errors 
did occur, learning was often locally isolated so that systemic reviews were 
limited, a finding that has some cohesion with Elliott and Smith’s review of 
experience in the UK soccer industry (2006).  Fischbacher-Smith and 
Fischbacher-Smith were particularly critical of the lack of learning through early 
warning signals (2009) and against competing priorities but completely 
convinced that learning, generally, and particularly through early warning 




signals, was essential for patient safety improvements.  The discussion in the 
previous chapter is testimony to Smith’s view (2005a), and that of Smith and 
Elliott (2007) and Smith and Toft (2005), that the inability to learn from incidents 
was widespread in organisations but he emphasised that in healthcare the 
organisational challenges were significant and three-fold.  In the first instance 
the diversity and divisional nature of healthcare made the dissemination of 
learning difficult to successfully achieve.  In the second instance, patient 
confidentiality could create a barrier to learning and, in the third instance, limited 
systematic reporting of incidents left learning incomplete (although as Section 
3.2 will evidence, there has been some progress in this area in the UK).   
 
At a more individual level, Toft and Reynolds (1994) suggested that individuals 
within organisations demonstrated a tendency to underestimate the probability 
and extent of injury related to adverse events and so were passive learners.  
Smith and Toft (2005) argued that an individual’s ability to learn after an 
adverse incident was socially constructed and rooted in individual insight and 
‘sensemaking’ (Weick 1988) and therefore had inherent limitations.  Drawing on 
the concept of denial,  which was discussed in the previous chapter (Augustine 
1995, Hickman and Crandall 1997, Mitroff 1988, Mitroff and Anagnos 2001, 
Mitroff and Pauchant 1992, Mitroff et al 1994, Register and Larkin 2002, 
Richardson 1995, Smith 1990, 1999, Smith and Elliott 2000, Turner 1978, 1994, 
Watkins and Bazerman 2003), Smith and Toft (2005) proposed that it created a 
perception of invulnerability and approach that was psychologically defensive, 
both of which were impediments to effective learning.  Furthermore, Smith and 
Toft (2005) proposed that management in particular suffered from a lack of 
contextual learning in that learning was replicated from elsewhere rather than 
being sensitised to local conditions.   
 
Contextually, Smith and Toft (2005) identified learning as a particularly 
significant issue in healthcare due to the level of ‘misbehaviour ‘ (Ackroyd and 
Thomspon 1999) and the pressures on individuals to cover mistakes, a view 
which was endorsed by Sheridan (2003).  Although Smith and Toft (2005) were 
convinced that misbehaviour was widespread in healthcare, they considered 




relationship between misbehaviour and adverse events.  Whilst the research 
associated with this thesis does not specifically focus on ‘misbehaviour, it was 
designed to explore the behaviour that underpinned adverse events.  In terms 
of the concealment of mistakes, Sheridan (2003), as did Fischbacher-Smith and 
Fischbacher-Smith (2009) and Leape (1994), stated that this in part occurred 
because when errors happened in healthcare there was a propensity to blame 
individuals and pursue them through negligence claims.  In 2008, Reason was 
still claiming that, in healthcare, professionals perceived that error equated to 
personal incompetence.  Several authors (Leape 1994, Sheridan 2003, Smith, 
R 1999) suggested that this affected the behaviour of healthcare professionals, 
for example, “medical students learn quickly that showing confidence is part of 
the culture of their education and practice” (Sheridan 2003 p385) and “... 
doctors, like pilots, tend to overestimate their ability to function flawlessly under 
adverse conditions such as under the pressures of time, fatigue or high anxiety” 
(Leape 2000 p 725).  However, Sheridan (2003) also argued that working 
conditions such as the pressure of work, professional responsibility and lack of 
underlying support mechanisms could result in clinicians lacking the confidence 
or opportunity to reflect.  Leape (2000), broadly concurred, arguing that 
systemic improvements must go hand in hand with improvements in the working 
conditions of healthcare professionals - “Creating a culture of safety requires 
attention not only to the design of our tasks and processes but to the conditions 
under which we work – hours, schedules and workloads; how we interact with 
one another; and perhaps most importantly, how we train every member of the 
healthcare team to participate in the quest for safer patient care.” (Leape 2000 
pp725-726).  Leape was also a key proponent of the elimination of a blame 
culture (1994) as were Leape and Berwick (2005 and Finlayson (2002) who 
highlighted the dominance of blame in the NHS and identified that there should 
be a balance between establishing ownership for mistakes and a need to 
support those involved during the aftermath of an incident.  The observations of 
Sheridan (2003) and Leape (2000) have a particular resonance with the findings 
of the study associated with this thesis as will be shown in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 
8.  However, whilst Sheridan (2003) and Leape (2000) identify the conditions of 
work as being synonymous with a safety culture, the author will assert, in 




Chapter 8, that what underpins effective patient safety is an effective 
organisational climate as outlined in the previous chapter.    
As outlined at the outset of this section, this chapter is focused on examining 
both human error in healthcare and patient safety.  The review so far has 
concentrated on looking more specifically at the literature concerned with 
human error in healthcare, identifying contributory factors as being the nature of 
healthcare and healthcare professionals, the behaviour of healthcare 
professionals and inadequacies in the approach to learning.  The next section 
will explore the synthesis between human error in healthcare and smouldering 
crises. 
 
3.1.2 The Synthesis with the Concept of Smouldering Crises 
 
In the context of this thesis, Chapter 2 presented a definition of organisational 
crisis as being a high impact incident whose genesis lay in problems within the 
organisation’s systems which progressed, unexpectedly, over time and caused 
damages to the resources, reputation and stakeholders of an organisation.  The 
contributory factors in the precipitation of these incidents appeared to be 
organisational complexity and the organisation’s systems and practices but 
predominantly human error.  Chapter 2 also explored the anatomy of crisis 
situations and, utilising Smith’s forensic examination of the incubatory progress 
of a crisis (2005a), showed how, at successive ‘points of inflection’ problems, 
which originated in the organisation’s systems, escalated.  Within the context of 
management’s responsibility for order and control, Smith (2005a) emphasised 
the significant role that grassroots management played at these points since the 
quality of operational decision making and management’s response would 
shape the destiny of a crisis by either arresting its development or exacerbating 
the situation.  It was the view of Smith and Toft (2005) that the capacity to 
successfully stem systemic problems was a product of management’s efficacy 
in terms of information and knowledge and the robustness of the organisation’s 
defensive systems. 
 
In the previous section, the author has discussed predisposition to error within 
healthcare in the UK.  It has been shown that healthcare is a complex 




environment and a number of factors have contributed to this.  There was 
evidence that the service was disparate and delivered through a wide network 
of organisations each of which had its own distinctive management style and 
cultural underpinning which made management control and effective 
communications across the service challenging, resources were limited and, 
finally, patients were heterogeneous in both their nature and care issues and 
often arrived at the service in a perilous condition (Leape 1994, Leape and 
Berwick 2005, Reason 2008, Sheridan 2003, Smith 2002a 2002b, 2005, Smith 
and Toft 2005, Vincent 2006 and Walshe 1999).  Within this complexity, 
healthcare professionals attempted to carry out their work in an error-free 
manner but there were indications of how this intent was compromised.  In the 
first instance, in attempting to satisfy the strategic and operational demands of 
their role, healthcare professionals focused on the satisfaction of job goals and 
were less sensitised to error issues (Sheridan 2003).  In the second instance, 
and within the demanding healthcare environment, it appeared that, at an 
individual level, complexity in relationships, inadequacies in training and the 
propensity for overt self belief amongst healthcare professionals were 
contributory factors in incubating error potential (Smith and Toft 2005).  It 
appeared that the potential error risk was seen as being a composite of the 
status of the individual and the prospect of risk in any given clinical situation 
(Reason 2008).  However, the situation regarding behaviour was exacerbated 
with what appeared to be a limited approach to learning from errors in the 
sector either through the pressure of work (Finlayson 2002, Leape 2000, 
Sheridan 2003), denial (Smith and Toft 2005, Toft and Reynolds 1994), an 
isolated approach to learning (Sheridan 2003), lack of systematic reporting 
(Smith 2005a, Smith and Elliott 2007, Smith and Toft 2005) and a concealment 
of errors due to the pervasive blame culture (Leape 1994, Reason 2008, R 
Smith 1999, Sheridan 2003).  On this latter point, Rosenthal (1999), as did 
Esmail (2006), elucidated further that the factor of uncertainty, in terms of self 
knowledge and medical knowledge itself meant that a healthcare professional’s 
work was a ‘process of discovery’ and that, as a result, this sat uncomfortably 
with error and blame.  The consequences of this were that errors within the 
organisation’s systems and practices occurred (Department of Health 2000a, 




Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith 2009) and were to be expected 
(Donaldson 1999).   
 
At one level, Smith and Toft (2005) believed that ‘misbehaviour’ (Ackroyd and 
Thompson 1999) was very significant because of the reverence and etiquette 
evident in the strong hierarchical relationships and there were some high profile, 
well publicised and damaging cases of this, for example, the cases of Nurse 
Beverley Allitt and GP Harold Shipman.  However, more specifically for this 
thesis given the author’s area of interest outlined in Chapter 1, some error 
incidents achieved a lower profile but were still damaging to those involved.  
Vincent (2006) used the ‘Predictive Human Error Analysis’ technique to classify 
them into three broad areas; errors of omission (forgetting to do things), errors 
of commission (doing the wrong thing) and extraneous errors (doing something 
that is unnecessary).   
 
The Department of Health (2000a) provided some specific cases such as the 
administration of incorrect medicine dosage, for example, when a hospital 
patient was mistakenly administered antibiotic tablets incorrectly through an 
intravenous drip and when children received double the amount of medication 
prior to x-ray.  Other incidents cited by the Department of Health (2000a) were 
connected with the technical procedures in the delivery of the service such as 
the cases of a number of women who, despite earlier sterilisations, became 
pregnant because a surgeon had placed the sterilisation clips incorrectly.  There 
were also failures in terms of communications such as the case of a patient with 
a history of thrombosis, undergoing an exploratory operation, prior to which the 
details of the thrombosis were recorded on the admission form but not 
transferred to the operation form.  The patient was discharged without the 
necessary anticoagulants and later developed a blood clot on his lungs.  In 
each of these cases the patients survived and measures were taken locally to 
address the issues concerned (Department of Health 2000a).  
 
Whilst these incidents appeared isolated, there was also evidence of recurring 
errors such as errors in the administration of spinal injections and negligent 
harm in obstetrics and gynaecology (Department of Health 2000a) and 




examples of serious and extensive systemic error such as the cases of 
children’s heart surgery provision at Bristol Royal Infirmary (Department of 
2001b) and of emergency admissions at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust (Healthcare Commission 2009).   
 
The report of the public inquiry into children's heart surgery provision at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary (Department of Health 2001b) identified that inadequate 
resources, poor structural organisation, flawed communications, ineffective 
leadership and teamworking were responsible for poor paediatric cardiac 
surgery and the ensuing high mortality rates.  The report found that these 
circumstances had perpetuated because control of the care of these vulnerable 
patients lay in the hands of few.  The Inquiry into the care of patients at the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, conducted by Robert Frances QC, has, so 
far, found that patients were routinely neglected by the organisation and those 
within it due to a preoccupation with cost cutting, targets and processes (The 
Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Inquiry 2010).  The report attributed 
compromises in patient safety to a chronic shortage of staff, which had existed 
for a long period of time, found that morale at the Trust was low and that staff 
either felt ignored when they raised concerns and issues or were prevented 
from speaking out for fear of bullying.  The Inquiry judged that the Trust's board 
was disconnected from what was actually happening in the hospital.  The cases 
of Bristol and Mid Staffordshire, which occurred a decade apart, serve to 
illustrate that despite the focus on patient safety both in academic and practical 
literature, recurring serious patient safety breaches which smoulder in the 
systems and processes of healthcare organisations in the UK remain a 
significant issue.  Moreover, it further validates the need to be sensitised to and 
embrace the knowledge of grassroots professionals which underpins this thesis. 
 
All of these incidents were unexpected and had originated over time from a 
coming together of ‘active failures’ and ‘latent conditions’ (Reason 1987, 1990, 
1997, 1998, 2000a, 2008, Vincent and Reason 1999) to create a ‘pathway to 
vulnerability’ (Smith 2000a, 2005b) within the organisation’s systems and had 
produced, through damage to the organisation’s resources, reputation and 
stakeholders, a high impact.   




The author’s proposition is that incidents such as these meet the criteria for 
smouldering crises defined in Chapter 2 and are, thus, evidence of smouldering 
crises within healthcare, a view which is consistent with Smith’s (2005a) and 
Smith and Toft’s (2005) perspective.  These emerging incidents, which 
compromise the safety of patients, are embedded within the systems and 
processes by which healthcare is delivered (West 2006) and are at the behest 
of management who are responsible for creating and controlling them 
(Donaldson 1999, Smith and Toft 2005).    
 
From a position where the factors contributing to human error in healthcare had 
been reviewed through an examination of the literature concerned with the error 
in medicine, this section has explored the synthesis between human error in 
healthcare and smouldering crises.  Utilising the principles that underpin 
knowledge regarding error in medicine and citing case examples from the 
healthcare sector, the author has shown that the errors that the healthcare 
professionals make in delivering patient care exhibited the characteristics of 
smouldering crisis situations, developed in the previous chapter, which are the 
focus of attention of this thesis.  The next section will address how healthcare in 
the UK has attempted to better manage the risk of error in the delivery of patient 
care through the patient safety agenda. 
 
3.2 The Rise of Patient Safety in UK Healthcare 
 
“A well-led, well-managed healthcare organisation will seek to minimize (patient 
safety) incidents by preventing their occurrence and acting swiftly to limit their 
adverse consequences when they do occur” (Donaldson 1999 p219).  This 
section will review the evolution of patient safety in UK healthcare.  Since the 
beginning of this century there has been a general movement to address the 
issue of patient safety in the UK healthcare sector as a result there has been a 
plethora of papers and initiatives authored by public officials and under the 
auspices of patient safety research (House of Commons 2009).  For the 
purposes of synergy with both the thesis and the previous chapter and focus, 
this section will concentrate on, what are for this thesis, the key aspects of the 




patient safety literature, namely literature which considers adverse events 
where systemic failure appears to be the origins. 
 
Whilst Smith (2002c) provided a useful summary of the early development of 
patient safety in the UK, a report by the House of Commons Parliamentary 
Health Committee on Patient Safety published in June 2009 presented a more 
contemporary audit (House of Commons 2009).  Within the report a table, 
summarising what the Committee defined as the key patient safety documents 
and initiatives since 2000, is detailed and shown, with some minor adaptations, 
as Table 3.1 below. 
 
2000 Chief Medical Officer’s Expert Group, An Organisation with a 
Memory—sets a new direction for patient safety in the NHS  
April 2001 Department of Health, Building a Safer NHS for Patients: 
implementing An Organisation with a Memory—makes the NHS the 
first healthcare system in the world with a patient safety strategy  
July 2001 National Patient Safety Agency established  
2004 Health Foundation establishes Safer Patients Initiative in four UK 
hospitals, including Luton and Dunstable in England  
2005-6 Series of reports assessing progress:  
National Audit Office, A Safer Place for Patients  
Public Accounts Committee, A Safer Place for Patients  
Department of Health, Safety First: A report for patients, clinicians 
and healthcare managers  
2008 Lord Darzi, High quality care for all: NHS Next Stage Review Final 
Report  
 
Table 3.1 Summary of Key Patient Safety Documents and Initiatives Since 2000 
(Adapted from The House of Commons Parliamentary 
Health Committee Report on Patient Safety June 2009, House of Commons 
2009)  
 
Organisation with a Memory (Department of Health 2000a) was the first focused 
review of patient safety in the UK healthcare sector although there were similar 
initiatives happening globally through bodies such as The Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (US), The Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement (US), The Institute for Safe Medication Practices (US), The Joint 
Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organisations (US) and The 
Australian Patient Safety Foundation (Australia). 
 




Drawing on the work of noted academics and clinicians in the fields of risk and 
crisis management, human error and patient safety (for example Leape, 
Reason, Smith, Turner, Vincent, Weick), learning from other safety-critical fields 
such as civil aviation, within the context  of an increasingly litigious society 
(Fischbacher and Fischbacher 2009) and reports of 400 deaths or serious 
injuries as a result of medical devices, 10,000 serious adverse reactions to 
drugs and a litigation bill of £400m, Organisation with a Memory acknowledged 
the fact that whilst there was evidence of ‘active failures’, there was also 
evidence of the contributory role of ‘latent’ failures’ (Department of Health 2000a 
pix).  As the previous chapter explained, what this meant was that patients were 
more likely to be harmed by failures in the organisations’ systems rather than 
the actions of individuals.  Consistent with the literature outlined in Section 3.1, 
the report, as did Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith (2009), advocated 
that there should be a move away from blaming and punishing individuals and a 
refocusing on aspects of the care system that created systemic errors.  
However, to achieve this outcome, organisations in healthcare needed to 
encourage openness in the reporting of incidents so that lessons could be 
better learned from systemic errors (Department of Health 2000a).   
 
Whilst there were some adverse incident reporting mechanisms being used (for 
example the Yellow Card Scheme, reports to the Medical Devices Agency, the 
NHS complaints system, the National Confidential Inquiries line and litigation 
reviews), there was no formal and universal method of recording incidents and 
there was much concern that for every major injury there were a greater number 
of minor injuries (1:29) and an even greater number of near misses (1:300), the 
so-called Heinrich Ratio (Department of Health 2000a).   
 
Organisation with a Memory (Department of Health 2000a) aimed to persuade 
the policy makers to introduce a mandatory reporting scheme for adverse 
events and specified near misses so that universal learning could be gained 
from systemic failures and, in so doing, patient safety would be improved.  
Specifically Organisation with a Memory reported the following ten 
recommendations for patient safety in the UK healthcare sector.  In the first 
instance, a mandatory reporting scheme for adverse healthcare events and 




specified near misses should be introduced.  In the second instance, a scheme 
for confidential reporting by staff of adverse events and near misses should also 
be introduced.  In the third instance, a reporting and questioning culture in the 
NHS was to be encouraged.  In the fourth instance, a single overall system for 
the analysis and dissemination of learning from adverse events and near 
misses in healthcare should be introduced.  In the fifth instance, existing 
sources of information regarding adverse events should be better exploited.  In 
the sixth instance, the quality and relevance of adverse event investigations and 
inquiries should to be improved.  In the seventh instance, a research 
programme into adverse events in healthcare should be instigated.  In the 
eighth instance, the (new) NHS information systems were to be better exploited 
so that staff could access learning from adverse events and near misses.  In the 
ninth instance, an action oriented approach was recommended so that learning 
from adverse events and near misses was implemented quickly and 
consistently across the sector.  Finally, the specific categories of serious and 
recurring adverse events needed to be identified. 
 
In 2001, and influenced by the findings of Organisation with a Memory, the US 
study To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System (Kohn et al 1999) and 
the principles of clinical governance, the Department of Health published 
Building a safer NHS for patients: Implementing 'An Organisation with a 
Memory' (Department of Health 2001c) which set out how the recommendations 
within Organisation with a Memory (Department of Health 2000a) were to be 
implemented and specified patient safety targets.   
 
In acknowledging the inevitability of patient safety incidents in a highly complex, 
risk-prone sector, the report (Department of Health 2001c) made key 
recommendations in two specific areas; to record and learn and to create the 
right culture.  Accordingly, the key objective was to establish a universal 
reporting system so that learning from errors and adverse events could be 
achieved.  This reporting system would see a rationalisation of the existing 
systems spread across the sector, be endorsed through an open and blame-
free culture and focus on identifying the root causes of systemic error.  It was 
also recommended that the learning that was envisaged from the reporting 




system should be supported by a programme of patient safety research.  The 
newly-established and independent National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) 
would administer the reporting system within their remit of coordinating the 
effort throughout the country to report and more importantly to learn from 
mistakes and problems that affected patients (Williams and Osborne 2004).  
However, whilst the report identified the creation of a universal reporting and 
learning system as a key objective, there was evidence that the agenda for 
patient safety was broadening, for example, to embrace partnerships with 
outside agencies such as professional associations, suppliers and patients not 
initially specified by Organisation with a Memory  (Department of Health 2001c).    
 
Building a safer NHS for patients: Implementing 'An Organisation with a 
Memory' (Department of Health 2001c) also specified patient safety targets for 
what had been identified as common adverse events; by the end of 2001, zero 
deaths/paralysation by maladministered spinal injections, by 2002, zero hanging 
suicides by mental health patients and by 2005, the number of harm cases in 
obstetrics and gynaecology reduced by 25% and the number of serious errors 
in the use of prescribed drugs reduced by 25%.  However, in 2005, the 
Department of Health reported these targets had not been met although some 
progress had been made (Department of Health 2005b) 
 
By 2004, the Healthcare Foundation, an independent charity which works 
through research and collaboration at all levels within the sector to improve the 
quality of healthcare, had established the first phase of its Safer Patients 
Initiative.  Under the banner of ’Identify, Innovate, Demonstrate, Encourage’, the 
Foundations’ Safer Patients Initiative was the first major improvement 
programme of healthcare interventions to address patient safety in the UK.  
Working locally with 4 hospitals during the 2004-2006 period and then a further 
20 between 2006 and 2008, the Foundation had ambitions to bring about 
universal organisational systemic change through improving the reliability of 
specific processes within the delivery of healthcare including general ward care, 
critical care, perioperative care, pharmaceuticals management and leadership 
(Health Foundation 2011).  Following a review of the two phases of the 
programme, the Foundation concluded that the initiative had succeeded in 




raising awareness of and instigating action in patient safety and engaging 
senior managers in the drive to improve safety but had not delivered an impact 
at an organisational level.  The report concluded that to achieve this 
overarching ambition would need a broader approach with the appropriate level 
of resources and time in order to instigate change at all levels of healthcare in 
the UK (Benning et al 2011a 2011b, The Health Foundation 2011). 
 
The year of 2004 also saw the publication of the NPSA’s Seven steps to patient 
safety.  This report, building on recommendations from reports and  the findings 
from studies in the UK, USA, Australia, New Zealand and Denmark, specified 
the actions that healthcare organisations, in particular the NHS, needed to take 
in order ensure patients’ safety.   With ambitions to help staff meet clinical 
governance, risk management and control assurance targets, Seven steps to 
patient safety was aimed primarily at staff, including senior leadership teams, 
with responsibilities for clinical governance and risk management although was 
advocated to be of use to staff in frontline positions.  The Seven steps to patient 
safety were identified as; building a safety culture, leading and supporting staff, 
integrating risk management activity, promoting reporting, involving and 
communicating with patients and the public, learning and sharing safety lessons 
and implementing solutions to prevent harm (National Patient Safety Agency 
2004).  It is not the author’s intention to explain or review every last aspect of 
each step, rather the approach will be to focus on critical aspects of the steps 
that are pertinent to this thesis. 
 
Building on the work of Reason and Vincent outlined earlier in this chapter, 
Seven steps to patient safety (National Patient Safety Agency 2004) stressed 
the correlation between a safety aware, open and fair culture and improved 
levels of patient safety.  One of the key benefits of this, according to the authors 
of Seven steps to patient safety, Woodward, Randall, Hoey and Bishop, was 
that with an aware, open and fair culture came a greater propensity for regular 
reporting which in turn created the opportunity to identify critical incident 
clusters and thus patient safety issue themes.  Emphasising that culture was a 
difficult and time-consuming activity for leaders of organisations, Seven steps to 
patient safety offered practical advice regarding the promotion, measurement 




and achievement of a safety culture and included a recommendation for the use 
of the now universally adopted ‘Manchester Patient Safety Assessment Tool’  
for assessing the development of a safety culture through the exploration of the 
attitudes, values and behaviours evident in working practices (National Patient 
Safety Agency 2011). 
 
Consistent with strategic literature (for example Doyle and Stern 2006, Lynch 
2009) regarding the achievement of organisational goals and a united 
orientation, Seven steps to patient safety proposed that creating a safety culture 
and adopting an orientation to deliver improved patient safety required leaders 
to lead and command the respect and co-operation of those in the organisation.  
The report placed responsibility for the achievement of improved patient safety 
through the delivery of each of the ‘Seven Steps’ firmly at the feet of senior 
personnel within healthcare organisations and provided a tactical prescription of 
actions that would enable senior managers and executives to achieve (National 
Patient Safety Agency 2004).   
 
Reason’s concept of ‘latent conditions’ (1987, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2008), that is 
recurring systemic issues within the organisation’s environment which provoked 
patient safety incidents, was used in Seven steps to patient safety to emphasise 
the gains that could be achieved by systematically learning and proactively 
managing the risk of these conditions at an organisational level.  The report 
advocated that risk be elevated to board level above a supporting and 
integrated network of risk staff, some of whom would be affiliated to the NPSA, 
and that widely recognised risk assessment infrastructure utilising models such 
as ‘Failure Modes and Effects Analysis’ be deployed in order to identify potential 
patient safety risks before they were enacted. 
 
The main thrust of the move to promote reporting in Seven steps to patient 
safety was the National Reporting and Learning Service (NRLS), a recording 
and reporting system driven out of the initial recommendations of Organisation 
with a Memory and designed to provide an opportunity for universal learning 
from adverse events and near misses.  Supporting the need to create an open 
and fair safety culture, reporting of incidents was anonymised and confidential, 




as was the data emanating from the NRLS.  In preparing the groundwork for the 
NRLS, the NPSA found a great diversity in the terms used to describe adverse 
events and near misses.  The report, as did Donaldson (1999), set out a 
“lexicon” of terms that were used to describe such incidents and was critical of 
the suggestion of individual causality contained in some of the terms, for 
example error and mistake (National Patient Safety Agency 2004 p97).  The 
report proposed that the term ‘patient safety incident’ replaced adverse incident 
or event, clinical incident or error, medical error or mistake and, most 
significantly, near miss since the NPSA was interested in learning from all 
incidents, potential or otherwise (National Patient Safety Agency 2004).  
Furthermore, a grading system was introduced, ranging from zero to 
catastrophic, to co-exist with the term ‘patient safety incident’ in order to indicate 
the seriousness of the incident.  In 2009 the House of Commons’ Health 
Committee Report on Patient Safety stated that the NPSA defined a patient 
safety incident as "any unintended or unexpected incident [due to medical 
management, rather than the natural course of the patient's original illness or 
condition] which could have [led] or did lead to harm for one or more patients 
receiving NHS-funded healthcare" (House of Commons 2009).  
 
The reporting of all serious patient safety incidents to the Care Quality 
Commission via the NRLS became mandatory from 1 April 2010 and, since the 
NRLS was established, over four million incident reports have been submitted 
by healthcare staff (National Patient Safety Agency 2011).  The NRLS has not 
been without its problems and although there was criticism when delivery of a 
fully operational system was delayed and exceeded its budget (Vincent 2007, 
Vincent et al 2008), there was an acknowledgement that enacting the system 
was more complex than the concept had originally suggested (House of 
Commons 2009). 
 
Based on the need for Chief Executives of NHS organisations to comply with 
The Health and Social Care Act 2001 and, since it was recommended that 
patient involvement improved patient care and safety (Fischbacher-Smith and 
Fischbacher-Smith 2009, Department of Health 2001c), Seven steps to patient 




safety proposed that patients were involved both at a strategic level and in 
terms of their own care, even when incidents occurred. 
 
In recognising that the underlying reasons for patient safety incidents were 
predominantly systemic and therefore extended beyond the healthcare 
employee, Seven steps to patient safety advocated the use of Root Cause 
Analysis (RCA), pioneered by authors such as Rasmussen (1983) and Reason 
(2000a), to properly establish the causal route to the incident and enable 
learning to occur (although the report also advocated the use of the Incident 
Decision Tree (Reason 1997) in order to identify whether systems failure was 
the cause of the error).  The benefits of universally adopting such a tool were 
argued as being  that a consistent and uniform approach would be taken to 
each incident, that the focus would be on the systemic origins of the incident, 
that the process would engage staff and patients and that change would follow 
the identification of the causal factors.  However, RCA was not advocated for all 
patient safety incidents rather the expectation was that it would be utilised in 
incidents concerning unexpected death or permanent injury, where acute care 
was needed as a result of the incident and those which triggered external 
investigations such as complaints, criminal investigations or the coroner’s court.  
It was of interest to the author, although not surprising, that the methodology 
underlying RCA bore simiarlities to the Critical Incident Technique which was 
investigated as part of this thesis’ research methodology considerations.  Whilst 
the author did not fully consider RCA as a methodology for the research study 
associated with this thesis, as Chapter 4 will detail, the underlying rationale for 
the choice of methodology was a desire to establish the behaviours underlying 
workplace actions in healthcare in order to explore the notion of smouldering 
crises and their respective management. 
 
The final step in the Seven steps to patient safety was centred on the need to 
learn from incidents and to translate this learning into universal and sustainable 
practices through a patient safety culture and the systems, processes and 
policies of healthcare in the UK.  The NPSA performed a central role in this by 
identifying incident themes through the NRLS, forming partnerships with 
healthcare agencies and the Department of Health to create high level solutions 




and establishing programmes of research including reports on medical error in 
2005.  By way of illustration, the NPSA published the first National Patient 
Safety Observatory Report in 2005, entitled Building a Memory:Preventing 
Harm, Reducing Risks and Improving Patient Safety (National Patient Safety 
Agency 2005) in which Vincent et al’s work (1998) was used to identify nine 
factors which contributed to patient safety incidents; the patient, the task, the 
team and social, the work and environmental, communication, education and 
training, equipment and resource, medication and, finally, organisational and 
strategic.  As it will be shown, these findings demonstrate a particular 
resonance within the findings of the research study undertaken for this thesis 
and presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
 
However the path of the body responsible for patient safety in the UK, the 
National Patient Safety Agency, has not been smooth.   
 
There have been structural issues; the Government’s 2005 review of arm’s-
length bodies allocated additional responsibilities for the management of the 
National Clinical Assessment Authority, NHS Estates (hospital food, cleanliness 
and safe hospital design), National Confidential Enquiries and the National 
Research Ethics Service to the agency (Department of Health 2004) and the 
newly formed coalition Government’s examination of quangos proposed that the 
responsibilities of the National Patient Safety Agency would pass to the new 
NHS Commissioning Board (The Official Site of the British Prime Minister’s 
Office 2011).   
 
More notably there have been issues regarding efficacy and substance.  
Precipitated by a lack of progress generally and specifically concerning the time 
and budgetary concerns regarding the NRLS, further reviews were undertaken 
by the National Audit Office, the Committee of Public Accounts and the 
Department of Health in 2005 and 2006 (Department of Health 2005b, House of 
Commons 2006, National Audit Office 2005,).  The Department of Health’s 
report (2005b) was particularly critical of the development of patient safety 
under the auspices of the NPSA, as were Baba-Akbari Sari et al (2006) and 
Kmietowicz (2007).  The Department of Health (2005b) argued that patient 




safety was not given the same priority as other major issues in healthcare such 
as waiting times and funding and the data collected via the NRLS was not being 
used effectively.  The result was a change of leadership at the NPSA and a 
refocused agenda which included the need to scrutinise the NRLS in order to 
make reporting easier and ensure that learning was expedited across the NHS 
and outsourcing of the development of technical and organisational solutions for 
patient safety issues to other NHS organisations rather than handling them in-
house (Guardian 2011). 
 
Following Lord Darzi’s NHS Next Stage Review (Department of Health 2008), 
the NPSA was recognised as the key body to drive forward patient safety in the 
UK and tasked with a number of key initiatives.  In the first instance, the NPSA 
was to work with partners to develop a profile of Never Events, these were 
patient safety incidents which seriously harmed patients and were of significant 
concern to the NHS and the public yet were entirely preventable given the 
knowledge that was available.  In the second instance, the NPSA was charged 
with driving safety improvement across the UK healthcare system by ensuring 
that successful safety initiatives were rolled out across the NHS (Department of 
Health 2008).   
 
However, the House of Commons Health Committee’s report into Patient Safety 
(House of Commons 2009) remained unconvinced by the progress that had 
been made regarding patient safety in the UK healthcare sector (a similar 
finding concerning progress in the UK was to be found in the Committee’s 
Report in 2006 and in the US in Leape and Berwick’s paper of 2005.  The 
Committee, as were Boaden (2006) and Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-
Smith (2009), were critical of the adequacy of patient safety data, particularly on 
the grounds of the high level of underreporting, the persistency of a person 
centred ‘blame culture’ and, using examples such as the Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust case, stated that “there has been insufficient progress in 
making services safer .... there are sufficient deficiencies in current policy” 
(House of Commons 2009 p3).  Whilst Baba-Akbari Sari et al (2006) and Walsh 
and Anthony (2007) were particularly vocal about the inefficacy and lack of 
discernable impacts regarding the NRLS data, the House of Commons Health 




Committee’s report drew particular attention to the need for the NPSA to gather 
qualitative data using models such as RCA through the NRLS, particularly in 
terms of extreme incidents where death or serious injury was present.  
Furthermore, where learning was available, the report asserted that it was not 
readily accepted by frontline staff because of the autocratic manner of 
communication and a cultural reluctance to accept that incidents in patient care 
were avoidable.  The report, as did, Reason (2008), recommended greater 
involvement by frontline clinicians in the development of patient safety initiatives 
and more patient safety focused training which was interdisciplinary and was 
significantly critical of the adverse impact that inadequate staffing levels had on 
patient safety.  Despite legislative direction and the NPSA’s desire to engender 
patient safety into the leaders of healthcare organisations around the UK, the 
House of Commons Health Committee report (House of Commons 2009) 
reiterated the need to prioritise patient safety amongst managers and Boards, a 
view with which Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith (2009) concurred 
arguing that organisational learning needed to be better embraced in the very 
fabric of the healthcare organisations if patient safety improvements were to be 
realised.  The report concluded by stating that “Government policy has too often 
given the impression that there are priorities, notably hitting targets (particularly 
waiting lists and Accident and Emergency waiting), achieving financial balance 
..... which are more important than patient safety.  All Government policy in 
respect of the NHS must be predicated on the principle that the first priority, 
always and without exception, is to ensure that patients do not suffer avoidable 
harm” (House of Commons2009 p7).  However, whilst acknowledging the need 
for further improvement in terms of patient safety, the independent regulator for 
healthcare, the Quality Care Commission, argued that, consistent with Reason’s 
‘Swiss Cheese Model’, vigilance with regard to patient safety was not a 
transient issue for organisations and needed constant development (House of 
Commons 2009).  Furthermore, although not underplaying the importance of 
serious patient safety incidents nor the need to fully explore them, advocated 
that, synonymous with smouldering crises, these were potentially signals for 
more significant failings in the organisation (House of Commons 2009). 
 




This section has been concerned with how healthcare in the UK has attempted 
to better manage the risk of error in the delivery of patient care through the 
patient safety agenda.  There is clear evidence that since the turn of the century 
there has been an intent to improve patient safety in the UK through policy and 
operational changes.  However, the movement to improve patient safety, has 
encountered criticism, not least because progress towards the safer delivery of 
patient care in the UK has been limited.  Whilst early criticism focused on the 
delay in the delivery and the budgetary overspend of the NRLS and the poor 
dissemination of patient safety information, more recently attention has centred 
on the inadequacies in NRLS, the lack of success in reducing errors in medicine 
and eradicating the blame culture and the priority with which patient safety is 
viewed.  The errors in medicine which are reminiscent of smouldering crises are 
typified by adverse patient safety incidents in healthcare.  This section has 
shown that despite a significant programme of policy and operational change, 
progress has been limited in curbing the nature and incidence of these events.  
Whilst these observations have been instrumental in further directing the 
research study associated with this thesis, the author will argue in Chapters 8 
and 9 that this thesis’ contribution to knowledge also has a particular resonance 




Chapter 1 outlined how Aneurin Bevan launched the NHS, what is today the 
largest publicly funded healthcare organisation, on July 5 1948 underpinned by 
a philosophy of delivering healthcare to all which was free at the point of 
delivery and based on clinical need, not the ability to pay.  The philosophy 
remains and directs Government aspirations to achieve the highest standards of 
excellence and professionalism, reflect the needs and preference of patients, 
work across organisational boundaries in the interests of patients, provide value 
for money for the taxpayer and be accountable to those it serves.  However, 
since its inception the perennial challenges of managing funding and resources 
has occupied successive Governments, the current Government included, 
which has vowed to focus on outcomes rather than processes and improve 
patient choice, experience and safety.  This latter point of patient safety is a 




critical issue within the context chosen for this thesis since systemic human 
error in healthcare is viewed by academics and practitioners as one which is 
concerned with the safety of patients. 
 
The knowledge base for the development of patient safety in the healthcare 
sector has been heavily influenced by the paradigm that systemic management 
failures underpin the ‘latent conditions’ within organisations which create the 
incidence of smouldering crises.  In this sense, the author recognised a 
correlation with the management literature concerning smouldering crises 
discussed in the previous chapter and a movement away from apportioning 
blame at individual level.  However, there were also distinctive observations 
made in the literature concerning error in healthcare regarding the nature of 
healthcare and healthcare professionals, the behaviour and well being of 
healthcare professionals and the efficacy of organisational learning through 
systemic reviews.  In the first instance, organisational complexity, resourcing 
limitations, communications and control challenges and the perilous conditions 
of patients precipitated the propensity for error in healthcare.  In the second 
instance, whilst the work of healthcare professionals was driven by the task, 
resources and capabilities, their working environment was difficult.  This, when 
combined with the operational and individual challenges, created the conditions 
in which errors smouldered, a patient safety culture was inhibited and 
compromised the dutiful ambitions of healthcare professionals.  In the third 
instance, this situation was sustained due to the limited learning which was a 
result of a diverse and divisional structure and culture, an inadequate approach 
to learning which saw the persistence of denial and a blame culture and patient 
confidentiality. 
 
Despite the challenges of combating error prone conditions and in spite of an 
acknowledgement that complete error-free healthcare was not an aspiration, the 
healthcare sector in the UK, headed by the NHS, has taken action to improve 
the safety of its patients.  Pioneered in the Chief Medical Officer’s report 
Organisation with a Memory, a programme aimed at reducing patient safety 
incidents has been embarked upon.  Led by the National Patient Safety Agency 
and including pilot schemes to test patient safety initiatives, a range of technical 




instruments and significantly, the first reporting mechanism for patient safety 
incidents, the programme has experienced some success.  However, a series 
of appraisals by public bodies, academics and researchers has been critical of 
the level and nature of progress and believed that further developments, 
possibly with more involvement from frontline staff, were required.  Criticism 
centred on several factors.  In the first instance, early criticism focused on the 
delay in the delivery and the budgetary overspend of the NRLS and the poor 
dissemination of patient safety information.  In the second instance, the 
adequacy of the data produced by the NRLS was questioned, specifically the 
continued level of underreporting and the lack of qualitative data.  In the third 
instance, it was argued that despite a programme of patient safety, there had 
been an insufficient reduction in errors and the blame culture remained.  In the 
fourth instance, patient safety was still perceived to be a lower priority than 
resourcing and funding issues in healthcare.   
 
The review of error in medicine and patient safety led the author to identify three 
limitations in the patient safety in healthcare literature.  In the first instance, 
although the principles of management literature on smouldering crises 
supported the development of patient safety in healthcare, the behavioural 
issues concerning the contributory role of management perspective, knowledge 
and capabilities had not been explicitly and widely acknowledged.  Thus, there 
was a case for proposing that patient safety in healthcare could be better 
managed if those who managed the organisation’s systems and processes had 
more information which was used effectively.  In the second instance, the 
working environment of a healthcare professional appeared to play a significant 
role in the precipitation of errors in patient safety and, whilst there was some 
knowledge regarding the healthcare professional at work, there was a case for 
exploring this further.  In the third instance, whilst the movement to improve 
patient safety embraced in the UK healthcare sector had made progress, key 
limitations concerning the nature and quality of the information underpinning its 
continued development had been identified.  The direct criticism was in the over 
emphasis on quantitative information at the expense of qualitative information.  
It is within the context of these limitations that the author placed her work. 
 




Accordingly, this led the author to consider further the research methodology 
and the associated contribution to knowledge.  Chapter 2 has already reasoned 
that, in order to address the identified limitations of management literature 
concerning management failures in smouldering crises situations, the research 
methodology would focus on investigating and exploring the behaviour in the 
workplace of those at grassroots level where there was the potential to cause a 
smouldering crisis through systemic human error.  Since the research context is 
healthcare, it was the workplace behaviour of healthcare professionals that 
would be the focus of the study.  Within the context of the limitations in the 
patient safety in healthcare literature, exploring, from a qualitative perspective, 
the behaviour of professionals in healthcare would provide a further area of 
contribution.  This thesis will contribute to patient safety knowledge by providing 
more in-depth information to those who manage the ‘latent conditions’ in the 
organisation’s systems and processes which propagate patient safety incidents.  
Thus, this thesis will also contribute to the debate regarding patient safety and 
in so doing, will enhance management knowledge in the prevention of 




Chapter 4  Research Methodology 
 
This chapter details with the methodological approach taken in this thesis within 
the context of the epistemological and ontological alternatives available.  It goes 
on to discuss the application of critical theory to the research study 
underpinning this thesis.  The relative merits of quantitative and qualitative data 
collection methods are considered within the context of the aim of the thesis.  
The chapter concludes by detailing an account of the research choices made 
and the methods used to collect and analyse the data for this thesis.   To aid the 
reader, the flow and sequence of decisions is signposted at the end of each 
section in diagrammatical form. 
 
Instrumental in the consideration of the research methodology are the 
observations made about existing literature, that of crisis management in 
Chapter 2 and patient safety in Chapter 3.   Specifically, the author has noted 
that crisis management theory has gravitated towards high profile crises and is 
founded on and centric to the views of those at the top of organisations.  As a 
consequence, although some knowledge concerning the behaviour of 
management in the systemic failures that lead to smouldering crisis situations 
has been developed, knowledge is limited in terms of the contributory behaviour 
of those at grassroots who were closer to the crisis incubation point.  Within the 
healthcare context of this thesis, the author has asserted that adverse patient 
safety incidents exhibited the characteristics of smouldering crises and, whilst 
knowledge in the areas of error in medicine and patient safety regarding the 
management of such events has informed policy and practice, tangible progress  
has been limited.  The author has argued that knowledge has been developed 
in a partial manner focusing on ‘hard’ issues at the expense of the development 
of a more ‘soft’ behavioural approach and that research, policy and practice 
would be better informed if this was partiality was addressed. 
 
Thus the aim of this thesis is to develop a deeper understanding of the 
management of smouldering crises and patient safety in healthcare by 
examining how the effect of grassroots behaviour can potentially cause 




this thesis was focused on investigating and exploring how and why individuals 
at grassroots level behave in the way they do. 
 
4.1 Research Philosophy 
 
According to Wilson (2010), epistemological and ontological perspectives were 
central to any researcher’s work.  It is, stated Wilson (2010), the nature and 
combination of these concepts which dictated the philosophical position of a 
researcher since collectively they drive how a researcher views the world, the 
people within it and the nature of scientific discovery.  As a consequence, a 
researcher’s philosophical position would influence the methodology, research 
strategy, analysis and interpretation of data.  Thus it was necessary for the 
author to consider alternative research philosophies in order to identify her 
philosophical position since this would be pivotal to the choice of research 
methodology and the design of the research plan which would facilitate the 
achievement of the aim of this thesis.  It is not the intention of the author to 
present an evaluation of every research philosophy considered but to centre the 
discussion on the issues that were important to the author when identifying her 
philosophical position. 
 
The author observed that a positivist philosophy advocated the notion that the 
research was able to be independent from what was being observed and, as a 
consequence, research could be undertaken objectively (Wilson 2010).  
According to Rorty (1979), the role of the research was to reflect what was 
being observed neutrally and without contamination.  A researcher with a 
positivist orientation would approach studies concerning the social world in the 
same way that they would approach studies concerning the natural sciences 
(Johnson 2003) by, for example, focusing on facts, aiming to identify causality 
and formulating and testing hypotheses.   According to Gill and Johnson (2002, 
2010), a positivist philosophy would direct researchers to deductively prove 
theories by establishing cause and effect in a remote and value free manner.  
Wilson (2010) proposed that the research strategy of a positive researcher was 
likely to be quantitative as the research used measurement to validate testing 




approach to matters such as human behaviour which could not be objectively 
observed and measured.  The limited approach to acquiring behavioural 
knowledge was felt to be inhibiting by the author generally and specifically in the 
context of this study.  The author was seeking to explore the behaviour of 
individuals in order to understand why potentially their actions may cause crises 
to smoulder within organisations.  Consistent with the author’s observations 
regarding the limitations of existing literature, the author believed that the aim of 
the research could not be achieved through measurement but required a 
deeper understanding of the reasons behind such action.   
 
As the anti-thesis of positivism, a post modernist philosophy promoted the view 
that knowledge was socially constructed and highly subjective (Johnson 2003).  
According to Barry and Elmes (1997) and Kilduff and Mehra (1997) , it was 
impossible for a researcher to adopt a neutral observation of the world since by 
interpreting what was being observed the researcher was imposing meaning.   
A researcher with a post modernist philosophy would inductively develop theory 
by adopting methodologies which allowed the researcher to focus on meanings 
in order to develop an in-depth understanding of what was happening.  The 
author felt that the emphasis on meaning and understanding within a post 
modernist philosophy overcame the main limitation of a positivist orientation and 
was more conducive to providing a successful foundation upon which to build 
the research strategy and design for this thesis.  However, for some 
researchers with a post modernist orientation, such as interpretivists, 
investigations into issues concerned with the social world could only be 
explored if the research worked from within a setting.  As the author felt that this 
was not an approach which was necessary in the context of this study, she 
sought to identify other philosophical views which addressed the issue of 
researcher involvement but retained the inductively based social constructivist 
approach of post modernism. 
 
The author considered the philosophical position of critical theorism.  Critical 
theorists maintained that the nature of science had twin dimensions, the 
empirical-analytical science of the noumenal world and historical-hermeneutical 




understanding of both (Habermas 1974).  Thus, the critical theorist’s philosophy 
appeared to combine the ontological objectivism of positivism with the 
subjectivism of post modernism (Johnson 2003).   Gill and Johnson (2010) 
highlighted that the aim of critical theorists was to explore contemporary 
pervading routines and their relative impact on the behaviours of the 
“disempowered” in organisational settings through structural phenomonology 
(p208).  In Chapters 2 and 3, the author observed limitations in terms of the 
development of behavioural knowledge in both crisis management and patient 
safety literature.  The author’s intention in this thesis is to complement existing 
knowledge concerning the management of smouldering crises and patient 
safety by investigating and understanding the contribution of the behaviour of 
grassroots individuals.  Furthermore, critical theorists believed that progression 
and the commitment to acquiring knowledge should be achieved through an 
inclusive, democratic process (Blaikie 1993).  Gill and Johnson (2010) 
concurred, stressing the need to “emancipate people who are … 
disenfranchised in organisations …“ (p208).  As was evidenced in Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3, knowledge regarding smouldering crises and patient safety has 
neglected to consider the views of grassroots individuals, developing as it has 
from an organisational perspective and, in terms of crisis management, through 
the empirical contributions of executives and senior managers within 
organisations.  Thus, there appeared to be a cohesion between what the author 
aimed to achieve in this thesis and the mode of investigation of critical theorists.  
For these reasons, the author was orientated towards a critical theorist’s 

































4.2 Research Strategy 
 
The previous section explained how the author arrived at the decision that her 
philosophical paradigm was that of a critical theorist and, in doing so, identified 
the emphasis on and value of taking a phenomological approach to the 
research strategy.  Lee and Lings (2008) stated that a phenomological 
approach was justified when a research strategy aimed to study human 
experiences within the world in which those experiences were happening.  
Wilson (2010) suggested that an enquiry of a nature, which sought to elucidate 
meaning from narratives and stressed that reality was socially constructed, lent 
itself to qualitative research strategies.   Thus, the author felt that a qualitatively 
designed phenomological strategy was entirely appropriate in view of the fact 
that the research aimed to explore the behaviour of grassroots individuals in 
their work setting in order to contribute to the level of understanding concerning 
the impact these behaviours had on smouldering crises and patient safety.  
However, in coming to this decision, quantitative strategies associated with 
deductive approaches to philosophy such as experiment and survey research 
were discounted due to their emphasis on measurement at the expense of 













The author then reviewed a number of qualitative research strategies, all of 
which presented the opportunity of taking a phenomological approach to the 
research strategy, in order to identify the most relevant strategy for the research 
underpinning this thesis.   
 
The author felt that the research aim did not require the collaborative approach 
of action research and participant observation strategies nor was there any 
benefit in taking the longitudinal and evolving nature of grounded theory.  A 
case study strategy was, according to Yin (1994) though, more appropriate 
because case studies “investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident” (p 13).  Furthermore, Yin (1994) suggested that a case 
study strategy could be considered for critical, extreme or unique cases.  The 
author considered whether the research aim could be achieved by building case 
studies around human error incidents in healthcare.  However, the main 
reasons for rejecting this strategy were two-fold.  Firstly, the author knew from 
previous research experience (which was outlined in Chapter 1), that gaining 
access to healthcare professionals involved in human error incidents was 
difficult and sometimes even prohibitive.  Secondly, the gap in the literature 
identified in Chapters 2 and 3 was concerned with the incubation of smouldering 
crises.  To focus specifically on human error incidents would inhibit the capacity 
to explore the broader impact of an individual’s behaviour on incubating crises. 
 
A critical incident technique (CIT) strategy also seemed, at the outset, 
appropriate.  According to Flanagan (1954) CIT involved the exploration of a 
well defined and isolated critical incident from the reflections of those 
participating in it, in order to better understand the actions and motives of those 
involved.  It was particularly helpful when understanding about an area was 
limited yet the study called for in-depth development of knowledge (Gremler 
2004) because it facilitated the cognitive and behavioural understanding of the 
incident from the perspective of the individual (Chell 1998).  There was 
evidence (for example Brant 1992, Kemppainen 2000, Kilroy 2006, Mallak etc al 





Chell (1998) advocated that in order to identify critical incidents, it was 
necessary for a researcher to have a contextual understanding.  Therefore, the 
author initiated secondary research in order to facilitate contextual knowledge 
and prepare the groundwork for subsequent primary research.  In addition to 
Chell’s specific comments regarding the operationalisation of CIT, the author 
felt that it was necessary to investigate the context of healthcare in the UK in 
order to formally familiarise herself with the setting of the research.  
Furthermore, as Chell suggested, this secondary data investigation and 
analysis was required to explore the nature and characteristics of human error 
incidents within healthcare in the UK as a precursor to identifying critical 
incidents.  Aspects of the findings of the secondary data review have informed 
Chapters 1 and 3.   
 
Although the author accessed a significant amount of secondary data in order to 
familiarise herself with the healthcare setting, The Department of Health’s 
Organisation with a Memory (2000a) was a particularly helpful report since it 
collated secondary data from across healthcare in order to review the status of 
errors in the sector.  The report identified a series of common errors which were 
maladministration of spinal injections, negligent harm in the field of obstetrics 
and gynaecology, errors in the use of prescribed drugs and negligent 
supervision of mental health patients.   The Department of Health’s subsequent 
document (Building a Safer NHS: Implementing Organisation with a Memory 
2001c) outlined planned actions to address the incidence of errors generally 
and common errors in particular.  In addition, the report also proposed a 
research programme, funded by the Department of Health and other major 
medical research funders.  There was evidence that a major research 
programme was starting to address specific human error problems in 
healthcare.  
 
Whilst this research programme validated and legitimised the subject of the 
thesis, it also caused the author to reflect on the research strategy underpinning 
this thesis.  In the first instance, and notwithstanding the author’s own 
reservations regarding the difficulties of approaching healthcare professionals 




programme might further hinder this study’s access arrangements.  In the 
second instance, the Department of Health’s research would focus, to some 
degree, on the common error types that were identified in Organisation with a 
Memory (2000a).  This was borne out in subsequent secondary research which 
identified research activity in these areas and caused the author to reconsider 
whether identifying common error incidents as critical incidents would be well 
received by the authorities who were responsible for granting access.  Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, the author reviewed all of this within the context 
of the gap in the literature identified in Chapters 2 and 3 and concluded that as 
the research underpinning this thesis was concerned with the incubation of 
smouldering crises in healthcare, focusing solely on human error incidents 
would inhibit the capacity to explore the broader impact of an individual’s 
behaviour on incubating crises.   
 
Thus, the author felt that it was not appropriate to utilise CIT in its purest sense, 
as in the work of Flanagan (1954).  However, there was evidence in the work of 
Chell (1998) that the strategy had been adapted to specific research 
applications and the author remained convinced that whilst it did not seem 
appropriate to focus on critical incidents, broadening this strategy to a scenario 
based on working life worked well with the aim of the research underpinning this 
thesis.  Thus, the literature on CIT as a strategy was helpful in providing more 
general guidance regarding the utilisation of a strategy which involved working 
life scenarios. 
 
Determining the working life scenarios was challenging for the author.  As 
outlined in Chapter 1, healthcare is a diverse and fragmented sector, yet it is 
necessary for distinctive and disparate elements to come together in order to 
care for patients.  With the aim of the research being to explore how the 
behaviour of grassroots individuals created the potential to initiate a 
smouldering crisis, the author needed to consider which aspects of working life 
to focus upon.  The literature suggested that a technique which utilised 
incidents worked best if the incident was well defined but the question was what 
and how to define.  To specify an incident which focused on a particular 




interactions between individuals in different elements of healthcare provision 
when caring for patients and this seemed from the review of literature in 
Chapter 3 to be an important issue.  However, it was difficult to envisage being 
able to specify an incident that would provide the opportunity to explore the 
behavioural interactions between individuals across all elements of healthcare 
provision.  So approaching the creation of incidents from an organisational 
perspective did not yield a decision regarding scenarios.  
 
The author decided to take an alternative view and approach the creation of 
working life scenarios from the perspective of patient care.  The author felt that, 
broadly speaking, patients needed the care of healthcare professionals in two 
ways.  Patients needed acute care in emergency situations where there was 
some urgency in the provision or routine care in situations where provision 
could be planned.  This appeared to be a better approach as it seemed to offer 
the author the opportunity to create scenarios which combined elements of 
healthcare but were specific to the scenarios healthcare professionals 
encountered in their working life.    
 
The next decision was to decide how to articulate these two scenarios, one 
which expressed an acute care situation and one a routine situation.  Within the 
context of the literature, the author considered how the scenarios were going to 
be used.  In the first instance, the scenarios would be used to define the sample 
selection, since the sample selected would be based on those who would 
participate in a scenario.  In the second instance, the scenario would be used to 
stimulate the reflections of these participants so that the behaviours in their 
daily working lives could be explored and evaluated.   The author was 
concerned that if the specification of the scenarios was centred on particular 
acute or routine care needs, for example a patient is admitted by ambulance to 
hospital following a heart attack or a patient is referred by a GP to a consultant 
as a result of incessant pain in a shoulder joint, the discussion might focus only 
on the behaviours that happened as a result of these needs.  Therefore, the 
author made a decision to base the scenarios on acute and routine care needs 
but not specify the precise nature of the need.  Accordingly, the working life 






A patient is brought to Accident and Emergency via ambulance as an 




A patient is referred by a GP to a Surgical Consultant who later arranges for a 
scheduled admission to hospital for a surgical procedure 
 
These scenarios ensured that the research strategy could explore the 
behaviours of healthcare professionals across the sector, from general 
practioners, to ambulance personnel, to professionals in emergency and routine 
care provision in hospitals.  They were felt to be specific enough to facilitate the 
reflections of these professionals in their working life yet offered a focused 
direction for implementation of the research strategy. 
 
In conclusion, given the author’s philosophical stance, working life scenarios 
were selected as the research strategy.  The author believed that utilising 
narrative, phenomologically-based scenarios would aid individuals in discussing 
behaviours in their daily working lives.  Furthermore, it would also assist the 
author in exploring and investigating meaning in these narratives (Davis 2006, 
Edvardsson and Roos 2001) which would explain how an individual’s behaviour 



































4.3 Primary Data Collection 
 
4.3.1 Research Questions, Regulations and Boundaries  
 
Before the data collection could take place, a number of issues had to be 
resolved.  The first of these was to define the research questions in order to 
provide the focus for the collection and subsequent analysis of data (Saunders 
et al 2007).  Secondly, decisions about the boundaries of the research had to 
be made since this would influence the recruitment of the sample.  Whilst these 
are set out above as a sequence, in reality the author was dealing with each of 
the aspects concurrently as a decision in one area would affect what was 
happening in another.  This section will explain the rationale for the decisions 
made in each of the above areas. 
 
4.3.1.1 Research Questions 
 
Chapter 2 defined smouldering crises as the area of research for this thesis.  
However, whilst the existing crisis management literature acknowledged the 
dominant role of human error as a root of these crises and knowledge 














understanding regarding the underlying reasons for grassroots behaviour was 
limited.  Although Chapter 3 demonstrated that there were commonalities 
between crisis management and patient safety literature, the level of 
behavioural understanding was perceived, by critics, as inhibiting progress and 
for the author was identified as an area for development in this thesis.  
Therefore, central to the contribution of this thesis, and thus, the aim of the 
research, was to develop this understanding by exploring the nature of the 
behaviour of individuals at grassroots level. 
 
In order to ensure that the research achieved this aim, it was critical to define 
clear research questions which were specific within the context of this study and 
the author’s research philosophy (Saunders et al 2007).  The focus of the 
research questions was to explore the behaviour of grassroots individuals in 
healthcare.  However, this would be insufficient to achieve the aim of the study 
unless they were sensitised to the area of contribution.  
 
Accordingly, the author rationalised the specific research questions as: 
 
1. What influences grassroots healthcare professionals in the work setting? 
 
2. How does this affect how they behave in their job roles? 
 
These questions were necessary because the author wanted to explore the 
drivers for healthcare professionals in the work setting and how and where the 
behaviours of grassroots individuals in their daily working life created the 
potential to initiate a smouldering crisis. 
 
3. What effect does the behaviour of grassroots individuals have on their 
peers?   
 
This question was necessary because the literature concerning the systemic 
nature of smouldering crises suggested an inherent and cumulating progression 




consequential impact of one individual’s behaviour on another in order to 
consider what part this played in a smouldering crisis. 
 
4. What effect does the behaviour of grassroots healthcare professionals 
have on patient care and how might this behaviour in the workplace lead 
to patient safety errors which are symptomatic of smouldering crises? 
 
This question sought to examine how behaviour impacted upon the care of 
patients since, as explained in Chapters 1 and 3, there were instances in 
healthcare organisations where the unintentional behaviour of individuals 
caused injury to those in their care.  The author has argued in Chapter 3 that in 
organisations where the raison d’être was patient care, this behaviour was 
symptomatic of a smouldering crisis. 
 
4.3.1.2 Research Boundaries 
 
Given the scale and disparate nature of healthcare provision in the UK 
(examined in Chapters 1 and 3), the author felt that it was necessary to define 
the boundaries of the research underpinning this thesis.   
 
In defining the boundaries of the research, the author considered a number of 
options.  
 
In the first instance, with the incidence of human error in healthcare being 
central to the thesis, the author investigated whether she should conduct the 
research in a healthcare organisation where error incidents had been reported.  
Whilst these could be identified through secondary data such as broadsheet 
press commentary, Department of Health reports or public inquiries, the author 
felt that this would not be appropriate to the study on two counts.  Firstly, 
organisations identified and examined via these methods might be reluctant to 
participate in any research.  Secondly, domiciling the research in what might be 






In the second instance, the author considered using a number of healthcare 
organisations across the country.  This option was discounted because it was 
felt that the qualitative nature of the research did not require a large sample nor 
the generalisability of the results of the research.   
 
In the third instance, the author considered conducting the research in a 
healthcare organisation which would act as a proxy for healthcare organisations 
for the purposes of the study.  Whilst several alternatives were considered, the 
author selected South Yorkshire Strategic Health Authority (SYSHA) as a proxy 
for a number of reasons.  Firstly, the links between both Sheffield universities 
and the SYSHA is good and there was a particular desire to improve the links 
between Sheffield Hallam University, the sponsor of this research, and SYSHA.  
Secondly, and as a consequence, the author believed that this presented an 
opportunity to support the sponsoring organisation’s move to improve links.  
Thirdly, the author felt that approaching an organisation with links to the 
University would expedite access arrangements.  The author, though, was 
aware that this made the research locality based.  However, Easterby-Smith et 
al (2008) did not identify locally based research as a particular problem for two 
reasons.  The first reason being that any behaviour was contextually bound and 
therefore researchers would need to evaluate each context separately and 
avoid generalisation.  Alpander (1982) concurred, believing that generic 
classification measures could be identified in such cases but their practical 
application regarding generalisability was limited.  The second reason, 
according to Easterby et al (2002) was that generalisabilty often favoured the 
powerful and therefore it was more holistic to focus on what was happening in 
each locale.  
 
4.3.1.3 Research Regulations 
 
In terms of regulation, the research was subject to the ethical and scientific 
standards of both Sheffield Hallam University and SYSHA.  Sheffield Hallam 
University (2006) stated that a research study should comply with a number of 
ethical principles; namely beneficence, non-malfeasance, informed consent, 




Research Ethics Service stated that “The Research Governance Framework for 
health and social care defines the broad principles of good research 
governance and is key to ensure that health and social research is conducted to 
high scientific and ethical standards” (National Research Ethics Service 2011).  
The author felt that the procedures associated with satisfying these standards 
were beneficial as they provided additional guidance concerning the quality and 
integrity of the research process.  The research was assessed as being 
compliant with the standards and therefore authorised by Sheffield Hallam 
University and relevant bodies in SYSHA.  However, achieving approval from 
the relevant bodies in SYSHA to proceed was challenging.   
 
In the first instance, the author had no prior knowledge of the regulatory process 
and found it difficult to establish what was required and by whom. 
 
In the second instance, the time spent investigating what was required, together 
with the application and approvals process, impacted heavily upon the time 
frame of the study.  This was important for the author since it required a 
modification of aspects of the research plans including the sampling method 
and the transcription process (see Section 4.3.2.2 and 4.4). 
 
4.3.2 Collecting the Data 
 
4.3.2.1 Implementation of the Method  
 
The author decided to develop an understanding of an individual’s behaviour by 
exploring the daily working lives of healthcare professionals through the use of 
appropriate scenarios.  This section is concerned with how the research 
strategy was implemented and the issues that the author felt it necessary to 
consider.   
 
The author considered that within the context of the qualitative research 
strategy, there were two methods of implementing the scenarios: focus groups 





Lee and Lings (2008) advocated that focus groups were a good method of 
establishing people’s attitudes and suggested that groups worked well when the 
researcher felt that it was necessary to explore the views of a specific group of 
people on a particular topic.  Davis (2006) concurred, proposing that focus 
groups facilitated the explicit expression of implicit thoughts and feelings and 
allowed participants to describe the motivations for their actions.  According to 
Lee and Lings (2008) one of the key benefits of utilising focus groups was that 
the researcher was able to observe how a group interacted.  Initially, for these 
reasons the author felt that administering the scenarios through focus groups 
could be an appropriate method.  It blended well with the aim of the research, 
the use of focused scenarios and the research questions, particularly question 3 
regarding the interactions between professionals.  However there were several 
reasons why focus groups were not utilised.  In the first instance, the gap in 
knowledge and the contribution of this thesis was firmly placed at the individual 
level.  Whilst the author wanted to explore the consequential impact of one 
individual’s behaviour on another in order to consider what part this played in a 
smouldering crisis and adverse patient safety incidents, the unit of analysis was 
the individual healthcare professional.  In the second instance, Lee and Lings 
(2008) warned that, logistically, focus groups were difficult to organise.  The 
author investigated this further during a discussion with an experienced 
researcher in the proxy organisation who confirmed that this was particularly the 
case.  For these reasons, focus groups were not considered to be an 
appropriate method. 
 
Wilson (2010) suggested that interviews allowed a researcher to acquire an 
insight into the beliefs and attitudes of participants through verbal and non-
verbal communication.  Although interviews could be utilised in quantitative 
descriptive or explanatory research, they were also appropriate in qualitative 
exploratory researcher (Saunders et al 2007).  Lee and Lings concurred (2008) 
stating that in-depth interviews were appropriate for sensitive issues or where 
“detailed individual experiences” were sought (p233).  Qualitative interviews 
could be either unstructured, where the researcher used a few brief topics to 
direct the interview, or semi-structured, where the interview was directed 




Researchers would, according to Lee and Lings (2008) use the former when 
they did not wish to impose particular views on the participant but warned that 
this method at times did not generate useful data because it allowed the 
participant to talk about anything.  On the other hand, Lee and Lings (2008) 
advocated that semi-structured interviews were appropriate where the review of 
literature had the potential to direct a focused topic guide.  Lee and Lings (2008) 
advocated that interviewing was particularly useful because of its flexibility, in 
terms of content, style and timing, a view with which Wilson (2010) concurred, 
adding that an additional benefit was that interviews could be recorded.  
Operationally, therefore, interviews were considered by the author to be more 
straightforward to administer than focus groups yet would yield the same depth 
of reflection from participants, particularly if directed through a semi-structure 
topic guide that had been developed out of a researcher’s review of research 
literature.  For these reasons, the author concluded that the data would be 
collected through interviews. 
 
The interviews utilised a semi-structured topic guide.  The design and structure 
of the topic guide was informed by the advice of Lee and Lings (2008) and 
Saunders et al (2007) regarding good practice.   In addition, aspects of the 
literature on critical incident technique (Chell 1998, Davis 2006 , Flanagan 
1954, Gremler 2004, Mallek et al 2003) were applied.  The topic guide can be 
found at Appendix 4.1.  
 
The guide began by reviewing the information that had been provided to the 
sample beforehand in the information pack which can be found at Appendix 4.2 
and then confirmed participant anonymity and confidentiality.    Saunders et al 
(2007), as did Lee and Ling (2008), considered this to be good practice in semi-
structured interviews.  The remainder of the guide introduced the working life 
scenario then asked participants to discuss their respective roles and likely 
actions.  Participants were also asked to identify and provide their own rationale 
for things ‘going wrong’ and ‘right’ within the scenario.  There was an 
opportunity within the topic guide for the researcher to probe each aspect of the 
scenario.  In addition, participants were asked to provide anonymised examples 




were saying.  Finally, participants were asked to identify specific areas where 
they provided patient care through the interaction with peers.  For time 
management reasons, the author chose to utilise one scenario per interview, 
with the selection being based on the scenario’s appropriateness to the sample.  
Where both scenarios were appropriate to the sample, the author rotated the 
scenarios. 
 
4.3.2.2 Access Arrangements 
 
Before the research method could be implemented, the author needed to 
negotiate access to participants in the proxy organisation.  This section explains 
the process that the author encountered and the issues it raised for the thesis. 
 
The author found that securing access to healthcare staff was a time consuming 
and lengthy process.   The process was further complicated because the 
scenarios had been designed around the experiences that healthcare 
professionals encountered in their working life yet combined different elements 
of healthcare provision.  The consequence was that, in order to fully explore the 
underlying behaviours of healthcare individuals within the scenarios, 
participants from several areas of the proxy organisation would need to be 
involved in the research.  Specifically, a teaching hospital trust, a primary care 
trust and an ambulance trust.  Each area had its own unique approach to ethics 
and scientific approval with no particular cross-liaison capability.  Establishing 
the requirements of the process per se, and the distinctive processes within it, 
was demanding and, in the main, enormously frustrating for the author.  More 
importantly for the author, this had implications for the timing of the research 
underpinning this thesis and required modifications to aspects of the 
implementation and analysis process. 
 
Figure 4.1 at Appendix 4.3 shows a summary of the process as it happened, 
broken down into the constituent parts. 
 
The research was subject to several ethical and scientific approvals.  




Hallam University and healthcare organisations where the research would be 
conducted.  These were North Sheffield Local Research Ethics Committee 
(NSLREC) on behalf of Central Office for Research Ethics Committees 
(COREC), Sheffield Health and Social Research Consortium (SHSRC) and 
Yorkshire Ambulance Trust. 
 
The author began the process by seeking ethical approval from the sponsoring 
organisation, firstly, at Faculty level and then through Sheffield Hallam 
University’s Ethics Committee.  These approvals were required by the author 
before Sheffield Hallam University could be documented as the research 
sponsor and provide indemnity insurance for the subsequent SHSRC and 
NSLREC applications.   
 
The author was then required to seek an informal scientific approval from 
SHSRC in order to formally register the research as a live project.  With 
registration complete, the author was able to make a formal approach for 
scientific approval from SHSRC.  Registration and approval from SHSRC meant 
that the ethics application to NSLREC could be made and the award of a 
requisite National Health Service honorary contract formalised.  The summation 
of the SNLREC application was an interview at Board level.  The SNLREC 
application was a significant step for the research on a number of counts.  In the 
first instance, achievement of ethical approval from SNLREC was the stimulus 
required to commence the access process into each specified area of the proxy 
organisation.  In the second instance, the application process itself required a 
considerable level of detail about the research including a full explanation of the 
method and sample and the provision of detailed information and invitation 
packs, informed consent forms and the topic guide.  Whilst this was a 
challenging and time consuming aspect of the access process, the author is 
clear about the benefits it delivered in terms of moving the thesis on and 
specifying the task of implementing the underlying research.  
 
Once the author had received SNLREC approval, separate and discrete 
applications could be made to each distinctive aspect of the proxy organisation.  




of time and effort as there was no uniformity in their respective approaches to 
and formalities of granting permission to access their staff.  For example, whilst 
the Primary Care Trust was willing to take the approvals granted by SHSRC 
and SNLREC as proof of scientific and ethical governance, Yorkshire 
Ambulance Trust required a further briefing to, and an interview with, their Chief 
Executive.  In addition, Sheffield Teaching Hospitals Trust sought security, data 
protection and occupational health clearance together with finance sign off for 
the research project. 
 
It was only when this protracted process was completed that access was finally 
granted and the process of sample selection could begin.  This caused an 
enormous strain on the time frame of the study.  Sheffield Hallam University 
Faculty ethical approval was granted in October 2006, yet it was March 2008 
before permission to gain access to NHS staff was finally achieved. 
 
4.3.2.3 Sample Selection 
 
The approach to the sample design was purposive.  According to Saunders et 
al (2007) purposive sampling was a “non-probability sampling procedure in 
which the judgement of the researcher is used to select the cases that make up 
the sample.” (p608).  This method, they proposed, allowed a researcher to 
select a sample of participants that would facilitate the achievement of the 
research aim yet were suitable for the research method.  Wilson (2010) 
elaborated stating that in purposive sampling, the researcher used personal 
judgement to select participants because they were able to provide information 
that was important to the research which could not be provided by others.  
Saunders et al (2007) stated that purposive sampling was particularly common 
in qualitative research when a researcher was working with small samples and 
identified common uses of purposive sampling including extreme or critical 
cases or heterogeneous or homogenous cases.  However, most notably for this 
research, according to Saunders et al (2007), purposive sampling could be 
used for typical cases when the researcher was using a typical case to create 
an “illustrative profile using a representative case” (p609).   The author felt that 




research.  Although the lack of generalisability was raised (Lee and Lings 2008, 
Wilson 2010), the author felt that this was not an issue for the research since 
this thesis aims to develop the understanding of the management of 
smouldering crises and patient safety by exploring the views of individuals at 
grassroots level within a healthcare organisation and does not intend to be 
definitive and generalised.  Accordingly, a purposive approach to sampling was 
taken by the author. 
 
The sample was designed around the health professionals who had information 
to impart in the context of the working life scenarios.  Thus, it was drawn from 
grassroots health professionals in the SYSHA, specifically the Primary Care 
Trust and Sheffield Teaching Hospitals Trust, and Yorkshire Ambulance Trust 
areas.  The composition of the initial sample selection is shown below in Table 
4.1. 
 
Location  Health Professional Number Applicable Working 
Life Scenario 
Sheffield Teaching 




1 Scenario 1 
Nurse 2 Scenario 1 
Receptionists 2 Scenario 1 
Sheffield Teaching 




1 Scenario 1 or 2 
Nurse 2 Scenario 1 or 2 
Ward Clerk 2 Scenario 1 or 2 
Yorkshire Ambulance 
Trust 
Ambulance Crew 6 Scenario 1 
Primary Care Trust General Practioner 3 Scenario 2 
Practice Manager 3 Scenario 2 
 
Table 4.1 Initial Sample Selection 
 
Before conducting the interviews the author sought further practical advice from 
an experienced researcher in the proxy organisation.  The view was that 
securing the planned 22 interviews with healthcare professionals over the 
scheduled fieldwork period of 3 months was going to be a difficult task.  
However, given the impact on timings of the scientific and ethical approvals 
process, this schedule had to be adhered to.  The author sought further 




Highet (2003) had investigated previous research into a relatively novel 
combination of the focus group and the individual interview, a paired interview.  
A paired interview involved two participants, who had ties but no hierarchical 
relationship, being interviewed at the same time.   Highet’s (2003) subsequent 
evaluation of the implementation of this technique concurred with the research 
literature that suggested practical and data quality benefits.  Highet found that 
arranging interviews was more straightforward as participants were more 
enthusiastic about taking part and participants were more relaxed as they were 
in familiar company, which helped the interviewer to develop rapport and trust 
more quickly.  More significantly, within the context of her study, Highet (2003) 
identified that this led to better quality of data since participants were more 
ready to “elicit thoughtful, reflective accounts” (p108) which provided “the 
occasional glimpse into their private, emotional worlds” (p114) and shed new 
light on the research subject offering.   With the benefit of this evaluation, the 
author of this thesis felt that paired interviews would expedite the collection of 
data without compromising the quality.  On reflection, in some aspects of the 
sample, the author felt that paired interviews would be particularly beneficial to 
the quality of data collection.  With the criterion of identifying participants with 
ties but no hierarchical relationship, the author returned to the sample selection 
in order to consider which interviews could be paired.  The author felt that the 
Sheffield Teaching Hospital Trust interviews with nurses, receptionists and ward 
clerks would all satisfy the criterion as would the interviews with ambulance 
crew.  However, the author felt that it would not be appropriate or logistically 
practical to pair the two interviews with senior house officers.  Finally, whilst 
there was a hierarchical relationship between the general practioner and 
practice manager, the benefits of conducting a paired interview were felt to 
override the specific application of the criterion.  Therefore, the final sample 










Location  Health 
Professional 









1  Scenario 1 
Nurse 2 Yes Scenario 1 







1  Scenario 1 or 2 
Nurse 2 Yes Scenario 1 or 2 
Ward Clerk 2 Yes Scenario 1 or 2 
Yorkshire 
Ambulance Trust 







3 Yes (3 paired 
interviews) 
Scenario 2 
Practice Manager 3 
 
Table 4.2 Final Sample Selection 
 
4.3.2.4 Final Sample Selection 
 
At the outset, the author intended to identify and select the sample from 
information available in the public domain, for example, the annual Binley’s 
Directory of National Health Staff.  However, in progressing the access process 
explained above in Section 4.3.2.2, it became evident that line management 
approval would be required prior to identifying and selecting the sample.  This 
might have been a further obstacle had it not been for Binley’s Directory of 
National Health Staff, for whilst this source would not yield the details of the final 
sample, it was helpful in providing some line management contacts.  
Fortunately, for the author, the contacts made through the approvals process 
also yielded lucrative sources that were useful in identifying the final sample. 
 
Accordingly, SHSRC via the Academic Unit for Primary Medical Care provided 
the names and contact details of 13 General Practioners and Practice 
Managers in their area.  Yorkshire Ambulance Service provided the names and 
contact details of 6 ambulance crew in the Sheffield area.  The Northern 
General Hospital, General Surgical Ward Firth 5 provided the names and 
contact details of 4 doctors, 2 nurses and 2 ward clerks.  The Northern General 
Hospital, Accident and Emergency Department provided the names and contact 
details of 24 doctors, 2 nurses and 2 receptionists.  This was not a large sample 




particular perseverance in the task of recruiting the sample.  This was finally 
achieved as a result of a resolute determination and commitment to 
implementing the fieldwork.     
 
Using the contact information offered by the parties above, individual potential 
participants were approached in writing at their work address.  For convenience 
purposes and because the author was working with a relatively small sampling 
frame, an offer was made, and in most cases accepted, to conduct the fieldwork 
in a suitable area at the participants’ workplaces.  The author believed that this 
would overcome any logistical reservations potential participants had and 
improve the chances of recruiting to the study. 
 
A full and detailed information pack accompanied the letter seeking 
participation, together with an informed consent pro forma.  These are provided 
at Appendix 4.2.  The invitation letter, information pack and informed consent 
pro forma carried full details regarding the purpose of this research and the role 
of participants within it and specific information about how the author would 
conduct the research.  The pack was prepared in accordance with the 
requirements of the COREC scientific and ethical approvals process. 
 
As was mentioned in Section 4.3.2.2 the requirements of the COREC were 
helpful in providing further guidance regarding the level and content of 
information supplied to potential participants.  In the context of informed consent 
and data protection, the requirements of the COREC were particularly stringent.  
Therefore, within the information pack, participants in paired interviews were 
asked to consent to a discussion of the subject matter amongst their peers.  In 
addition, any participants unwilling to take part were not pressurised into doing 
so and those who decided to take part were reassured that if the discussion 
became difficult, a follow up interview could be arranged.  In the event, all 
participants felt able to complete the interviews (although eventually time 
prevented the two nurses on the General Surgical Ward from actually taking 
part) and, whilst some participants offered the author the opportunity to 
recontact them to discuss the findings, the author did not feel it necessary to 




regarding the security of the data collected and participants were advised that 
the intention was to use the data collected only for this study.  Furthermore, 
during the interviews, the anonymity of participants was protected.  Participants 
were assigned an identification code at the outset.  The code was used by the 
author to ‘label’ the CDs carrying the interviews.  Only the author had access to 
the information showing each participant’s name and the associated 
identification code thereby protecting participants’ anonymity during the 
transcription process.   
 
The author had to demonstrate a great deal of tenacity in securing interviews 
with some participants.  The process of approaching potential participants in 
writing, receiving completed informed consent forms and then contacting 
participants to arrange a mutually convenient time did not go according to plan.  
The letters were sent out over a period of time as the author secured line 
management approval and the contact details in a sporadic manner.   However, 
the author received no completed informed consent forms by return.  
Accordingly, since time was a pressing issue, the author followed up the letters 
via telephone and email.  In some cases, as soon as the author was able to 
discuss the study verbally with potential participants, some agreed to take part 
in the study.  In other cases, and particularly in the case of Accident and 
Emergency Doctors, this was a protracted process.  However, eventually verbal 
informed consent form was given and interviews were set up at a mutually 
convenient time.  Formal documentary evidence of informed consent was given 
at the interview itself. 
 
The author found the recruitment of the sample and the scheduling of the 
fieldwork to be a long and laborious process principally due to the difficulties of 
contacting potential participants, the pressure of work and the demands on their 
time.  The fieldwork was eventually implemented as planned although, despite 
numerous attempts to secure a paired interview with nursing staff from a 
General Surgical Ward, this interview did not take place.  Twenty interviews 
































4.4 The Analysis Process 
 
This section will explain how the overall approach to the analysis was informed 
by the aim of the thesis and the search for answers to the research questions 
posed.  In so doing, this section will also later describe and rationalise the 
practical approach the author took within the context of the literature concerning 
qualitative analysis techniques. 
 
The overall approach to the analysis needed to be coherent with the nature of 
the thesis’ aim and the research questions posed (Wilson 2010).  The aim of 
this thesis is to develop a deeper understanding of the management of 
smouldering crises and patient safety in healthcare by examining how the effect 



















order to do this the research focused on discovering what influenced grassroots 
individuals in healthcare during their daily working lives and how this affected 
their job role behaviour.  In addition, the research investigated what effect this 
had on peers and patient care.   
 
Wilson (2010) stated that an inductive approach to qualitative research, as 
proposed by the author of this thesis, developed an understanding of the data 
as it emerged.  In the first instance, the author considered a grounded theory 
approach.  Grounded theory offered the opportunity to take an open and 
inductive approach to the data as a means of generating theory (Wilson 2010).  
Within the context of the thesis’ aim and the research questions, this seemed 
appropriate to the author of this thesis.  However, the author was dissuaded 
from adopting this approach because in employing working life scenarios to 
direct the interviews, the author felt that this, to some degree, inhibited her 
ability to approach the data in a completely open manner.  In the second 
instance, the author considered narrative analysis.  The working life scenarios 
underpinning the research were narratively and phenomologically-based and 
focused on facilitating the exploration of behaviours within daily routines.  
According to Saunders et al (2007), narrative analysis was based on the 
accounts of individuals’ experiences and the ways in which they explain these 
through their subjective interpretations and relate them to constructions of the 
social world in which they live” (p504).  Lee and Ling (2008) considered 
narrative analysis as being particularly useful when participants were relating 
stories about the world in which they live.  Through stories participants were 
able to make sense and understand particular contexts (Miles and Huberman 
2002).  In this sense, the author felt that narrative analysis was more consistent 
with the overall aim of the thesis, the research strategy and the research 
questions.  However, whilst Saunders et al (2007) were guarded in stating that 
researchers should not seek to fragment the data, they suggested that 
fragmentation may be appropriate where narrative analysis was used to 
“explore linkages, relationships and socially constructed explanations that 

































Whilst Wilson (2010) recommended that although researchers should prepare a 
plan for the steps that were needed to undertake inductively based qualitative 
analysis, decisions regarding the narrative of the data were in the hands of the 
researcher.  Broadly, Wilson (2010) advocated that the steps should involve the 
transcription of data, generation of categories, themes and patterns and 
interpretation and presentation.  Miles and Huberman (1994) summarised these 
stages as data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing.  A structured 
and planned process was adopted by the author to the analysis beginning with 
the transcription of the data.  However, in order to remain sensitive to the 
overall aim of the thesis and research strategy, the author adopted a meta-
approach to analysis.  An overall approach of narrative analysis was combined 
with a more structured method of cross-case data reduction (Lee and Ling 
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as a whole was reduced through descriptive coding before it was evaluated and 
interpreted through themes.   The author’s experience regarding data reduction 
was in line with Miles and Huberman’s (1994) suggestion that the process was 
not a linear sequence but an iterative, cyclical process which reached a climax 
when the researcher reached conclusions.  The remainder of this section will 
explain in more detail the process of analysis which was followed by the author 








At the end of each interview, a contact record sheet, as advocated by Miles and 
Huberman (1994), was recorded as a preliminary part of the analysis.  The 
objective here was an informal one and borne out of a desire to record the 
context in which the interviews had taken place as well as any observations 










• Hand Coding 
Stage 4  
• Descriptive Coding 
Stage 5 






Once the interviews had taken place, the data was transferred onto CDs ready 
for transcription.  Initially the author was to transcribe the interviews, however, 
the fieldwork process had been protracted (see 4.3.2.2. and 4.3.2.3) and so for 
expediency purposes the possibility of making up some time by passing the 
transcription to a third party was considered.  Wilson (2010) advocated that this 
was a common approach by research for two reasons.  Firstly the researcher 
may not have the necessary skills of an experienced transcriber.  Secondly, it 
was a time consuming process and transferring responsibility to another 
allowed the researcher to focus on other areas of the research.  Accordingly, 
the author consulted the local COREC committee to seek their guidance and 
advice regarding sub-contracting the transcription process and was advised to 
select a third party with previous experience transcribing working for a 
healthcare organisation.  The committee also advised that the appointed person 
must sign a confidentiality agreement prior to commencing her duties.   The 
author observed both of these requirements in appointing a transcriber.   The 
data was sent, bearing the participants’ identification codes only, via post to the 
transcriber for transcription.   The transcriber was requested to identify the 
participants by their identification codes and to blank any named references to 
other individuals.  The transcription was prepared in word processing format 
and returned electronically to the author.  The recorded data was securely 
electronically stored by the researcher and transcriber in password protected 
files and, once transcription had taken place, the transcriber was requested to 
destroy all copies in her possession.  The original data remains securely stored 




All of the data, including contact record sheets, was hand coded in an open and 
category-free manner.  Whilst this meant that the resulting analysis was at a 
micro level and produced a multiplicity of descriptive codes, this was necessary 
in order to begin the process of disaggregating the data (Saunders et al 2007).  




allowing the author to begin the process of becoming familiar with the 
participants and their responses.  The author chose to review this initial open 
coding using a structured, theme based, coding frame.  The coding frame 
selected (Miles and Huberman 1994) was felt appropriate within the context of 
the study as it covered aspects such as how participants defined the situation, 
participants’ perspectives about the setting and people and views about 
processes, activities and events.  Although the coding frame was not useful in 
its entirety, the author found that it was helpful in beginning the process of 




Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested that coding gave access to meaning 
since codes were “tags and labels for assigning units of meaning to the 
descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study” (p56).  They 
recommended the progressive, yet iterative approach to coding that was 
adopted for this analysis.  According to Miles and Huberman (1994) formal 
coding involved an initial stage of descriptive coding in which aspects of text 
were assigned a classification before later interpretative coding in which more 
meaning was found by combining classifications into broader categories. 
 
Before commencing this stage of the analysis, the author considered the 
support provided by qualitative computer software packages as a means of 
effecting this approach to analysis.  Computer software packages provided a 
means of examining meaning in the data, exploring relationships and providing 
a sense-making framework (Miles and Huberman 1994).  According to Bazeley 
(2007), the software package was not, in itself, an end to analysis, rather it was 
a toolkit which provided some of the means; “the use of the computer is not 
intended to supplant time-honoured ways of learning from data, but to increase 
the effectiveness and efficiency of such learning” (p 2).  This view was one with 
which respected peer researchers concurred and, based on this 
recommendation and the pressures on time expressed in Section 4.3.2.2, 




Concurrent with Miles and Huberman’s approach (1994), Bazeley’s (2007) 
practical advice regarding the utilisation of the Nvivo toolkit was followed.  Once 
the data had been transcribed, it was loaded into Nvivo and the classification of 
the data into descriptive codes was undertaken.  The author took a very 
fragmented approach to this, considering that classifications could be 
amalgamated rather than having to attempt to further disaggregate the data.  
This stage resulted in a total of 58 separate classifications of the data.  These 
are shown at Appendix 4.4 as ‘Descriptive Codes’.   
 
Stage 5  
 
As was discussed above, the author went through cycles of interpretative 
coding, each one realising a greater understanding of meaning over its 
predecessor before arriving at an interpretative coding frame which the author 
felt was valid since it represented the views of participants within the context of 
this thesis.   
 
Initially, the author adopted a mind map approach to exploring the descriptive 
codes in Version 1 of the interpretative coding frame.  Whilst this was useful for 
exploring some relationships between descriptive codes, the author felt that the 
data remained quite fragmented and the link with the thesis was rather weak. 
 
In Version 2 of the interpretative coding frame, the author approached the 
aggregation of descriptive codes from the perspective of the individual in the 
sense of ‘the working world as I see it’.  This was felt to be much closer to the 
overall aim of the thesis, the research strategy and the research questions than 
Version 1.  The author was aiming to contribute to the knowledge regarding the 
management of smouldering crises and patient safety through a better 
understanding of how the daily behaviours of healthcare professionals had the 
potential to incubate these incidents.  The author felt that exploring how 
individuals, either personally or collectively, viewed their working world had the 
potential to reveal how individuals behaved.  As participants made personal and 
collective observations, the author felt that it would also be appropriate to 




which were felt by the author to be consistent with the working world theme 
were selected and aggregated as shown in Table 4.3 
 
What are my things 
that are set in my 
working life 
What are the issues that I 
experience in my working life 
that are outside of my control 
How do I deal 
with these issues 








Patient Care Transitions 
Ineffectiveness 
Inefficiency 
Training of Others 
Education of Others 













Table 4.3 Interpretative Coding, Version 2  
  
Whilst this was another useful step in interpreting the data, the author felt that 
this approach would potentially explain how individuals behaved in the context 
of organisational controls, in terms of systems and processes, but not why.  
Furthermore, the author felt that the result was partial in that the approach to 
the interpretative coding was focused on exploring the behaviour of individuals 
within the context of organisational control.  On reflection, interpreting the data 
within the context of perceived organisational control was not consistent with 
the aim of the thesis as it tended towards the organisational perspective that the 
author was so critical of in Chapters 2 and 3.  For these reasons, the author 
believed that this approach to interpretation was not as closely aligned to the 
aim of the thesis as the author had originally thought. 
 
A further attempt at interpretative coding, Version 3, shown in Table 4.4, was 
more successful in attributing descriptive codes to an interpretative coding 
frame which was based on how individuals felt about aspects of their working 
lives.  The author observed that whilst some feelings were presented as being 
unique to the individual, others were common across participants.  In addition, 














Patient Care Transition 








Changes – Implemented 















Employee Safety and Well 
Being 
Teamwork 











Right – Intra NHS 
Right – Inter NHS 
Inflexibility 
Exposure 
Changes - Implemented 





Wrong – Intra NHS 
Wrong – Inter NHS 
Personal  Relationships 









Changes – Implemented 
Changes - Pending 
 
Table 4.4 Interpretative Coding, Version 3 
  
Whilst an approach revealed individual and shared feelings was proving to be 
fruitful in the author’s search for meaning, the author felt that this interpretation 
somehow lost sight of the research strategy and thus would be limited in helping 
the author achieve the aim of the thesis. 
 
The author returned to the descriptive codes and reviewed them in the light of 
the aspects of previous versions of the interpretative coding frames that were 
consistent with the aim of the thesis.  The notion of ‘the working world as I see 
it’ had some resonance for the author.  The thesis was seeking to develop an 




exhibited behaviours in their working lives that potentially could cause a 
smouldering crisis and adverse patient safety incidents.  However, the author 
was also receptive to the fact that participants were narrating recounts of their 
working lives from both personal and shared perspectives.  Thus the author 
attempted to investigate whether the narratives of participants identified in the 
descriptive codes could be combined into three interpretative categories.  The 
first category would be how participants behaved in their working life.  The 
second category would be why participants behaved in this way.  The third 
category would be what participants drew from the shared perspective.  The 
author found that the narratives of participants concerning their daily behaviour 
were centred on the affinity they had for the professional role that they occupied 
and their interactions with peers.  However, whilst the behaviour of participants 
appeared to be role and peer driven, the underlying motivation was centred 
almost exclusively on patient care. This became Version 4 of the interpretative 
approach to coding and is shown in Table 4.5.   
 
Individuals’ Behaviour in Daily 
Working Life 
Motivation for Behaviour Influence of Peers 
My Education 
Education of Others 
My Training 


























Table 4.5 Interpretative Coding, Version 4 
 
These three categories and the descriptive codes within them were consistent 
with investigating how and why individuals behaved in the way that they did.   
 
Before discussing how these codes were shaped into the themes that are 
presented in the next chapters, the author feels it necessary to point out several 
issues.  Firstly, descriptive codes were selected for this version of the 
interpretative coding frame based on the contribution they could make to the 
themes identified.  Accordingly, not all of the descriptive codes were selected.  




those selected as some narratives were multiply coded.  For example, a 
narrative which appeared in the code ‘Respect’  also appeared in the code 
‘Esteem’, similarly a narrative that appeared in the code ‘Personal Stress’ also 
appeared in the code ‘Reaction to Efficiency’.  Furthermore, some codes that 
were selected appeared in more than one interpretative category, as with 
‘Professionalisation and Experience’ where it appeared in ‘Individuals’ 
Behaviour in Daily Working Life’ and Motivation for Behaviour’.  This has only 
occurred where the author felt the descriptive code crossed categories. 
 
Having reached a decision about which interpretative approach to adopt, the 
author then explored the narratives contained within the descriptive codes in 
each of the interpretative categories.  When undertaking this, the author 
observed a further layer of recurring themes which crossed the interpretative 
categories.    
 
Within some of the themes, the participants were observing and commenting 
upon organisational aspects of their working lives; the facets of their working 
lives through which the organisation structured and controlled what participants 
did (Targets, Boundaries and Resourcing) and the consequences of these 
aspects (Stress and Pressure).  Other themes were more concerned with 
participants’ views about themselves and their peers; their motivation for 
seeking and sustaining a career in healthcare (Patient Orientation), their 
feelings of belonging to a profession (Training ) and the affiliations they had with 
their peers (Relationships and Respect and Value).  These themes crossed 
descriptive coding categories, for example, in the code Professionalisation and 
Experience participants made comments that were attributed to Patient 
Orientation, Respect and Value, The Public, Boundaries, Resourcing and 
Stress and Pressure.  The author deduced that the examination of the final 
version of interpretative categories yielded themes which offered a greater 
insight into what actually prevailed in terms of participants’ behaviours.  The 
author believed that this further layer of analysis, which created a depth of 
understanding beyond the interpretative coding, should form the basis of the 




concerning participants’ organisational perspectives whilst Chapter 6 will 




This chapter has detailed the methodological approach taken by the author of 
this thesis.  Since the author’s research philosophy is oriented towards that of 
the critical theorist, the research strategy centred on taking a structural 
phenomological approach.  Whilst a quantitative strategy was discounted by the 
author, several qualitative strategies were reviewed and the author rejected 
those of a collaborative nature such as action research.  Whilst initially case 
study investigation seemed suitable, the author believed it would inhibit the 
research study and be practically difficult to implement.  Critical incident 
technique, on the face of it, presented a more appropriate strategy.  However, 
the findings of secondary research suggested that this would be a difficult 
strategy to adopt and would suffer from the same implementation issues as a 
case study strategy.  Although the consequence of this was that the author felt it 
was not appropriate to implement a critical incident technique based strategy in 
its purest sense, there was an indication from the literature that the technique 
could be adapted.  Accordingly, the author applied the concept of critical 
incident technique to the working life scenario and adopted this as the research 
strategy.  Determining the working life scenarios was challenging but the author 
chose to take a patient oriented approach since this was influential in directing 
the work of healthcare professionals.  Two scenarios were identified; one based 
on an acute patient care need and one based on a routine patient care need.   
 
The overall aim of the primary research was to explore the behaviour of 
healthcare professionals in order to contribute to the understanding of the 
management of smouldering crises and patient safety.  Thus the research 
questions were sensitised to this area of contribution.  However, before the 
primary data collection could begin, the author had to define the boundaries of 
the research and navigate the lengthy and complex regulations concerning 
research, particularly research conducted in healthcare.  Several qualitative 




that observation would not provide the data required and, although focus groups 
were considered, the author was counselled against attempting them in a 
healthcare setting.  Therefore, the author decided to implement personal and 
paired interviews using a semi-structured topic guide which was based on the 
working life scenarios.  Although access and sampling was challenging, the 
author was fortunate enough to establish contacts within the regulatory process 
who were helpful in providing the contact details for a purposive sample.  Given 
the pressure on time caused by the regulatory and access processes, the 
author decided to pair some of the personal interviews.       
 
A narrative approach was taken to the analysis and the author developed the 
final analytical framework through a series of 5 stages involving the 
development of descriptive and interpretative coding.  The final stage of 
interpretative coding blended the individual and shared perspectives that were 
found in participants’ narratives.  The author found that in recounting their 
working lives, participants’ behaviour was centred on the affinity they had for 
their profession and peers whereas their underlying motivation was patient 
orientation.  However upon further examination, the author identified themes 
which recurred across the interpretative categories.  These themes had either 
an organisational or individual perspective and are the basis for the 
presentation of the data in Chapters 5 and 6 which follow. 
 




Chapter 5  An Individual in the Workplace: Perspectives on the  
                  Organisation 
 
The aim of the thesis is to develop the understanding of smouldering crisis 
management and patient safety by examining how an employee’s behaviour 
can potentially cause smouldering crises conditions.  Chapter 4 detailed the 
research methodology which, in the context of the thesis’ aim and the limitations 
of existing literature identified in Chapters 2 and 3, focused on investigating and 
exploring how and why individuals at grassroots level behave in the workplace 
in the way they do. 
 
It is not the intention to repeat the detail in Chapter 4 concerning the 
methodological approach to the research.  However, in undertaking the final 
stage of the analysis, the author observed common themes that crossed the 
descriptive codes and interpretative categories.  Whilst these themes shared 
the common bond of participants recounting aspects of their working life, the 
author observed that within the themes, participants were expressing their 
working life from two perspectives.   The first perspective concerned 
participants’ observations regarding aspects of their working life which were 
shaped by the organisation and influenced how they felt and behaved at work.  
Whereas the second perspective concerned participants’ views about 
themselves and their peers and how these influenced how they felt and 
behaved in the work environment.  The identification of these perspectives 
helped the author to make sense of the views of participants within the context 
of their behavior at work and it is upon this basis that the data from the research 
study is presented here.  This chapter will focus on exploring and explaining the 
findings concerning the facets of participants’ working lives which were 
organisationally oriented.  Chapter 6 will focus on evaluating participants’ 
feelings about themselves and their peers. 
 
Participants’ narratives concerning aspects of their life which originated through 
the organisation were centred on structural and control mechanisms and their 
relative impact on the individual at work.  In exploring this perspective, the 
author identified five main themes which are used to structure this chapter.  The 
themes were: the use and nature of targets, the delivery of patient care across 




work boundaries, changes to the resourcing in healthcare, experiential training 
and the impact these initiatives had on the individual in terms of perceived 
inequities and stress.  The chapter begins with a brief explanation concerning 
the presentation of the data which it is hoped will be helpful to the reader. 
 
5.1 The Presentation of the Data  
 
The data is presented at sample level unless there is specific evidence that 
particular participants or groups of participants within the sample held distinctive 
views.    Several different techniques are utilised to present the data within the 
chapters.  Direct quotations are utilised to explain particular findings but are 
also assembled into ‘Illustrations’ where it is important to present a sequence of 
quotations in order to support the discussion.  Vignettes appear through each 
chapter when the comments of a participant summarise key aspects of the 
discussion.  The data is presented in tabular form where participants have 
distinctive views on common aspects of the discussion.  Finally, figures are also 
used selectively because they summarise in a presentational manner the 
observation that is being made. 
 
In terms of sourcing the data, the data is referenced according to its Nvivo 
classification.  The specific reference is constructed from the key theme 
identifier, followed by the sample identifier and the Nvivo coding reference.  So 
the reference ‘ID A&EN:1 N2’ is taken from the Nvivo key theme entitled 
‘Individual Differences’ or ID, the interview with the nurses from Accident and 
Emergency and Nvivo Reference 1. 
 
5.2 The Use and Nature of Targets in Healthcare 
 
The target culture and specific targets were a recurring theme in the interviews.  
Whilst there was the occasional mention of the difficulties in the pre-target 
era.(D A&EN:3 N1, N2), participants were particularly critical of the detrimental 
impact targets had on patient care. 
 




There was anger from GPs (General Practioners) reacting to the introduction of 
extend opening hours. 
 
“The people who are going to benefit from this are the people who have got a 
sore throat and turn up on a Saturday morning... The people who are going to 
come to harm are the little old lady who I saw down the road with diabetes who 
is living on her own and really struggling but she isn’t going to get the level of 
input because I am spread so much thinner  ... At the end of the day, what is 
happening is that trivia and patient demand is being prioritised... What has 
come about is it is all about patient choice and not about need. ...  it isn’t 
necessarily the people that shout loudest that need the most.  You can probably 
feel the frustration which is unusual because I am normally quite positive.” (RB 
GPPM1:24 GP1). 
 
In discussing the 4-hour waiting time, Accident and Emergency nurses shared 
GPs’ concerns for the shifting priorities associated with targets, seeing waiting 
time targets being responsible for directing what they did.  Furthermore, they 
also recognised that in satisfying this deadline, the service had become more 
process oriented.  These nurses took it very personally because it inhibited their 
aspirations to care for patients’ humane needs [1].   For one nurse, the manner 
in which she described the process is particularly stark yet she reconciled her 
situation by considering the cost of failure [2]. 
    
[1] “... it does sometimes feel like a conveyor belt and that you are shifting 
patients and you are trying to push to get patients out ... sometimes they are not 
ready to go but you still just have to get rid of them.” (PL A&EN:5 N1, N2) 
 
[1] “My view, personally, is that it has got down not to what is happening with 
the patient but to how long it has taken, I don’t think the patients are getting the 
care they should do because of that.  Because it is only since that has been 
introduced that you have been getting people coming down saying why is this 
patient still here?  ... they are just interested in getting that patient through the 
department and the nurses have to deal with the patient and why they are left in 
the department, it is more on targets, that is what it is run on now, targets. (PS 
A&EREC:6 R1) 
 
[2] “... we’ve got all the names of the patients in the department on a board and 
as they are about to breach they turn red and you know you have got to sort 
that patient out because if you don’t then the department loses money and if the 
department loses money then you lose nursing staff, you lose equipment, well 
you don’t lose it but you don’t get any more.” (F A&EN:2 N2) 
 
However, for Ambulance crew discussing response time targets (commonly 
know to them as the ORCON system), the feeling was one of almost 




resignation.  They were of the opinion that this quantified target was the only 
measure by which key internal and external stakeholders judged them.   As a 
consequence, they believed that ORCON exclusively directed individual and 
organisational priorities.  The explicit view from Ambulance crew was that this 
happened at the expense of the proactive management of other aspects of the 
service which were only dealt with when they became critical.  
 
“... yes ORCON (the Ambulance Service’s response target) is first because they 
get a bonus for meeting all their targets ... (ID AC1:9 AC1B)    
 
“... there are many instances where people in cars have been left on scene a 
long, long time with a patient that really should not have been left on scene a 
long time but you just get the impression that CONS or the powers that be just 
think well they have got somebody with them, they have ticked that ORCON 
box, they have got somebody there and it is a paramedic, they are receiving all 
the treatment they can.” (PS AC2:11 AC2B) 
  
“... so what they are doing is they are activating us on just address alone, 
nothing else... we don’t get more time, we get less ... they are taking all the 
details as they normally would but the clock is ticking ... and we are supposed to 
be on route so we can actually be there before we get any details other than 
address ...” (EM AC2:1 AC2A, AC2B) 
 
“... I think in essence maybe it is because the government and general public 
judge the ambulance services performance on its ORCON, how fast we get 
from the call taken to the time we arrive at the door.  That is quantifiable, that is 
easily recognisable, are the service achieving it or not, are they achieving their 
75% or whatever the percentage is that they have to get now, yes or no, 
performing or underperforming and that is a shame because that is what the 
management seem to concentrate on and everything else falls out of the basket 
and is dealt with in a fire-fighting way only when it goes wrong.” (D AC3:9 
AC3A) 





Finally, the opinion of other 
participants was a direct objection 
to the way in which some targets 
were used as the sole judgment of 
performance and disregarded the 
experience and knowledge of a 
professional.   This was the case 
for the following GP who also 
questioned the ethics of how 
targets are administered (Vignette 
1). 
 
5.3 The Delivery of Patient Care 
      Across Work Boundaries 
 
Evidence from the fieldwork 
suggested that whilst healthcare 
organisations were highly diverse 
and fragmented, employees relied 
on co-operation between different 
aspects of the organisation in 
order to effect successful patient 
care.  Participants across the 
sample spoke about the difficulties 
of managing the treatment of patients across boundaries.   
 
The concerns of some were focused on problems that occurred during critical 
points in the care service such as when a patient’s care transferred from one 
aspect of the service to another. 
 
“... taking a patient of another healthcare professional can be very frustrating ... 
I haven’t had one for ages but we went through a run of some really 
uncomfortable jobs.” (ID AC1:12 AC1B) 
  
“I had another one where this baby had stopped breathing but would breathe if 
you stimulated it so you had to constantly stimulate it and that was off a nurse ... 
Vignette 1  
 
“... the PCT tell me that I should be 
doing it through this new, hugely 
expensive, system that the 
government have put in place called 
Choose and Book and I can’t choose 
the Consultant so you just see the 
surgeon with the nearest 
appointment ...” (PR GPPM2:1 GP2) 
 
“... but if it is something like a bad 
knee or someone has had a knee 
replacement by somebody or other 
or had a bad experience with a 
different orthopaedic surgeon then 
sometimes I feel it is important to 
nominate the Consultant and I am 
not allowed to do that on this Choose 
and Book system so then I just have 
to send a letter in.  But we have 
targets to send so many of our 
referrals through Choose and Book 
because the PCT get a bonus 
payment from the government if it is 
used.” (PE GPPM2: 5 GP2)    
 
“the secondary care trust of the 
hospital say we can’t do that 
because GP’s might just choose their 
favourites, as though somehow we’re 
children.”  
 
(TR GPPM2:12 GP2)   
  




but it’s knowing which bit is my responsibility and which bit was hers and she 
wouldn’t let go of the child, so she ended up sitting in an unsafe position  in the 
vehicle with the child in her arms and then I was having to look after its airway 
and its breathing while she still had it in her hands ... she took hold of this baby 
and was so freaked out by it that she wouldn’t let go, she knew that she was 
responsible at the time before we arrived but then wouldn’t let go when we 
arrived ... (ID AC1:14 AC1B) 
 
“Sometimes if they are in pain, they may have had some medication written up 
in A&E, on occasions when they haven’t our staff have been informed to do an 
incident form ... ” (TM GSWC1:1)  
 
Furthermore, boundaries created barriers. These barriers impeded the ability to 
effectively care for patients because professionals became tribal and 
preoccupied with their own role.  The result was that they failed to communicate 
and co-operate with others.   
 
There was a great strength of feeling from one GP who argued that: 
 
 “There is this complete obsession with avoiding hospital admission but avoiding 
hospital admission is all about people communicating and people knowing what 
is going on and people working together and so what tends to happen is the 
situation deteriorates, it’s almost supervised neglect in a way, the system 
creates supervised neglect, every individual is doing their own bit and they are 
all actually doing their own bit properly but the problem is that nobody is putting 
those bits together to realise that actually there is a global decline in this 
patient’s condition.  If they had been here with everyone with their own bits of 
knowledge and their own bits of skill and everything else, we’d have actually 
stopped that so then that patient wouldn’t have ended up in hospital.” (PR 
GPPM1:9 GP1) 
 
As these situations escalated, there was evidence that, contrary to and in 
conflict with their patient oriented beliefs, professionals became insular and 
parochial. 
 
 “... it all gets very difficult and actually you then forget what you’re there for 
which is the patient care and you then start fighting your corner ...” (RB 
GPPM1:20 GP1) 
 
For some participants, boundary challenges struck at the very heart of their 
values and beliefs. 
 
“... the very people who depend on us working together and spending time 
together are the people with serious illness.... (RB GPPM1:24 GP1) 
 




The defined barriers created 
by boundaries in the 
workplace conspired to 
erode relationships and 
created an atmosphere that 
was toxic and unproductive, 
particularly in terms of 
patient care (Vignette 2). 
 
As the following quotations 
show, participants were 
annoyed that this 
sometimes happened 
because professionals 




“... it really frustrates me 
when I am going through 
notes and things are in the 
wrong place.  It surprises 
me that they just leave it 
because there are 
outpatient appointments, 
and yes the nurses can do 
it, ... everything just gets left 
...” (TW GSWC2:5) 
 
However, the issue of 
boundaries seemed much 
more prevalent amongst 
GPs and Practice Managers.  There were examples, such as the following, 





“... we have a patient who goes to surgery 
at our branch surgery once a week who 
has very bad leg ulcers that have to be 
dressed every week ... He lives on his own, 
he is a rather eccentric individual and he is 
now of retirement age ... so every week he 
goes into our nurses, now district nurses 
see a lot of patients with similar problems 
to what he has ... they don’t see our patient 
because he goes into the surgery because 
he is mobile ... ... he can walk there, he is 
not capable of getting on a bus, I think 
mentally he would struggle with that ... Now 
one particular week our nurse rang in sick 
and our second nurse, ... was on holiday so 
we didn’t have a nurse.  So I rang district 
nurse team and asked if they could go and 
see this patient at home to do the 
bandaging because I haven’t got a nurse 
and the sister refused because he is mobile 
... ‘We only see patients who are 
housebound ‘ ... so I had a man here who 
we had already had to ring and say you 
can’t go into the surgery this morning for 
your leg doing because our nurse is sick 
but don’t you worry because we are sorting 
it ... he had already rung 4 times, ‘when is 
somebody coming, you said somebody 
would be coming’ and we’re saying we are 
trying ... we put it through as a referral to 
the district nurse team so then it went in a 
different way but they still refused and so 
the poor man never got his leg done so he 
was totally out of it because he just couldn’t 
cope.  ”  
 
(F GPPM2:6, 7 GP2, PM2) 
 




“The relationship with the main district hospital up the other way used to be 
close but now there are so many Consultants around and now that it is a rather 
impersonal environment.” (PE GPPM2:11 GP2) 
The following GP concurred in suggesting that boundaries between 
professionals and their work were becoming too defined and rigid.  
 
 “I think the main problem in it all is that patients are beginning to fall through 
holes in the service because the boundaries are getting so defined. “ (TW 
GP1PM1:10 GP1)  
 
GPs and their Practice Managers were furious and outraged at how defined 
boundaries controlled patient care processes and provided several illustrations 
of this.  In each case, their working relationship with the Primary Care Trust was 
both the source of the issues and the focus for their hostility.   
 
In the first illustration, the demarcation lines between general practice and the 
Primary Care Trust is the subject of frustration for a GP and his Practice 
Manager.  Their attempts to engage with the running of patient care in the area 
were disregarded and they felt snubbed and ignored.  Their perception of the 




“... some of us in the 6 practices  are trying very hard to help the health authority 
reduce their financial overspend but by remodelling and perhaps optimising 
services that won’t cost any more but we have had no success in engaging with 
the health authority and saying actually we could give you some good ideas, 
why don’t you do this, why don’t you do that and then it will solve the service 
problem and also it will cost you less money and we have had 2 years of no 
listening ... they ask you the question and then never come back to listen to the 
answer do they? ... That’s right ... and that is what you are up against, that they 
are coming out wanting you to help and then when you think of ways to help 
them, it is not what they want, they have thought of their own ways which may 
help them but it is not helping us, is it?” (RSP GPPM2:6 GP2, PM2) 





The second illustration raised a 
recurring theme (see Vignette 3 
and Illustration 3), that of the 
boundaries between general 




The GP began by providing some 
brief background information to the 
issue. 
 
“... there are two ways of 
employing nurses in general 
practice or primary care, one is 
employed by the practice as a 
practice nurse and another group 
of nurses, the district nurses, are 
employed by the PCT and then at 
one time the district nurses were 
seconded or attached to the 
practices ..”.  
 
He then continued by explaining what they had observed in the working 
practices of the respective groups of nurses; Practice Nurses and District 
Nurses.  To his mind, the resources of these two groups of professionals were 
not being used effectively or efficiently. 
 
“... and we found that the nurses would be doing something at home with the 
patient then as soon as they came in here they would change and it always 
seemed that somehow people weren’t using their skills and experience ...” 
 
The result of this was that boundary responsibilities had not only created 
complexities in patient care but also conflict between individuals and a collapse 
in teamworking.  The GPs first thought was to introduce a new supervisory role 
at Trust level to manage the situation. 
 
“ ... we almost had 2 groups of nurses kind of pushing work off on each other 
rather than working together and it did seem that the process was getting so 
complex that it needed a highly skilled but pretty well paid band 7 nurse to 
Vignette 3 
 
“Because everyone is being pushed 
into boundaries so they have drawn 
this up around themselves and they 
won’t step outside it but there are a 
group of things that occur which 
don’t actually fit into anybody’s 
boundaries and it is those things 
which always fall through the net.  
And all it needed was that half hour 
cup of coffee talking about what was 
on tele last night and by the way 
have you seen Mrs Jones?  And 
although you might have been 
talking about what was on TV last 
night, what was talked about in that 
half hour actually saved three hours 
work because it was what was 
talked about, you know, have you 
seen Mrs Jones’s leg recently, it is 
actually looking a bit gammy, that 
would have triggered off a chain of 
events that would have actually 
solved the problem.”  
 
(TW GP1PM1:6 GP1) 
 




manage the whole process from the community nursing group without any 
connection with us ...so we were saying, give us a district nurse, let her talk with 
our practice nurses for an hour about who is doing what, where and when and 
we could I’m sure deliver better nursing to the patients, cheaper.  And all the 
other practices said fine, let’s integrate it within our practices ...” 
 
However, in attempting to address the boundaries he had observed, he 
encountered others similar to those cited at Illustration 1.     
 
“...there was a substantial paper billed by a GP at one of the other practices and 
a district nurse and a community nurse which has been ignored by the PCT ... 
which would have improved care, saved money ...” (CS GPPM2:1 GP2) 
  
The final illustration from General Practice also comes from the issues 




The discussion between this GP and his Practice Manager shows how 
entrenched attitudes became as boundaries were established.  The 
professionals involved exhibited a vicious spiral of rigid and inflexible behaviour 
which at times verged on the ludicrous and combative.  They were, though, 
resolute in apportioning blame at the door of the Primary Care Trust. 
 
“... it becomes the only way that you feel you can fight back, if everyone else is 
watching their corner then your only defence is to start watching yours. ... so in 
a way you start getting dogmatic about it yourself and saying, this dressing is 
not actually our responsibility, it is the district nurses responsibility. ...You can 
get into a situation where if someone was to get in their car and go out and do a 
dressing, that could be a half hour job but you can spend three quarters of an 
hour having four conversations with four different people discussing whose job 
this actually is, almost until somebody breaks or someone picks up the ball that 
you’ve thrown them. ...  none of this is the district nurses’ fault, this is not district 
nurses saying I’m not going to do that or that is not in my remit, this is coming 
down on them from the PCT, their job descriptions changed, they were 
specifically told you can’t do this, you can do that, they were given a whole set 
of guidelines that they had never followed before.’ (RB GP1PM11:13-16 GP1, 
PM1) 
 
“In actual fact we ask the nurses to do all the bloods in the future now and on 
the whole that works okay but it is a good example of the way the dogma within 
it made a system that should be potentially very straightforward, difficult ...” (TW 
GP1PM1:5 GP1) 
 




However, whilst staff in General Practice seemed to experience the most 
damaging effects of boundaries, they were particularly expressive about how 
breaking down barriers between groups of health professionals had improved 
working relationships.  This was, though, realised in a number of different ways.  
As the following illustration from a Practice Manager demonstrates, at times 
success was achieved through initiating casual contact at informal times such 
as when staff were having their lunch.  This participant felt that the easy 
atmosphere created open conditions where communications could be shared 
and collegiatism was promoted through the establishment of trust. 
 
” ... every day I have my lunch with them ... So we can talk on an informal basis  
... I think that is why they feel they are part of everything because as soon as 
something is happening, they know of it, it is all in the open and they are always 
part of it.” (CS GPPM2:5 PM2) 
 
Other participants evidenced breaking down barriers in more formal ways.  
What follows is a dialogue between a GP and his Practice Manager about a 
situation they handled (CS GPPM1:2-5 GP1, PM1) 
 
The GP and Practice Manager began by outlining what they had achieved.  
There was pride in the way in which they recounted the outcome of a holistic 
patient led service.  
 
GP:  “... we were quite ground breaking some years back in that we actually 
established a proper integrated nursing team which had a mixture of district 
nurses, practice nurses, health visitors, all grades of people, all working 
together and they basically spread the workload, including the practice 
workload, and they did it all on the basis of who was the best qualified to do that 
particular task.” 
 
 PM1:   “The complication is, by and large, practice nurses are employed by the 
practice, health visitors and district nurses are employed by the PCT so the 
ground breaking bit was we had to break down barriers between people who 
were employed by different bodies ... the common denominator was they 
worked for the same group of patients ... “ 
 
They then continued by explaining, using an illustration, how they effected the 
holistic service.  Their methods were multi-layered.  
 




 First of all they established opportunities where staff could communicate.  
Secondly, they confronted hierarchical beliefs which shaped the demarcation 
lines between staff in terms of their responsibilities.  Thirdly, they were prepared 
to be steadfast and determined in trying to overcome barriers that had formed. 
 
GP1:  “It was quite complicated basically; there was an awful lot of sitting down 
together in teams, breaking down dogma actually.  ... the health visitors didn’t 
want to have anything to do with giving children vaccinations because they felt 
they were over-qualified to do it, they felt their expertise was very much about 
much more the child globally and we started off with lowly practice nurses 
should be given this because they are just technicians whereas we are 
something special.  Well we got round that by saying actually nobody is 
anything special here and all of us, including doctors, will do whatever it is 
necessary to do within this common pathway. ... took all sorts of sessions and 
days and sitting down and writing down what had to be done and who was best 
to do it. 
 
There was clear evidence of negotiation in the calm and rational approach they 
took when the sense of what they were doing was challenged. 
 
PM1:  “ ... initially it was, well I’m paid by these and my team leader is, and who 
pays my petrol if I go out and do a practice visit because someone else pays my 
petrol, etc and once we’d got through all that and worked out that there was a 
balance here, that if a practice nurse did some district work then it balanced 
back so what we were doing was the same amount of work but it was fitting in 
better categories.”  
 
GP1:  “The issue with that was, no matter how you wrote it down, the people 
who were spending most time with the children were the health visitors and they 
could be doing that while they were doing other things so they could be doing 
some of their assessment work while they were doing that, it wasn’t difficult to 
do and in the end they did accept that and it worked incredibly well for a period 
of time.” 
 
Most importantly, they articulated the significant benefits felt by the practice and 
its staff and patients.   
 
“... they were all based around the practice as a unit and they met together, they 
met in their different groupings, they met with us and so the whole thing 
functioned very well and actually it did save an awful lot of time because things 
weren’t duplicated, people with particular skills would go out and do stuff ...” 
 
Their final reflections encapsulated and reinforced the patient oriented nature of 
healthcare professionals. 
 




PM1:  “ ... we had to forget about organisational barriers ... it was forgetting 
about the organisation, forgetting about who paid you and what your job 
description said and basing it back on the patient and the patient being the 
centre of it.” 
 
These professionals had identified an issue, acted autonomously and used their 
initiative and skills.  The result for them was better patient care delivered 
through the flexible collaboration of a group of individuals who understood and 
valued each others’ perspective.   
 
5.4 Changes to Resourcing in Healthcare 
 
Participants were explicit in recognising the resource intensive nature of their 
occupation and readily described their working days. 
 
“... just to run through my average day in general surgery, it would start at 
7.30am and I would do probably an hour and a half ward round of all the 
patients and my job would involve documenting clearly what the Registrar had 
said, how the patient was that morning and any plans for the day.  Then, once 
that ward round is finished my job while I go round, if I am on my own for 
example, usually there are 2 or 3 of us and we would kind of split a role, one 
writing notes, one would do the jobs that were requested and the other would 
keep a list of the jobs that were requested but if I was on my own I would have 
to do all three and then when the ward round is over I would have to go back 
and handle those patients and do the jobs that had been allocated by the 
seniors that morning, ...” (PE GSREG:33)  
 
There was much commentary from participants across the sample about the 
impact of resourcing changes on their working conditions.  Participants 
perceived that these changes distracted them from working with their peers to 
deliver the very best patient care possible and, thus, threatened their capacity to 
perform their duties.  The result were feelings of discord.  Furthermore, they 
argued that resourcing changes that were imposed on employees, by those at 
the top of the organistion rather than derived through consensus, were more 
likely to result in an unfavourable response from employees.    
 
However, a significant amount of the discussion was context specific and so 
distinctive for each group within the sample.  Although this meant that different 
groups of professionals were occupied by different issues, the outcome was the 
same.  Participants perceived that these issues undermined their opportunity to 




perform their professional duties.  What follows is a presentation of the views 
expressed by firstly, hospital staff, secondly, those in general practice and 
finally, the ambulance service.  
 
5.4.1 Resourcing Changes in Hospitals 
 
Staff within hospitals felt that their roles were being extended, this seemed to 
create much anxiety particularly amongst administrative staff.  This Ward Clerk 
felt particularly strongly that she was being asked to undertake duties for which 
she had no training and which, to her, seemed entirely inappropriate. 
 
 “... they are now asking the ward clerks to take more responsibility for 
outpatients ... they have said we don’t want you to question a doctor’s opinion 
but in a way they are asking us to question doctors...  but how can we question 
a doctor?  How do we know what this patient needs or things like that?” (PE 
GSWC2:5) 
 
A member of the reception team in Accident and Emergency corroborated with 
this indicating that roles were being extended without any consultation with the 
staff involved. The futility of the situation appeared to add to this participant’s 
sense of frustration. 
 
 “... I think everything has got to add to our tension because basically you are 
only employed to do one job and when lots of other jobs are thrown at you, 
whether you want to do them or not, you are expected to do them and you have 
to do them and so it is all adding to pressure and stress.” (ID A&EREC:9 R1)  
 
The working conditions created by the rotation system which underpinned the 
Foundation Programme for Doctors was identified by this doctor as a problem.  
This doctor’s perception was that it held the potential to expose both 
experienced and inexperienced doctors.   
 
“ ... I had been doing surgery for 2 months when the others came into the job 
behind me ... as I said it is the busiest room in the hospital and you have a lot of 
very sick, very complicated patients and  ... you went from having 3 people who 
knew everything inside out to 1 person who knew everything inside out and 2 
people who have never done any surgery before which turned out to be 3 
people who had never done any because of the F2 as well ...” (ID GSREG:27) 
  




In spite of this, she was resolved to do her best for patients despite feeling 
isolated and alone with the responsibility. 
 
“... you never know what emergency is coming in, you can have anything from a 
stabbing to a bottom abscess so you never know how long they are going to be 
in and how serious it is.  That can be a bit difficult because there really is just 
one of you and one SHO and one Registrar and if they are not available then 
you are on your own ... So it ended up being me and 2 other house officers who 
kept this man alive for 4 hours before we could get the Registrar out of theatre 
... and make theatre available for this gentleman and actually I pumped 10 units 
of blood into this chap and it resulted in me going over people’s heads ... but 
this chap survived ... it is sometimes a battle with fire, you really do just need to 
get on with it ..” (TM GSREG: 10, 13, 17)  
 
In addition, the introduction of the Working Time Directive and its effect on the 
hours of junior doctors had, according to this doctor, escalated what was 
expected of doctors during the working day.  Hypothetically this participant 
viewed the potential paradoxical effects on patient care. 
 
“The reason it is busy is you have got the same number of medical staff that 
you had years ago and what you have done is you’ve just lowered the number 
of hours that they work so you are paying them less so you are doing the same 
amount of work in fewer hours, nothing has really changed in terms of the 
workload, the only thing that has changed is the amount of people doing it in 
lesser time.  In terms of the effect that it has on patients, I guess mistakes are 
more likely in someone who is 
trying to sort a whole ward out by 
himself or who is busier; I guess 
you are more likely to make 
mistakes.  On the other hand you 
can argue that if you are working 
less hours you are more alert so 
that kind of counters it.” (TM 
A&ESHO:16) 
 
As the following quotations testify, 
participants in hospitals believed 
that resourcing changes such as 
extended roles had created error 
incidences.  Participants were open 
about errors, some were clearly 
concerned, yet all accepted the 
state of affairs.  Disturbingly, this 
Vignette 4 
 
“... sometimes I have to decide 
whether to send people up to A&E 
and I’m not sure that they would 
get any better care up there 
because everybody is so rushed, 
they see doctors who are 
inexperienced and nurses who are 
under qualified for what they do 
and I get the impression that when 
people go through the front door of 
the hospital, the quickest solution 
is decided upon and they are sent 
back out and they sometimes have 
missed that they are dealing with a 
critical diagnosis.”  
 
(PE GPPM2:12 GP2) 
 




situation was also readily recognised by other healthcare professionals as can 
be seen from the succinct summary of a GP (Vignette 4). 
 
“... if you have not been back to look at someone that you know might become 
more ill then yes, you are taking a risk aren’t you, you might go back and 
something has happened to them and you have not had chance to go and look 
... it has happened in the department ...that people have deteriorated and you 
haven’t been able to get back to them and then, when you have got back to 
them, they have been critically ill.” (PL A&EN:12-13 N1,N2)  
 
5.4.2 Resourcing Changes in General Practice 
 
GPs and their Practice Managers felt that resourcing changes were destroying 
the very fabric of general practice (Vignette 5).  The remainder of this section is 
concerned with the changes 




The launch of extended 
hours for GP surgeries had 
just been announced when 
the interviews were taking 
place.  As a result, it was a 
burning issue amongst this group, spontaneously mentioned by each GP and 
Practice Manager.   
 
One particular GP and his Practice Manager summarised the situation 
beginning with their concerns about its impact on their collegiate locale. 
 
“... if we are open from 7 in the morning until 7 at night, you can’t expect 
everybody to be there at 11am and so as a result what happens is the whole 
thing gets spread thinner and thinner.” 
 
Furthermore, the extended hours were threatening to the GP because he felt 
that it stretched an already scarce resource and prevented him from engaging 




“... I think what is in danger of being lost in 
general practice is there is an awful lot of 
goodwill work done which can’t be 
measured, which is not paid for and if we 
lose morale and motivation then that will 
go.” 
 
 (CS GPPM1:9 PM1) 




“... it was about patents saying they wanted more appointments which was a big 
political thing ... the reality is will it actually work and will it actually meet the 
needs of the patient ... and the way we work ... We run educational meetings 
here and when I am stretched I am going to find it really difficult to run an 
educational meeting for 8 GPs, 3 of whom never meet the other 5 ... (EO 
GPPM1:4 GP1)  
 
The GP and his Practice Manager then went on to explain the irrelevance of the 
scheme in their eyes.  The clear concerns were that it focused attention and 
resources on the quantity of their patient care at the expense of recognising the 
quality.   
 
“The only thing people are looking at is the number of appointment slots with 
patients at a particular time but seeing patients is probably the smallest part of 
our day or seeing patients in a face to face consultation.  You spend a lot of 
time dealing with patient issues but somehow you can’t measure that. ...” 
 
This particular practice showed great concern for the finer details of patient care 
but felt that, as the emphasis changed, it would be impossible for them to 
continue to properly support patients. 
 
“ As we start to get stretched a little bit further and resources get stretched a 
little bit further, people are going to stop looking at those systems and they are 
going to stop doing those systems ... stuff just won’t happen ever and that’s the 
danger of where it’s going at the moment.” (CS GPPM1:7, 8 GP1, PM1)” 
 
The threat to general practice presented by extended hours was also 
recognised by another practice team.  However, they were pragmatic in their 
acceptance of the initiative, preferring to take an agreed view in terms of 
managing its introduction. 
 
“The biggest threat we have had just lately has been that we have been asked 
to do extended hours which meant the staff would be working different hours to 
what they are contracted to work which is a big thing to ask your staff.  ... I have 
talked to the staff from the minute it came up ... how did they think it would work 





The staff of General Practice were also extremely cynical about Poly Clinics and 
their likely impact on their practice. 




“PM2 and I both sit on our local commission group and nobody is interested at 
all (about their concerns about Poly Clinics) and so there was a meeting with 
the local MP ... and the MP ... said that he was unaware that there was any 
privatisation agenda at all, that the dialysis centres and these new poly clinics 
are only going to be in London or in deprived areas, they are not going to come 
anywhere else at all, no no no there is no privatisation agenda so we could be 
reassured.” (RSP GPPM2:4 GP2) 
 
This participant went on to explain his fears for his practice and his patients, 
concerns which were shared by other GPs. 
 
 “Where it is moving is 60 doctors working shifts in a big centre which again is 
fine for a certain proportion of people but actually nobody is holding together the 
complicated bit.  It’s what is locked up in my head that is the problem, you know 
I know her son, I know who to contact if there is a problem, I know what level of 
crisis they can cope with as a family so I have got a pretty good idea of when it 
is falling apart and when they actually need some intervention.  But all of that 
goes and all of that slides into an automated system ... ” (PR GPPM1:5 GP11) 
  
“... the problem that is going to arise is you don’t know what you have got until 
you lose it and at the end of the day it is that load of stuff that you are going to 
lose, you can’t do that when you haven’t got the personal knowledge of people. 
(TW GP1PM1:8 GP1, PM11) 
 
5.4.3 Resourcing Changes in the Ambulance Service 
 
Of all those interviewed, the timing of the fieldwork coincided with great 
changes in the Ambulance Service.  This element of the sample was 
enormously outspoken and critical about the impacts these changes had on 
their working life.  Ambulance crew were particularly concerned about the 
negative impact of resource allocation on their ability to carry out their duties.  
As the four Illustrations below show, their concerns were context specific and 





Over the recent past, the Ambulance Service has reorganised how it delivers its 
service to patients.  Nowadays, patients might be cared for by a technician 
crew, who are mainly based in ambulances, or paramedics who drive the 
response cars.   





Ambulance crew were disturbed by changes to the staffing regime.  
Synonymous with other services, the function and responsibilities of a member 
of ambulance crew is dictated by their role.  So for example, technicians 
perform a more limited role than paramedics who have undergone specialist 
clinical training.   
 
“... there is an ECP (emergency care practitioner) scheme so people started 
going to that but it was too expensive (band 7) so now we have PP Paramedic 
practitioners band 6) so they have less training ... they go on to cars so we kind 
of lose them from the main rota and some people go to Rapid Response 
vehicles which are single person.” (PE AC1:27 AC1B) 
 
There were also strong objections about the subsequent distribution of 
technicians and paramedics.   
 
... it doesn’t help when you know that you don’t have 100% assurance in your 
own mind that control will respond the next available appropriately trained 
person to go to that job and assist you. (PS AC3:18 AC3A) 
 
It was sometimes a case of the right people but the wrong transport or the 
wrong people but the right transport. 
 
“... there are some technicians on cars still which to me is just silly ... so the car 
gets there and does all the assessment but often they are not backed up by an 
ambulance, so then, if they decide this patient is poorly, they have to phone and 
let comms know that they need an ambulance ...(TO AC2:4 AC2B) 
 
“... you phone up and say, you do know we are a double tech crew, is there a 
paramedic running? ... We need to know if there is a paramedic running 
because depending on whether or not there is a paramedic determines what we 
do. ... (Interviewer: So you have all the equipment) Yes, on the unit, but not the 
person who can use it. ... can you imagine what it is like for a double tech crew 
to pitch up to somebody that needs, say adrenaline, or they could die then you 
know they need that but you can’t give it. ... they know what needs doing but 
they can’t do it. (TM AC2:8-9 AC2A) 
 
The personal impact of resourcing was exhibited in crew’s feelings of cynicism 
and dejection.  They were sceptical about the underlying rationale for the 
changes and despairing about limited resources. 
 
“... they want to increase the amount of cars and reduce the amount of 
ambulances, they want to increase the amount of urgent tier staff so they will 
send a car and they will hope that person can downgrade that job so that within 




2 hours an urgent tier can get them and that bypasses the whole middle 
ambulance tier ....” (F AC1:8 AC1A, AC1B) 
 
 “... the problem we see is that fundamentally people need moving and there 
aren’t enough ambulances to move people … there are a lot of calls that need a 
2-man ambulance and we have not got enough of them.” ( F AC2:4 AC2A) 
 
As the following examples testify, ambulance staff witnessed the patient 
suffering that resulted from the changes, namely technician crew being 
prohibited from administering life saving treatments [1] or paramedic staff being 
unable to transport patients to hospital [2].  In the eyes of these participants, the 
impact on patient care and the staff attempting to deliver it, was acute. 
 
[1] “I was working on a job last night with another technician and I have done a 
paramedic diploma at Hallam university ... (I am) on the HPC register as a 
registered paramedic, I have done hospital placements so I can cannulate and 
insulate and all that ... So last night I go to a cardiac arrest, me and C who is a 
technician ... so patient is in cardiac arrest so what do you want to do, you want 
to cannulate and get some drugs in, they said a paramedic was coming and for 
20 minutes we were doing CPR before the paramedic came.  It is absolutely 
appalling because at the end of the day I could have cannulated that patient 
and got adrenaline in, intubated them, I could have done all that in 20 minutes, 
instead we were sat waiting for a paramedic to come.” (PL AC3:17  AC3B) 
  
[1] “ (I feel) Frustrated more than anything, when you go to a job and you know 
what they need, what can be done for a patient, but you can’t do it. ... Well, God 
forbid, but if I was ever in that situation I think I would phone A&E to speak to a 
doctor and ask if they would authorise me to give adrenaline, how can you 
stand there and watch somebody die when you know what they need? ... you 
can’t just stand by and watch somebody die (PE AC2:8-10 AC2A)  
 
[1] “I do think that having double technician crews puts patients at risk, without 
doubt ... (PS AC2:9 AC2B) 
 
[2] “There are one or two people who have come off Car because they have 
had bad experiences where they have been left with people.  It is a stressful 
enough job as it is but if you just imagine that you have a paramedic on scene 
with someone who has had a heart attack and they will also have the relatives 
asking where is the ambulance?  They watch casualty, they know that they 
should be on an ambulance and should be going to A&E, ...  the paramedic on 
scene is trying to do the best for the patient, trying to sort relatives out, ringing 
control and sometimes you just absolutely despair of the situation.” (D AC2:7 
AC2B)  
 
Ambulance crew recognised, though, the positive outcomes that occurred when 
resource allocation enabled technicians and paramedics to effectively work 
together. 




“... it was a good job that car got there because they would have died but it is 
also a good job they sent that ambulance so that they got there within 5 minutes 
of the car getting there.  So they do make a difference, they definitely can get 
there faster than us but they can only make a difference for a short while on a 
certain type of patient and if that ambulance doesn’t back them up, they are 
stuck.  It seems to happen to certain people, there is a guy here who came off 
the car because he constantly ended up at patients’ houses where he was stuck 
without a back up and the patient was ill and there is a guy that moved to 




Ambulance crew are directed to patients by a communications team.  Recently 
the local communications team was closed and a new regional communications 
team was established.   
 
Ambulance crew appeared to demonstrate parochial tendencies and exhibited 
an attachment to pre-change conditions.  Here, a member of crew described the 
first of the changes which was the relocation of Ambulance Control following the 
merger of two regional ambulance services. 
 
 “At the moment it is in Rotherham and it is quite small and works for the South 
Yorkshire area, it gathers calls and sends calls out to us in the South Yorkshire 
area whereas within the next month it is going through to Wakefield and then it 
will be the whole of the Yorkshire Ambulance Service which goes right up to the 
edge of Tees and is West Yorkshire all the way over to Hull and South 
Yorkshire.  So, then that one control unit will supply the whole area with calls.” 
(CW AC11:1 AC1B) 
 




“... the move to Wakefield  ... losing the relationship that we have actually got 
now with the people in cons unit in Rotherham ... teamwork ... because we do 
react together, their local knowledge about what we are doing and the fact that 
we do actually help personally...” (PR AC1:4 AC1A, AC1B)  
 
Furthermore and without 
exception, ambulance crew 
participants then proceeded to 
highlight the problems that they 
either anticipated or had 
experienced as a result of the 
merger.  Their criticism appeared 
two-fold.  Firstly, a lack of local 
knowledge on the part of 
communications personnel 
produced an ineffective and 
inefficient use of ambulance crew 
as a resource.  Secondly, at the 
very least this led to a disparity of 
workload but there was also 
evidence that it had seriously 
compromised patient care 
(Vignette 6). 
 
“... communications ... it has now 
moved to Wakefield whereas 
before it was here.  That is not as good now, at least they were in Rotherham 
before and the staff there seemed to know the crews and the area, basically 
they knew who was closer to where, now it just seems like they haven’t got a 
clue.  Some crews are just hammered all day and other crews are sat on the 
station for 2 or 3 hours doing nothing ... They will say, what station are you from 
and we say so and so and they will say, where’s that? (EO AC3:11-12 AC3A, 
AC3B)  
 
 “... the mind boggles sometimes when you are driving and you actually cross 
other crews and you think why are they not going to where they have just come 
from and why are we not going to where we have just come from and why are 
we passing like ships in the night? (EM AC2:3 AC2B)  
 
“it was a lot better and there was all this promise that actually we don’t need a 
local control centre that has a local knowledge and maybe a more intimate 
Vignette 6 
 
“We are now with a system where, 
with that fatality yesterday, a lone 
responder on a fast response vehicle 
was left on scene for a very long 
time and 2 other response vehicles 
heard on the radio that this person 
was asking for immediate assistance 
and they offered to go, they were 
close by and the call centre said that 
they were not needed, that it was not 
necessary and a crew was 
responding.  In fact 2 crews were 
responding from out of Sheffield and 
one of the fast response vehicles 
was 4 minutes away and, bearing in 
mind we are dealing with a fatality on 
scene and a seriously ill 10 year old 
paediatric girl... that is the frustration 
because, first and foremost, if control 
phoned through and interrupted a 
meal break and said there was an 
emergency then anyone here would 
respond, no problem ...”  
 
(PR AC3:5 AC3A, AC3B) 
 




knowledge of the crews and a local knowledge of where those crews were and 
who was best to respond.” (PR AC3:11 AC3A) 
 
Moreover, ambulance crew were disparaging about the quality of Ambulance 
Control staff. 
 
“... they can be anybody, they could have worked in McDonalds last week and 
then have gone through the despatch training and then they are answering 999 
calls and a few weeks later they are despatching ambulances with no clinical 
involvement.” (PE AC2: 11 AC2A)  
 
More importantly and as a direct consequence, it has also adversely affected 
their ability to deliver patient care. 
 
“ ... if I get an address in an area that I know is undesirable and I haven’t got 
any details of what I am going to then I will quite happily admit that I will phone 
control and say unless I know what I am going to then I am not going any 
further.  So then, yes, that is being detrimental to your patient because that 
patient might be a genuine chest pain patient who could be having a heart 
attack.  So, in my eyes, they are delaying me going to the scene because they 




Deficiencies in the nature and quantity of supporting resources were also raised 
by ambulance crew.  Crew were opinionated on the subject of the drugs that 
they carry.  Whilst they had life saving improvements to suggest, their 
overwhelming perception was that decision makers were reluctant to listen 
because of resourcing priorities.  
    
“My main issue (is that) ... our burns kit is a bottle of sterile water and a roll of 
cling film.  The iconic picture of the bombings in London and the picture of a 
young woman with the burns mask on, why are we not carrying things like this?  
And when you ask, well they go out of date and are too expensive, well I know 
for a fact that if I pitched up at a house fire and it was some of my relatives then 
I would want them to have something more than a bottle of sterile water poured 
on them and piece of cling film draped over them.” (PL AC2:14 AC2B) 
  
“... it is the system that we use.  We have one little material bag and in that bag 
there are various pockets, none of them are standard and so you pick one from 
one ambulance and another from a different ambulance and the layout will be 
completely different.  We used to have Nubain which is an analgaesic and 
Narcam which is an opiate reversal and something we use for an overdose and 
you could give one against the other, when actually you could have an 
overdose and you wanted to give Narcam to combat the overdose and you 




might have given Nubain which is an extra opiate because they both begin with 
a N and they are both in flimsy little cardboard boxes.  One of the suggestions, 
moving on from something that happened, was let us have different coloured 
boxes because they are in the same size vial and they both begin with the same 
letter but they have completely different effects. ... there is a reluctance (to 
learn)...” (TM AC3:8 AC3A) 
  
“...  we carry a little grab bag of specific drugs, fatal given at the wrong time or 
at the wrong dose and clinical near-misses happen and we could have learned 
lessons from ones that have happened in the past but we don’t seem to have 
and there is a reluctance to move forward with a whole raft of ideas that are 
cheap to implement but would really make things a lot easier ...” (D AC3:8 
AC3A) 
 
“... why can’t we learn from these things and say okay we’ve got cheap 
measures that we could do to move one step on to try to avoid this happening 
again ... people are saying that sodium chloride has changed and it is not going 
to be long before someone mixes that up with Salbutamol, it might not be fatal 
or life threatening but ... another is sodium chloride in IV bags is the same size 
as glucose in IV bags and it might not be long before one of those is given in 
error.” (D AC3:9-10 AC3A, AC3B) 
 
In addition, there was some commentary about staffing changes following the 
merger of two ambulance services.  It was the perception of participants that 
when the two services merged, staff who were employed locally to manage 
drug stocks were made redundant as part of efficiency measures.  Staff were 
extremely frustrated that this had had a detrimental effect on the level of life-
saving equipment available for them to use in care situations.      
 
“Since we merged it is just an absolute nightmare, I mean over the bank holiday 
weekend up at A&E there has been no 100% oxygen masks, there has been no 
40% adaptors for oxygen masks, we ran out of suction tubing, there were some 
drugs that some of the paramedics were saying they had run out of. ... there 
wasn’t anything to stock up with (in Casualty), there was no stock at casualty 




Finally, participants explained the effects that changes to their pay and 
conditions had had on their goodwill and inclination to be flexible.   
 
“... we used to be paid through our meal breaks so you could be on your break 
5 minutes and the phone could ring and you would be off out again ... they don’t 
pay us now.  I think the reason for this is because they had to reduce our hours 
under Agenda for Change...  but, if there is a cardiac arrest and we are 2 doors 




down and on our meal break then they can’t phone us.  Now I know that I would 
want to go ... but they are not paying us so we don’t respond now ...” (PR AC2:6 
AC2B) 
 
5.5 Experiential Training 
 
Participants spoke extensively about training.  Whilst there was some 
discussion about the broad processes that they were trained to perform, 
participants were more occupied with the dynamics of training.  In the first 
instance, it was evident that participants possessed distinct attitudes towards 
training.  Secondly, they distinguished between qualifications and training.  
Qualifications, they saw as defining their role, whereas the practioner-led 
training they received on the job was a crucial stage in gaining the experience 
they required to do the job well and progress within their profession.   Thirdly, it 
was apparent that self-reflection co-existed with training to build the 
experienced professional.  Finally, there was explicit commentary about the 
inadequacies of training.  This section will present the findings of each of these 
aspects in turn. 
 
5.5.1 Attitudes Towards Training 
 
Participants had various attitudes to training ranging from being very 
appreciative to a more rational viewpoint.   
 
As the following quotations show, one hospital doctor’s attitude was influenced 
by several positive and constructive hands-off, on the job training experiences. 
 
...  when I started this job I thought I had the worst job in the world, I had a huge 
number of hugely complicated very sick patients ... and felt that I was learning 
nothing and just running around all the time doing just what the seniors had told 
me but by the time I finished, I realised I was probably the luckiest person there 
because I had a big period when I was completely unsupported and I just had to 
learn it in order to survive ... it is a brilliant way of learning ...” (TM GSREG:29)  
  
“... if you have faith in your juniors ... then they are more willing to let you run 
free and make your decisions and stuff and just supervise from a distance.  And 
I think that that’s a very good way of learning because I think if you are hand 
held for most of our education then it is very easy to never learn anything really” 
(ID GSREG:20)  




However, another hospital doctor demonstrated a more pragmatic opinion 
towards training.   
 
“What we are there to do is see as much as we can, at the end of the day that is 
part of our training, you see as much as you can and you get confident and 
competent in dealing with all those different things” (EM A&ESHO:7)  
 
5.5.2 An Evolving and Experiential Approach to Training 
 
Across the sample, participants readily acknowledged the worth of training in 
terms of developing valuable experience, expertise and confidence.   
 
“... I have always wanted to be in A&E, acute medicine, intensive care and 
trauma surgery so my objective in life is to expose myself to as much acute 
medicine and learn to cope with it without being frustrated ...”(ID GSREG:8) 
  
“The Day Ward Clerk taught me, she has been here 20 years or something ...  I 
have been here nearly 4 years now and I think you learn more and more ...”(TM 
GSWC1:4) 
 
 “... some things work really well, organising some ongoing or inter-department 
training with other units like the burns unit or A&E, on your float weeks ... people 
can now take opportunities to do day placements at maternity wards in 
Barnsley, an A&E placement at the Northern General, the same at the 
Childrens’, the same with the chest pain nurses for cardiology experience ... 
(EO AC3:10 AC3A)  
 
As the previous quotation indicates, this appeared to evolve over time.  
Consequently, participants perceived that growing experience and expertise 
would broadly run concurrent with status and tenure. 
 
“I have been here for 2 years and I’ve just done cannulation and venapuncture 
and IV drugs so it is not something you do immediately it just kind of gets added 
on as you go through ...” (ID A&EN:13 N1) 
  
“ ... at the beginning I wouldn’t have even ultra sounded a patient who needed 
an appendix out because I didn’t know if that was the appropriate investigation.” 
(TM GSREG:23)  
 
“I mean the more experienced of us can decide that can wait but there are girls 
that are not as experienced” (ID A&EREC:9 R1)  
 
The following member of ambulance crew explained how experience facilitated 





 “ ... there are patients that you 
go to and you think this is an 
ASHICE call, no doubt about it, 
and then you get other patients 
where you look at the ECG etc 
and you think well they are not 
critical at the moment ...” (TM 
AC1:5 AC1A)  
 
As the participants below 
testify, the ultimate benefit of 
experience is that it can make a 
positive impact on the patient 
experience and patient care.  
This is borne out graphically by 
the story Vignette 7.     
 
“... it makes more sense for someone with more experience to see them directly 
and makes the process a little quicker because SHO’s are better equipped to 
make decisions about theatre or no theatre and know more about the kind of 
procedures people need whereas house officers don’t have that knowledge.” 
(EO GSREG:1)  
  
 “… I think what we are good at is, we have a good idea, we get a good history, 
we kind of package the patient up from being in a very messy state ... we get 
them bundled up into the ambulance, safe, hopefully feeling a little better ...” 
(TO AC3:2 AC3A) 
 
However, particularly when participants started to comment on the training of 
others, the converse was perceived to be true.  Participants across the sample 
highlighted instances where their peers lacked the practical experience and 
knowledge to perform their duties.   
 
“It is very difficult and very unusual, it is not a regular occurrence that the house 
officer has more experience than the F2 ... the way it worked was it just went on 
experience, he knew I knew more about the patients and the kinds of things we 
needed and took a step back and let me lead ward round and let me decide on 
things ... however, the other F1’s who were coming in behind me who had 3 
months with him are finding it very difficult, they look to me as the F2 rather than 
him which isn’t appropriate but also goes along the lines that experience in 




“This lass was having a fit and the 
doctor was doing CPR and I got the 
bag and mask out to start and I 
looked down, the patient was only 
about 12, and I said “Doctor the 
patient is breathing” and they 
stopped.  I mean she will have done 
that fit thing and they do stop 
breathing for an amount of time but 
then they just start again but the 
doctor assumed she was having a 
cardiac arrest.  You don’t get cardiac 
arrests that have come out of fitting 
unless they have been fitting for a 
long time.”  
 
(TM AC1:10 AC1B)  
 




In some cases, this appeared a transient situation that occurred when staff were 
new. 
 
“... the majority of junior doctors when they move onto a ward, they 
acknowledge the fact that they don’t have experience in that field ... (ID 
A&ESHO:12) 
 
“... when we get new house officers on I would like to do and say these are the 
rules because they are in some ways just let loose ...” (TO GSWC2:1)  
 
There were, though, more significant examples where the training regime 
limited practical experience and knowledge that ultimately compromise patient 
care. 
 
 “... there have been negative incidents that have happened, that people who 
were in AC3B’s position or qualified and operating as a paramedic with little 
experience on the road have made some big mistakes” (EM AC3:7 AC3A) 
 
As the following doctor reported, this variability in practical experience and 
knowledge became a source of conflict between professionals. 
 
“We are trained in something different to what they are, the jobs are totally 
different but often doing a job for a few years, a nurse will become experienced 
in their field so they don’t like junior staff coming there to learn that field within 4 
months, for example, telling them or advising them or prescribing things 
because they are not allowed to do that whereas they are quite experienced in 
that field and they’ll know what to do and they just can’t be bothered to wait for 
it.” (TO A&ESHO:5) 
 
“... so being told not to do it that way sometimes there can be a rift ...” (ID 
A&ESHO:3) 
 
Furthermore, participants appeared to harbour misgivings about the level of 
personal exposure inexperience brought. 
 
“... not all house officers will see it that way, they will see it as a failure of the 
system and they should not have been put in that position on their own and they 
are very right ... it was difficult because as a first job you don’t know where the 
boundaries are and it took the point where the nursing staff had to take 
someone aside and say this is not right, this is not fair on you, that you are 
doing the ward round, that they don’t do any work ... leaving you alone on the 
ward.” ID GSREG:10, 29)  
 




“... there is also a box on the 
non-conveyance where we 
have to mark to say the 
patient is capable of making 
that decision ... and we’ve 
got no training for that ... we 
get sent to psychiatric cases 
as they will come up ...and 
we have minimal training for 
that ... you use anyone you 
can to witness it, we use 
police, we will take car 
numbers down ...” (TM 
AC1:11 AC1A AC1B) 
 
One particular respondent 
described an incident which 
summarises the paradoxical 
nature of experiential 
training in healthcare.  
Incidents such as this are, 
on the one hand, a dramatic 
part of everyday working life 
when part of a person’s 
professional training relies 
on learning on the job.  
However, for the staff 
involved they are also 
alarming and risky.  It seems that they are, though, expected as a part of 
working life and, as long as the patient care outcome is positive, this particular 
healthcare professional felt validated by their actions and in fact, took some 
satisfaction from their achievement (Vignette 8) 
 
5.5.3 Self Reflection and Organisational Learning 
 
Within the context of developing their experience, some participants were open 
in their need for self-reflection as a mechanism for learning.  The notion of self 
reflection was particularly significant for the doctors in the sample.   
Vignette 8 
 
“... he was a gentleman who have been 
admitted from a medical speciality ... 
vomiting blood and passing blood from his 
back end and had been transferred across 
to us ... he had bled when I had been 
alone with him the day before and I had 
some senior support and we had managed 
to do some camera tests to see where it 
was coming from and what they thought 
was the cause had been treated and he 
had been put back on the ward and had 
been reasonably well.  Then the following 
day, I didn’t have any senior support at all, 
it was me and that was it and one of the 
other F1’s who was stuck with another 
poorly patient on the other side, across the 
hospital ... this gentleman started to bleed 
profusely and uncontrollably and I had 
nobody, both of my SHO’s were away, all 
of the Registrars bar one was away and he 
had been taken away to do a clinic at the 
Hallamshire and the on-call Registrar was 
stuck in theatre .. I did feel validated by the 
fact that I had done a good job and I have 
done everything I can and I have managed 
to do it.  Probably the first time that I 
actually sat back and thought I have 
managed to save somebody’s life today .. . 
“  
 
(TM GSREG:12, 14)   
 




 “We are mostly on the shop floor, seeing people, sorting them out and learning 
from it I guess.” (ID A&ESHO:17) 
  
“If you are willing to put yourself out there and say yes, the knowledge I have 
says this, this and this, I will double check it with somebody in a little while but 
my choice is to start this treatment and if it is wrong them I will have to learn 
from that decision ...” (TM GSREG:27) 
 
One particular hospital doctor, who was humble enough in her reflections to 
recognise her limitations, condemned those who did not engage in self learning. 
 
“I think knowing when the time has come to say, I really need help with this, 
could you do that and letting go a little bit is also very important ... (ID 
GSREG:24) 
 
“... there are times when it is appropriate to look back on it and say, that was a 
good thing, that was a bad thing, that shouldn’t have happened or maybe we 
could do something about it.  But some people don’t take it seriously, they don’t 
reflect ...”  (TM GSREG:19)  
 
It was evident that learning through reflection was not restricted to an 
individual’s self reflection.  Participants commented upon the formal 
mechanisms within healthcare organisations which were used to prompt and 
gather self reflection as a means of generating organisational learning.  The 
principal type of mechanism recalled by participants was the incident reporting 
schemes that record and report any so-called adverse events.  However, 
participants remained unconvinced and challenged their efficacy on the grounds 
that they were cumbersome to complete, positioned defensively and thus, 
negated the capacity for organisational learning. 
 
“... staff fill out incident forms if the patient has a little fall or anything like that, .. 
they would put everything on the incident form ... and then if something 
happens from a patient point of view and they look back at it and they have got 
a document of what staff have said at the time so it is protecting both sides 
really ... (EO GSWC1:1)  
 
 “I filled one in the other day and had someone helping me and I didn’t think it 
was particularly an easy, friendly system to go through, it is just so long winded, 
I think there should be something a lot more simple ... because there are a lot of 
incidents that do happen and people don’t report them because they know it is 
going to take a good hour or more to fill in ... and as AC2B says, she still hasn’t 
heard anything back ...” (TM AC2:1-2 AC2A, AC2B)   
 
“So in theory you could put an incident form in about it but what benefit would 
be gained by doing it I am not entirely sure.” (PR GSREG:11-12) 




 5.5.4 Inadequacies in Training 
 
So far this section has presented participants’ opinions about training.  These 
have, to a large extent, been positive with evidence of constructive attitudes 
towards the notion of training and experiential learning.  However, there were 
indications that participants perceived inadequacies in the extent, quality, 
availability and content of training. 
 
In the first instance, participants raised concerns that some staff received 
insufficient training to be able to perform their role well and this impacted upon 
others. 
 
“... when the phone is going all the time, I find myself apologising and I have no 
need to but you just find yourself saying I am ever so sorry but she just wants to 
speak to you and you think maybe I should have better skills in putting them off 
... (TM GSWC2:3)  
 
 “I think the way that doctors and nurses are trained ...., I don’t think people see 
enough patients ...” (EO GPPM2:2 GP2)  
 
In the second instance, this participant highlighted the dependency between the 
nature and quality of the training and the trainer, indicating a variable picture.  
  
“What you do is you learn how to approach certain members by learning their 
character over the job ... some are more interested in some cases and not in 
others, some are very good at teaching you and helping you out with things, 
others aren’t ...” (ID A&ESHO:7) 
 
In the third instance, resourcing changes affected the availability of training.  
This seemed particularly acute amongst ambulance personnel who were 
anticipating new communications staff following the relocation of Ambulance 
Control.  For them, the potential impacts were clear and detrimental to both 
ambulance crew and members of the public. 
 
“... we haven’t got hours given to us to even have meetings, our supervisor and 
management don’t see all the girls all the time because of the different shifts 
and they don’t even get chance to talk to half of the girls because of the 
different shifts that they do.  So there could be meetings to try and but there is 
no money available ...and it’s all down to funds because there is nothing 
available in the department for us to have ongoing training ...” (TM A&EREC:2 
R1)  





“... you’ve got this generation of Consultants who worked 120 hours a week 
when they were my age and my standard and so when you turn around and you 
say we need more support on the ward then they will go, what do you mean you 
need more support on the wards, I was on my own for 48 hours straight on a 
regular basis and nobody heard me complaining.” (IE GSREG:6)  
 
“... at the moment our Rotherham unit is closing and they are moving to 
Wakefield ... they don’t have local knowledge like the control staff at 
Rotherham, they knew if you were being sent to a dodgy area and you got, be 
careful, watch yourself,  it is a known area but staff in control now have no idea, 
they have no local knowledge (ID AC2:1 AC2A).  
  
 “You know if somebody phones 999 and says it’s 100 yards past Tesco’s near 
that church then someone in Rotherham will say I know where you mean and 
will send us, there will not be any of that when it goes to Wakefield so if 
members of the public don’t know where they are then they have had it because 
there will be no local knowledge.” (PS AC2:3 AC2A) 
 
In the fourth instance, in a service where patient care is delivered across 
organisational boundaries, there were identified inadequacies in training to 
ensure cross-boundary empathy and understanding. 
 
 “We usually, these days, get a discharge summary ... which sometimes we can 
work out and sometimes we can’t ... and that is the bug bear ... they will write on 
all sorts of things eg STEMI we used to get written on a discharge summary 
which we eventually translated which actually means, it is basically a heart 
attack when there isn’t an ECG change to go along with it but again it was a 
piece of paper with just 5 letters on it.” (EO GPPM1:1 GP1)  
 
 “... I actually get the choice of clinics which were written by surgeons and don’t 
always make immediate sense to me, some of them do and some of them don’t 
and sometimes it is straightforward and sometimes it’s not.” (EM GPPM1:1, 2 
GP1) 
 
 “At one time, if they wanted to, they could come and spend a day with you but it 
is like everything else now in that there seems no leeway for people to do that 
... (EO AC2:5 AC2A)  
 
5.6 The Perceived Inequities of Organisationally Oriented Aspects of Working  
      Life 
 
Across the sample, participants spoke about the resource induced unfairness 
and inequity they experienced during their working life.  These negative 
emotions created unconstructive conditions within which staff attempted to 
perform their roles and thus encroached upon their ability to perform their 




duties.  Whilst the notion of inequity affected how they felt as professionals, it 
also influenced their perceptions of other professionals.  The inequity and 
unfairness was principally centred on responsibilities and reward.    
 
Staff believed that there was an unfair approach towards the monetary rewards 
for working.  In fact, as the following quotation testifies, some staff were 
resentful and bitter about the resource allocation arising from healthcare 
budgets and judged this in the light of the relative value of particular members 
of staff. 
 
“I would say that everywhere in the health service or the hospital it is governed 
by money.  And that is the annoying thing, we feel, as receptionists, that 
everything couldn’t carry on without us but we are the ones that don’t get paid a 
lot of money, we haven’t got as many staff but there’s always money for extra 
nurses and extra management that stand about ... and there is always money to 
bring locum doctors in, probably they are not going to do as much work ... So 
there is always enough money for medically trained ... but there is never 
enough money for the other jobs ... “ (ID A&EREC:10 R1).  
 
Some participants perceived that their role, when compared to others, had 
changed and as a consequence, now yielded a greater burden and level of 
responsibility which was not always recognised or appreciated by others.  In 
some instances this resulted in feelings of professional exposure and 
compromised patient safety. 
 
 “I think there are situations where people don’t always appreciate what another 
person’s role is and what they need to get done because what is important to 
one person isn’t to another.  I think some of the nursing staff ...  don’t realise 
that after a weekend when you have been PI’n (admitting patient focus 
information), ... it is absolutely horrendous and I don’t think they realise how 
important it is ...” (ID GSWC2:2). 
 
“... it is difficult because of the way the system (the Foundation Programme for 
Doctors) works that you try as a junior, as a foundation year 1 or 2, to rotate 
through as many specialities as you can so you can decide what you want to do 
for your specialist training so you will inevitably ... end up with a senior as an F1 
who knows less about your subject than you do. ... it can be quite difficult when 
somebody gets very unwell and you need somebody to call upon who you know 
will be there ... no matter how good  ... you are, you can’t manage on your own 
... there are issues with safety” (IE GSREG:4, 7)  
 




There was an awareness that the role, and burden, of particular members of 
staff were location and context specific.   This seemed most acute amongst 
Accident and Emergency staff who indicated that they had greater 
responsibilities than those in other areas. 
 
“... in A&E you are basically working by yourself, you have everyone around but 
you see the patient as your patient ... but it is not so much of a team between 
doctors compared to other disciplines ...” (TM A&ESHO: 13)  
 
“... they are employing support workers who are advanced support workers ... 
support workers are like the old nurses that will actually feed patients and toilet 
patients and do all the basics and here all our support workers are being trained 
up on venapucture, cannulation, they do all ECG’s, they all do extended roles 
that, in the hospitals, a lot of the nurses wouldn’t do ... (TO A&EN:2).   
 
Despite these observed inequalities, there was a egocentric underpinning 
evident in the comments of some participants who spoke about extended 
responsibilities.  Some used extended responsibilities to elevate their role whilst 
others basked in the glory of self achievement.   
  
“... more and more things are being expected that nurses get trained in but it is 
just where it differentiates them between a nurse and a doctor ...”(IE A&E 
N1N2:9 N1)  
 
“... we didn’t have a good 
relationship with our Registrar, 
so it really was correcting their 
mistakes for the best part of 3 
months and meant we had a 
fantastic working relationship 
with the nursing staff because 
they knew how the ward 
worked, they knew what the 
Consultant wanted, they knew 
we usually do this, so it was 
brilliant.  (IE GS REG:11)  
 
5.7 The Stressful Impact of 
      Organisationally Oriented 
      Aspects of Working Life 
 
The following quotation from a 
nurse encapsulates the physical 
and emotional demands she 
Vignette 9 
 
“,,, sometimes you can be on a run of 
10 shifts in a row and they are all 
different shifts so you don’t do 10 lates 
or 10 earlies, you could finish at 9 o 
clock at night so you don’t get home 
until 9.30pm, by the time you unwind 
when you get home it is 11, you get 
home, have something to eat, have a 
shower and go to bed, it is 11 and then 
you are up at 6am to be back on duty 
for 7am and you have done that for 10 
days and you are really knackered.  On 
day 1 and day 2 and day 3 you can 
probably cope with it and be alright but 
by day 10 you can sometimes cry ...” 
 
 (PL A&EN:4 N2) 
 




encounters whilst fulfilling her daily duties.  Implicit within her account are the 
resulting stresses and pressure (Vignette 9).  Her views, whilst replicated 
across most of the sample, were particularly dominant in the interviews with 
hospital staff.   
 
Some participants spoke 
about the impact this had on 
them, not only at work nor 
simply in terms of patient 
care.  This was confirmed by 
the following nurse who 
argued that resource 
allocation was so challenged 
in some areas that staff were 
forced to compromise patient 
care (Vignette 10). 
 
The reflections about how the 
competing priorities within a role prevented participants from achieving job 
satisfaction were heartfelt, emotional and, for some, impinged on their home 
life.  
 
“... we make a lot of mistakes, well we don’t make them because we don’t do it 
on purpose, it is just circumstances but the PFI that controls this system are 
completely aware of it, they try and blame us and say we are careless and we 
work too quickly but when you have got 6 or 7 ambulances to book in then you 
have to work quickly ...We average about 280 patients upwards a day, that’s 
from the whole A&E including ambulances and people who walk in, so you can 
understand it, we are pulled from pillar to post. (PL A&EREC:3 R1, R2)  
 
 “I think the hard thing about this job is you never do a good job, there are 
always things that you could do better because, there are that many things to 
do, you always compromise what you are doing and the nice things like feeding 
them and giving them a cup of tea are the least of your priorities, they are way 
down on your scale of what you have got to do.  They are the nice things, 
having a cup of tea and being clean but they are not going to kill you or make 
you really unwell so you never get to do those nice things and patients are 
never happy in A&E ... you personally feel awful; you get home and feel awful 




“... when you have got to get somebody 
through in 4 hours and I have somebody 
with chest pain and I need to do an ECG 
then that will always take precedent over 
somebody needing the toilet and it 
sounds awful but it will and there have 
been times when I have been busy and I 
have knowingly left people incontinent in 
dirty sheets because they are not going to 
die from that and it is horrible and I feel 
horrible doing that but I think you need to 
go the other way and employ more 
people to do the basics.”  
 
(IE A&EN:10 N2)  
 




Throughout many of these interviews, participants spontaneously mentioned the 
stress and pressure that dominated their daily working, and at times spilled over 
into their home life, some of the common sources are shown below in Table 5.1. 
 
Form of Pressure Example  
The Nature of Patients Needs  “You get difficulties there when you can’t get the full details from the patient for 
whatever reason and the doctors want to take bloods, they can’t take bloods from 
the patient unless they have got this line up on the screen from admissions.  So 
you have to phone up and tell them about him but all the details could be wrong 
and not checked, because the doctors will put you under pressure saying they 
want to take bloods and the patient has not been admitted yet, so you might just 
have to get a line up and go back in and change the details later but you just hope 
that they have got the proper details from the patient to put on the label for the 
bloods.” (RB GSWC2:13) 
Relentless Workflow “...sometimes if there are no beds you can end up with about 15 people just 
waiting for a bed but it doesn’t stop the other ones coming in the door as well.” (PL 
A&EN:3 N1)  
 
“I think I can safely say that most people that work on that desk feel that you don’t 
really acknowledge the person that you are talking to because you are just going 
through things, you want a lot of information from them and a lot of it is personal 
information that people don’t always want to give, that is of no benefit to their visit 
to the department but it is because people in various areas of the hospital want 
the information for audits and figures and things and you are going through them 
at such a rate that you must appear to people as though you are not bothered, 
you are unconcerned and you are just treating them as though they are not a 
person. “ (PL A&EREC:4 R2)   
Lack of Time “... it is really stressful in triage because they say you get on average 3 minutes to 
make that decision.” (D A&EN:2 N2)  
 
“I feel quite stressed out of triage.  Triage is quite nice if you’ve got time to do it 
but if you are really busy like, literally, they are booking in every 3 minutes, it’s 
stressful to make them decisions quickly and safely and the most times I go home 
and worry is when I have been in triage, I worry about who I have put in the 
waiting room.” (RB A&EN:30 N2) 
 
“I think, as a nurse, it (4 hour waiting time target)is probably more stressful 
because you feel you are constantly nagging at the doctors as well, what’s 
happening, have you referred this patient on.” (A&EN:1 N2) 
Letting Others Down “I mean our work piles up and piles up and that is stressful, I’ve got that to do and 
I’ve got this to do and still patients are streaming in, sometimes and you don’t 
show it but you get knotted up, well I do because there is so much to do and we’re 
never going to get it done before the next shift because you feel as though you 
are leaving your work for other people to carry on and that can be very stressful.” 
(PE A&EREC:16 R2) 
Inadequate Human Resources “... sometimes they will just sit them with me to keep them quiet (slightly laughing) 
and I think, is that my job to baby-sit a dementia patient ... I can object but I would 
look a right git wouldn’t I?  I mean I’ve got my job to do as well.  A lot of the time 
they are quite pleasant but there was one who attacked a support worker quite 
recently and got her by the throat and it took 3 people to get him off, he didn’t 
know what he was doing, he couldn’t be held accountable for what he did but you 
are sometimes quite fearful.” (RB GSWC2:24-25) 
 
“... they are just so busy, one nurse has got ten patients and there is not always a 
nurse in charge that is floating between the bays, I mean it is a surgical ward so 
they are having operations and when they come back they are poorly so things 
get missed.” (PL GSWC2:9) 
 
“...the thing when we phone admissions, we haven’t had the notes up in time and 
they have been given something they are allergic to and the patient has been too 
out of it to convey, we have had that before and that is terrifying.” (RB GSWC2:14) 
Continuous Change You get tired really; you get worn out don’t you? ... you do ... changes have been 
happening forever ... (RSP GPPM2:8 GP2, PM2) 
 
Table 5.1 Sources of Stress and Pressure 
 




Predictably some stresses occurred because of the urgent and incessant nature 
of patients’ needs.  However, they also arose because of the target-led 
processes for dealing with patients.  At times, the tension participants felt was 
very personal.  Whilst some participants were apologetic that their behaviour 
had not met their own personal standards, others were remorseful that in not 
fulfilling their duties they had let down their peers.  For some, the anxiety of the 
working day encroached on their home life.  Participants also spoke about how 
constraints in human resourcing within healthcare placed limitations on some 
staff and transferred the strain to others.  Some participants were both unhappy 
and anxious about these situations yet felt powerless to do anything about 
them.  Whereas others were open about the potential for human error as a 
result of inadequate resourcing.  Finally, participants were disillusioned and 
exhausted by constant change in their working environment.  Irrespective of the 
source of stress and pressure, being prevented from executing their duty 
elicited a range of emotions from participants and their peers as is shown in 














“... there are 2 
ways of coping with 
being put under 
that amount of 
pressure ... one is 
to become 
ridiculously self-
sufficient to the 
point of never 
wanting anyone to 
help you... ” (PE 
GSREG:52) 
 
“... for some of the 
newer doctors who 
have never seen it, it 
can be really scary 
and panicky and 
they can panic and 
don’t know what to 
do really ...” (ID 
A&EN:2 N1) 
 
“... sometimes a 
nurse will say you 
have not told me 
that patient has 
chest pain, they can 
get quite aggressive 
telling you that ... (ID 
A&EREC:1 R1)  
 
“I’m a superbly 
relaxed individual, it 
does raise a greater 
concern about the 
destruction of 
general practice that 
this government is 
putting out ...” (PE 
GPPM2:7 GP2) 
 




Some participants chose to face the pressure by developing a pragmatic 
attitude.  For them, it was a case of simply getting on with things irrespective of 
the issues.  Others exhibited a relatively considered response to matters but, in 
describing their reaction, they demonstrated their reluctance to accept a state of 
affairs.  There was, though, evidence of more extreme behaviours and feelings 
when participants were observing their peers.  Participants reported the 
aggressive behaviour by others when their sense of responsibility was 
challenged and, at its most extreme, there were others who had witnessed 




The aim of this thesis is to develop a deeper understanding of the management 
of smouldering crises and patient safety in healthcare by examining how an 
employee’s behaviour can potentially cause smouldering crises conditions.  
This chapter has evaluated the narratives of participants regarding how 
organisationally imposed aspects of working life influenced the behaviour of 
healthcare professionals, why and how this impacted upon the individual.    
 
Participants’ views in this chapter centred on the mechanisms that the 
healthcare organisations utilised to enforce structure and control, namely 
targets, work boundaries, resourcing and training.  Participants were critical of 
targets, believing them to be detrimental to patient care.  Delivering good 
patient care across the boundaries that divided aspects of the healthcare 
service was felt to be challenging and, at times, divisive not least because of the 
resulting barriers that became erected between professionals.  Furthermore, 
throughout the sample, resourcing changes were perceived to have resulted in 
ineffective and inefficient use of professionals and compromised patient care.  
Whilst participants were generally supportive of experiential training, there were 
concerns regarding the extent, quality, availability and content of training. 
 
Although this chapter has shown that participants raised these organisationally 
led themes, their narratives were peppered with concerns regarding the relative 
impact on the individual.  According to the views of participants, management 




systems created pressure and stress in the working lives of healthcare 
professionals and fostered unconstructive conditions within which staff 
attempted to perform their duties.  Their overriding concern was that, as a 
consequence, they were unable to properly perform their duties and patient 
care was compromised. 
 
However, as outlined at the outset of this chapter, in undertaking the final stage 
of the analysis, the author also observed a second perspective concerning the 
working lives of healthcare professionals which concerned participants’ views 
about themselves and their peers and how these influenced how they felt and 
behaved in the work environment.  Chapter 6 will now focus on exploring and 
evaluating this second perspective. 
 




Chapter 6  An Individual in the Workplace: Perspectives on the Individual 
 
Chapter 4 explained how the analysis of the research found common themes 
within the interpretative coding which were expressions of participants’ feelings 
concerning aspects of their working life.  These feelings informed how and why 
individuals at grassroots level behave in the workplace in the way that they do.  
The author observed that the themes could be divided into two perspectives.  
Chapter 5 evaluated the first perspective and focused on how participants’ 
working life was affected by organisational structure and control mechanisms.  It 
was found that participants were critical of the impact that targets, boundaries, 
resourcing and aspects of training had on patient care.  Furthermore, 
participants believed that ultimately this caused pressure, stress and 
unconstuctive working conditions for healthcare professionals.  However, in the 
analysis of participants’ narratives, the author also found evidence that this 
organisational perspective was not the sole influence of an individual’s feelings 
and behaviour in the workplace.  A second perspective, which was revealed in 
participants’ views about themselves and their peers, influenced how they felt 
and behaved in the work environment.   
 
Within this second perspective, the author identified three main themes which 
are used to structure this chapter.  First and foremost, an individual’s behaviour 
in healthcare is motivated by and directed towards patient care.  Participants 
demonstrated a great sense of patient orientation.  In addition, though, there 
was evidence that the behaviour of individuals was positively influenced by peer 
relationships.  However, whilst both of these aspects had a beneficial impact on 
individuals in the work place, there was also evidence that aspects of peer 
relationships were destructive to the individual.  Furthermore, participants 
exhibited strong negative feelings concerning the level of respect they 
perceived they were afforded by the organisation and their peers and this 
appeared to have a resounding effect on their self worth.  Thus, the themes 
along which this chapter is structured and which formed the basis of the 
evaluation of the perspective of the individual are: patients and patient 
orientation, the paradoxical nature of peer relationships and their impact on 
working life and peer and organisational respect and value. 




6.1 Patients and a Patient Orientation 
 
This section explores the narratives of participants concerning the nature of 
patients and the profound orientation of healthcare professionals towards 
patients and patient care. 
 
6.1.1 The Changing Nature of the Relationship with Patients 
 
By the very nature of their work, healthcare staff interacted with the public on a 
day to day basis.  As such they were subject to the impacts of changes in social 
trends which affected the nature of the patients they treated.  Based on the 
views of participants, there were instances when staff felt ill-equipped to deal 
with some of these changes, finding their working lives challenged by the very 
people they were determined to serve, namely patients.  Whilst this was 
mentioned across the sample, it seemed most acute for ambulance crew 
perhaps due to the frontline nature of their work.  There were numerous 
reasons for their opinions and these are exemplified in the quotations from 
ambulance staff shown in Table 6.1 
 
Firstly, crew were fearful of patients’ propensity to take litigious action.  In 
instances such as this, crew tended to err on the side of caution rather than use 
their professional judgement to assess a patient.  Secondly, although their role 
responsibilities compelled them to attempt to treat patients, at times the 
offensive and dangerous behaviour of patients prevented them from doing so.  
Thirdly, changes in the characteristics of the population presented challenges in 
delivering patient care.  Finally, crew were extremely frustrated by calls from 
time wasting patients as they perceived that this hindered the service they could 











Potential Litigation “I have not been on the service very long but basically I have just been 
taught to take the patient in, cover your own back and just take the 
patient in, it is not my decision to say they can’t have an ambulance, just 
take them in .” (RB AC3:10 AC3B) 
 
“... the liability is a thing, it is always in the back of your mind, we will go 
to patients where you will think not a lot wrong here but, just in case, we 
are going to have to do this and this ... yes, take them to the hospital and 
then we are covered.” (PE AC1:34 AC1A, AC1B) 
 
“... the thing is that the communications people know these regulars but 
they still have to send an ambulance out ... I think it is probably born out 
of a sheer terror of litigation, of being sued  ...” (D AC3:2 AC3A)  
Abusive Patients “... the police were actually on scene at that one and this guy just 
grabbed my arm and started to twist my arm and wouldn’t let go but the 
police jumped on him so that was not so much of a problem because the 
police were already there.  So, even with police on the scene, you can 
still get assaulted. “ (D AC2:4 AC2B) 
 
 “We got a call the other day; somebody had collapsed in the street 
which is nothing new to us.  We got this guy and he started being very 
aggressive, a young male on the scene said that he had phoned for the 
ambulance and he had told the staff on the phone that this man was 
known to be violent and aggressive particularly towards ambulance staff 
and he carries a knife .... It would be added to the statistics and we would 
get accurate abuse, verbal abuse, physical assault statistics ... it is 
underreported ... (EO AC2:2- 3 AC2A, AC2B)  
 
“… from our health and safety point of view, it is worse for us ... there are 
a lot of intimidating situations ...” (EM AC2:1 AC2A, AC2B) 
Population 
Changes 
“... we went to the Children’s a couple of weeks ago with no information 
whatsoever even though there were 10 people in the room which we 
picked the baby up from, they did not speak any English whatsoever and 
they were trying to get a 3 year old to translate for us, they had only 
arrived in the country the day before ... it is unusual to have somebody 
with no English at all but sometimes you are dealing with a low amount of 
English and there are difficulties with understanding. (TM AC1:6, 8 
AC1A, AC1B)   
 
“... we live in times now where there are lots of different nationalities here 
and we don’t always know how to spell the names and so you can get 
things like that wrong and misunderstand what they mean and things like 
that.  You might have to wait for interpreters, how can you wait for an 
interpreter when that patient is in pain, you have got to administer what 
you think.  So there is a lot of onus to get things right, you might have to 
ask them if they were previously known as because some people could 
have been married several times and have 4 or 5 names and you go 
back, were you previously known as, were you previously known as, just 
to check it is that person.” (RB GSWC2:16) 
Time Wasters “I think that is the frustration that those types of jobs, the genuine time-
wasting jobs seem to be more than the genuine jobs.” (PR AC3:3 AC3A)   
  
“... if they won’t go but sometimes you can spend absolutely hours trying 
to persuade them to go and you try then I try and then you get a relative 
in to try or the police turn up and the two police try and you go round in 
circles.” (PE AC1:35 AC1B) 
 
Table 6.1 How the Public Challenges Duty 
 




In relation to the last point on time wasters, ambulance crew directed their 
strongest opinions towards management.  Management, they believed, evaded 
their corporate responsibilities in not educating members of the public about 
usage of the service. 
 
 “I think there is a responsibility on a corporate level that there are better 
education programs set in place and a better PR system set in place” (EO 
AC3:4 AC3A)  
 
“... there is no educational policy on a corporate level to educate the public as to 
what is an appropriate call and what isn’t.  And so I think the public are 
frustrated, ... they use us, rightly or wrongly ...  the public has to learn how to 
use us appropriately ...  (EO AC3:2, 6 & 8 AC3A, AC3B)  
 
6.1.2 A Patient Orientation 
 
Despite the difficulties 
healthcare professionals 
encountered when dealing 
with patients, there was 
evidence that participants 
were drawn to a career in 
healthcare.  Although not 
entirely typical of the way in 
which other participants 
articulated their sense of duty as a vocation, Vignette 1 conveys how this doctor 
was irresistibly attracted to a career in healthcare. 
 
Whilst there was also passion in the affection this participant exhibited towards 
her profession, this seemed to be tinged with what appeared to be a common 
appetite for the dramatic. 
 
“...  in my first year of medical school I completely fell in love with what I do and 
I fall a little bit deeper in love every single day that I work ... and my face still 
lights up when I talk about what I’ve seen.” .”   (MCC GSREG:1) 
 
”... they said why don’t you do medicine and I had seen ER and I thought oo yes 




 “... you get some people who have ... found 
their calling in life, love it every day and 
would be here all day every day if they were 
given a choice and sadly I might have to put 
myself in that bracket of wanting to be here 
all the time but there you go.”  
 
(PE GSREG:45) 




Furthermore, this participant inferred that the desire for the more adventurous 
side of healthcare had directed her vocational ambitions. 
  
“I am a rather unusual house officer in that I have always wanted to be in A&E, 
acute medicine, intensive care and trauma surgery so my objective in life is to 
expose myself to as much acute medicine ...” (PE GSREG:20) 
 
In speaking further about their working life, it became apparent that participants’ 
duty extended beyond an initial altruistic attraction to a career in healthcare.  
Participants exhibited an intense and overriding concern for serving and helping 
patients with the result that, almost without exception, patient orientation 
underpinned everything they did.  However, within the responses of 
participants, the impetus for a patient orientation appeared to be multifaceted. 
 
Firstly, participants positively reconciled serving patients with achieving job 
satisfaction. 
 
“... that example I gave you was a time when I reflected on it and it is probably 
the first time I ever cried over a patient and I cried because they lived (laughing) 
not because they died, I cried from relief that I had done a good job ...” (CW 
GSREG:1) 
 
:... a lot of the things we do, they work, and that is nice ...” (TM AC3:5  AC3A)   
 
Secondly, there was a recognition and appreciation of the uniqueness of their 
interaction with patients.  For some participants, this bestowed a privileged 
position on them and their role. 
 
“I think what is unique for us is that quite a lot of the people we take in ... we 
have a unique opportunity of seeing them in their environment ...” (TR AC3:2 
AC3A) 
 
Thirdly, and to the last, participants believed that ultimately the patient was their 
responsibility and thus, as the following quotations show, their role was to 
ensure that everything possible was done in terms of patient care    
 
“... if a patient came up to us and we thought that they were really ill or had got 
an abdo pain and we thought it was appendicitis then we would notify the nurse 
and ask them to see them next ...” (RB A&EREC:8 R1) 
 




 “... we are quite a good team and they help, the main point really is for the 
patient to get the best care and to treat the patient as best as we can really.  So 
everybody has got the same goal and are working together.” (TW GSWC1:11) 
 
This sense of responsibility was, though, complex and not always an entirely 
positive experience for participants as is shown in Table 6.2 below.   
 
Some participants recognised the importance of their responsibilities, indicating 
that the weight of responsibility correlated closely with the implications of what 
was at stake.  For others, responsibility arose out of ultimate patient ownership.  
There was also evidence that participants were openly prepared to extend their 
obligations because of a pragmatic and genuine concern for patients.  However, 
some participants’ opinions regarding responsibility were more negative.  
Participants expressed feelings of passive resignation, fulfilling patient 
responsibilities in a compliant manner.  There were others who appeared 
frustrated by the injustice which resulted from the association between 




“ We’ve got this big book of IV drugs and I look in it anyway even if I think I 
know just to check again, in fact I probably check the same drug every day 
even though I know, just to see it again.” (PR A&EN:6 N1) 
 
“... if you make that judgement and you make the wrong judgement and 
you sit somebody out in the waiting room and they suddenly turn poorly, 
they have seen no doctor, it is all your responsibility.  So if they had a 
cardiac arrest in the waiting room and died, you have got to answer to the 




 “... I don’t think there is any clear cut thing of this is my job and this is your 
job, I think everything is our job and a few things are other people’s jobs 
as well and if they are too busy then it becomes our job.” (IE A&ESHO:3) 
Pragmatic Concern 
 
 “... if nothing had happened I would have jumped in my car and done it 
myself ...” (D GPPM2:2 GP2)  
Passive Resignation “At the end of the day the patient needs that doing and if nobody else does 
it then we have to do it ... Everyone is busy, that is the problem, but if 
something needs doing I can see that it needs doing and if I can’t get the 
message across to somebody else to either do it or prioritise it then I have 
to do it. (TM A&ESHO:6, 8) 
Accountability  “At the end of the day it all comes down to us, it seems to be that we have 
all the responsibility for the patient so if something goes wrong it is our 
fault, if something goes right it is partly because we did our job right ...  
(TM A&ESHO:6) 
  
“... if a doctor prescribes a drug and I administer that drug because the 
doctors don’t give drugs, I am accountable for that drug because I have 
administered it, not the person that has prescribed it ... so if the doctor 
prescribed penicillin and you didn’t check the allergies and gave it to them 
then it would be your fault not theirs ... ultimately you are accountable for 
administering that drug (EM A&EN:5 N1 & N2)  
 
Table 6.2 Multi-Faceted Sense of Role Responsibility 
  




Whilst the feelings of responsibility in Table 6.2 above were rooted in the 
function of a role, participants also demonstrated more sensitive and emotional 
connections with patient care.  For hospital staff, this revealed itself in 
expressions of dedication and devotion to their work as is shown in Table 6.3 
below. 
 
Doctors “I am a little bit anal which is probably why I didn’t leave until 5pm today 
because I realised there was something I hadn’t done that I should have done 
in the day.  I find people who don’t take responsibility for their actions very 
difficult to cope with and I find people who consider themselves better than 
they are very difficult to cope with too. (RB GSREG:23- 24) 
 
“I am lucky if I spend less than 60 hours in this place at the moment and that 
is fine by me, I would gladly stay another 20 to have the experience.” (PE 
GSREG:28) 
Nurses “... sometimes I know when I do triage that if I put somebody with a head 
injury who has lost consciousness into a team, if that team is really busy, they 
probably won’t be able to reassess after an hour anyway and I might not be 
as busy in triage so I know that if I put that patient in the waiting room I can 
constantly see them out the window and I may be able to reassess them 
more easily. ... best for the patient.” (PS A&EN:4- 5 N2) 
  
“...  I often leave the doors and the curtains open just glancing at your patients 
as you go past ... you are looking at your patients all the time and making 
sure they are alright ... and there is always that thing where you might go and 
see somebody and their pulse and their blood sugar might be fine but you 
think I don’t like the look of them and there is something going on ...” (TM 
A&EN:1, 7 N2)  
 
“ ....you do think about things when you get home ...” (PR A&EN:1 N1) 
Ward Clerks “... staff should have gone home earlier but they are still there doing the 
writing, I know it shouldn’t be like that but I think sometimes if they are 
experienced staff and they have had a particular shift where a patient has 
been unwell then they want to make sure, for their own peace of mind, that 
everything is okay before they go, it is not always the case that they feel they 
have to do that but I think people are dedicated.” (PE GSWC1:5)   
 
“You just do the best that you can.  I might be saying I need this information 
to put them on the computer and a nurse might say I’m not asking them now 
because they are in so much pain but then you worry that that bit of 
information is not going to be put on later if it gets left and I’ll leave notes for 
the day ward clerk or try and leave a note on the notes, if they do go to a 
different ward I will leave a note for that ward clerk to say this patient has had 
a change of address and I haven’t been able to input it on screen because I 
couldn’t check it with them or whatever.” (IE GSWC2:1). 
 
Table 6.3 The Dedication of Hospital Staff 




The same can be said of 
ambulance personnel who 
exhibited a much stronger 
feeling of obligation and an 
almost compulsion to care 
(Vignette 2). 
 
6.1.3 Protecting Patient  
         Orientation 
 
Despite the issues they faced 
in their daily working life, 
some of which were 
recounted in Chapter 5, many 
participants remained 
resolved to do what they could for patients and took a pragmatic approach to 
life in a healthcare organisation.  The following General Practice team were 
accomplished in their ability to take a detached and pragmatic view. 
 
“This is the NHS, if that is the rule that the NHS want me to play to this year 
then I will play to it, they will write a new set next year ... I think more and more 
changes are imposed by the department of health or ... the PCT ... I don’t think I 
have got a choice. So yes we accept it and where we can, if we think it is 
necessary to maintain the stability of the organisation, we will try and work 
within it.” (PR GPPM3:5 GP3, TR GPPM3:2, 3 GP3) 
 
“... there are continuing problems because the secondary care providers will 
restrict booking in order to hit certain targets, they will restrict the availability of 
bookings in order that they hit their 18 week target from referral to being dealt 
with.  And, in order to stop people being booked too far in advance, they will 
restrict the availability of appointments so there is a lot of sort of gaming goes 
on in order to meet these targets ... to the extent that the secretary/administrator 
of the practice comes in before 8 o’clock in the morning so she can access 
those appointments that are released on that day for that particular specialty 
because if you try and access them after 9 o’clock on that particular day there 
aren’t any because the local provider only puts as many as it can put on to 
continue to meet its targets, but then like so many things in the NHS we are 
driven by competing targets.” (PR GPPM3:8 GP3,PM3) 
  
“... I think you have to step back from the concept that the GP is all things to all 
people all the time, I think we have a defined role and the defined role might be 
about comprehensive care of people in the community but we are not 
Vignette 2 
 
 “it is really hard to refuse an emergency call 
even if you are before your time and so we 
do go out.” (RB AC1:2 AC1B) 
 
 “I will go to a job that I have very little 
information for and I will go to a job that 
someone has said standoff and I have to 
remind myself that I have the safety of my 
colleagues to consider and I have to remind 
myself not to put them into a situation that I 
am happy to walk into. ...  some people are 
more proactive in finding out exactly what is 
wrong whereas I will go in, I’ll take my 
oxygen and my resuscitator and I will work 
from what I find when I get there.”  
 
(ID AC1:3, 5 AC1B) 




completely responsible for everything that happens to anybody wherever they 
are whenever they are.” (D GPPM3:6 GP3) 
 
 “Well you have to put a barrier around what I have concerns about and what I 
haven’t got concerns about.  I have got concerns about the quality of care we 
deliver that I am responsible for in this building but I can’t lie awake all night 
worrying about what happens to people when they stroll into hospital in 
Bridlington.  I mean there is a life (laughter) ...” (D GPPM3:7 GP3) 
 
However, it was much more typical for participants to feel an emotional 
connection with protecting their desire to take care of patients. 
 
“... there is quite a lot of pressure from the 4 hour that the government state to 
get people turned over and sometimes it is impossible, you know if, for 
whatever reason, you have got a really sick patient that you need to stay with 
then you can’t always manage it (4 hour target).” (PL A&EN:2 N2) 
 
For some participants, this was achieved by an unequivocal determination to do 
the right thing by patients. 
 
“... the main point really is for the patient to get the best care and to treat the 
patient as best as we can really.”  (RB GSWC1:15) 
  
Participants illustrated this further by 
evidencing their empathy towards 
patients.  In addition, they went to 
great lengths to ensure that patients 
felt that they were important and 
were even prepared to be unpopular 
to achieve this (Vignette 3). 
 
“I think the patient was comforted 
because I made a very big effort to 
reassure them and keep talking to 
them.” (PE GSREG:41) 
 
“... so I hope genuinely that people 
feel they have value and that, 
although when you try and manage 
anyone medically it is just 
impossible, I think generally that our 
patients like coming here and feel we 
are doing our best for them rather 
than not ...” (PE GPPM2:17 GP2) 
Vignette 3 
 
“... you have got a choice of being 
very hard nosed and saying you do 
this, you do this, you do that, I’ll do 
this and any problems call me or 
sticking your head in the sand and 
just saying we’ll all just do our best 
and see what happens.  And I’m 
not really a head in the sand kind 
of person and it’s difficult because 
you feel horrible about yourself for 
telling people that a) they are not 
doing something properly and b) 
bossing them around.  But you kind 
of make a conscious choice I think 
of, do I want to get this done for the 
sake of my patients; well I think 
that is more important than feeling 








For others, sustaining patient care was less altruistic and a more egocentric act 
as is exemplified in the quotations in Table 6.4.  However, whilst for some 
participants it was about concentrating on the processes of their job, others 
were able to sustain their focus on patient care through the rewards it delivered 
to them in the form of an exciting and unpredictable environment in which to 
work, the sense of achievement they attained and, quite simply, the thanks they 
received.  
 
Focus On Processes  “... the nurse who has been caring, will say this patient needs follow-up and we’ve got a 
board that we’ve made and they write them on there and they sometimes forget but I 
always look because that is one of the things that worries me and I think it worries the 
day ward clerk as well because we are both similar in a lot of ways, we just don’t want 
anybody to slip through the net.  And I would rather someone be seen and alright than 
someone not be seen so I always check.“ (PE GSWC2:6)  
 
“I don’t shout, I’m not angry but I will say things like, well obviously that is not right and I 
am very opinionated and I imagine in some respects that makes me quite difficult for 
seniors to work with because I will point out if I think they are doing something wrong.” 
(PE GSREG:46) 
Exciting and Unpredictable 
Environment 
“... the adrenalin rush, one of the best things about this job is coming to work and not 
knowing what you are going to do, every job is different ... yes, so every chest pain job 
is different even though they are all the same.” (MCC AC1:1 AC1A, AC1B)   
 
 “... it is like any other job in that you have better days than others but your day goes so 
quick when it is fast paced and fast moving and sometimes I look and can’t believe that 
is the time and I do like that fast pace and I’ve never really been sat there twiddling my 
thumbs, there is always something to do ... yes, you kind of thrive on it really I think.” (D 
GSWC1:4) 
 
 “... for me I think it is definitely both (the medicine of science and caring for patients) 
because it’s problem solving, it’s like a puzzle almost, what I do on a daily basis is solve 
riddles and puzzles, mysteries almost.  I don’t get to do it from scratch and I don’t 
always get to the end and I won’t know what the full answer is but I’ll know somebody 
who does and I’ve been part of solving that puzzle and that is what I love, the little goals 
that come in between ...” (MCC GSREG:2) 
 
“Oh I do feel like that about this job (that every day is different) because you work with 
different people every day, you don’t know who is going to be on the shift because it is 
different shifts and everyone is different.  And obviously patients will be different so 
every day does bring its different challenges.” (MCC GSWC1:1) 
Sense of Achievement “... if there is somebody that genuinely needs your help and you can get there then you 
can help them,... you can actually make a difference to that person.  I mean, even as a 
technician, you can’t do as many things as a paramedic can but you have got the 
training to walk in and know that this person needs to be loaded and we need to go with 
no messing about and you can get on and get that patient in and even though your 
skills aren’t as extensive as a paramedic, you still feel you have made a difference.” 
(CW AC2:1 AC2A) 
 
“... I suppose because there are so many difficult bits and stresses, I think you forget 
about the people you have helped and got through the department because you are 
probably dealing with something that is not going right and you forget that 5 people 
have just gone through fine and are onto the ward.” (PL A&EN:17 N1) 
Gratitude “I like the feeling of and being thought well of.” (PE GSREG:24)  
 
“... we’ve had some who have come back into reception, we had one who said thank 
you, you probably saved that man’s life.” (PE A&EREC:7 R2) 
 
“I have had many times patients ask me I would like to thank so and so and who can I 
write to do that ...” (CW A&ESHO:3) 
   








6.2 The Paradoxical Nature of Peer Relationships and their Impact on Working 
       Life 
 
Whilst patients, and particularly patient orientation, motivated the behaviour of 
participants, so did their relationships with peers.  Although this section will 
show how peer relationships were a positive force for participants, there was 
also evidence of the destructive nature of relationships between professionals.  
This section will firstly look at the positive side of peer relationships before 
exploring the negative side. 
 
6.2.1 Positive Peer Relationships  
 
The cultivation of relationships across professional boundaries seemed to be 
apparent across the sample with participants extolling the positive benefits of 
peer relationships.  There was particularly solid evidence amongst ambulance 
crew of the importance of peer relationships and an appreciation for the effect 
this had on their working day.  Compared with the remainder of the sample, 
ambulance crew were uniquely aware of the kinship that was present in their 
workplace. 
 
“... the beauty of this place at the moment is that you can come to work and no 
matter who you are working with you are going to have a good shift ... and that 
hasn’t always been the case but it is really good at the moment and has been 
for a long while ...” (CW AC1:8 AC1A, AC1B)  
 
 ”... we all have digs at different stations but they are communities within a 
community.” (CS AC1:5 AC1A) 
 
Furthermore, ambulance crew took pleasure and found great benefit in getting 
to know their fellow professionals, even showing a willingness to engage in 
social activities in order to do so. 
 
“Sometimes you don’t know what they look like but over the years, you 
sometimes get to pop in, or two of them recently came on a night out we had 
and you do get to put a face to the voice but you do get used to the voice and 
you know what voice goes with what name and how that person is and their 
personality.  So even if you never see their face you do build up a relationship 
with them.” (PR AC1:1 AC1B) 
 




However, the narratives of most participants regarding positive peer 
relationships were purely restricted to the working environment and Vignette 4 
exemplifies the positive personal outcomes that participants experienced. 
 
There were several underlying reasons why peer relationships developed.  
Some peer relationships evolved quite naturally over time, whereas others grew 
out of mutual consideration and teamworking.  There was also evidence that 
good peer relationships 
were fostered through 
the sense of 
responsibility one 
professional had for 
another and the rapport 
that existed between 
professionals.  This 
section will now explore 
each of these reasons 
in more detail. 
 
6.2.1.1 Evolving Peer  
            Relationships 
 
In the first instance, some relationships had quite simply evolved over time. 
 
“I think the relationship with the Registrars is better than what you get with the 
senior house officers because a lot of them, you might have worked with them 
when they were SHO’s and they might have gone up to Registrar but because 
of their rotas they constantly work in A&E and I think they learn to appreciate 
the nurses more.” (PR A&EN:5 N2) 
 
6.2.1.2 Mutual Professional Consideration 
 
In the second instance, peer relationships arose out of instances where one 




’’ the guy who delivered the stock you would 
speak to every morning so you would be able 
to say we are getting a bit low on such and 
such, is there any chance of getting any?  
And he would say I will see what I can do and 
the next day they would be there  ... and just 
little things like, I am going to be working at 
such a place tomorrow, will you drop my kit 
off so I can cycle in?  Of course I can and he 
would drop you your bag off, there is none of 
that now.  I know that sounds like little trivial 
things but that is what creates a unit, an 
organised and functioning happy unit.” 
 
(CS AC2:4: AC2A&B) 
 




There was evidence that professionals were aware of the needs of their peers 
and thus were considerate in their actions.  Although some participants 
intimated this may not be an entirely altruistic act since a good deed could 
engender reciprocity or even facilitate quid pro quo arrangements.  
 
“... if a crew is coming off and a crew is coming on then 90% of the time the 
vehicle has been re-equipped and ready to go and in that case you can almost 
be certain that if a job comes in you can go straight out.” (CS AC1:3: AC11A) 
 
“... if I’ve got a lot of notes then she will help me out as well so we help each 
other, we’ve got that support really from each other .” (TW GSWC11:16) 
 
 “ ... our supervisor, when she is working, incorporates her hours so she is 
working on the reception desk to save the department money so that we can 
have extra hours for extra jobs that we have got because we do need the extra 
people and we just can’t do it. “ (F A&EREC:1 R1) 
 
Ambulance crew enthusiastically reported that the concept of good working 
relationships was quite simply based on a professional’s expertise in their role.   
It was suggested that this influenced their subsequent expectations and 
constructive dealings with others. 
 
” I think on a day to day, person to person basis, I would like to think that we 
have a phenomenal and fantastic relationship with staff, very positive, very 
professional, from the secretaries to the doctors to the cleaners, really really 
good, really positive ... I think we all work really well together  ... (CS AC3:5-6 
AC3A&B) 
  
“... then again that is that family teamwork sort of thing coming out again 
because we know we can do that with Northern General, Hallamshire.” (TW 
AC1:7 AC1A) 
 
The evidence of the sample was that their working lives were unpredictable and 
lacking in constancy.  The consequences were that participants cited numerous 
examples of how they showed consideration for others in adopting a flexible 
approach to working life even within the formal processes of the healthcare 
service.   
 
“I’ll take a history, do an examination, order investigations or do the 
investigations, blood tests and things like that, x-rays and then prescribe the 
treatment that I think or some investigations involve the nurse doing them such 
as urine tests ... sometimes we have to do them depending on how busy it is or 
if there are enough staff ... ” (TW A&ESHO:3) 




 “... you work in the same crew but you are a paramedic instead of a technician, 
the responsibility of each incident is ultimately the paramedics responsibility but 
we do swap job for job as to who attends ... we swap round, driver and 
attendant” (TW AC1:6 AC1A, AC1B) 
 
“Depending on the ASHICE call, sometimes there is a doctor waiting for you 
and they will jump on board and have a quick look at what is happening and 
then you hand over to staff.  Sometimes there can just be nursing staff and so 
you hand over to them ...“ (TW AC2:2 AC2A) 
 
Yet there were some excellent illustrations where acts of flexibility were informal 
but in keeping with fostering positive peer relationships.  Some participants 
demonstrated this through a tolerance of thoughtlessness borne out of mutual 
understanding.   For others, it rose out of hierarchical acknowledgement.   Once 
more, though, there was evidence that staff were prepared to be flexible with 
their peers in the interests of a common mission for good patient care. 
 
“... you do find vehicles and you’ve got to change this and you’ve got to change 
that or there isn’t any of that and it will be because that crew was really busy 
during the shift and was late off, we are constantly late off ...”(TW AC1:3,4  
AC1A, AC1B) 
 
 “... we do tend, with a lot of things, to work to how the nurse in charge on the 
day works, we know them, they know us and we work as to how they want us to 
work ...” (ID A&EREC:2 R2)  
 
“It was all about flexibility but in the end it was actually about people saying 
what does the patient need and how best can we serve them rather than saying 
this is my job I only do this.” (F GP1PM1:9 GP1) 
 
However, within the sample, doctors in particular recognised that learning to 
handle themselves well produced dividends in a working environment where 
patient care was best achieved through co-operation with others.   These 
doctors were honest and humble in their reflections and realised that they did 
not have complete knowledge, nor could they satisfy all of a patient’s care 
requirements alone.  The result was that they were more tolerant of others.  
Thus, when needing and seeking the help of others, principally nurses, to get 
through the working day, they did so in a self-effacing manner.  They were 
critical of others who took a more superior tone. 
 
“I think it is easy for me and the nursing staff because I don’t consider myself 
senior to them because they have got more experience than me and I 




appreciate that whereas some juniors don’t do that, some juniors go well you 
are a nurse and I’m a doctor and therefore I know more than you and that’s not 
how it works.” (PR GSREG:9, 10) 
 
This participant continued, illustrating and explaining how her approach was 
influenced by her past experiences, particularly those in healthcare.  This doctor 
acknowledged and could understand and appreciate the perspectives of others 
in her working life. 
 
“I worked my way through university, I worked as a dance teacher and I also 
worked as a health care assistant so I have worked both sides of the coin.  So I 
have been the nurse on the phone saying ‘this patient is ill, come now, please 
… he is going to die’ and then they died and I have also been the house officer 
on the other end of the phone going ‘I’m with someone else who is going to die 
right now, I’m really going to come as soon as I can, just try and do this’ …” (H 
GSREG:5) 
 
However, for some doctors, this was borne out of necessity to preserve their 
self image.  The following doctor recounted a need to turn to nurses in 
preference to senior colleagues in order to conceal inexperience and a lack of 
confidence. 
 
 “... the majority of junior doctors when they move onto a ward … acknowledge 
the fact that they don’t have experience in that field and the first point of help 
tends to be the nursing staff, I guess because you don’t want your seniors to 























6.2.1.3 Positive Peer  
            Relationships Through 
            Teamworking 
 
In the third instance, the notion of 
peer relationships underpinning 
teamworking was endorsed by 
participants who, undeniably, 
recognised that they had to work 
as part of a team to deliver 
patient care.  For some 
participants this was a very 
functional requirement within 
their immediate environment, 
particularly when novice staff 
were on duty (Vignette 5).   
 
“I think you have to work in a 
team really and my role, as a 
ward clerk, is to support the 
administration of a group of healthcare professionals ... ” (TW GSWC1: 9)  
 
 “ ... generally, we work with them day in and day out , I can’t think of anybody 
that doesn’t work as a team and that is all it can be here.” (TW A&EREC:8 R1) 
  
Accident and Emergency staff in particular recognised the critical role of team 
working when faced with grave patient care situations. 
 
“... we work in teams now ... if we assess someone and think they are really sick 
then we move them into resusc and hand them over to the resusc nurses.” 
(A&EN:1 N2) 
 
“I guess when the team becomes important, and it does happen,  is in resusc 
situations where you have got a very sick patient coming into resusc and then 
everyone just goes there and assumes a role and does it and it works well.” 
(TW A&ESHO:6) 
 
Others, however, acknowledged the value and contribution made by 
professionals across the wider context of healthcare provision.  There was 
evidence of a mutual respect and recognition that different groups of 
Vignette 5 
 
“... staff pulling together and helping 
each other out.  We have just had 
some new starters, nurses, so what 
will happen is if there is an 
experienced nurse then she might 
help one that is not experienced, the 
support workers are very good on the 
ward as well because they will do 
observations on patients and in the 
mornings they will get the patients 
washed and dressed.  And with the 
doctors, the house officers 
changeover every 4 months, so when 
they come it may be their first post 
and the staff on here are usually quite 
good.  I normally introduce myself 
and say if they can’t find any 
stationery or they are unsure about 
putting something on the computer 
then they can ask me, it’s just to help 
them find their feet and know their 








professionals had distinctive skills and experience and that better patient care 
was achieved if this network of professionals collaborated and positive peer 
relationships ensued. 
 
“Hospitals are very good in that they can investigate to a great degree what we 
will never be able to ... (ID AC3:1 AC3A) 
 
 “ ...if we make an ASHICE call ... and we get in and we find out from the 
specialist nurses and doctors that it is not a heart attack but it is a deficiency of 
potassium which was exacerbated by a 4 day history of diarrhoea ... they are 
great, they always say don’t worry, we would rather that you phoned it in, they 
don’t look at you with daggers, you know you have just created extra work for 
us ... very professional ... (EM AC3:2 AC3A)  
  
The sense of teamworking , though, resonated most strongly amongst 
ambulance crew.  They demonstrated significant consideration for and 
connection with their peers as the following illustrations show. 
 
 ”What you find, especially on nights, is you come in quarter of an hour earlier 
and there might be several night crews but only one crew is going off at 8, so 
one night crew takes that crew off, then they can go home and they know that in 
the last quarter of an hour they are not going to get a job so that night crew is 
very likely to go out before 8 especially here because we are very conducive to 
doing that. “ (CS AC1:4 AC1B) 
 
 “... they might just go, they might see how strong you are and whether you 
need some help lifting the patient, they might see if you need someone to travel 
in the ambulance (if you have got a double tech crew then the car paramedic 
will be more highly trained and it might be best for them to travel with one of the 
tech crew in the ambulance).” (TW AC1:14 AC1B)) 
 
”... generally we are all pulling in the same direction.” (CS AC1:6 AC1A) 
  
“ ...you get a chance to work with just about everybody and I think we are a 
good team here, everybody gets on well.” (F AC2:6 AC2A) 
 
Interestingly, there was a reasonable amount of reference made to the skills 
that good teams evidenced.  Participants recognised that non-clinical based 
skills and experience also benefited teamworking.   
 
 ” I think it is because we managed to attract a practice manager 4 or 5 years 
ago with a very strong HR background and she (referring to PM2) has very 
quietly and very effectively brought in a lot of the principles of good employment 
practice  ... We have got an excellent team here and we have got a pretty stable 




team here and they seem a happy and effective team because they are valued 
and that value comes from PM2 and their colleagues and I hope the doctors 
value them as well.   (GPPM2:4 GP2) 
 
“We got a huge number of staff from all walks of life which to me was fantastic 
for the service, we got a whole load of fresh blood in there and we were making 
headway with training.” (TW AC2:9 AC2B) 
 
6.2.1.4 Peer Responsibility and Defence 
 
In the fourth instance, peer relationships were fostered out of a sense of 
responsibility one professional had for their peers and there was evidence that 
defending fellow professionals strengthened the bond between peers.  The fact 
that fellow professionals were prepared to shield their peers in perceived unjust 
situations was very much appreciated [1].  For others, it offered important 
protection in dangerous situations [2]. 
 
[1] ”We would have drowned in our first job without the nursing staff and I think 
there is an awful lot to be said for having the balls to stand up and say this isn’t 
right ... you need to be taught how to do it properly, you are not a horrible 
person and we don’t hate you but what you are doing is unfair and dangerous... 
” (CS GSREG:4) 
 
[2] “ ... there is a bit of a them and us but we mostly get on alright.  You can ring 
them and they will try and help you out in a situation that you are in, you know 
that a lot of the time they will look out for your safety, you know that, a lot of the 
time, there may be someone in the control room who knows where you are 
going ...” (CW AC1:2-3 AC1B) 
 
Some participants, who took on the role of defender, were motivated to do so 
because of injustices they perceived, as the following quotation from a Practice 
Manager speaking about her GP indicates.   
 
“If you look at government statistics, it is all about counting how many 
appointments doctors have with patients, and there is no recognition of any 
workload following on from that.” (TR GP1PM1:2 PM2) (a Practice Manager 
speaking about a GP) 
 
It appeared that part of the rationale for defending peers was to be found in 
professionals’ united front against the conditions in which participants were 
working.  Participants spoke as if they were fighting a battle and had, through a 
collective mindset, achieved triumph in the face of adversity.  This served to 
further strengthen the bonds of peer relationships.  




“So you carry on with it (dealing with the Health Authority) for a year or two don’t 
you and well we are still carrying on with it aren’t we, I mean a lot would have 
packed up by now but we are carrying on because we do feel we are getting 
there at last and making some headway although it is very slow ...” (TR 
GPPM2:8  PM2) 
  
” ... the pressures that it put on the ward and the ward staff ... meant we had a 
fantastic working relationship with the nursing staff because they knew how the 
ward worked, they knew what the Consultant wanted, they knew we usually do 
this, so it was brilliant  ... we were forced into managing things that were far too 
complicated for our experience and just doing the best you could in a crisis ... ” 
(CS GSREG:4) 
  
”... nobody appreciates just 
how much responsibility we 
take, how we are two people 
dealing with something when 
almost anybody else, dealing 
with something in that much of 
an emergency, has many 
more than two people, have 
more people, have more 
training, have more 
knowledge or have at least 
somebody there above them 
that knows.  There are two 
people but as soon as 
somebody is driving you 
become one person” (CS 
AC1:12 AC1B) 
 
For the Ward Clerk in Vignette 6, the anguish and distress she felt for her peers 
seemed too much yet she spoke with such respect for what they accomplished. 
 
6.2.1.5 Positive Peer Rapport 
 
In the fifth instance, peer relationships developed out of the relaxed, non-
authoritative approach of some senior professionals and the ensuing positive 
rapport they had with their subordinates.   
 
“... we have a good relationship with the Consultants, they support us in what 
we say, they don’t come down heavy on us at all, they just let us get on with it, 
they guide us as to how they want things doing but there is no, you will do this 
and you will do that, they are very good. ... they are not above themselves or 
anything like that and that is what makes it very nice and I think that is what 
makes them very nice to work with ... (PR A&EREC:1,3 R1, R2) 
Vignette 6 
 
“It’s horrible sometimes, working on a 
ward, it really is quite horrible ... Yes 
and you see the pressure that people 
are under and you think they are under 
this amount of pressure and, in some 
instances, they are trying to save lives 
and keep people alive and it is difficult.  
Most people are really patient and 
there are not many rows that actually 
go off between staff, I think everybody 
just bottles it up and I think we work 
surprisingly well considering ...”  
 




“I think it is just the manners ... they are important people but they are not self-
important, they are just very down to earth people with us.  That makes a big 
difference, when people can talk to you properly without talking down to you ...” 
(RSP A&EREC:8 R1) 
 
“... I think the more senior the doctor,the better they treat you.”  (TO A&EN:1 
N2) 
 
As the following quotation demonstrates, when delivering patient care relies on 
co-operation between professionals, being able to communicate well is a 
significant benefit. 
 
“it’s like any job, if somebody speaks to you awfully, you are probably less 
inclined to help them and be agreeable to them, if someone speaks to you 
nicely and says please and thank you, you are much more open to helping them 
... ( ID A&EN:4 N2)  
 
For the following participant, peer relationships had developed into friendships 
which were valued and preserved despite the hierarchy of daily life. 
  
“ I do consider myself friends with my Registrars and I have called them this 
week in fact for advice about problems I have at work as opposed to calling 
someone on the same level as me so I think your ability to be friends with 
people who are junior to you and still tell them what to do comes with 
experience.  (PR GSREG:9, 10) 
 
 “... I think it is very difficult to get a balance between being friends with people 
and being senior to people.  I think that sometimes has a big impact on team 
and I think I’ve just about managed it and I think it’s hard because you want to 
be friends with the people that you work with but if you are senior to them or if 
you are in any way more experienced than them and need to tell them what to 
do or that they are doing something wrong occasionally, that makes it very 
difficult and I think that is something that comes with experience ...” (PR 
GSREG:8) 
 
The importance of good communications in encouraging peer relationships was 
to be found in participants’ specific comments about the relative merits of 
informal and formal communications.  Their judgement fell on the side of 
informal communications.  
 
This Practice Manager analysed the distinctions between formal and informal 
communications, concluding by praising the virtues of informal, bespoke 
communication. 




 ”... capturing everything in IT just means you have screens and screens and 
screens full of information which ... So... we have a whiteboard in the coffee 
room so anything particularly pertinent is written on there so people glance at 
that while they are having their cup of coffee and they might say ‘oh Mrs So an 
So what is happening there?’ “ (CS GPPM1:8 PM1)  
 
By way of endorsement, her GP continued with his views on the value of 
informal communications.  For him, informal communications help to create a 
more rounded view of a patient and their care.   
 
 “... what you can’t put value on is conversations and I mean one thing we do 
now is at 11 o clock we all stop for coffee and we sit down and talk.  We talk 
about all sorts of things. Yesterday we had a conversation about a chap who 
has quite severe psychiatric problems that we have all had a hand in but 
actually nobody had put the whole picture together until we sat down and said 
‘funny you should say that, I saw him on Monday when he was doing this and 
‘Well I saw him last week and actually he was fine’ and ‘I saw him with his 
mother the other day and there was something very odd going on’ and suddenly 
you begin to get a picture. ” (CS GPPM1:6 GP1). 
 
This rounded view of patients can, according to this participant, be a particularly 
important asset when what has to be communicated is difficult.  He concluded 
stating a belief in the efficacy of this method of mutual exchange, a view with 
which his Practice Management strongly concurred and fervently defended. 
 
 “... we had a very dissatisfied patient relative but the result of that is when I saw 
him yesterday I knew what had gone on, I knew what was happening and was 
able to handle it in a way that instead of the consultation being very angry, very 
aggressive and very difficult actually moved things on quite positively in a way 
that everybody was happy with.  But you can’t do that unless you spend the  
time... ” (F GP1PM1:12 GP1) 
 
“... this time is time that we have to protect ... that’s our communication time, it’s 
where we come together as a team and it’s the time where district nurses and 
health visitors used to slot in as well. ” (CS GPPM1:7 GP1). 
  
Similar views were held by other groups of participants.  The following quotation 
was taken from the interview with a member of ambulance crew.  There was an 
interesting account here of how when one professional respects another 
enough to take the time to listen, understand and help, the respect is 
reciprocated. 
 
“I have rung them and said I’m bringing in this patient and I’m just calling to let 
you know it could be this or it could be that, I am not sure but I thought I ought 




to let you know in advance.  And they are really supportive and say yes, fine, 
phone it in if you are not sure.  And you ask them questions and they are quite 
happy to take time out and explain ...” (TW AC2:10 AC2A) 
 
6.2.2 Negative Peer Relationships 
 
The narratives of participants reveal that peer relationships were not always 
positive and this section is concerned with negative working relationships 
between professionals.  Participants throughout the sample, argued that a 
breakdown in working relationships undermined their capacity to fulfil their 
professional obligations and sighted a number of contributory factors.  These 
were the quality of interpersonal skills, power in relationships, practical clinical 
ability and mutual value and respect.  This section will present the findings of 
each in turn. 
 
6.2.2.1 Quality of Interpersonal Skills Amongst Peers 
 
Whilst healthcare professionals received much formal and experiential training, 
some participants observed that their skill set was incomplete.  Hospital staff 
were particularly critical of the lack of good interpersonal skills amongst their 
peers and recounted instances where this had a negative impact on 
relationships. 
 
There was no common picture about the most prevalent offenders; doctors 
were critical of other doctors, administrative staff were critical of nurses but not 
doctors, nurses were complimentary about senior doctors yet disparaging about 
junior doctors.  What was interesting, was what participants perceived to be the 
underlying reasons for particular communications and interpersonal skills, 











Lack of Manners “I think that when doctors qualify they think I’m a doctor and 
you’re a nurse and it takes them a few years to realise that 
actually they need the nurses and if they speak to the nurses 
nicely then they get a lot more help.”  (TO A&EN:1 N2) 
 
“... arrogance because they are doctors ...” (IE A&EN:4-6 N1, 
N2)  
Stress  “Yes but I would say the nurses get stressed because 
obviously  they can go from being very laid back to stressed 
and shout at you without realising it ... on a busy day it can be 
a nightmare ...” (ID A&EREC:7 R1R2)  
 
Unwillingness “The problem in my first job was that they were both very rude 
and both unwilling to communicate properly and one was very 
junior, very, very senior ...  and one was  a very poor 
communicator ...  and the other one, who was slightly more 
senior, had taken no responsibility to improve his  
communication  ... (TO GSREG:14)  
   
Table 6.5 Reasons for Poor Communications Amongst Hospital Staff 
 
Participants felt that some staff were simply impolite and amongst young 
doctors, it was felt that the novelty of their status got in the way of courtesy.  
Inevitably, there were examples where the stresses and strains of the job 
pushed staff to the edge and compromised the way in which they spoke to 
others.  Disturbingly, there were also instances of discourtesy and contempt 
simply because it was perceived to be unimportant and irrelevant. 
 
As this doctor recognised, at times, the communications issue was 
compounded by inadequacies on both sides which created tension within a 
relationship. 
 
 “Personally I think it can be both sides, it can be arrogance from the doctor or 
from the nurse point of view not wanting to follow something someone else said 
simply because of the way they said it or because they don’t agree with it.  ... it 
all comes back to being trained in communications skill ...”  (TM A&ESHO:2,10)  
 
“... occasionally the major problem with that is communications between staff, I 
think, especially between doctors and nurses, relationships can be difficult ... 
(ID A&ESHO:1)  
 
However, participants were not always as complimentary about formal 
communications.  This ambulance crew highlighted instances where respect 
was perceived to be missing from formal communications. 
 
“ ... I used to go to a lot of these meetings ... and things were moving and they 
were listening to road staff.  And you could see it and you could actually go to 




the meetings with the Directors and the Chief Executive, they were accessible 
to us, we could go and try and sort some things out ... Whereas, now, that has 
not happened because ... all we get back from the people we do have access to 
is no, you can’t have that or somebody is looking into it, that is as far as you get 
and it is like banging your head against a brick wall.  ... we have had it better 
than that before.  (CS AC2:5 AC2B) 
 
Participants expressed concerns in reconciling the quality of formal 
communications with delivering good patient care.  Unequivocally, participants 
believed that this was compromised either because professionals had limited 
knowledge or were not always clear about what they were required to do.  
Irrespective of the reason, participants found poor quality communications very 
trying and were unsympathetic to their peers. 
 
“And again it hasn’t been a particularly well thought out communication ... 
because ...  it would have been helpful to know why ... And that is the frustrating 
bit ... because you’ll ring somebody who doesn’t know and then they will have to 
ring somebody else to check and then this thing begins to snowball at that point.  
And all the time the patient who is a relatively innocent party in all this ... what is 
going to happen ...”  (RSP GP1PM1:4 GP1) 
  
“...we’ve asked the Registrars before to make clear statements in the notes, NO 
Follow-up, if there isn’t because sometimes they just don’t mention any follow-
up... (TR GSWC2:2) 
 
6.2.2.2 The Use of Power in Peer Relationships 
 
Some of the observations made by participants were based on the notion that 
structure, hierarchy, experience and authority influenced the power in 
relationships between professionals.  The consequences of this affected not 
only how people worked but how they worked together.    
 
“... they go to performance meetings where they get shouted at like they are 
children over the fact that we haven’t met ORCON as a whole and they are 
supposed to do something about that.  So they find that frustrating, it is the god 
of ORCON, as we call it, and we are slaves to the god of ORCON and it doesn’t 
mean anything.  If a paramedic crew go to a job then they get ORCON and 
that’s great, they have achieved the time ...”  (ID AC1:8 AC1B) 
 
The damaging effects of power within relationships seemed most acute 
between the doctors and nurses of Accident and Emergency and the no-win 
situation is epitomized by the quotations in Figure 6.1. 
 




Figure 6.1 The Power Relationships Between Accident and Emergency Doctors 
                 and Nurses 
 
There was, though, evidence from these professionals of an entrenched 
tolerance of the situation.   Whilst for nurses this manifested itself in disdain for 
doctors, doctors demonstrated an almost pragmatic acceptance of the state of 
affairs. 
 
“...Throughout med school you are just taught how to deal with problems and 
you just end up dealing with it, it just comes with the job I guess. ...  I guess the 
nurses themselves decide, if you go to them and ask and they say I’m too busy 
then you just get on with it and do it, you just don’t both arguing...” (IE A&E 
SHO:4-5) 
  
“A lot of them are still public schoolboys that had a nice upbringing, not many of 
them went to comprehensives, they have had that middle class upbringing 
which is probably not what we have had as nurses ... it’s probably difficult for a 
doctor to acknowledge that he needs help from a nurse maybe ...” (ID A&EN:9, 
12 N1,N2)  
 
Some participants sought to explain the root of power in their relationships with 
their peers.  In the main, this was centred on peer evaluation and assessment.  
Doctors were vociferous in their objections to being assessed by nurses 
(Vignette 7).  Nurses exhibited similar beliefs.  At the very least whilst this 
nurtured barriers between staff, at its worst it had the capacity to foster a 
‘political’ subservience. 
 
͞... wheŶ you see that your seŶiors 
are, not part of the problem but 
feed this kind of situation in the 
sense that they tiptoe around 
nurses as well, as years have gone 
by it has just become part of the 
systeŵ aŶd I doŶ’t thiŶk it really 
ĐaŶ go ďaĐk.͟(ID A&ESHO:8)  
͞... I thiŶk it is just a power thiŶg 
really, a lot of them just think I am 
a doctor therefore I can do what I 
want and you are just a nurse ...it 
is probably difficult for a doctor to 
acknowledge that he needs help 
from a nurse ... (IE A&EN:4-6 N1, 
N2)  




“... the sisters have a sisters 
meeting once a month and none 
of the staff nurses are allowed to 
go and they will discuss us, how 
we are performing and things, so 
you get divides ...” (ID A&EN:3 
N2)  
 
6.2.2.3 Lack of Practical Clinical  
            Ability  
 
Participants readily recognised 
that professionals in healthcare 
were individuals and as such 
would have their own strengths.  
Some clinicians were very 
prepared to articulate their 
strengths. 
 
“... I have lost very few patients 
that I have had to resuscitate 
pretty much on my own, in fact I 
haven’t lost any patients I have 
had to resuscitate on my own 
...”(IE GS REG:5)   
 
There were some, though, who 
readily recognised the weaknesses of others which, whilst not preventing them 
from performing a role, influenced the way in which this was undertaken.  
Inevitably this affected peer relationships as it influenced the perceptions one 
professional had of another.   
 
“... I have a few very good friends who are excellent academics ... but the clear 
difference between us, I think, ... his strength lies in the fact that he is a walking 
encyclopaedia and not the fact that he can resuscitate anybody ... (TO 
GSREG:7)  
 
“... I have a friend who is 5 years older than me who is my Registrar who I have 
known all the way through medical school and is one year out of being a SHO 
and is very good but not very experienced, I also have another friend who is my 
other Registrar who is 4 weeks away from being a Consultant.  So the 
experience you get in your Registrar is very variable ... so unfortunately not all 
Registrars and not all SHO’s are created equal ...there is an understanding that 
experience doesn’t always make you the best doctor, that just because you are 
Vignette 7  
 
“... we, throughout training, were 
always taught to try and diffuse these 
situations, most people do it really well 
so it is just a case of ignoring it or 
letting it go by.  The problem is we are 
always doing that and because we are 
always doing that things seem to be 
getting worse ... nursing staff are ... not 
employed by us, they have got their 
own hierarchy and they have got their 
own manager that they are answerable 
to and so whether they get good 
reviews or not doesn’t depend on us, 
whereas our reviews do depend on 
nursing staff ...I don’t think it is right 
that we don’t get a say in how they do 
their everyday practice and I think that 
can affect relationships in that there is 
one person assessing you and you are 
not assessing them and they can do 
what they want and you can’t really ...”  
 
 (IE A&ESHO:1-2)  
 




a year above me doesn’t mean that you know more than I do ... (ID GSREG:3, 
5, 7) 
 
The observations of others went beyond simply perceptions of their peers, 
bordering on an intolerance of what they saw as blatant incompetence.  This 
was most evident when participants were recounting instances where they felt 
that peers had not correctly performed their role. 
 
“... if you do your job right and you have done all the right things, if you have 
done a good examination and a good history then it is pretty straightforward as 
to what it is and where the patient needs to go.  The problem is some staff rush 
that sort of thing and they want the patient moving on from the department so 
when they make a call, if they have made a quick assessment and then made a 
call then the other person is a bit wary about it because you haven’t told them 
all the information and they come down and see the patient and it is very 
different to what the story 
had been said ... the main 
problem I have is taking 
calls from people who 
haven’t done their job 




particular GP provided a 
most extreme example 
where ineffective care 
had become a case for 
complaint about negligent 
clinical practice (Vignette 
8). 
 
6.3 Peer and Organisational Respect and Value 
 
Whilst the previous sections have shown how participants’ views about patients 
and their peers influenced how they felt and behaved in the work environment , 
this was not a complete picture.  The narratives of participants revealed that an 
individual’s feeling of self worth was also a significant factor in their working life.  
This section will firstly explore the positive effects of the valued professional 
Vignette 8 
 
“... a patient complained because cardiac 
failure was missed in a young person and 
one of the doctors here is being criticised for 
missing it but the person had been in 
hospital the previous day and had come 
back saying that all investigations had been 
normal and they thought it was X and just 
prescribe Y, which is exactly what he did.  
Unfortunately, when we look at some of the 
investigations, their interpretation was wrong 
and a few days later this man is in intensive 
care, I am not sure that the clinical quality is 
within the NHS...”  
 
(EO GPPM2:1)  
 




before examining how a lack of respect, from both the organisation and peers, 
can have eroding consequences in terms of self worth. 
 
6.3.1 The Valued Professional 
 
Participants reported the positive effects of healthcare staff being involved in the 
running of their working environment.  There appeared to be something in the 
closeness this fostered and a suggestion that this created, for staff, a greater 
affinity for their working domain.  The following GP suggested that this was 
achieved by positive moves to encourage communication between staff.  The 
result seemed to be that staff felt their situation and views were recognised and 
understood and they felt valued. 
 
 ” ... we have a good team and I think some of it is because we are a small team 
... and there is still that small feel about it where everybody is on one level kind 
of thing, there is no hierarchy... I think that everybody is listened to, everybody’s 
consulted, they have a voice, they can speak up, if there is a change to be 
made then they are asked and I think they appreciate that, that they feel they 
are involved and are part of the practice.” (CS GPPM2:3 GP2) 
 
For some participants such as this ambulance crew, there was evidence that 
senior staff had addressed specific issues that were nagging at grassroots staff.  
In so doing, not only had they created more content personnel who felt that they 
had been listened to, they had also established aspirational goals for others. 
 
 ”... I think there was a lot of hard work from the senior members that were here 
at the time ... to turn the situation around and make everybody feel part of the 
team again... certain ones got on to be technicians and then they were a lot 
happier, I think that is what changed ... and others then thought maybe I am not 
getting on because I am not good enough and tried harder.” (CS AC1:9-10 
AC1A&B)  
 
 “I think it was just a case of making everybody feel part of being here, making 
the station look a bit better, getting it tidied up and painted ... yes, really it was in 
such a bad state, no carpet on the floor and leaks in the roof ... ” (TW AC1:13 
AC1A, AC1B) 
 
These hospital participants acknowledged the subtle yet effective way in which 
senior staff bestowed a sense of value on others. 
 




“I think they do realise that we do do a very difficult job as opposed to any other 
receptionists in the hospital. ... I think you are appreciated not so much with 
what they have said but I think you feel it maybe.” (TW A&EREC:7 R1, R2) 
 
“I think any of the doctors, if you or I said to them everything looks alright but I 
don’t like the look of them and I think something is going on, all of them would 
listen and they would go and see the patient quicker ... Because I do think that 
they appreciate that most of us have worked here for ages and it may be the 
first time the doctor has ever worked in A&E.” (TW A&EREC:7 N1)  
 
“...I make a conscious effort to say thanks for your help every single time 
because it used to annoy me that I had spent an hour and a half resuscitating 
this patient with a doctor who has then walked off and didn’t even know my 
name.” (PR GSREG:6) 
 
6.3.2 Lack of Respect and Value from the Organisation 
 
It was evident from the interviews that sometimes when a professional’s sense 
of patient orientation was compromised, so was his sense of self worth.  The 
grounds participants cited for this varied from general issues in the working day 
to much higher profile organisation-wide initiatives.  Irrespective of the reason, 
participants perceived that the actions of others towards them indicated a lack 
of respect and value.   
 
“I would expect that somebody would acknowledge that while I was doing my 
job that I was assaulted, perhaps for a manager to check, are you okay? Was 
there anything we could have done? Is there anything particular you were 
annoyed about that happened that day?  Or just to basically acknowledge, we 
have got your report, we are looking into it, just to let you know that it is being 
addressed ...  but nothing seems to be done.” (TW AC2:5 AC2B) 
 
However, as the following illustrations from General Practice demonstrate, 
participants exhibited much stronger feelings when they commented upon 
issues which they perceived had greater consequences for their feeling of self 
worth.  By and large the majority of illustrations of this nature came from GPs, 
who appeared to explicitly vent their feelings on the actions of those at the top 
of the healthcare organisation and the actions they had taken.  These 
participants were rather intense and emotional about the impact that these 
actions had on them and their working life and the tone of the discussion is 
passionate yet rather desperate in places.  
 






Illustration 1 concerns the Choose and Book system used by GPs to book 
hospital consultations.  This GP was insulted by the way in which his skills and 
experience have been judged by those above as inconsequential. 
 
“Perhaps after more than 20 years of practice in the area I suspect I know a 
little bit about the skills and attitudes of various specialists so ... if I was sending 
Mrs S to see somebody then I think the person she would get on best with and 
who also does a terrific job at this sort of problem would be Mrs X or Mr Y but I 
am now not allowed to use that experience, in fact it is suggested now that that 




In Illustration 2, the discussion centred on targets.  In the first instance, this GP 
was resentful that targets were being used to exert control from the top of the 
organisation on those at grassroots level.  In the second instance, he was 
disturbed that the targets were focused in aspects of patient care that could be 
quantified at the expense of what he perceived as the more vital, qualitative 
aspects of care.  His response inferred that the nature of this control, in 
particular, took little account of his knowledge and expertise in terms of patient 
care.   
 
“... the management of the health service has been littered by making the 
measurable important rather than measuring the important for ever, well 
certainly since the early 90’s when the start of the top down attempt to manage, 




The themes in Illustration 3 have some sympathy with those in Illustration 2 in 
that the participant also recognised that their capacity to influence patient care 
in their working environment was limited by the control of those above.  The 
feelings of this Practice Manager indicated that those above her were reluctant 
to recognise the contribution of those at grassroots level.  However, this 
account was also about how staff felt when confronted by continuous change.  
This participant demonstrated feelings of frustration at the enduring nature of 




change in healthcare and the effect this had on her ability to achieve in the 
workplace. 
 
 “... that is what you are up against, that they are coming out wanting you to 
help and then when you think of ways to help them, it is not what they want, 
they have thought of their own ways which may help them but it is not helping 
us, is it?  ... it is just that the NHS move the goalposts every five minutes, you 
are on your way to something and then all of a sudden it is changed so you are 
back peddling because then you have got to start looking at it from a different 
angle because they have decided well that is what we asked you to do but now 




Illustration 4 shows an account of a conversation between a GP and his 
Practice Manager.  These participants shared others’ sense of being controlled 
by those above them.  Their expression of the situation epitomises a cynical 
and disillusioned disposition towards those who head healthcare in the UK.  
Sadly, it also highlights what they despondently view as a deteriorating state of 
affairs where control replaces independence and those at grassroots feel that 
they are not being heard. 
 
GP: “I think that micromanagement from DOH down has spread down the whole 
system so every layer micromanages the layer below it and doesn’t allow the 
flexibility.  In the end DOH are only interested in whether you are in financial 
balance, they are not interested in anything else, ... and whether you hit their 
particular targets ... which aren’t necessarily wrong but they don’t actually look 
at patient care in the global sense of it. (PL GPPM1:2 GP1) 
  
GP: “I think a lot of the civil servants that work within the Department of Health 
know that what they are doing is destroying something that is extremely 
valuable but again the gap sits with ministers and they only hear the bits that 
they want to hear. ... I think it is a shame and I think they have driven it beyond 
a point where it is going to be very hard for them to turn it round, some of the 
embittered views that have been established really. (RE GPPM1:12-13 GP1)  
  
Their discussions then moved onto considering the specific effects that were felt 
in their practice.  The challenges of keeping morale high, in spite of the working 
conditions, were evident.  Whilst, this team never appeared to lose sight of their 
obligations, they were vocal about the damage that is being caused. 
 
PM: “ ... we have struggled this last 6 months, we have taken a nose dive 
haven’t we?   Yes and it is very hard to keep people motivated and keep people 




going and doing the stuff.  ... And you do it because actually, on the whole, the 
stuff that you do makes a difference ... (PE GPPM1:13 PM1) 
 
PM: “...  I think what is in danger of being lost in general practice is there is an 
awful lot of goodwill work done which can’t be measured, which is not paid for 
and if we lose morale and motivation then that will go.” (PR GPPM1:11 PM1) 
 
For some, the feeling of lack of respect and worthlessness was intolerable and 
left them feeling embittered. 
 
“I actually think that healthcare has deteriorated hugely in the past 3-4 years 
and I think the problem is you become bitter and angry about it all.  There is a 
picture being presented which is very much a political picture which is not right 
and morale is at an all time low, it’s about people are not being valued.” (TR 
GP1PM1:3 GP1) 
 
“ If someone is in hospital and I want to know how they are getting on, I used to 
ring and say I’m the GP of so and so and I would speak to Sister and she would 
say, fine, hello Dr so and so, yes she is doing fine or whatever.  Now, there was 
someone who rang me on my mobile at 10.30 at night saying I have taken my 
mum in because the Registrar wanted her admitted because she was confused 
and there is a possibility of dementia or some sort of cerebral stroke and so her 
daughter ... (said) my mum still hasn’t been admitted, ... she is getting very 
upset ... and tired ... and I want to take her home. ... So I said okay, are you 
near the nurses’ station then take your phone there and say you have your GP 
on the phone, let me just talk to the nurse and rearrange it.  In my hearing on 
the mobile phone when this very reasonable woman tried to explain, the nurse 
said, Oh a GP, that will be no good anyway, I am too busy so nobody even had 
the courtesy to talk. ...” (CS GPPM2:2 GP2) 
 
For some participants, 
paradoxically peer relationships 
were strengthened by 
perceptions of the ‘underdog’.   
These feelings unified groups 
of professionals and created an 
almost tribal state of mind 
(Vignette 9).  However, what 
underpinned the concept of 
‘underdog’ was the notion that their contribution was not properly valued by 




“ ... I think maybe there is a shared 
feeling of we are all in a Cinderella 
department, we are not the only 
Cinderella within the NHS and maybe 
there is a bit of that which goes on ....  
 
(T AC3:9 AC3A) 
 




 “... we make a lot of mistakes, well we don’t make them because we don’t do it 
on purpose, it is just circumstances but the PFI that controls this system ... try 
and blame us ...  but when you have got 6 or 7 ambulances to book in then you 
have to work quickly ... We average about 280 patients upwards a day ... we 
are pulled from pillar to post.” (TR A&EREC:2 R1, R2) 
 
“... if they are going to add on these skills then they need to pay you for the 
skills as well ...  they can’t 
leave you on the same pay 
but expect you to be 
practically doing the 
doctor’s job ...” (TR 
A&EN:12 N1) 
 
These feelings were 
particularly acute amongst 
ambulance personnel who 
believed that their needs 
were considered to be less 
important than others 
(Vignette 10).   For this 
group of staff, their neglect 
was felt to be on a number 
of fronts as the following 
illustrations show.  
 
Illustration 1 – Resource Needs 
 
“... they are quite happy to spend millions on changing us from white to green 
when we became YAS but they can’t buy decent burns kits ... I mean if 
somebody is in pain ... are they really bothered whether we all wear a green 
shirt, are they heck?  All they want to know is that you are going to come and 
help them and get them sorted out.” (RSP AC2:15 AC2A, AC2B) 
 
Illustration 2 – Safety Needs 
 
“ ... we got the call to him in the street but we got his home address and we said 
would this be flagged?  But they said they didn’t know ...  lo and behold, when 
we pitched up at A&E with him, the charge nurse knew straight away who he 
was and said I hope he has been checked because he carries a knife.  So even 
staff up at A&E was aware about it but first on the scene, you and your mate, 




 “... we have just got a new fleet of 
ambulances but it is as if the transport 
manager or fleet manager from YAS has 
got a special deal from a dealership and 
they have just churned out any old sort of 
ambulance, there has been no interaction 
with crews of what works and what doesn’t, 
what could be improved, we have taken a 
step back ... this is our office and they have 
just gone ahead and bought, as a 
guestimate, 100, 50, 60 of these and it is a 
terrible design. ... I think, in a nutshell, they 
just seem to blaze on ahead regardless of 
how staff on the road feel and what they 
think is good, there was no interaction or 
consultation ... ”  
(TR AC3:10, 11 AC3A) 
 




Illustration 3 – Employment Needs 
 
“... we were always stuck between being an emergency service and being NHS 
so I think we went more towards NHS with RS ...  we got more perks of being 
NHS but then again we are an emergency service ... we don’t get perks that the 
police get and the fire service in terms of pensions so we are just poor and 
stuck in the middle not knowing which side of the fence we are on so therefore 
we cop for all the crap from both sides.”  (RSP AC2:14 AC2B)   
 
6.3.3 Lack of Respect and Value from Peers 
 
There is much to be found in the comments of participants regarding why 
positive peer relationships were not achieved.  The narratives centre around the 
boundaries that defined what professionals did and as a result how they were 
perceived by others.  Following naturally on from this was the value of a 
professional.  Participants decried the fact that the worth of professionals in 
their own right was not recognised nor were their capabilities and their capacity 
to act responsibly and appropriately in a professional setting. The result was 
that instead of acting collectively, professionals began to think and behave as 
individuals, thereby negating and eroding positive peer relationships. 
 
There was evidence that the level of respect one professional had for another 
caused staff to question how valued they were and fostered destructive working 
relationships.  The origins of these feelings appeared to be rooted in 
participants’ perceptions about the nature of their role and its associated 
responsibilities. 
 
Almost to the last, participants felt that they had the most difficult job in 
healthcare and, for some, this was linked to the notion that they felt they were at 
the frontline of patient care. 
 
“We are mostly on the shop floor, seeing people, sorting them out ...” (ID 
A&ESHO:17)  
 
However, the strength of reaction amongst participants appeared to be 
dependent upon the perceived magnitude and importance of the issue.  
Accordingly, where issues were perceived by participants to be relatively minor, 




their reactions were more modest than instances which were seen as more 
significant and far reaching. 
 
Particularly amongst administrative staff, there did not appear to be any 
correlation between understanding the challenges of a role and the level of 
respect they received from peers.  
 
“I think ward clerks do deflect and protect staff a lot more than they appreciate, I 
will try and keep a lot of phone calls away from them if I can answer it myself or 
I will go and ask the patient if they are sat up in bed, ‘how have you been today; 
am I okay to tell your auntie so and so’.” (TW GSWC2:7) 
 
 “I think there are situations where people don’t always appreciate what another 
person’s role is and what they need to get done because what is important to 
one person isn’t to another ... “ (ID GSWC2:2) 
 
 “I had a patient the other day who had cut the end of their finger off ...  because 
all the nurses were busy, they didn’t want to see it and I had to make the 
managers aware, that patient still came back to me ... the finger was in the bag 
with cold water.  So when you tell people something you hope that they will 
respect you and follow that through and they don’t ... I think it is probably 
because we do overreact, we are not trained to do that “ (D A&EREC:2-3 R1, 
R2) 
 
However, some participants went further and there was evidence of much 
stronger feelings as the following illustrations show.   
 
Illustration 1 Nurses 
 
Nurses felt disgusted by the disrespect they perceived doctors showed to them. 
 
 “ ... what annoys me is when a doctor is absolutely lovely to a patient and then 
speaks to me rudely because then I think they know how to be nice and they 
know how they should behave  ... so why am I different because I am working 














Illustration 2 Ambulance Crew 
 
At Vignette 11 is the telling account of a member of ambulance crew.  These 
professionals possessed intense feelings of being on the frontline with a 
breadth and depth of responsibilities.  However, they believed that there was 
little recognition of the fact, 
particularly from other 
professionals who were better 
resourced. 
 
Ambulance crews were also 
vocal about the fact that their 
qualifications and experience 
provided them with the skills 
and capability to assess 
patients.  However, they felt 
that this was undervalued, 
ignored and, at times, 
undermined by others. 
 
“We take a really decent history so we could basically say where that patient is 
going to end up, from our assessment, but the thing is we can’t say eg it is a 
gallstone and the patient needs to go to a surgical ward, we have got to go 
through A&E ... (TO AC3:1 AC3B)  
  
“... it is so busy in there ... there will invariably be some comment from 
somebody about that ASHICE call, that it wasn’t good enough ... just casting 
aspersions on our ability to assess how ill the patient is ...” (TM AC1:4 AC1B)  
 
“... so they can be writhing in pain when we get there but because of our 
intervention, when we get to hospital, sometimes the pain has gone completely 
and they disagree with your assessment ...” (TM AC3:6 AC3B) 
 
 “... they (the hospital)  do seem to have a reluctance to appreciate that we can 
make an improvement in a case ...” (PE AC1:21 AC1B) 
 
Their sensitivity to the issue of value was not helped by the lack of recognition 




“...and we will hand over at the hospital to 
a team of seven and you will have 4, 5, 6 
doctors for the same patient ... with the 
nurses doing all the basic jobs that you 
have got to keep an eye on at the same 
time as doing the job that the doctor would 
be doing and you have got the relatives to 
deal with, you have got to negotiate that 
patient out of the house into the vehicle, 
you’ve got onlookers, you’ve got dogs, 
you’ve got mats and stairs ...”  
 
(ID AC1:15 AC1A, AC1B)  
 




“... my point is the press were 
quite positive and quite 
supportive of the fire service but 
we don’t get that as a whole, 
there was very little mentioned of 
the work that we did on that job 
and we were called and we 
attended and we dealt with the 
two patients there but nothing 
was said ..”.(EO AC3:5)  
 
“... it would be nice to have a 
better coverage of the good 
things that we do rather than it 
always seems to be negative and 
shock headlines of when 
something has gone wrong rather 
than some of the good stuff that 
we do ...” (EO AC3:6) 
 
Finally, ambulance crew believed 
that they had encountered the 
ultimate disparagement.  This is 
encapsulated in their opinions in 
Vignette 12 of new ambulance 
vehicles which they felt had been 
commissioned without respecting 
the views of users. 
 
6.4 Summary  
 
Chapter 5 evaluated how participants’ working lives were affected by 
organisational structure and control mechanisms. However, in evaluating the 
analysis, the author felt that this was not a complete picture since there was 
also evidence that working life was influenced by participants’ views about 
themselves and their peers.   
 
This chapter has been concerned with evaluating the second perspective and 
has explored how an individual’s behaviour in the workplace is also the 
outcome of an orientation towards patients, peer relationships and the notion of 
Vignette 12 
 
“… you try and find out who has input, 
some people went and looked at them 
and said this is not right, this will need 
to be moved, you need to put this here.  
So they did have some input from staff, 
fine, marvellous, did they take any 
notice?  No.   So we have now got 
vehicles with equipment positioned 
where you can’t see it, you’ve got a 
stretcher that has to be moved out with 
a patient on and one person has to 
hold the stretcher while somebody 
deploys the ramp, the ramp is a very 
steep incline ... it puts a strain on your 
back trying to hold the stretcher from 
running away and the main issue is 
when you have a cardiac arrest 
because of how you have to deploy the 
ramp.  With the old Renaults it was 
easy to get the ramp down and get the 
patient on and you were off.  This new 
one is an absolute nightmare” 
 
 (RSP AC2:13 AC2A) 




self worth.  Participants were driven in their work by a compelling sense of duty 
towards patients and exhibited a compulsion to care for patients.  The unanimity 
of this orientation created a great strength of feeling towards patient care across 
peer groups so that collectively each individual, in pursuing a patient orientation, 
was aiding peers to do the same.  The bond between professionals was 
furthered by the relationships fostered through mutual professional respect, 
teamworking and positive peer rapport.  This appeared to create strong ties 
across peer groups and had a unifying effect between professionals so much so 
that participants felt a great sense of responsibility for their fellow professionals.   
 
However, the picture was not completely positive and there was evidence in the 
narratives of participants that relationships could also be destructive and 
harmful to an individual’s working life and, in some instances, patient care.    
Furthermore, whilst participants extolled the virtues of being valued in the 
workplace, they perceived that the actions of the organisation and colleagues 
eroded a professional’s self worth and were detrimental to a patient focus and 
patient care.   
 
The evaluation of the perspectives presented in Chapters 5 and 6 was helpful to 
the author in creating an image of a healthcare professional’s working life.  
However, whilst the themes that contributed to the perspectives were useful, the 
author felt that the data remained fragmented to some degree.  The author’s 
consideration returned to the contribution that this thesis aims to make.  
Chapter 2 examined how the management literature on smouldering crises 
failed to take account of the behavioural influence of those at grassroots level in 
smouldering crisis situations and argued that this perspective would improve the 
limitations in management’s perspective, knowledge and capabilities which 
were perceived in aspects of the literature to underpin these events.  Chapter 3 
proposed that policy regarding the management of adverse patient safety 
incidents, which exhibited the characteristics of smouldering crises, would be 
better informed if the established ‘hard’ knowledge was combined with a more 
‘soft’ behavioural approach.  The research associated with this thesis, described 
in Chapter 4, aimed to bridge these gaps by exploring the behaviour of 
healthcare professionals at grassroots level in order to understand how 




potentially this could contribute to smouldering crisis situations.  Therefore the 
unit of analysis was the healthcare professional.  It was the author’s view that 
the data in Chapters 5 and 6 were building blocks in developing this 
understanding but it was vital to centre the data around the dynamics of a 
healthcare professional in order to create a stronger insight into the individual 
and their behaviours in the workplace.  This evaluation is presented in the next 
chapter, Chapter 7. 




Chapter 7  Building on the Organisational and Individual Perspectives: An 
                   Individual’s ‘Faces of Self’ 
 
This chapter will evaluate the dynamics of a healthcare professional by building 
on the organisational and individual perspectives explored in previous chapters.  
In so doing, the author seeks to provide a greater insight into the individual and 
their behaviour in the workplace which is central to this thesis’ aim of 
understanding why crises smoulder in organisations. 
 
The narrative approach to the analysis found that working life behaviour in 
healthcare was centred on an individual’s affinity with their profession and peers 
but grounded in an underlying need to care for patients.  Whilst the associated 
themes identified were useful, the author felt that the data remained fragmented 
in terms of creating a picture of the healthcare professional.  It was the author’s 
view that these perspectives needed to be built upon so that a deeper 
understanding of the grassroots individual in their working life could be 
appreciated.  In arriving at the perspectives explored in the previous chapters, 
narratives were identified which focused on how individuals behaved in their 
working life, why they behaved in the way that they did and what they gained 
from their dealings with peers.  The author encapsulated these in the notion of 
‘the world as I see it’, an identity which was more conducive to creating an 
understanding of the individual at work.  A better understanding of frontline 
healthcare professionals and how they might contribute to smouldering crises 
was necessary to redress the imbalances that had been identified in existing 
literature, thereby providing a more inclusive and holistic approach to the 
management of crises and patient safety. 
 
Thus, this chapter will build on previous chapters by exploring the viewpoint of 
‘the world as I see it’ through the voices and contribution of individuals in order 
to develop an identity of the healthcare professional.  Illustrations taken from the 









7.1 An Introduction to the ‘Faces of Self’  
 
The approach of existing literature concerning the management of crises has 
been to view organisational crises as failures of management systems.  
However, whilst the dominant cause of these events has been identified as 
human error and there has been some development in understanding the role 
that management plays in smouldering systemic failures, theory has, largely, 
not been informed by knowledge concerning the contribution of grassroots 
behaviour.  In the context of patient safety, adverse patient safety incidents 
exhibited the characteristics of smouldering crises and although knowledge has 
informed policy and practice, it was evident from existing literature that, firstly, 
tangible progress in curbing this classification of smouldering crises has been 
limited and secondly, this appeared to have happened in part because there 
had been a focus on ‘hard’ issues at the expense of the more ‘soft’ behavioural 
issues.  With a critical theorist perspective, the author liberated the views of 
employees who were closer to the potential crisis incubation point in order to 
gain a better understanding of why healthcare professionals, with no intention to 
harm their patients, might make mistakes that adversely affect patients in their 
care.  In so doing, the author deduced through the analysis that an individual’s 
identity or ‘sense of self’ in the workplace was not simply the composite of the 
organisational and individual perspectives that had been identified.  An 
individual’s sense of ‘self’ was based on three separate yet distinctive features 
of their working life; their obligations to their patients, their affinity with their 
profession and their relationships with their peers.  The author labelled these as 
‘Faces of Self’ (shown below as Figure 7.1).   Each ‘Face’ elicited an 
explanation of how and why health professionals behaved in the way that they 
did and why these behaviours might incubate error events which were 
symptomatic of smouldering crises. 
 
The first ‘Face of Self’ was identified as the ‘Duty Self’.  Participants expressed 
sincere and strong obligations towards their responsibilities that were driven by 
a profound sense of duty towards patients.  
 




“… it is probably the first time I ever cried over a patient and I cried because 
they lived not because they died, I cried from relief that I had done a good job 
…” (CW GSREG:1) 
 
The second ‘Face’ was identified as the ‘Professional Self’.  Whilst the ‘Duty 
Self’ was motivated by patient orientation, having a strong affinity with their 
chosen profession was what underpinned the ‘Professional Self’.   
 
“… if I was sending Mrs S to see somebody then I think the person she would 
get on best with and who also does a terrific job at this sort of problem would be 
Mrs X or Mrs Y …” (PE GPPM2:6 GP2) 
 
The third ‘Face’ was identified as the ‘Collegiate Self’ and was concerned with 
what participants drew from their relationships with peers.  The author found 
that the narratives of participants concerning their daily lives were also 
grounded on the affinity they had for and the interactions with their peers.  
Participants demonstrated great empathy with their peers that arose out of a 
sense of belonging and this, in turn, generated benefits for themselves, their 
peers and patients.   
 
“… especially on nights … you come in quarter of an hour earlier and there 
might be several crews but only 1 is going off at 8, so one night crew takes that 









Figure 7.1 Three ‘Faces of Self’ 
 
In building the faces, a pattern emerged as the author identified that each ‘Face’ 
had distinctive origins, features and challenges.  However, whilst the origins and 
features were what bound a ‘Face’, the challenges presented ‘noise’ which 
inhibited an individual’s capacity to realise a ‘Face’.   
 
The ‘Faces of Self’ illuminated the motivations and behaviours of health 
professionals and provided explanations as to why these behaviours incubated 















this chapter will explore the essence of each of the ‘Faces of Self’ beginning 
with the ‘Duty Self’ and then proceeding to examine the ‘Professional Self’ and 
finally the ‘Collegiate Self’.    In each case the discussion examines the origins, 
features and challenges of each ‘Face’ using selected extracts from the data 
and draws upon the literature within the field of individual and organisational 
behaviour in seeking explanations for the findings.     
 
7.2 The ‘Duty Self’ 
 
Central to the ‘Duty Self’ was a profound orientation towards patients which was 
also identified by Sheridan (2003) and Smith R (1999).  Harris et al (2008) 
applied the concept of ‘customer orientation’ from the marketing literature in 
their study of the ‘patient orientation’ of UK frontline healthcare professionals.  
Harris et al (2008) stated that the fulfilment a health professional received from 
caring for patients was a significant driver in career choice.   
 
Although not entirely typical of expressions in the data, the following quotation 
encapsulates how the sense of duty underpinned the vocational choice of 
healthcare professionals. 
 
“... some people ... have ... found their calling in life, love it every day and would 
be here all day every day if they were given a choice and sadly I might have to 
put myself in that bracket ” (PE GSREG:45) 
 
However, according to Harris et al (2008) the desire to care for patients not only 
attracted health professionals to their career, it also played a crucial 
motivational role once in post which centred on two features.  The first was the 
need to provide high quality patient care.  The second was the enjoyment a 
professional received as a result of achieving this aim.   There was evidence in 
the data analysis that the motivation of healthcare professionals was 
underpinned by a strong orientation towards patients and this influenced how 
professionals behaved.  Moreover, as the following sections show, the 
compulsion to care and the satisfaction derived from it both emanated from the 
study and thus, featured in the identity of the ‘Duty Self’. 
 




7.2.1 A Need to Provide High Quality Patient Care 
 
Harris et al (2008) found that healthcare professionals possessed an inherent 
desire to care for patients which was inextricably linked to their ability to be able 
to fulfil their duties.  Moody and Pesut’s (2006) study, also conducted amongst 
a group of frontline healthcare staff, found a similar expression with healthcare 
professionals expecting to be able to effectively care for patients once in post. 
 
The author identified from the data that the behaviour of healthcare 
professionals arose from a strong affinity for patient orientation and that this 
orientation towards the patient was, in part, motivated by a sense of 
responsibility.  The dynamics of a responsibility for patients were complex but 
included the critical nature of the work of healthcare professionals, a deep 
sense of ownership and genuine concern for patients.  The essence of the 
following quotation bears strong resemblance with some of the facets that were 
used in the Harris et al (2008) study to measure the desire of a professional to 
attend to patients’ needs, for example, “I keep the best interests of my patients 
in mind” and “I achieve my own goals by satisfying my patients”. 
 
“... sometimes I know when I do triage that if I put somebody with a head injury 
who has lost consciousness into a team, if that team is really busy, they 
probably won’t be able to reassess after an hour anyway and I might not be as 
busy in triage so I know that if I put that patient in the waiting room I can 
constantly see them out the window and I may be able to reassess them more 
easily. ... best for the patient.” (PS A&EN:4- 5 N2)  
 
Drawing on the theory of behavioural state motivation, Moody and Pesut (2006) 
advocated that “self-efficacy” (p24) in terms of patient care facilitated a 
professional achieving a high performance in the workplace.  However there 
were strong feelings emanating from the data that aspects of working life 
conspired to prevent professionals from achieving their patient orientation goal 
and thus, hindered performance.   
 
As Table 7.1 shows there were a number of issues that challenged patient 
oriented obligations and thus, weakened the ‘Duty Self’.  Most of these issues 
resulted from influences imposed on the individual by the organisation and 




included the impact of boundaries between professionals, a target oriented 
operational approach, resourcing constraints and changes to the social fabric of 
society, aspects of which have a resonance with the patient safety literature (for 
example Leape 2000, Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith 2009, 
Sheridan 2003, Smith and Toft 2005 and Vincent et al 2000).    
  
Boundaries  “... it all gets very difficult and actually you then forget what you’re there for which is 
the patient care and you then start fighting your corner ...” (RB GPPM1:20 GP1) 
Targets “... it does sometimes feel like a conveyor belt and that you are shifting patients and 
you are trying to push to get patients out ... sometimes they are not ready to go but 
you still just have to get rid of them.” (PL A&EN:5 N1, N2) 
Resourcing  “ (I feel) Frustrated more than anything, when you go to a job and you know what 
they need, what can be done for a patient, but you can’t do it. ... Well, God forbid, 
but if I was ever in that situation I think I would phone A&E to speak to a doctor and 
ask if they would authorise me to give adrenaline, how can you stand there and 
watch somebody die when you know what they need? ... you can’t just stand by and 
watch somebody die (PE AC2:8-10 AC2A)  
The Public “... the police were actually on scene at that one and this guy just grabbed my arm 
and started to twist my arm and wouldn’t let go … So, even with police on the scene, 
you can still get assaulted. “ (D AC2:4 AC2B) 
 
Table 7.1 Issues that Challenge the ‘Duty Self’ 
 
Boundary disputes caused conflict which inhibited professionals from 
succeeding in their duty and delivering effective patient care, causing tensions 
between professionals.  Targets shifted the emphasis from a patient oriented to 
a process approach to care so that professionals felt patient care and their 
associated workplace needs were threatened.  Changes in the design and level 
of human resourcing prevented professionals from fulfilling their duties, creating 
workplace stress and compromising patient care with potentially disastrous 
human consequences.  Finally, other issues, which originated in social changes 
outside the organisation, prevented professionals from carrying out their duties 
and had the capacity to erode the affinity healthcare professionals had with the 
people they wanted to serve. 
   
Despite the issues faced in their working life, healthcare professionals remained 
resolved to do what they could for patients, in part because they felt an 
emotional connection with protecting their sense of duty and taking care of 
patients.  This was consistent with Moody and Pesut’s (2006) recognition that 
healthcare professionals were prepared to transcend organisational problems in 
order to serve and care for their patients. 
 




“... there is quite a lot of pressure from the 4 hours that the government state to 
get people turned over and sometimes it is impossible, you know if, for 
whatever reason, you have got a really sick patient that you need to stay with 
then you can’t always manage it (4 hour target).” (PL A&EN:2 N2) 
 
Consistent with the findings of Harris et al (2008) and Moody and Pesut (2006), 
the author deduced from the data that healthcare professionals had an inherent 
desire to be patient orientated, this is what motivated their behaviour in the 
workplace and, thus, underpinned the ‘Duty Self’.  However, it is questionable 
whether aspects of the working conditions in healthcare played an enabling role 
in facilitating the achievement of a patient orientation approach and the ‘Duty 
Self’ since the evidence from this study is suggestive of the contrary.   
 
7.2.2 The Satisfaction Derived from Caring for Patients 
 
Professionals in the Harris et al study (2008) reported that caring for patients 
was the most satisfying aspect of their working life and felt that it was important 
to be able to empathise with patients in enjoyable encounters.  Once again the 
essence of the following quotations from this study has a resonance with some 
of the facets that were used in the Harris et al (2008) study in order to measure 
the enjoyment professionals reaped from taking care of patients, for example, “I 
really enjoy serving my patients” and “It comes naturally for me to have 
empathy for my patients”. 
 
:... a lot of the things we do, they work, and that is nice ...” (TM AC3:5  AC3A)   
 
“I think what is unique for us is that quite a lot of the people we take in ... we 
have a unique opportunity of seeing them in their environment ...” (TR AC3:2 
AC3A) 
 
Moody and Pesut (2006) viewed the satisfaction that healthcare professionals 
derived from caring for patients in the context of work motivation theory.  
Focusing on the application of the theories of Hertzberg (1968) and Hackman 
and Oldham (1980) in healthcare, Moody and Pesut (2006) explored how 
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards in the workplace provided the motivation and 
incentive to work.  Although extrinsic rewards including tangible aspects of work 
such as salary, the role of working conditions and relationships was also 




recognised, intrinsic rewards focused on delivering job satisfaction through an 
individual’s perceived feelings of achievement, recognition, advancement and 
responsibility.  Moody and Pesut (2006) noted that certain extrinsic factors, 
including a propensity to impact upon the lives of others, would heighten an 
individual’s intrinsic motivation in the workplace.  Georgellis and Tabvuma 
(2010) concurred, arguing that creating intrinsically motivated employees was a 
necessity in the public sector. 
 
The author discovered that whilst health professionals attained satisfaction from 
fulfilling their patient orientated obligations, sustaining it on a day to day basis 
created difficult personal and patient impacts which were detrimental to a 
professional’s well being.   
 
In the first instance, and consistent with Moody and Pesut’s findings (2006) 
regarding the emotional demands of the profession, there were many reported 
examples, such as the one below, of how stressful working life became 
particularly when professionals felt they were compromising patient care. 
 
“I feel quite stressed out of triage.  Triage is quite nice if you’ve got time to do it 
but if you are really busy like, literally, they are booking in every 3 minutes, it’s 
stressful to make them decisions quickly and safely and the most times I go 
home and worry is when I have been in triage, I worry about who I have put in 
the waiting room.” (RB A&EN:30 N2) 
 
In the second instance, the data suggested that new working practices 
conspired to erode the opportunities for healthcare professionals to serve their 
patients in the way they felt was best for the patient.  The result was that 
professionals felt devalued.  Moody and Pesut (2006) proposed that there was 
evidence to suggest a correlation between poor self worth, “depersonalisation” 
(p25) and the presence of stress and pressure, although a study conducted by 
Roelen et al amongst healthcare professionals in the Netherlands (2008) 
appeared less convinced of these linkages. 
 
“Perhaps after more than 20 years of practice in the area I suspect I know a 
little bit about the skills and attitudes of various specialists ... but I am now not 
allowed to use that experience, in fact it is suggested now that that experience 
is of no value ...” (PE GPPM2:6 GP2) 




Finally, although healthcare professionals in this study demonstrated a single-
minded resolve to care for patients, there was also evidence that competing 
priorities within the work environment precluded participants from this quest.  As 
the following quotation illustrates the consequences of this can be acute both in 
terms of patient and professional well-being. 
 
“... if you have not been back to look at someone that you know might become 
more ill then yes, you are taking a risk aren’t you, you might go back and 
something has happened to them and you have not had chance to go and look 
... it has happened in the department ...that people have deteriorated and you 
haven’t been able to get back to them and then, when you have got back to 
them, they have been critically ill.” (PL A&EN:12-13 N1,N2) 
 
This study has found that healthcare professionals acquired great satisfaction 
from caring for patients and this strengthened the patient orientation which 
underpinned the ‘Duty Self”.  Whilst an ambition to care for people was what 
motivated a professional’s behaviour, the discharge of their duty was often 
threatened by the reality of a challenging organisational environment, a finding 
which was consistent with aspects of the patient safety literature (for example 
Smith and Toft 2005 and Vincent at al 2000).  A study by Roelen et al (2008) 
stated that the nature of the working environment performed an important role in 
creating satisfaction amongst professionals.  The findings of this study implied 
the contrary, suggesting that work satisfaction was adversely affected by 
difficult working conditions, specifically the complicit role played by the 
pressures of work, new working practices and competing priorities.  As a 
consequence, the resolute determination of professionals to focus on duty was 
not always realised in practice, resulting in damaging personal effects which 
extended beyond individuals to their patients.  The result was that professionals 
experienced a detrimental effect in their well-being in terms of stress and low 
self-value which damaged the ‘Duty Self’.   It is debatable, then, whether a 
healthcare professional can achieve a completely patient orientated 
underpinning to the ‘Duty Self’ without a working environment which is 








7.2.3 A Summary of the ‘Duty Self’ 
 
The author identified that the ‘Duty Self’ evolved out of a passion for patient 
orientation which led to healthcare professionals being undeniably drawn 
towards healthcare as a profession.   The ‘Duty Self’ was then strengthened by 
the crucial motivational role played by a professional’s need to provide high 
quality patient care which conferred a profound sense of responsibility on the 
professional and delivered job satisfaction when it was realised.  However, a 
challenging working environment created disturbances which damaged the 
capacity of healthcare professionals to achieve a patient orientated approach 
and caused significant issues in terms of professional and patient well being.   
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Figure 7.2 The ‘Duty Self’, Challenges and Noise 
 
The picture of the ‘Duty Self’ deduced from the analysis has shown that 
healthcare professionals at grassroots level have something to add to the 
debate concerning smouldering crises and patient safety.  Healthcare 
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professionals occasionally make mistakes which are symptomatic of 
smouldering crises.  The existing literature views these errors as consequences 
of failures in management systems and would address them through procedural 
solutions.  The author sees them as feature of a dysfunctional working 
environment which, if addressed by a management that was aware of them and 
their significance, would allow healthcare professionals to realise their strong 
desires to deliver effective and safe patient care.  
 
To this end, Moody and Pesut (2006) advocated that the capacity to realise the 
motivation to care was influenced by effective environmental conditions which 
fostered a positive sense of self value and personal and professional well being.     
Harris et al (2008) concurred, stating that patient orientation was an important 
trait for healthcare professionals and an essential requisite for a successful 
healthcare career and, since healthcare professionals were the service, held the 
key to long term success for healthcare organisations, a view supported by 
Baptiste (2008). 
 
The author proposes that in view of the crucial role played by patient orientation 
in both the performance of healthcare professionals and their organisations, it 
would be interesting to look further at the internal environmental issues that 
have been identified above and within the patient safety literature as impinging 
on realisation of this. 
 
7.3 The ‘Professional Self’ 
 
In exploring the working lives of healthcare employees through the data, one of 
the prevailing impressions was that first and foremost they saw themselves as 
professionals.  Not only did their profession dictate what they did in their daily 
working life and how they did it but it also conferred upon them a certain identity 
and authority.  Central to this impression of the professional was the nature and 
level of training, in fact so strong were the feelings emanating from the data that 
it was upon this platform that the author built the ‘Professional Self’.  Thus, in 
identifying the ‘Professional Self’ the author had constructed another account to 
explain the behaviour of individuals which would lead to a deeper understanding 




of the working life at grassroots level and thus provide the opportunity to take a 
more holistic and insightful approach to the management of smouldering crises 
and patient safety than that found in the existing literature.  However, whilst the 
‘Professional Self’ was an expression of occupation and role, it was also the 
lens through which working life was observed.  The author observed that within 
the data there was an apparent acute awareness of issues which challenged 
the ‘Professional Self’ on a daily basis.  The author deduced from the data that 
these challenges not only affected how healthcare professionals felt about their 
profession but also how they viewed the attitudes and behaviour of peers.  This 
was important to the author since the literature concerning the systemic nature 
of smouldering crises and adverse patient safety incidents suggested an 
inherent and cumulating progression towards a situation and the author had 
designed the research so that the consequential impact of one individual’s 
behaviour on another could be explored in order to consider what part this 
played in the ensuing crisis conditions. 
 
7.3.1 The Role and Nature of Training as a Platform for the ‘Professional Self’ 
 
There was a strong support emanating from the data that training, and 
particularly experiential training that developed over time, was worthwhile in 
terms of developing valuable experience, expertise and confidence.  The 
following quotation typifies the views of healthcare professionals. 
 
“The Day Ward Clerk taught me, she has been here 20 years or something ...  I 
think you learn more and more ...”(TM GSWC1:4) 
 
Baptiste’s (2008) study of 100 public sector employees, commended the virtue 
of public sector employers who, having recruited skilled employees, ensured  
that they continued to develop their professional expertise, knowledge and job 
capabilities through training.  Moody and Pesut (2008) supported this position 
advocating that acquiring skills and knowledge enhanced individual behaviour in 
the workplace and was particularly effective when it was built up over time. 
 
Furthermore, as exemplified by the following quotation, it was evident from this 
author’s analysis that, consistent with the studies of Moody and Pesut (2008) 




and Roelen et al (2008), acquiring new knowledge and expertise was seen 
within the context of career development. 
 
“The way it works is you maybe did PTS then urgents then you get the 
technician course through A&E then you get the paramedic course.” (EO AC1:1 
AC1A) 
 
Clarke (2005), in surveying attitudes towards training and development in 
palliative care organisations in the UK, found that a supportive training and 
development infrastructure which facilitated opportunities for reflection and 
informal learning were important for fostering an effective learning environment.  
Although the author derived from the data that learning in the form of self 
reflection was occurring, it was emanating from the motivation of individuals to 
learn from their patient care experiences and thus, driven from a patient 
orientation rather than being induced through formal organisational 
mechanisms.    
 
“We are mostly on the shop floor, seeing people, sorting them out and learning 
from it I guess.” (ID A&ESHO:17) 
 
The study of Kuvaas and Dysvik (2009) into employee development and 
intrinsic motivation found that employees who were orientated towards helping 
others in their work and were able to realise this were intrinsically motivated and 
fulfilled in terms of their own goal achievement.   This was consistent with what 
the author deduced as the data showed a strong connection between an 
individual’s capacity to realise patient orientation expectations and the 
satisfaction that resulted from being intrinsically motivated as a result. 
 
 “it makes more sense for someone with more experience to see them (patients) 
directly and makes the process a little quicker because SHO’s ... know more 
about the kind of procedures people need whereas house officers don’t have 
that knowledge.” (EO GSREG:1) 
 
The author reasoned that some healthcare professionals in this study felt good 
about the fact that they had the necessary skills and were able to use them to 
make a difference to patients, particularly those with acute care needs.    
Baptiste’s (2008) suggestion that training and the nature of the work that an 
individual performed influenced job related well being was supported by the 
findings of Morrison et al’s study into job design, skill utilisation and intrinsic job 




satisfaction (2005) .  Morrison et al (2005) found a strong positive relationship 
between the degree to which an individual perceived that their skills were being 
utilised and developed and job-related well-being and intrinsic job satisfaction, 
this is illustrated by the following quotation taken from this study.   
  
“... we kind of package the patient up from being in a very messy state or an 
awkward position or if they need some definitive pre-hospital care then we do 
that, we get them bundled up into the ambulance, safe, hopefully feeling a little 
better and get them to hospital.” (RESPECT AC3:1 AC3A) 
 
However, this was an area of contradiction in this study since some healthcare 
professionals felt that career progression and resourcing issues in the working 
environment inhibited their opportunities to fully utilise their skills.  As a 
consequence, healthcare professionals who did not feel that their skills were 
being utilised, experienced job dissatisfaction and frustration.  
 
 “There is a group of us that were taken on, we applied to be trainee 
paramedics and we were taken on as trainee paramedics and we were told that 
in 3 years we would be paramedics.  4 years plus down the line, the majority of 
us are not paramedics and, no, we will not automatically become paramedics ... 
” (RCG AC2:14 AC2A) 
 
Consistent with existing literature, this study found that healthcare professionals 
recognised the importance of professional expertise and the training that they 
undertook in order to develop this.  As such the author reasoned that training 
underpinned the ‘Professional Self’.  The resulting value it bestowed on an 
individual in healthcare when a professional was able to utilise their expertise in 
order to help patients was a motivating factor. 
 
7.3.2 The Challenges of Sustaining the ‘Professional Self’  
 
The preceding section focused on the author’s understanding, deduced from 
the data, of the core element of the ‘Professional Self’, namely training.  In 
analysing the recollections of healthcare professionals concerning their daily 
working life, the author postulated that the ‘Professional Self’ was a pervasive 
identity with which professionals had a great affinity and through which they 
viewed their working lives.  As a consequence, the author became acutely 
aware of the resentment felt by professionals when they encountered issues 




which affected their capacity to fulfil the roles for which they had been trained.   
These issues influenced a professional’s self and peer perceptions.  This 
section will focus on what the data inferred were the most prevalent of the 
issues, namely working conditions, perceptions of inequality and the 
relationships between professionals. 
 
Moody and Pesut (2008) recognised that in order to foster positive working 
conditions it was necessary for healthcare professionals to have manageable 
levels of complexity in the work setting.  The data in this study inferred that 
aspects of the working environment conspired to increase the level of 
complexity encountered by healthcare professionals in their working life and 
hindered the realisation of the ‘Professional Self’. 
 
In the first instance, changes in the social dynamics of the public inhibited a 
professional’s ability to fulfil their role.  The example below shows how this can 
result in professionals struggling to utilise their skills and care for patients.  
 
“... we went to the Children’s a couple of weeks ago with no information 
whatsoever even though there were 10 people in the room which we picked the 
baby up from, they did not speak any English whatsoever and they were trying 
to get a 3 year old to translate for us, they had only arrived in the country the 
day before ... it is unusual to have somebody with no English at all but 
sometimes you are dealing with a low amount of English and there are 
difficulties with understanding. (TM AC1:6, 8 AC1A, AC1B)   
 
In the second instance, resourcing changes affected the development of 
employees because funding was scarce and training opportunities were 
restricted.  However, and more seriously, the author also detected that 
resourcing changes were detrimental to safe patient care because professionals 
were unable to fulfil their professional duties in an effective manner, a view 
which was consistent with Smith (2002b) and Smith and Toft (2005). 
 
“......and it’s all down to funds because there is nothing available in the 
department for us to have ongoing training ...” (TM A&EREC:2 R1)  
 
“At one time, if they wanted to, they could come and spend a day with you but it 
is like everything else now in that there seems no leeway for people to do that 
... (EO AC2:5 AC2A)  
 




 “The reason it is busy is you have got the same number of medical staff that 
you had years ago and what you have done is you’ve just lowered the number 
of hours that they work ... so you are doing the same amount of work in fewer 
hours...  In terms of the effect that it has on patients, I guess mistakes are more 
likely in someone who is trying to sort a whole ward out by himself or who is 
busier ...” (TM A&ESHO:16)  
 
In the third instance, the data inferred a strong feeling of unfairness and inequity 
in professional life, particularly as a result of the approach to experiential 
training, role design and the use of targets to judge the efficacy of professionals.  
Contrary to what the data in this study inferred, Baptiste (2008) advocated that 
for individuals to perform well in an organisation, it was necessary to ensure 
that employees perceived the organisation to be supportive, trustworthy, fair 
and consistent in aspects of work including training and development.  
However, the data in this study was consistent with the findings of MacDonald’s 
(2005) investigation into the effect of targets and directives in healthcare which 
showed that employees perceived them as control mechanisms which inhibited 
their professional working life.   
 
A qualitative study of new workforce roles in healthcare in the UK conducted by 
Bridges et al (2007) suggested that there was evidence that roles had become 
extended and, as a result, more complex over time.  Bridges et al (2007) 
attributed this extension and complexity to constant change and a distracting 
working environment.  This was borne out by the data and was typified by the 
following quotation. 
 
“They just keep extending the skills like nurses didn’t used to take blood or put 
cannulas in but now they do and they just keep adding more and more things 
on so, if they keep on adding, where is going to be the difference between the 
nurse and the doctor other than taking the history which a nurse could do.” (RB 
A&EN1N2:23 N1) 
 
The findings of Hyde et al’s (2005) study of role redesign in the UK health 
sector confirmed the extension and complexity of roles in the sector.  Consistent 
with the author’s observations in this study, Hyde et al (2005) identified that the 
roles of professionals working in healthcare in the UK had changed significantly 
and involved skill-mix changes, job widening and job deepening.  Hyde et al 
(2005) identified that these changes had implications for the pay, management 




and accountability and the education and training of healthcare professionals.  
Campion et al (2005) warned of the negative motivational effects of 
implementing job enlargement (increasing the number and variety of tasks 
within a job role) without delivering job enrichment (adding tasks which enhance 
the meaningfulness of work and the sense of responsibility) because employees 
perceived that they were being overloaded.  The author of this study exposed a 
resulting undercurrent of dissatisfaction in the data as a consequence of these 
changes which is exemplified in the following quotations. 
 
“... if they are going to add on these skills then they need to pay you for the 
skills as well don’t they; they can’t leave you on the same pay but expect you to 
be practically doing the doctors job but the doctor is on loads more than we’re 
on ... I have been underpaid for 4 years  ... because they changed the pay scale 
in 2004 but they have never given us the money yet so we are still on the old 
one... (IE A&EN1N2:11 N1,N2) 
 
“At the end of the day the patient needs that doing and if nobody else does it 
then we have to do ...” (PE A&ESHO:5) 
 
Consistent with the findings of Harris et al (2008), the negative emotions that 
the author sensed in the data created unconstructive conditions within which 
individuals attempted to perform their roles and thus encroached upon their 
ability to realise the ‘Professional Self’.  The author deduced that whilst the 
notion of inequity affected how they felt as professionals, it also influenced their 
perceptions of other professionals.  The data exposed perceptions that role 
changes yielded a greater burden and level of responsibility which was not 
always fair nor was this recognised or appreciated by others.  There were 
instances observed by the author where this resulted in feelings of professional 
exposure and compromised patient safety.  
 
“... it is difficult because of the way the system (the Foundation Programme for 
Doctors) works that you try as a junior, as a foundation year 1 or 2, to rotate 
through as many specialties as you can so you can decide what you want to do 
for your specialist training so you will inevitably ... end up with a senior as an F1 
who knows less about your subject than you do. ... it can be quite difficult when 
somebody gets very unwell and you need somebody to call upon who you know 
will be there ... no matter how good  ... you are, you can’t manage on your own 
... there are issues with safety” (IE GSREG:4, 7)  
 
In the fourth instance, the data inferred that when a patient’s care crossed 
boundaries, professionals were defensive about their expertise to the extent 




that working relationships between professionals became strained, as 
professionals felt their contribution was being devalued.  This was consistent 
with McMurray (2006) and McMurray and Pullen (2008) who identified the 
discrete nature of health specialisms and the challenges of physical proximity 
as being responsible for boundaries between professionals.  Loh et al (2009, 
2010) supported the view stating that boundaries created an ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
mentality and caused individuals to be favourable towards those within their 
own boundary at the expense of those considered to be outsiders.   
Significantly, aspects of existing patient safety literature acknowledged (Leape 
2005, Reason 2004, 2008, Smith 2005a and Walshe 1999) the role that 
boundaries played in incubating adverse patient safety incidents.  
 
“... it is so busy in there ... there will invariably be some comment from 
somebody about that ASHICE call, that it wasn’t good enough ... just casting 
aspersions on our ability to assess how ill the patient is ...” (TM AC1:4 AC1B) 
(Ambulance crew discussing how they feel when they deliver patients to 
Accident and Emergency)  
 
The discovery of the ‘Professional Self’ by the author was a further attempt to 
explain the behaviour of individuals in healthcare which was necessary if a 
deeper understanding of grassroots level was to be developed.   However, once 
again, the author postulated that events within a professional’s working 
environment endangered the realisation of the ‘Professional Self’.  Strong 
emotions were evoked by professionals who felt unable to fulfil their 
professional obligations since this was seen to attack their expertise and 
ultimately arrest their capacity to care for patients.  The consequences 
weakened feelings of self worth, damaged peer relationships and created a 
climate in which human error incidents could occur. 
 
7.3.3 A Summary of the ‘Professional Self’ 
 
The author deduced from analysis of the data that the ‘Professional Self’ was an 
expression of expertise and role, built on a platform of training and experience.  
It was also the lens through which working life was observed.  The value of 
experiential training and self reflection was widely recognised in the data, in its 
own right and within the context of patient care. 




Kuvaas and Dysvik (2009) and Baptiste (2008) recognised the importance of 
developing employees’ skills, knowledge and competencies for both the 
individual and the organisation.  Utilising the concept of social exchange theory, 
Kuvaas and Dysvik (2009) proposed that when an organisation invested in its 
employees in this way, greater employee satisfaction ensued and the employee 
was more likely to reciprocate in positive ways.  The data was suggestive that 
healthcare professionals aspired to develop their skills in order to better serve 
patients and, when this occurred, their well being was heightened.   
 
However, the author identified from the data that a number of internal and 
external factors sought to erode the ‘Professional Self’ and the consequential 
care a professional could offer to patients.  Whilst social changes impinged on 
an individual’s capacity to fulfil their professional obligations, internal factors 
created the most disturbance.  Changes in the working conditions of 
professionals had led to restrictions in training opportunities and fostered 
perceptions of unfairness and inequality amongst peers.  Furthermore, 
professionals struggled to succeed in their aspirations to care for patients by 
utilising expertise when patient care was delivered across organisational 
boundaries and this created tensions in the relationships between 
professionals.  This is summarised in the model of the ‘Professional Self’ at 
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Figure 7.3 The ‘Professional Self’, Challenges and Noise 
 
Clark (2005) proposed that an effective learning environment was achieved 
through a supportive training and development infrastructure which was realised 
through aspects such as the design of work, work environments and structures 
and policies.  The author questions whether, given the analysis of the data, this 
has been achieved in the healthcare sector and to what degree this has 
impinged on the agenda for improving patient care and safety. 
 
7.4 The ‘Collegiate Self’ 
 
The author observed from the analysis of the data that whilst the ‘Duty Self’ and 
the ‘Professional Self’ were distinctly personal, what underpinned the ‘Collegiate 
Self’ was a feeling of belonging to a unified body of individuals, a collegiate in 
effect.  This collegiate spirit influenced how people felt in the workplace but 
more significantly how they behaved, since it created an atmosphere of 
willingness and well being which was centred around the care of patients.  In 









   














‘Self’ was very individualistic, a healthcare professional perceived that duty and 
professional aspirations could not be achieved without the contribution of peers.   
Thus, although in identifying this further aspect of the individual in the workplace 
the author had constructed a third account to explain behaviour, the discovery 
of the ‘Collegiate Self’ was important because it provided a root for the concept 
of ‘Self’ in the collective behaviours at grassroots level.  This was important to 
the author since the research had been designed to expose what existing 
literature recognised as the cumulative progression of smouldering crises within 
the organisation’s systems. 
 
7.4.1 The Origins of the ‘Collegiate Self’ 
 
The author constructed the following figure from analysis of the data which 
suggested that the ‘Collegiate Self’ was dependent upon several factors which 
appeared to evolve in a hierarchical fashion but commenced with how valued a 




Figure 7.4 The Hierarchy of the ‘Collegiate Self’ 
 
In the first instance, a professional who, through the attitudes and behaviours of 
peers and superiors, was content in the work environment and confident in their 
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“I think it was just a case of making everybody feel part of being here, making 
the station look a bit better, getting it tidied up and painted ... yes, really it was in 
such a bad state, no carpet on the floor and leaks in the roof ... ” (TW AC1:13 
AC1A, AC1B) 
 
 “I think any of the doctors, if you or I said to them everything looks alright but I 
don’t like the look of them and I think something is going on, all of them would 
listen and they would go and see the patient quicker ... Because I do think that 
they appreciate that most of us have worked here for ages and it may be the 
first time the doctor has ever worked in A&E.” (TW A&EREC:7 N1)  
 
In the second instance, valued professionals had a propensity to challenge the 
barriers and boundaries between professionals. 
 
“...we actually established a proper integrated nursing team which had a mixture 
of district nurses, practice nurses, health visitors, all grades of people, all 
working together and they basically spread the workload, including the practice 
workload, and they did it all on the basis of who was the best qualified to do that 
particular task.” 
 
In the third instance, and as a result of the creation of a valued professional 
prepared to challenge boundaries, co-operation and flexibility were promoted 
and dutiful obligations to the patient were satisfied. 
 
“It was all about flexibility but in the end it was actually about people saying 
what does the patient need and how best can we serve them rather than saying 
this is my job I only do this.” (F GP1PM1:9 GP1) 
 
In engaging with all of this, individuals felt appreciated, appreciated the role and 
perspective of others and therefore were better able to perform as a team. 
 
”What you find, especially on nights, is you come in quarter of an hour earlier 
and there might be several night crews but only one crew is going off at 8, so 
one night crew takes that crew off, then they can go home and they know that in 
the last quarter of an hour they are not going to get a job so that night crew is 
very likely to go out before 8 especially here because we are very conducive to 
doing that. “ (CS AC1:4 AC1B) 
 
Interestingly, though, the data inferred that the ‘Collegiate Self’ went beyond 
teamworking and was not to be found in actions instigated by an organisation in 
the workplace.  The author postulated that the essence of the ‘Collegiate Self’ 
was to be found in the relationships between professionals and the resulting 
consideration one professional had for another, particularly when faced with 
challenging situations in the workplace.  This viewpoint was consistent with 




Rosenthal (1999) who considered that collegiatism amongst professionals 
involved “closing ranks” (p152).     
 
Healthcare professionals drew great satisfaction from positive peer relationships 
and there was a sense of responsibility and support evident between peers.  
This was consistent with Rosenthal (1999) and Martin’s (2010) notion of 
productive peer support and coherent with the findings of Moody and Pesut 
(2006) who identified that conditions which fostered good relations and social 
support had a positive influence on work motivation.  However, Roelen et al 
(2008) found that although peer relationships enhanced workplace satisfaction, 
the same strength of correlation was not found in the relationships that 
professionals had with their superiors.  The author deduced that this confirmed 
that the notion of the ‘Collegiate Self’ lay in the relationships between peers and 
was not hierarchical.  However, this observation reinforces the challenges 
explored in Chapter 2 regarding power and control in organisational hierarchies 
and the impact this had upon smouldering crisis situations (Smith 2005a). 
 
“... the beauty of this place at the moment is that you can come to work and no 
matter who you are working with you are going to have a good shift ... and that 
hasn’t always been the case but it is really good at the moment and has been 
for a long while ...” (CW AC1:8 AC1A, AC1B)  
 
 “... if I’ve got a lot of notes then she will help me out as well so we help each 
other, we’ve got that support really from each other .” (TW GSWC11:16) 
 
However, the bonds between peers seemed, from the data, to be at their 
strongest when professionals were battling to provide patient care despite 
obstacles. 
 
 ”... nobody appreciates just how much responsibility we take, how we are two 
people dealing with something when almost anybody else, dealing with 
something in that much of an emergency, has many more than two people, 
have more people, have more training, have more knowledge or have at least 
somebody there above them that knows.  There are two people but as soon as 
somebody is driving you become one person” (CS AC1:12 AC1B) 
 
Thus, consistent with the discussion concerning the ‘Duty Self’ and the 
‘Professional Self’, the author concluded that, despite the ‘Collegiate Self’ being 




a more collective expression of self, its roots remained in an orientation for the 
patient and a desire to deliver effective patient care. 
 
7.4.2 The Factors that Harm Collegiatism 
 
The essence of the ‘Collegiate Self’ lay in the sense of belonging that a 
professional garnered from being valued by and working with peers to 
effectively care for patients.  The author construed, though, that there were also 
factors which could inhibit and destroy the sense of collegiateship amongst 
professionals.   These issues, which centred on the impact of workplace 
resourcing changes and boundaries, broke down relationships and promoted 
conflict and ill feeling between healthcare professionals.  More importantly, the 
results were that motivation and job satisfaction was eroded and patient care 
was compromised.   
 
The author’s analysis of the data inferred that resourcing changes, such as role 
redesign, prohibited peers from getting together to care for patients because of 
perceived role demarcation lines. 
 
“ ... we almost had 2 groups of nurses kind of pushing work off on each other 
rather than working together” (CS GPPM2:1 GP2) 
 
Furthermore, as is illustrated by the following quotation, the author deduced that 
defined workplace boundaries created territorial tendencies amongst 
professionals which isolated individuals and had a detrimental effect on patient 
care.   
 
“… everyone is being pushed into boundaries so they have drawn this up 
around themselves and they won’t step outside it but there are a group of things 
that occur which don’t actually fit into anybody’s boundaries and it is those 
things which always fall through the net.” (TW GP1PM1:6 GP1) 
 
It was noted in the discussion concerning the ‘Professional Self’ that the studies 
of Loh et al (2009, 2010), McMurray (2006), McMurray and Pullen (2008) 
identified the discrete nature of health specialisms and the challenges of 
physical proximity as being responsible for creating an ‘us’ and ‘them’ situation 




and erecting boundaries between professionals.  Moody and Pesut (2006) 
concurred stating that frontline healthcare professionals perceived difficulties in 
patient care transitions between distinctive aspects of care due to collaboration 
problems.  Penney and Spector (2005) also recognised that negative peer 
relations could adversely affect an individual’s satisfaction and well being in the 
workplace and stated that this was counter productive to performance.  
Indicative of the author’s analysis of the data, the research of Sasou and 
Reason (1999) indicated that teamworking environments produced problems 
that held the potential to lead to human errors.  Furthermore, aspects of the 
patient safety literature (Leape 2005, Reason 2004, 2008, Smith 2005a and 
Walshe 1999) identify. 
 
However, in addition to the detrimental impact on patient care, the analysis of 
the data in this study suggested that difficulties in the relationships across 
boundaries led professionals to question the respect their peers had for them 
and resulted in a lowering of self worth. 
 
“In my hearing on the mobile phone when this very reasonable woman tried to 
explain, the nurse said, Oh a GP, that will be no good anyway, I am too busy so 
nobody even had the courtesy to talk. ...” (CS GPPM2:2 GP2) 
 
7.4.3 A Summary of the ‘Collegiate Self’ 
 
The author postulated that the ‘Collegiate Self’ was encouraged and sustained 
by the positive attitudes professionals held for each other and this, as a 
consequence affected their behaviour towards each other and had the capacity 
to enhance patient care.  When a professional felt valued, they were more 
inclined to make the effort to break down barriers that existed between them 
and their peers.  This resulted in improved communications, flexibility and 
teamworking.  However, the author deduced that what distinguished the 
‘Collegiate Self’ from teamworking lay in the feelings professionals had for each 
other.  Professionals who were respected and valued by peers, reciprocated 
and the social cohesion of the collegiate grew.  The author hypothesised that 
part of the reason for this was that professionals found strength in being united 
with others against the conditions they faced on a daily basis, in effect this 




created a tribal mentality.  However, the data inferred that these conditions, 
specifically the boundaries and resourcing changes in healthcare were, harmful 
to the prosperity of the ‘Collegiate Self’ because there was an associated 
breakdown in relationships as conflicts arose.  The consequences were that 
professionals became demotivated and dissatisfied in the workplace and, 
disturbingly, patient care was compromised.   
 
Effective patient care was best delivered through the combined efforts of 
professionals across organisational boundaries.  The discovery of the 
‘Collegiate Self’ demonstrated the potency of like-minded professionals working 
collectively for the common good.  However, without conducive conditions at 
work, the strength of the collegiate was eroded and, consistent with the notion 
of smouldering crises, patient care suffered.  Interestingly, the damaging theme 
of dysfunctional working conditions was, once more, surfacing from the data 
and the author felt that further exploration would be useful to the study.  The 
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7.5 Summary  
 
This chapter has built on previous chapters by exploring the viewpoint of ‘the 
world as I see it’ in order to develop a better insight into the role that grassroots’  
behaviour plays in smouldering crisis and adverse patient safety situations.  The 
author saw this as necessary because existing literature concerning 
smouldering crises and patient safety viewed the causes of crises as human 
error within faulty management systems but exhibited a limited understanding of 
the contributory role of grassroots individuals. 
 
The author deduced from the data that an individual’s identity or ‘sense of self’ 
in the workplace was based on three separate yet distinctive features of their 
working life.  The author classified these as the ‘Faces of Self’, with each ‘Face’ 
inferring a partial explanation of how and why health professionals behaved in 
the way that they did and why these behaviours might incubate error events 
which were symptomatic of smouldering crises.  The ‘Duty Self’ was founded on 
participants’ profound orientation for patients.  The ‘Professional Self’ was 
created out of the affinity a professional had for their profession.  The 
‘Collegiate Self’ was an expression of what participants garnered from their 
relationships with peers.  The orientation for effective care appeared to be a 
pervasive feature.  Consistent with Harris et al (2008), the author found that 
when professionals were able to realise each ‘Face’ their intrinsic motivation 
was enhanced and their job satisfaction increased.  However, in constructing 
each ‘Face’ and consistent with aspects of existing smouldering crisis and 
patient safety literature, the author found that common issues in the conditions 
in which professionals worked presented ‘noise’ which inhibited an individual’s 
capacity to realise a ‘Face’ and caused detrimental impacts to professionals and 
patients alike.  The author hypothesised that these issues appeared central to 
compromises in patient care which were symptomatic of human error induced 
smouldering crises and, thus, significant to this thesis and, therefore, worthy of 
further exploration.  This is the subject of the next chapter. 




Chapter 8  The Interrelationships between the ‘Faces of Self’ and the 
                   Contribution Value of the Thesis 
 
This chapter will elucidate the theoretical development from this study through 
the synthesis of the discussion from the previous chapters and explain the 
contributory value of this thesis.   
 
As outlined in previous chapters, notably Chapters 1, 2 and 3, the review of 
existing literature concerning crisis management, the management of 
smouldering crises, error in medicine and patient safety lead the author to 
identify limitations in existing knowledge regarding smouldering crises and 
patient safety.  It was within the boundaries of these identified limitations that 
the author placed her work, specifically the design of the research methodology 
and the contribution to knowledge.  Thus, the author will argue that the 
contributory value of this thesis has a dual perspective; the contribution to 
knowledge concerning patient safety and the contribution to knowledge 
concerning the management of smouldering crises.   
 
The author advocated in the previous chapter that the motivation and behaviour 
of grassroots individuals was inspired by and gravitated towards a self doctrine 
based on an individual’s relationships with patients, the profession and peers, 
identified and developed by the author into a model labelled the ‘Faces of Self’.  
In exploring the dynamics of each ‘Face’, however, the author explained that in 
healthcare, where the raison d’être is ‘first do no harm’, the conditions in which 
professionals worked were precipitating errors and error potential in patient care 
which compromised patient safety and were suggestive of smouldering crises.       
 
This chapter advances the discussions outlined in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
regarding healthcare professionals in the workplace.  It will begin by exploring 
the relationships between the ‘Faces’ and how the interrelationships between all 
three ‘Faces’ played a crucial role in developing a healthcare professional who 
was more effective in the patient care setting and thus satisfied and intrinsically 
motivated.  However, it will be argued that the conditions in which professionals 
worked had the capacity to create weaknesses in the interrelationships which 
inhibited a professional’s ability to fulfil patient care obligations and held the 




potential for human error which compromised patient safety.  Thus, in the first 
part of this chapter, the author will propose that knowledge regarding patient 
safety will be developed if consideration is given to aspects of the working 
environment which damage a professional’s opportunity to fulfil duty obligations 
and realise professionalism and collegiatism since the potential for adverse 
patient safety incidents are a consequence of such damage.   
 
Given the significant influence of working conditions on the behaviour of 
individuals and the precipitation of error, the chapter will then explore the 
concept of organisational climate which is a pervasive perspective that 
individuals within an organisation hold regarding their working environment. 
 
The chapter will conclude considering the contribution value of this thesis in 
terms of smouldering crises.  The management literature on smouldering crises 
recognised the dominant impact of systemic human error, specifically in terms 
of management’s limited perspective, knowledge and capabilities, on the 
precipitation of crisis conditions but the author of this thesis proposed that this 
was a partial view.  The author will reveal how the literature on organisational 
climate can better explain the impact that working conditions have on the 
behaviour of grassroots individuals.  Accordingly, this chapter concludes by 
proposing that the debate on the management of smouldering crises should 
embrace the organisational climate paradigm since it is the author’s view that 
the limitations in management’s perspective, knowledge and capabilities which 
are responsible for these situations will be improved if attention is given to the 
prevailing internal conditions of the organisation.    
 
Finally, the reader will observe that the first part of the chapter is concerned with 
the author’s arguments regarding the contribution value of this thesis in terms of 
patient safety with the latter part of the chapter being concerned with the 
contribution value of this thesis in terms of smouldering crises.  However, it will 
also be clear that there is interplay between the factors influencing the author’s 
discussion in both of these aspects.  This is entirely intentional on the author’s 
part and is a consequence of the author’s holistic view of a healthcare 
professional which emanated in the discussions in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 and the 




pivotal role played by the workplace conditions and the organisational climate 
therein. 
 
8.1 Exploring the Relationships and Interrelationships between the ‘Faces of 
      Self’ and the Contribution Value for Patient Safety 
 
As the previous chapter has shown, each ‘Face of Self’ was distinctive, had 
been built up by the author from the narratives of grassroots and contributed to 
the understanding of the individual in their working life.  Thus the ‘Faces of Self’, 
as deduced from the data, explained a professional’s perspective of working life 
which was so crucial to this thesis in investigating why crises might smoulder in 
an organisation and why adverse patient safety incidents occurred.  However, in 
developing an understanding for each ‘Face’, the author observed common 
themes.  This observation was important because commonality between ‘Faces’ 
suggested that there was potential for further consolidation in order to present a 
more complete prospect of an individual’s behaviour in the workplace and a 
strengthened concept of ‘Self’.  This consolidation facilitated the author’s 
propositions in terms of the contributions to knowledge concerning patient 
safety, which is covered in this section, and smouldering crises, which is 
covered in Section 8.3.     
 
8.1.1 The Interrelated ‘Faces of Self’ 
 
The author considered that the relationships between the ‘Faces’ might be 
emergent in nature.  Conceptually the author reasoned that the relationships 
might occur because a professional would be drawn to healthcare for vocational 
reasons, develop professional expertise and then have the confidence to grow 
within a collegiate of peers.  As a consequence, the author contemplated 
whether the relationships might be sequential as is illustrated below in Figure 
8.1 






Figure 8.1 Sequential Relationships between the ‘Faces of Self’ 
 
However, the author felt that this did not fully exploit the significance in the 
‘Faces’ of the role of patient orientation and the ensuing impact on job 
satisfaction and intrinsic motivation which were so important to professionals in 
this study. 
 
This led the author to consider the implications that the common features 
across the ‘Faces’ had in terms of the relationships between the ‘Faces’.   
  
Some aspects of commonality across the ‘Faces’ had a positive impact on the 
behaviour of individuals and strengthened the bonds between the ‘Faces’, 
others had the converse effect and eroded the bonds between ‘Faces’ and 
induced conditions in which errors could occur. 
 
An orientation for patients and a desire to deliver safe and effective patient care 
underpinned each of the ‘Faces’.  The previous chapter revealed that the health 
professionals in this study demonstrated sincere and strong obligations towards 
caring for patients that were driven by a profound sense of duty and realised 
through personal professional expertise and working effectively with peers.  
Thus, the author construed that patient orientation had a positive effect on the 
motivation and behaviour of professionals and played a significant role in 
explaining the relationships between the ‘Faces’.  However, such was the 
pervading nature of patient orientation in a professional’s working life, that the 
author envisioned the prospect of the ‘Faces of Self’ as being venn-like with 
patient orientation being the connecting relationship between one ‘Face’ and 
















Figure 8.2 Patient Orientation and the ‘Faces of Self’ 
 
The previous chapter explained that when professionals were able to fulfil 
patient orientation aspirations, they derived job satisfaction and intrinsic 
motivation.  Thus, the author contemplated the role that job satisfaction and 
intrinsic motivation played in the interrelationships between the ‘Faces’.  The 
author postulated that job satisfaction and intrinsic motivation were the 
realisation of each ‘Face’ and thus strengthened not only the ‘Faces’ 
themselves but the common bond of patient orientation.  This is illustrated in 
Figure 8.3 below where job satisfaction and intrinsic motivation are the resulting 
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Figure 8.3 Fulfilment of Patient Orientation and the Central Core of the ‘Faces  
of Self’ 
 
Whilst achievement of an orientation for patients created intrinsically motivated 
and satisfied professionals and resilient ‘Self’, the author deduced from the 
evidence in the previous chapter that there were areas common to each ‘Face’ 
that weakened the ‘Faces of Self’ and thus the performance of the professional 
in the workplace.  More critically, in the context of the smouldering crises and 
patient safety, they were cited as the source of potential error incidents.   
 
Similar to the observations of Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith 
(2009), Leape (2000) and Vincent, Stanhope and Taylor-Adams (2000), the 
inhibiting factors centred on the conditions in which professionals worked.  The 
author identified that structural boundaries between professionals built barriers, 
created tensions and inhibited the delivery of effective patient care.  Policies 
regarding the design of work and resourcing forced professionals to deal with 
the consequences of competing priorities and built resentment between peers.  
However, others were more concerned with the resulting personal damage to a 
professional’s satisfaction and intrinsic motivation in the workplace.  
Professionals experienced unfulfilled ambitions, an erosion of self worth, a lack 
of mutual trust and feelings that they had been let down by their organisation.  
The consequence was that professionals felt embattled, were gravely 
concerned about patient care and resentful of the organisation which they 
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identified as being the instigator of the conditions.  These inhibiting factors are 




Figure 8.4 The ‘Faces of Self’ 
 
The author, thus, deduced that the working conditions experienced by 
professionals within an organisation played a significant role in their behaviour 
and had the capacity to create weaknesses in an individual’s performance 
which held the potential for the human error that was symptomatic of 
smouldering crises and adverse patient safety incidents.   
 
8.1.2  The Contribution Value for Patient Safety 
 
The normative theoretical corpus concerning patient safety proposed that 
‘latent’ conditions in an organisation’s systems and processes incubated 
adverse patient safety incidents.  It was evident to the author that within the 
‘Faces of Self’ model, behaviour was affected by the climate in which 
professionals worked and featured both the ‘hard’ management issues which 
were identified as influencing ‘latent conditions’ in the patient safety literature.  
However, aspects of the model also recognised the significant role played by 
the ‘soft’ behavioural issues which were often neglected in the literature.  
Furthermore, within the normative theoretical corpus, authors such as Reason 
(2004, 2008) and Vincent and Reason (1999) had also attempted to determine 
aspects of workplace behaviour in healthcare which exhibited a potential for the 
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creation of error.  The author asserts that the ‘Three Faces of Self’, which had 
emanated from the author’s approach to deriving meaning from the narratives of 
participants (Chapters 5, 6 and 7), was a more holistic and informative 
perspective of the healthcare professional than could be found in the existing 
literature since it explored both the ‘latent conditions’ which lead to errors and 
the ‘soft’ factors that could curb adverse patient safety incidents.    
 
Thus, the first contributory value of this thesis is that improvements in the 
organisation’s climate will address infringements on a professional’s duty, 
professionalism and colleagiateship caused by deficiencies in the conditions in 
which healthcare professionals work and thereby address factors which can 
lead to adverse patient safety incidents and smouldering crises in healthcare.  
Healthcare professionals are duty-bound and demonstrate a responsibility 
towards those in their care as such they are strongly oriented not only to patient 
care but also to patient safety.  Furthermore, these grassroots individuals 
perceive themselves to be, first and foremost, professionals and demonstrate a 
high degree of professional identification and integrity which, they feel, 
enhances their ability to deliver effective and safe care.  Their duty and 
professionalism together is augmented by working with like-minded peers in 
delivering patient care.  However, this orientation for the patient, professional 
identity and collegiatism is eroded by the factors within the working environment 
in which professionals work.  Typically they feature the boundaries that exist 
between professionals which serve to build barriers and organisationally-led 
initiatives such as targets which produce competing priorities.  Whilst at an 
individual level these conditions result in poor intrinsic motivation and job 
satisfaction, they are also reminiscent of the ‘latent conditions’ which are so 
corrosive for patient safety.   
 
This section has explored the contribution value of this thesis in terms of patient 
safety.  Given the significant influence of working conditions on the behaviour of 
individuals and the precipitation of error, the next section will explore the 
concept of organisational climate in more detail.  The chapter will then move 
onto consider the contribution value of this thesis in terms of smouldering 
crises. 




8.2  Working Conditions, the Organisational Climate and an Individual’s 
       Motivation and Behaviour 
 
This study is based on the liberation of the views of those at grassroots level 
concerning their working life.  The author deduced from the data that aspects of 
the internal organisational environment were inhibiting the performance of 
individuals.  James et al (2008) stated that the feelings and beliefs that 
individuals held about the internal environment of an organisation influenced 
their behaviour in the workplace and was attributed to the notion of 
organisational climate.  Thus, the author concluded that what was affecting the 
performance of individuals in this study and weakening the ‘Faces of Self’ 
paradigm was the organisational climate.   
 
Tagiuri and Litwinn (1968), as did Forehand and von Gilmer (1964), saw the 
organisational climate as an enduring quality which distinguished one 
organisation from another but was based on the perceptions of employees and 
influenced their behaviour at work, a view with which other authors concurred 
(Dawson et al 2008, Kaya et al 2010).  Kaya et al (2010) furthered the view 
stating that organisational climate was also an expression of the nature of an 
individual’s relationships with others in the organisation.  However, despite 
being based on the individual perspectives of those who worked in an 
organisation, the literature stated that the climate of an organisation was 
derived from the collective values of individuals (Dawson et al 2008, James et al 
2008, Kaya et al 2010, McKay et al 2009 and Van de Voorde 2010).  Within the 
literature, organisational climate was often associated with discussions on 
organisational culture.  Explaining the distinction between the two concepts, 
James et al (2008) stated that climate was individually oriented and owned 
whereas culture reflected a “system-level” orientation and was owned by the 
organisation (p21).  Momeni (2010) illustrated the distinction by suggesting that 
unlike organisational culture which exerted an invisible influence on the 
behaviour of the individual, the features of organisational climate were more 
visible.  Whilst the review of literature in Chapters 2 and 3 highlighted the 
perceived importance of culture in either promulgating or inhibiting smouldering 
crisis conditions (Singer et al 2007, Smith 1990, 1999, 2002c, 2006b, Smith and 




Toft 2005, Weick 1999), it was the author’s view that what participants were 
identifying as inhibiting factors was the organisational climate and that this was 
was more influential in the behaviour of individuals in the workplace. 
 
Aspects of the literature on organisational climate explored the dimensions of 
organisational life which contributed to an organisation’s climate with the work 
of Jones and James (1979), James and James (1989), Kopelman et al (1990) 
being most widely recognised (for example in the work of Bellou and 
Andronikidis 2009, Griffith 2006, James et al 2008, McKay et al 2009 and Van 
de Voorde 2010).  James and James (1989), as did Jones and James (1979), 
identified that the features of the organisational climate were based on 
workplace stress and disharmony, job challenge and autonomy, the facilitation 
and support for work and group cooperation and friendliness.  The work of 
James et al (2008) extended these categories to include work attitudes in terms 
of job satisfaction, job involvement and commitment, psychological well-being 
and motivation.  The dimensions were consolidated and expressed as work 
facilitation, goal emphasis, opportunities for growth and advancement and 
professional esprit de corps (Bellou and Andronikidis 2009).  There was, to a 
large degree, synthesis between dimensions identified by James and James 
(1989) and Jones and James (1979) in the work of Kopelman et al (1990) who 
categorised the dimensions as goal emphasis, means emphasis, reward 
orientation, task support and socio-emotional support.   
 
In order to facilitate a deeper understanding of the influence organisational 
climate had on the individuals within this study, the ‘Faces of Self’ and thus, the 
contributory value of this thesis in terms of smouldering crises and patient 
safety, the author explored aspects of these areas within the context of the data 
presented in this and the previous chapters. 
 
8.2.1 Goal Emphasis 
 
McKay (2009) expressed goal emphasis as “the goals that employees are 
expected to achieve” (p 769) and that an individual had a more positive 
disposition towards the organisation’s climate if there was cohesion between 




the aims of the organisation and the individual.  In this connection, and 
consistent with the views of Dawson et al (2008), McKay (2009) proposed that 
positive climate conditions developed work behaviours that were relevant to the 
achievement of goals.  Helpfully for the author of this thesis, Dawson et al 
(2008) and Gracia et al (2010) explored this in the service context.  Gracia et al 
(2010) stated that “orientation should be more than an organisational premise; 
for it to be genuinely effective, employees have to perceive and share it.” 
(p278).  Dawson et al (2008) argued that individuals, who were more disposed 
to a service orientation, exhibited improved service behaviours if the climate 
was perceived to be positive. 
 
The organisations that deliver healthcare in the UK aim to provide a safe, 
patient centred service (Department of Health 2000a).  As the previous chapters 
explained, individuals in this study demonstrated a profound and genuine need 
and desire to take care of patients and exhibited this as a patient orientation.  
The author had determined that patient orientation underpinned each ‘Face of 
Self’; in the ‘Duty Self’ it was found in the vocational choices made by 
individuals and exhibited in their sense of responsibility once in post, in the 
‘Professional Self’ individuals aspired to develop their skills in order to better 
serve patients and in the ‘Collegiate Self’ individuals co-operated to overcome 
adversity so that effective patient care could be delivered across organisational 
boundaries.  Despite there being an apparent coherence between the goal 
aspirations of the organisation and individuals within it, the author did not 
identify this perception in the narratives of individuals.  The pressures of 
resourcing changes impeded patient care, patient centred targets forced 
individuals to compromise the quality of care in favour of quantity of care and 
boundaries created barriers that could not be overcome even in the interest of 
the patient.  Consistent with the observations of Sheridan (2003) and Smith R 
(1999) individuals saw these organisationally-instigated climate conditions as 
being contrary to a patient orientated goal and disturbingly identified the impact 








8.2.2 Task Support and Means Emphasis 
 
According to McKay (2009), and Martin (2010) and Van de Voorde (2010), in 
creating a climate where individuals perceived task support, employees within 
the organisation needed to feel that they were being supplied with all of the 
necessary requirements to be able to perform their duties.  McKay (2009) 
furthered that task support was concerned with the quality of working life and 
job design.  However, this was not the only gauge of organisational climate 
concerning the role that an individual performed.  McKay (2009) stated that 
individuals also needed to feel that they knew what was expected of them in 
performing their duties through means emphasis.  This was achieved by clear 
procedures and equitable and effective human resource policies and practices, 
such as training, rewards and career progression, a view with which Kaya et al 
(2010), Martin (2010) and Van de Voorde (2010) concurred.  This, advocated 
Bellou and Andronikidis (2009), facilitated individuals perceiving that they were 
able to effectively perform their work. 
 
Individuals in this study were complimentary about the value of the training they 
received and saw this and career progression contributing to the ‘Professional 
Self’.  However, perceptions of the organisational climate in this connection 
were damaged by perspectives on the quality and level of task support and 
inequities in means emphasis.  As the author identified in this chapter and the 
previous, and consistent with viewpoints in the patient safety literature (Leape 
2000, Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith 2009, Sheridan 2003, Smith 
and Toft 2005 and Vincent et al 2000), boundaries that existed between aspects 
of the organisation conspired to create difficulties for individuals attempting to 
perform their duties.  This was exacerbated by what individuals perceived as a 
lack of commitment to supplying the adequate resources and training which 
individuals felt was required, a perspective also to be found in the patient safety 
literature (Smith 2002a and Smith and Toft 2005).  Furthermore, changes to job 
design and the introduction of new working practices led individuals to assert 
that there were inequities in the organisation’s treatment of one individual 
compared to another.  Not only did individuals feel that they were inadequately 
prepared for the role they had to perform, but that the lack of training and 




associated expertise as well as inadequate resources, resulted in the potential 
for human error. 
 
8.2.3 Socio-emotional Support 
 
McKay et al (2009) and Van de Voorde (2010) stated that individuals within an 
organisation needed to perceive that the organisation was considerate and 
protective of their personal well being through socio-emotional support.  Kaya et 
al (2010) suggested that this arose out of mutual trust and support among 
different levels of the organisation, a view which was endorsed by Martin (2010) 
and Bellou and Adronikidis (2009) who proposed that this involved developing a 
communal spirit.  Thus, the advocates of socio-emotional support within the 
context of organisational climate stated that individuals who perceived a positive 
organisational climate would feel that they could trust the people they worked 
for and gain affirmation and respect from peers (Momeni 2010).  
 
In the previous chapters, the author identified from the narratives of individuals 
feelings of being undervalued to the extent that self-worth was questioned.  The 
organisation was not perceived to be supportive in enabling the fulfilment of 
grassroots needs to effectively care for patients.  Furthermore, individuals felt 
that the consequential personal stress that they experienced was ignored by 
those above in the organisation.  Moreover, the tensions in attempting to deliver 
effective patient care across boundaries with overstretched and inadequately 
trained resources created an apparent lack of professional and personal respect 
between individuals. 
 
In conclusion, there was recognition in the literature that organisations which 
had supportive climates were able to positively affect the intrinsic motivation of 
employees (Kaya et al 2010) because the organisation’s climate influenced an 
individual’s cognitive state, and thus their motivation at work, and affective 
state, and thus their job satisfaction (Chuang and Liao 2010, McKay 2009). 
Furthermore, this resulted in individuals who were more loyal and communal 
(McKay 2009).  Moreover, according to the literature (Dawson et al 2008, 
Griffith 2006, James et al 2008, Kaya 2010, Kopelman 1990, McKay 2009), 




organisational climates that were viewed positively and as more supportive, 
enhanced the attitudes and performance of individuals within them and effected 
a more favourable organisational outcome.  
 
The author deduced from this study that the organisational climate was not fully 
supportive of individuals in their workplace.  The result was that cognitive and 
affective states of individuals were diminished.  In terms of the ‘Faces of Self’ 
which has been posited by the author as an expression of the individual in the 
workplace, the consequences were that the job satisfaction and intrinsic 
motivation which arose out of a patient orientation and strengthened the ‘Faces 
of Self’ was weakened.  Within the context of the organisational climate 
literature and patient care, this resulted in a less favourable organisational 
performance. 
 
8.3  Organisational Climate and The Contribution Value for Smouldering Crises 
 
Whilst the formulation of the ‘Faces of Self’ in Chapters 5,6 and 7 led directly to 
the author articulating the contribution value for patient safety knowledge, the 
development of the model also had a resonance in terms of the contribution 
value for smouldering crisis knowledge.  Referring back to elements of the 
previous chapters and this chapter so far, this section will further explore the 
notion that workplace conditions influence grassroots behaviour and assert that 
a better understanding of these conditions as the organisational climate will 
improve the limitations that have been identified in management’s perspective, 
knowledge and capabilities which were identified as being instrumental in 
smouldering crisis situations (Smith 2005a, 2006b and Smith and Toft 2005). 
 
This study has shown that individuals at grassroots level had a desire and 
intention to fulfil their duties in the workplace in an effective and error-free 
manner.  Seemingly there would be no reason to perceive that grassroots 
individuals would commit patient care errors.  However, whilst patient 
orientation underpinned a healthcare professional’s duty, professionalism and 
collegiatism, there were factors which conspired to erode the realisation of each 
of these aspects and hindered an individual’s patient care and safety 




obligations.   Exploration of the reasons why participants felt that they were 
unable to provide effective patient care centred on difficult working conditions.  
The discourse of the organisational climate paradigm, which was founded on 
the concept of an enduring and shared perspective based on how individuals in 
an organisation perceived the internal environment influenced their behaviour in 
the workplace, illuminated that the goal, mean and socio-emotional emphasis 
and task support dimensions of climate were inhibiting effective individual 
performance.  Despite a public resolve to provide a safe, patient centred 
service, grassroots individuals did not perceive that an orientation for the patient 
was a shared goal.  Furthermore, there was a belief that work facilitation was 
hindered by the quality and level of task support and by inequalities in means 
emphasis.  Moreover, in the light of the above, individuals felt undervalued and 
stressed by the climate in which they worked, yet the organisation, and at times 
their peers, showed no consideration of these emotions. 
 
The normative theoretical corpus concerning smouldering crises proposed that 
the roots of these crisis situations were to be found in the limited perspective, 
knowledge and capabilities of management (Smith 2005a, 2006c, Smith and 
Toft 2005).  However, the author asserts that systemic human error, that is 
human error which occurs in the organisation’s systems and processes, is 
reminiscent of the task support and means emphasis dimensions of 
organisational climate since it is concerned with how the organisation facilitates 
employees performing their duties.  The contributory value of this study 
regarding systemic human error as a source of smouldering crises is that, by 
also considering the perspective of the task support and means emphasis 
dimensions of organisational climate, the debate is more holistic and inclusive 
since the knowledge gained from the shared perspectives of grassroots 
individuals will also be incorporated.  However, the author also found that 
smouldering crises occurred because the goal emphasis dimension of the 
organisational climate was not realised.  For a positive climate to be effected, it 
is a requirement that there is mutuality in the goals which direct organisational 
and individual behaviours.  This was not the case currently in healthcare and 
the perceptions of individuals within the organisation were that whilst their 
behaviours were oriented towards those in their care, the same could not be 




said of the organisation.  The perceived effect was that care was compromised 
and, as a consequence, cognitive motivation and affective behaviour were 
impeded.  Whilst the normative theoretical corpus recognised, even anticipated, 
that errors would occur within an organisation’s systems and processes, there is 
little consideration of the benefits of common goal emphasis in stemming 
human error.  Thus the author also asserts that if there is synthesis between the 
goals of the organisation and the individual and these are rooted in an 
orientation towards those who the organisation serves, grassroots individuals 
will be more effective and intrinsically motivated and the incidence and potential 
for smouldering error will be curbed. 
 
8.4  Summary 
 
This chapter has explicated the theoretical foundation of this thesis by 
synthesising the discussion from the previous chapters and stating the dual 
contributory value of the author’s work.  In terms of patient safety, the author 
asserts that improvements in the organisation’s climate will address 
infringements on a professional’s duty, professionalism and colleagiateship and 
address factors which lead to adverse patient safety incidents and smouldering 
crises in healthcare.  The author also asserts that in order to develop the 
theoretical understanding of smouldering crises within organisations, it is 
necessary for the normative theoretical corpus on organisational crises to 
embrace the knowledge that is found within the discourse on organisational 
climate, specifically in terms of goal and means emphasis and task and socio-
emotional support.  These contributions will be formalised in the next chapter 
where the author will also chart the progression of this thesis, consider the 
management implications and limitations of this study, identify areas for further 





Chapter 9  The Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This chapter will synthesise the discussions from the previous chapters, propose 
the contribution to knowledge and reflect on the limitations of the study.  In 
addition, the author will consider the practical implications for managers, reflect on 
the achievement of the thesis’ objectives, identify areas for further research and 
conclude with some personal reflections. 
 
9.1 The Progression of the Thesis 
 
The aim of this thesis was to contribute to knowledge by developing the 
understanding of the management of smouldering crises and patient safety in 
healthcare. 
 
In Chapter 1 the author explained her personal motivations for locating the 
research study associated with this thesis in the healthcare sector.  The author had 
become intrigued by the notion that in organisations where the raison d’être was 
‘first do no harm’, humans, through no apparent evil intention, were committing 
errors that were causing injury to those in their care.  In addition, Chapter 1 also 
stated the aims and objectives of the thesis, documented defining moments in the 
journey, set out the business context of this work and concluded by presenting an 
overview of the research methodology and the structure of the thesis. 
 
In Chapter 2 the author analysed the literature on crisis management in 
organisations.  As a discipline, crisis management had evolved in an era of large-
scale, socio-technological disasters such as Chernobyl, Three-Mile Island and 
Exxon Valdez.  The author found that the dominant approach in the normative 
theoretical corpus was to consider crises from an organisational perspective, 
viewing them as management failures within an organisation’s systems.  The 
author felt that this was a limited perspective and cited a number of reasons for 





In the first instance, the management literature on organisational crises had tended 
to focus on examining the reasons for large-scale, high profile sudden crisis 
events, seeing organisational crises as systemically originated transformational 
events which resulted in major damage to an organisation’s resources, reputation 
and stakeholders.  However, in adopting this approach, there was less attention 
given in the literature to an escalating incidence of relative minor crises that 
‘smouldered’ within organisations which was first recognised by Turner (1976, 
1978) and later adopted by a number of authors (Lagadec 1988, Smith 1990, 1999, 
2005a, 2006b Parsons 1996, Heath 1998, Hwag and Lichtenthal 2000, James and 
Wootten, 2005, Kouzmin 2008).  The empirical evidence that crises could smoulder 
within an organisation was highly significant for the author.  The author felt that 
these incidents were reminiscent of the types of adverse events that were identified 
in Chapter 1 as an area of interest.  Furthermore, the characteristics of crises were 
highly applicable to the healthcare context of this thesis in that they were indicative 
of systemic failure and wide ranging human, financial and reputational damage.  
Finally, the literature (James and Wootten 2005, Mitroff 2004 and Smith 2005a, 
2006b) suggested that there existed a potential to contain what was seen as the 
dominant cause of organisational crises, namely human error and this had a 
particular resonance for the author, since it implied that there was a legitimacy in 
exploring the management of smouldering crises further.     
 
In the second instance, systemic human error was widely recognised as a 
dominant cause of organisational crises.  However, Smith (2005b, 2006b), as did 
Smith and Toft (2005), clearly distinguished between the origins of error and where 
responsibility was domiciled, for whilst the origins were often to be found in the 
interactions between grassroots individuals and the ‘latent conditions’ of the 
organisation’s systems, the ultimate responsibility for failure lay with management.  
Smith (2005a) elaborated proposing that these failures of management, which 
were to be found in poor operational decision making and responses, began as the 
crisis emerged and allowed the crisis to escalate, passing through decisive ‘points 





Smith and Toft 2005, Elliott and Smith 2007) exposed the behavioural limitations in 
management perspective, knowledge and capabilities as being the factors behind 
these management failures.  Thus, the author concluded that the notion of 
systemic human error embraced both the behaviour of those closest to the crisis 
incubation point and those who were directly responsible for the systems within 
which they worked.  The author sought further explanation in the literature 
specifically concerned with human error (Leape 1994 and Reason 1987, 1990, 
1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2008) and found some insight into the nature of human error 
and strong agreement regarding underlying systemic problems and human 
reliability issues.  However, whilst grassroots error dominated the systemic 
problems underpinning smouldering crises, consistent with the management 
literature on crises, the causal route was identified as management failures which 
were further illuminated by the identification of a clear distinction between the 
causal factors in error situations that could be influenced by management (the 
‘latent conditions’) through an organisation’s systems and processes, compared to 
those it could not (‘the active failures’).  Particularly in view of the management 
behavioural limitations in terms of perspective, knowledge and capabilities 
proposed by Elliott and Smith (2007), Smith (2005a, 2006b) and Smith and Toft 
(2005), the author felt that without the benefit of a greater knowledge of the 
contributory role played by the working environment at grassroots level, 
understanding regarding ‘latent conditions’ was partial.  Furthermore, the author 
had identified through a review of patient safety literature the seriousness with 
which the healthcare sector viewed human error in medicine and the associated 
intent of healthcare organisations to understand and learn from error incidents.  
This further persuaded the author of the timeliness and legitimacy of addressing 
the limitations of management perspective, knowledge and capabilities by 
exploring the behaviour of those at grassroots level in healthcare as a means of 
developing an understanding of smouldering crises which incubated over time. 
 
In the third instance, whilst theory was empirically based, this was founded on the 





was evidenced in the work of several authors (for example Fink 2002, Mitroff et al 
1988, Mostafa et al 2004, Pauchant and Mitroff 1992, Pearson and Rondinelli 
1998, Ray 1999, Register and Larkin 2002).  The author felt that although this was 
not an inappropriate approach, it was partial and incomplete since it was neglectful 
of the narratives of those at grassroots level who were potentially closer to the 
crisis incubation point.  Furthermore, whilst elements of the normative paradigm 
(for example Smith 2005a, 2006b, 2006c and Smith and Toft 2005) raised, for the 
author, significant and informative ‘soft’ behavioural factors in the smouldering of a 
crisis, given the orientation of the research the author concluded that knowledge 
regarding organisational crises at this present time negated to exploit the learning 
that could be garnered from the behavioural contribution of those who were closer 
to the crisis incubation point.  Finally, many authors (Bland 1995, Burnett 2002, 
Fink 2002, Greening and Johnson 1996, Heath 1998, Hitchcock 1998, Loosemore, 
1998, Mitroff 2004, Mitroff and Anagnos 2001, Mitroff and Kilman 1984, Mitroff et al 
1996, Parsons 1996, Pauchant and Mitroff 1992, Preble 1997, Ray 1999, Register 
and Larkin 2002, Roux Dufort 2000) in a movement to prepare organisations and 
the managers within them for crisis situations, overtly addressed their work to 
executives and managers within organisations.  The author felt that although there 
was a necessity for organisations and those within them to prepare and manage 
crisis situations, this would be better served by academics if the management 
literature took a more holistic approach to understanding what happened in 
smouldering crisis situations, particularly in terms of the effect of identified 
limitations in management perspective, knowledge and capabilities, by acceding to 
seek the knowledge of those at grassroots level. 
 
The author concluded that the identification of this limited perspective in crisis 
management literature led her to place her work in investigating and exploring the 
behaviour in the workplace of those at grassroots level where there was the 
potential to cause a smouldering crisis through human error.  This would result in 
the contribution of additional knowledge, from a novel perspective, concerning the 





holistic and inclusive approach to the understanding of crisis management in 
smouldering crisis situations.   
 
The discussion in Chapter 3 was based on the author’s critical review of the 
literature concerned with patient safety.  There appeared to be a strong correlation 
between the development of knowledge concerning patient safety in healthcare 
and the management literature concerning smouldering crises in that rather than 
apportioning blame to individuals, systemic management failures were perceived to 
underpin the ‘latent conditions’ within healthcare organisations which created the 
incidence of smouldering crises. There were also distinctive observations in the 
literature concerning a number of issues which appeared to precipitate error in 
healthcare (Donaldson 1999, Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith 2009,  
Reason 2004, 2008,Smith 1995, 2001, 2005a, Smith and Toft 2005, Walshe 1999, 
West 2006).  Firstly, the recurring theme of organisational complexity was raised 
as was resourcing limitations, communications and control challenges and the 
nature of patients’ conditions.  Secondly, health professionals worked in an 
extremely difficult and challenging environment which, when combined with 
individual and operational challenges, not only created conditions in which errors 
occurred but also compromised the duty aspirations of professionals.  Thirdly, the 
situation was exacerbated and sustained by an inadequate approach to learning. 
 
In spite of these challenges, the NHS pioneered action to improve the safety of its 
patients.  Organisation with a Memory (Department of Health 2000a), a programme 
aimed at reducing patient safety incidents and led by the National Patient Safety 
Agency, developed pilot schemes to test patient safety initiatives, a range of 
technical instruments and significantly, the first reporting mechanism for patient 
safety incidents.  However, whilst the programme had experienced some success, 
a series of appraisals by public bodies, academics and researchers had been 
critical of the level and nature of progress (Boaden 2006, Fischbacher-Smith and 
Fischbacher-Smith 2009, House of Commons 2009).  The criticism centred on 





the National Reporting and Learning Service (NRLS) and the poor dissemination of 
patient safety information.  Secondly, the adequacy of the data produced by the 
NRLS was questioned, specifically the continued level of underreporting and the 
lack of qualitative data.  Thirdly, there had been an insufficient reduction in errors 
and the blame culture remained.  Fourthly, patient safety was still perceived to be a 
lower priority than resourcing and funding issues in healthcare.   
 
Following the review of error in medicine and patient safety in Chapter 3 the author 
concluded that there were three limitations in the patient safety in healthcare 
literature.  In the first instance, the behavioural issues concerning the contributory 
role of management perspectives, knowledge and capabilities developed in the 
management literature concerning crises was not widely recognised or regarded in 
this body of literature.  The author proposed that patient safety in healthcare could 
be better managed if those who managed the organisation’s systems and 
processes had more in depth information which was used effectively.  In the 
second instance, given the prominence that the working environment of a 
healthcare professional appeared to play in the precipitation of errors in patient 
safety, there was a case for exploring this further.  In the third instance, key 
limitations concerning the nature and quality of the information underpinning the 
movement to improve patient safety in healthcare had been identified, specifically 
the relatively low level of qualitative information.  The author had, through these 
conclusions, identified a further area in which her work would be placed. 
 
Chapter 2 reasoned that the identified limitations of management literature would 
be addressed by investigating and exploring the behaviour in the workplace of 
those at grassroots level where there was the potential to cause a smouldering 
crisis through systemic human error.  The author had proposed that since the 
thesis context was healthcare, the focus of the study would be the workplace 
behaviour of healthcare professionals.  Given the limitations that had been 
identified in the patient safety literature, creating a study which would explore, from 





workplace would provide a further area of contribution in delivering greater 
knowledge for those who manage the ‘latent conditions’ in the healthcare systems 
and processes which propagated patient safety incidents. 
 
In Chapter 4 the author explained that in order to examine the gaps in knowledge 
concerning the management of smouldering organisational crises and patient 
safety, the research methodology focused on investigating and exploring the 
behaviour in the workplace of those at grassroots level where there was the 
potential to cause a smouldering crisis through human error.   
 
The research strategy centred on taking a structural phenomological approach. 
The author felt that the critical theorist’s philosophy of combining ontological 
objectivism with epistemological subjectivism was consistent with her views.  
Furthermore, the author believed that the approach to research of the critical 
theorists, which explored contemporary pervading routines and their relative impact 
on the behaviours of the “disempowered” in organisational settings, was 
appropriate for the aim of the study.  The author had observed the pervading 
organisational perspective of the management literature concerning the 
management of crises and the associated emphasis on management processes 
and it was her intention to complement existing knowledge concerning the 
management of smouldering crises by investigating and understanding the 
contributory behaviour of grassroots individuals.  Thus, in line with perceived 
limitations in the behavioural perspective of both crisis management and patient 
safety knowledge, the research adopted a qualitative approach. 
 
Several qualitative strategies were reviewed.  The author rejected those of a 
collaborative nature such as action research and case study investigation since the 
author felt it would inhibit the research study and be practically difficult to 
implement.  Furthermore, whilst critical incident technique presented a more 
appropriate strategy, the author’s secondary research suggested that this would be 





as a case study strategy.  However, the author found evidence of ways in which 
critical incident technique could be adapted and so applied the principles of the 
strategy to working life scenarios and adopted this as the research strategy.  In 
determining the working life scenarios, the author chose to take a patient oriented 
approach since this was highly influential in defining the work of healthcare 
professionals and two scenarios were identified; one based on an acute patient 
care need and one based on a routine patient care need.  As the overall aim of the 
primary research was to explore the behaviour of healthcare professionals in order 
to contribute to the understanding of the management of smouldering crises, the 
research questions were sensitised to this area of contribution;  specifically they 
were concerned with what drives grassroots individuals in healthcare during their 
daily working lives, how this affected their behaviour in the workplace and how the 
behaviour of grassroots individuals affected their peers and patient care. 
 
The author discounted observation as a method for data collection on the grounds 
that it would not provide the data required and whilst focus groups were 
considered, the author was advised that organising such an approach would be 
extremely difficult in a healthcare setting due to the logistics of assembling a group 
of healthcare professionals.  Therefore, the author collected the data by conducting 
a series of 20 interviews, from a planned 22, some of which were conducted on a 
paired basis as according to Highet (2003) this led to more thoughtful, reflective 
data, using a semi-structured topic guide which was based on the working life 
scenarios.   
 
As the aim of the thesis was to develop the understanding of crisis management 
within the context of healthcare organisations by exploring the nature of the 
behaviour of individuals at grassroots level, a narrative approach was taken to the 
analysis.  The author found that, in recounting their working lives, participants’ 
motivation and behaviour was undoubtedly patient oriented and centred on the 
affinity they had for their profession and peers.  Whilst exploring the narratives 





themes, participants were observing and commenting upon the facets of their 
working lives through which the organisation structured and controlled what 
participants did.  However, other themes were more concerned with participants’ 
views about their motivation for seeking and sustaining a career in healthcare, their 
feelings of belonging to a profession and the affiliations they had with their peers.  
The author felt that these themes offered a greater insight into what actually 
prevailed in terms of participants’ behaviours and, thus, these themes formed the 
basis of the presentation of data in Chapters 5 and 6.   
 
In Chapter 5 participants’ views were focused on the mechanisms that healthcare 
organisations and the managers within them utilised to structure and control the 
behaviour of employees.   Furthermore, in recounting narratives about the stress 
and pressure caused when their working lives interacted with management 
systems, participants highlighted incidences of potential and actual human error.  
However, the author identified that this was only a partial representation of the 
working lives of participants since the narratives were also concerned with their 
perspectives on themselves and their peers, how this influenced their feelings in 
the workplace and how they behaved.   
 
In Chapter 6 the author evaluated the individual’s perspective and found a 
profound feeling of patient orientation which, in the first instance, motivated 
healthcare professionals to care for patients and, in the second instance, drove 
their behaviour in the workplace and created a unifying force across peer groups.  
There was, though, also evidence that an individual’s behaviour and focus on 
patient care was detrimentally affected by poor relationships between peers and an 
underlying lack of respect and value.   
 
However, whilst the organisational and individual perspectives explained above 
provided a useful insight into the data, the author felt that the picture of individual 
behaviour remained fragmented.  This was not helpful in achieving the aim of the 





contributory role in smouldering crises and patient safety.  The author felt that the 
‘world as I see it’ viewpoint was more conducive to understanding the identity, and 
ensuing behaviour, of an individual in the workplace.  Thus, in Chapter 7, the 
author built on the findings of Chapters 5 and 6 by exploring the viewpoint of ‘the 
world as I see it’ through the voices and contribution of participants in order to 
develop the identity of the healthcare professional.  The author developed an 
individual’s identity, expressed as ‘Self’, based on three separate yet distinctive 
features of their working life; their obligations to their patients, their affinity with 
their profession and their relationships with their peers.  The author asserted that 
these ‘Faces’ held the key to explaining how and why health professionals 
behaved in the way that they did and why sometimes errors which adversely 
affected patient care occurred.  The first ‘Face of Self’ was identified as the ‘Duty 
Self’ and was distinguished by expressions of a sincere and profound sense of 
patient orientation, an attribute which was also identified by Sheridan (2003) and 
Smith, R (1999).  The second ‘Face’ was identified as the ‘Professional Self’ and 
was distinguished by expressions of a strong professional affinity.  The third ‘Face’ 
was identified as the ‘Collegiate Self’ and was distinguished by expressions of an 
allegiance to peer professionals.   In exploring the dynamics of each ‘Face’, and 
consistent with the observations of Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith 
(2009), Leape (2000) and Vincent, Stanhope and Taylor-Adams (2000), the author 
found that conditions in the working environment were eroding the strength of each 
‘Face’.  Furthermore, in healthcare, where the raison d’être is ‘first do no harm’, 
these same conditions were precipitating errors and error potential.   
 
Consideration of the individual in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 had built a picture of the 
behaviour of individuals in healthcare and identified organisational and individual 
issues that held the potential for precipitating human error.  However, in exploring 
the interrelationships between each ‘Face of Self’ in Chapter 8, the author 
identified that a profound desire to care for patients bound each ‘Face’ to the 
others and, when this was successfully achieved by healthcare professionals, 





However, whilst a patient orientation together with the resultant job satisfaction and 
intrinsic motivation explained the interrelationship between the ‘Faces’, the 
conditions in which professionals worked created a weakness in the central core of 
the model.  The author concluded that what was affecting the performance of 
individuals and weakening the ‘Faces of Self’ was the organisational climate, an 
enduring quality which distinguished one organisation from another but was based 
on the perceptions of employees and influenced their behaviour at work (Tagiuri 
and Litwinn 1968 and Forehand and von Gilmer 1964).  Grassroots individuals did 
not perceive that an orientation for the patient was a shared goal and believed that 
work facilitation was hindered by the quality and level of task support and by 
inequalities in means emphasis.  This resulted in individuals feeling undervalued 
and neglected by peers and the organisation, experiencing workplace stress and 
incubating the propensity to commit errors. 
 
9.2 The Contribution to Knowledge 
 
The genesis of this thesis was in the recognition that organisational crises 
precipitated by human error were escalating and that the impact on organisations 
was significant, particularly in terms of the financial, human and reputational 
effects, and potentially fatal.  Events like these are alarming and disruptive 
occurrences and never was this more so than in healthcare where the 
consequences of adverse events are so personally catastrophic for the individuals 
involved and organisationally destructive.  There was, and still is, quite rightly, a 
compulsion, on the part of researchers and practioners, to understand why crisis 
events happened and to identify ways in which their progression can be halted.  In 
the normative discourse specific attention was beginning to focus on the conditions 
that precipitated crisis evolution in the organisation’s systems and processes 







The review of the management literature, focusing specifically on these emergent 
conditions, led the author to conclude that the behavioural limitations in 
management’s perspective, knowledge and capabilities that allowed crises to 
smoulder would be best addressed by extending knowledge concerning the 
contributory role of workplace behaviour amongst grassroots individuals where 
information was sparse.  Furthermore, creating a qualitative study, exploring the 
workplace behaviours of healthcare professionals, would enhance knowledge 
concerning the ‘latent conditions’ which propagated the patient safety incidents that  
were typical of smouldering crises and provide a deeper understanding of the 
healthcare professional at work.  In so doing, the author would be continuing the 
tradition of extending knowledge in order to identify ways in which the progress of 
smouldering crises could be limited. 
 
This section will now present the author’s specific contribution to knowledge in 
these areas; the management of smouldering crises and patient safety in 
healthcare. 
 
9.2.1 The Contribution to Knowledge Concerning the Management of Smouldering  
         Crises 
 
The limitations of the normative discourse regarding organisational crises were 
identified and have been addressed through the design and execution of the 
research study associated with this thesis.   
 
In the first instance, the focus of research had tended to be on large-scale, high 
profile cases.  This had occurred at the expense of developing understanding of 
the rising concern in the literature regarding the evolutionary pathway of a 
smouldering crisis (Smith 2005b, 2006c).  The research strategy associated with 
this thesis focused on the use of working life scenarios in order to explore daily 
working lives since this was where the potential for incidents and events, which 





In the second instance, the normative discourse took a systemic causal viewpoint 
and resolved to inhibit crisis potential through procedural improvements in the 
organisation’s systems (Smith and Toft 2005).  The dominant cause of 
organisational crises was widely recognised as systemic human error.  The 
emphasis had been on developing the understanding of why human errors 
occurred by taking an organisational perspective focusing on management failures 
(Vincent 2006, Pauchant and Douville 1992).  However there was evidence of the 
complicit role played in these situations of limited management behaviour in terms 
of perspective, knowledge and capability (Smith 2005a, 2006c, Smith and Toft 
2005, Elliott and Smith 2007).  In addition, empirically based theory had been 
almost exclusively founded upon the narratives of executives and managers whilst 
the related and meaningful knowledge of grassroots individuals, who innocently 
and unwittingly precipitated the majority of these events, was largely ignored in the 
normative discourse.  The consequence was that theory had been developed in a 
partial manner.  This thesis has liberated the opinions of grassroots individuals and 
created a deeper and more insightful understanding of why their behaviour caused 
crises to smoulder within organisations.  This perspective was novel and would 
improve the limitations observed in the literature concerning management’s 
perspective, knowledge and capabilities.  In so doing, knowledge regarding how 
organisations could better effect containment would be furthered.  
 
However, in addressing these limitations, the significant contributory value of this 
thesis lies in the way in which the author has shifted the discourse regarding the 
understanding of smouldering crises to a position where it embraces the 
organisational climate paradigm.  The normative discourse proposes that 
smouldering crises occur when limitations in management’s perspective, 
knowledge and capabilities allow error incidents within the organisation’s systems 
and processes to escalate through ‘points of inflection’.  This thesis proposes that 
aspects of these limitations can be addressed by management’s more effective 
consideration of the organisational climate, specifically shared values, means 





learning, delivered through the provision of this novel information, will influence 
aspects that are so critical in the incubation of smouldering crises, namely early 
warning knowledge, enlightened and more complete crisis contingency plans and 
systems and procedural developments and improved ‘latent conditions’.  The 
consequence is that these aspects can be positively influenced by management so 
that these destructive and alarming error occurrences are curbed.  The theoretical 
discussion regarding the movement of the debate to a position where it embraces 
the organisational climate paradigm is developed below, however, the specific 
management implications this new knowledge delivers in terms of early warning 
knowledge, enlightened crisis contingency plans and systems and procedural 
developments and the positive influence on ‘latent conditions’ is developed further 
in Section 9.3 The Management Implications of this Thesis. 
 
Not all errors are inevitable primarily because grassroots individuals do not seek to 
be ineffective or error-prone in the workplace.  Their aspirations are to seek a 
legitimacy in and acquiesce with the organisation’s ambitions, to see these 
ambitions imbued throughout the organisation, to be able to effectively perform 
their work and to perceive that they, as individuals, matter to the organisation.  
Hypothetically, organisations which realise a mutuality and operational 
underpinning in their goal ambitions, facilitate work performance and effect a 
considerate approach to grassroots level, will contain, although possible never 
eliminate, the instances of error.  This is not the case in reality.   
 
Despite an evident consensus in terms of goal philosophy, there is a disparity 
between intent and action on an organisation’s part which has a resounding and 
damaging impact on grassroots work performance and well being but more 
disturbingly creates the conditions for error potential which are reminiscent of 
smouldering crises.  Organisations and the managers within them must be more 
considered in developing, communicating and implementing the strategic and 
operational attributes of the business based on an inclusive philosophy so that the 





workplace.  Whilst this will result in better performing and more satisfied and 
motivated grassroots individuals, the most significant outcome is that the 
conditions propagating errors can be contained, as are the resultant damaging and 
disturbing impacts. 
 
Thus, the first proposition of this thesis is that the limitations of management 
perspective, knowledge and capabilities which are responsible for the 
escalation of smouldering crises can be ameliorated if management are 
sensitive to and effective in the management of the organisation’s climate.  
Specifically, through this enlightened perspective management within 
organisations can curb the human errors that underlie the incubation of 
smouldering crises if they effect an alignment of the organisational and 
individual goals and there is better consideration of how the organisation 
facilitates employee fulfilment of these goal aspirations.  In so doing, the 
interplay between the organisation’s systems and processes and individuals 
within the organisation is synchronised and focused on the same end.  The 
benefits this creates in terms of employee cognitive and affective behaviours 
diminish the conditions in which errors incubate and are a source of strength 
in terms of a more effective individual, management and organisational 
performance.  However, this can only be achieved if the management of an 
organisation engages with the dimensions of its climate.  In so doing, 
management achieves improved perspective, knowledge and capabilities 
and the organisation will realise less crisis prone conditions which smoulder 
and are, ultimately, so damaging and destructive. 
 
This aspect of the theoretical corpus of this thesis presents a complementary 
contribution to the normative debate on organisational crises as the resultant 
contributory discourse of organisational climate strengthens the normative 
paradigm making it less partial and more holistic.  It is, thus, advocated that 
researchers and practioners pursuing the normative paradigm, engender the 





that is contained in the narratives of grassroots level to provide better and more 
actionable information for management so that a more complete and deeper 
understanding of smouldering organisational crises than has been achieved to date 
is realised.   
 
9.2.2  The Contribution to Knowledge Concerning the Quality and Safety of Patient 
          Safety in Healthcare 
 
Consistent with the approach taken regarding the limitations of the normative 
discourse on organisational crises, limitations in the patient safety literature were 
also identified and have been addressed through the design and execution of the 
research study associated with this thesis.   
 
In the first instance, although there was commonality in that the principles of 
management literature on smouldering crises supported the development of patient 
safety in healthcare (for example Reason 1987, 1990, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2008), 
the behavioural issues concerning the contributory role of management 
perspectives, knowledge and capabilities (2004, 2005a and Smith and Toft 2005), 
had not been explicitly and widely acknowledged.  The research study associated 
with this thesis was designed explicitly to contribute to improved management 
knowledge and, in so doing, pre-empted research and knowledge requirements in 
the patient safety literature and practice regarding the emergent nature of 
smouldering crises.  
 
In the second instance, the conditions in which healthcare professionals worked 
played a critical role in the promulgation of patient safety incidents (Sheridan 
2003).  Exploring the conditions at work of healthcare professionals through the 
utilisation of working life scenarios facilitated further exploration of this significant 







Finally, key identified limitations in the UK’s patient safety programme centred on 
the nature and quality of the information underpinning its development with direct 
criticism being levelled at the lack of qualitative understanding (House of Commons 
2009, Boaden (2006) and Fischbacher-Smith and Fischbacher-Smith (2009).  A 
qualitative approach to the research provided an opportunity to explore behaviour 
in the workplace within the context of patient safety in order to develop a deeper 
understanding of the issues involved. 
 
In addressing these limitations, a second contributory value of this thesis was 
established.  The author identified strong and unified themes emanating from the 
data which were utilised to encapsulate the behaviour in the workplace of 
healthcare professionals in an identity of ‘Self’.  Whilst author’s such as Reason 
(2004, 2008) and Vincent and Reason (1999) had uncovered and articulated 
aspects of a professional’s workplace behaviour that held the capacity to 
propagate error, this seemed to the author to be a partial approach.  The author’s 
formulation of the ‘Three Faces of Self’, which arose out of the process by which 
the author endowed meaning to the narratives contained in the research, has 
shifted the debate regarding the contributory role played by healthcare 
professionals in the workplace.  In consolidating the perspective of the healthcare 
professional in the ‘Faces of Self’ the author has encapsulated the healthcare 
professional’s ‘world as I see it’ in a more holistic perspective which, whilst 
exploring the fractures in behaviour that led to errors as has been done before, 
also considers factors that preserved patient safety.  There was a further significant 
realisation concerning the factors that led to errors since whilst some were, as 
proposed in the normative discourse, systemically and process oriented and, as 
such, concerned with ‘hard’ management issues, there were others that were 
oriented towards the ‘soft’ management issues which the literature had recognised 
was neglected.  The theoretical discussion regarding moving the debate to a 
position where it embraces a deeper understanding of the behavioural issues is 
developed below, however, the specific management implications that this new 





professionals, policies regarding the design of work, resourcing and competing 
priorities and job satisfaction and intrinsic motivation in the workplace is developed 
further in Section 9.3 The Management Implications of this Thesis. 
 
The intentions of healthcare professionals are entirely proper.  Healthcare 
professionals have a profound responsibility and duty towards their patients which 
results in working lives that are underpinned by a strong patient orientation.  This 
position is enhanced by their professional identification and integrity.  Healthcare 
professionals are confident in their skills and expertise and are resolute in their 
desire to deliver safe and effective patient care.  The environment of belonging and 
willingness fostered by effective peer relationships creates a positive work 
atmosphere which further contributes to better patient care.  However, whilst 
patient orientation underpins a healthcare professional’s duty, professionalism and 
collegiateship, there are also factors which conspire to erode each of these 
aspects.  The boundaries that exist between professionals cause difficulties in the 
delivery of effective patient care and create tensions in the relationships between 
professionals.  Organisationally-led initiatives such as targets and resourcing 
changes lead to competing priorities in the workplace and result in professionals 
feeling undervalued.   For the individual, the result is poor intrinsic motivation and a 
compromise in the psychological contract between the professional and the 
healthcare organisation.  However, through initiating changes to the organisation’s 
climate, healthcare organisations can address the challenges which erode a 
professional’s duty, professionalism and colleagiateship.  In so doing, the 











Thus, the second proposition of this thesis is that action to address adverse 
patient safety incidents will only be as effective as the information and 
knowledge upon which it is based. The systemic and process elements of 
‘latent conditions’ are only a partial causative view of incidents and must be 
complemented by an understanding, on the part of those who both instigate 
and manage the implementation of patient safety policy, of the contributory 
role of behavioural elements of ‘latent conditions’.  Specifically, these 
behavioural elements must consider the orientation of individuals to those 
they serve and work with and the means by which the service is delivered 
since ruptures in each of these areas underlie adverse patient safety 
incidents.  Affective amelioration of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ ‘latent conditions’ 
by policy makers, leaders within organisations and management generally 
will create a more effective, motivated and satisfied healthcare professional 
in the patient care setting and negate the conditions in which the adverse 
patient safety incidents promulgate.  In so doing, the smouldering crisis 
conditions, of which adverse patient safety incidents are typical, will be 
curbed and the patient safety programme in the UK will move forward on a 
more holistic platform. 
 
This further aspect of the theoretical corpus of this thesis presents developmental 
contribution to the normative debate on patient safety in healthcare.  The resultant 
contributory discourse enhances the knowledge and action that has been 
undertaken to date by harnessing the behavioural learning gained from grassroots 
healthcare professionals to present a more holistic perspective of the ‘latent 
conditions’ that promulgate adverse patient safety incidents, which are 
symptomatic of smouldering crises. 
 
9.3 The Management Implications of the Thesis 
 
In embarking on this thesis, the author had a desire to develop the understanding 





wish to contribute to existing academic research and knowledge, the second was 
to practically support organisations and the managers within them who are tasked 
with dealing with smouldering crisis situations.  The previous section has set out 
the two propositions of this thesis for academics and researchers.  This section is 
concerned with the messages regarding the implications for senior and middle 
managers and policy makers within organisations and, although the research study 
associated with this thesis was implemented in the healthcare sector, some of the 
observations made by the author have a more generic application for managers.  
The author sees these implications operating on three levels; the first is concerned 
with messages for senior managers within organisations in terms of strategic level 
developments, the second is concerned with messages for middle managers within 
organisations in terms of operational development and the third is concerned with 
messages for policy makers regarding patient safety initiatives. 
 
In the first instance, the senior management implications are drawn, by the author, 
from the way in which the key findings in Chapters 6 and 7 can ameliorate 
management’s perspective, knowledge and capabilities.  The previous section has 
already elucidated that in embracing the organisational climate, management’s 
limited perspective, knowledge and capabilities which allow smouldering crisis 
conditions, would be improved, specifically in the areas of early warning 
knowledge, enlightened crisis contingency plans and systems and procedural 
developments and ‘latent conditions’.  The views of grassroots in the research 
study associated with this thesis detailed in Chapters 6 and 7 specified aspects of 
the ‘latent conditions’ in which they worked as precipitating smouldering crises.  
These aspects were centred on the nature and use of targets, boundaries across 
which the service was delivered, the design of resourcing, experiential training and 
the implications these had for professionals at work, aspects of which were entirely 
consistent with Reason’s early specification of ‘latent conditions (1997).  For those 
at grassroots, there was difficulty in reconciling the need to meet targets with 
delivering an effective service.  In addition, where effective delivery of the service 





critical points which impinged on the realisation of this.  Furthermore, the manner 
and nature of resourcing changes, for example job design, and inadequacies in 
experiential training were felt to exacerbate prioritisation and service delivery 
issues.  These novel views come from the frontline of an organisation, from those 
who are enacting the organisation’s systems and processes in order to safely 
satisfy ‘customer’ needs and who testify that, despite initiatives to improve safe 
service delivery, the current decisions of senior managers regarding targets, 
boundaries, resourcing and training impinge on progress.  The movement towards 
addressing smouldering crisis situations is a progressive one and senior managers 
now need to better move beyond service delivery measurement in order to better 
understand their qualitative context, since this will enhance management 
perspective, knowledge and capabilities by providing early information regarding 
situations in which crises are beginning to smoulder, better direct the organisation’s 
systems, processes and contingency planning and thus, orient the focus on safe 
and effective service delivery thereby improving further the ‘latent conditions’ in 
which smouldering crises prosper.   
 
In the second instance, at an operational level, there were numerous instances in 
the data where better receptivity and effective communication upwards by middle 
management of the views of grassroots concerning the orientation of systems and 
processes could have achieved much in exerting influence on aspects of the crisis 
smouldering ‘latent conditions’.  Centring targets on the quality and effectiveness of 
service delivery rather than the efficiency of service delivery would better ground 
targets in organisational and individual goals and would allow greater flexibility for 
service delivery across organisational boundaries.  This could be enhanced by 
encouraging the development of informal intra service knowledge and appreciation.  
Resources would be more effectively and efficiently utilised if training and 
development achievements were formally and operationally recognised.  
Management bears ultimate responsibility for control and order in an organisation 
(Smith 2005a, 2006b, Smith and Toft 2005), however, the findings of this study are 





autonomy, for since without it the evidence of this study supports that of the 
‘misbehaviour’ literature (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999) in finding that control 
processes can generate the  motivation for grassroots individuals to embark on 
violations in order to fulfil their duties. 
 
In the third instance, the implications for policy makers concerned with patient 
safety are three-fold.  Firstly, the data from this study is evidence of the value that 
can be derived from qualitative data of the first person order in terms of patient 
safety (House of Commons 2009, Reason 2008).  Despite various qualitative 
measures such as Root Cause Analysis and the Incident Decision Tree advocated 
by Seven steps to patient safety (National Patient Safety Agency 2004) the NRLS 
has focused on the learning that could be garnered from quantitative 
measurement.  Secondly, the processes for reporting patient safety incidents are 
viewed with scepticism and, as a consequence, are perceived to have little 
significance or use.  Thirdly, consistent with the findings of the House of Commons 
Health Committee’s report into Patient Safety (House of Commons 2009), patient 
safety is judged by those at grassroots level to be a lesser priority than resourcing 
and funding and yet there is an inescapable link between resourcing, funding and 
the capacity to realise the safe delivery of patient care.  Whilst, the National Patient 
Safety Agency (NPSA) is in the unenviable position of attempting to convince 
Government, policy makers, senior managers and leaders within healthcare 
organisations to focus on patient safety at a time of severe austerity and unrest, 
the present Government has vowed to focus on outcomes not processes and to 
improve patient experience and safety so the mandate to leverage action is evident 
(Department of Health 2010). 
 
9.4 The Fulfilment of the Thesis’ Objectives 
 
At the outset, in Chapter 1, the author identified six objectives for this thesis.  This 






The first objective was to explore what was understood about organisational crises 
and how far this explained the evolution of smouldering events which incubated 
over time in the behaviours at grassroots level.  The literature review at Chapter 2 
considered organisational crises in terms of their characteristics, typologies and 
then, in focusing on the defined area of this study, examined in detail the concept 
of the smouldering crisis.  With particular emphasis on smouldering crises, Chapter 
2 then proceeded to investigate the root causes of organisational crises.  The 
conclusion of the review of literature was that management behavioural limitations 
were embedded within smouldering crises situations and, furthermore, there was 
evidence that this was an under researched area.  This was thus where the author 
placed her work. 
 
The second objective was to investigate how this knowledge was translated into 
meaningful advice concerning how smouldering crises could be best managed.  
The literature review in Chapter 2 also examined the management of 
organisational crises and identified that, consistent with the notion of the emerging 
crisis, these situations passed through a series of phases.  Given the defined area 
of study being the smouldering crisis, the review adopted a focus on how the 
management behavioural limitations, identified as being significant to the 
propagation of these situations, impacted in the stages of a crisis.  The evidence 
was that management’s limited perspective was particularly influential in inhibiting 
early warnings, crisis contingency plans and systems and procedural 
developments and exacerbating ‘latent conditions’.  Furthermore, in reviewing the 
orientation of the literature concerning the management of organisational crises, a 
propensity to emanate empirical from the views of those in senior management 
positions was identified, at the expense of considering the views of those who were 
closer to the point at which a smouldering crisis incubated.  This further refined the 
area where the author placed her work. 
 
The third objective was to understand the contextual setting for this thesis as a 





brief situational analysis of the healthcare sector in the UK was given in Chapter 1 
whilst Chapter 3 critically reviewed the literature concerning error in medicine.  
Commonalities were found between the literature concerning error in medicine and 
the literature on organisational crises in terms of root causes, a focus on systemic 
human error, the apportionment of responsibility on management failures and the 
tendency to view systemic and procedural improvements as the remedial solution 
for curbing error in medicine.  However, whilst all the signs of smouldering crises 
were evident in healthcare, the arguments regarding the significant influence of 
‘soft’ management behavioural issues occupied less prominence.   
 
The fourth objective was to explore the knowledge regarding patient safety and 
investigate the extent to which this knowledge ameliorates adverse patient safety 
incidents in healthcare.  Chapter 3 discussed the manifestation of error in a clinical 
situation as being that of patient safety.  The literature evidenced that a critical 
review of patient safety initiatives had been undertaken and the conclusion was 
that, although progress had been made, there was a need for further research, 
particularly that of the exploratative qualitative nature.  Both this and the limited 
prominence of ‘soft’ knowledge in healthcare was a significant finding which further 
influenced the author’s placing of her work. 
 
The fifth objective was to design and implement a research study that would 
facilitate improvements in management knowledge through the investigation and 
exploration of how and why individuals at grassroots level in healthcare behave, at 
times, in such a way that their actions lead to the errors which are indicative of 
smouldering crises.  This objective came as a direct consequence of the limitations 
observed in both the literature review of organisational crises and patient safety; 
that there was increasing evidence that smouldering crisis situations arose due to 
limitations in the behavioural aspects of management’s perspective, knowledge 
and capabilities and that understanding was particularly limited in healthcare, that 
aspects of these behavioural issues were identified as areas for further research 





perspectives.  Accordingly, a qualitative research programme was designed to 
explore and investigate the behaviour of grassroots individuals in the workplace in 
order to better understand how smouldering crisis situations arose. 
 
The sixth and final objective was to contribute to the normative debate regarding 
smouldering crises and safety in healthcare.  This chapter has, at Section 9.2.1 
and 9.2.2 set out the central propositions of this thesis.  The core of the first 
proposition is centred on the proposal that the negative influence of management 
behaviour in smouldering crisis situations will be improved by embracing 
understanding the effect that the organisational climate has on grassroots 
individuals.  The core of the second proposition is centred on the proposal that 
understanding of both adverse patient safety incidents and action to resolve them 
will be more effective if there is an appreciation of the impact that unfulfilled duty 
and inhibited professional and collegiate efficacy has on the capacity to exacerbate 
the ‘latent conditions’ that are causally connected to smouldering crises in 
healthcare. 
 
9.5 Study Limitations 
 
Inevitably the author has reflected on this study and has some observations 
regarding its limitations; some of which are concerned with the theoretical 
development of the contribution, some of which are concerned with practical 
implementation issues. 
 
In the first instance, in terms of the proposed contribution to theory, the author is 
resolute that the knowledge developed in this thesis should complement existing 
management literature concerning the management of organisational crises.  The 
contribution of this thesis has been developed solely around the limitations that the 
author observed in existing literature and is not intended to supplant existing 






Furthermore, the author is realistic in viewing this work as partial progress in 
developing ‘soft’ knowledge concerning the contributory role of management 
perspectives, knowledge and capabilities in smouldering crisis situations.  Indeed 
this work could be viewed as an inaugural attempt to address the issues raised by 
others (Elliott and Smith 2007, Smith 2005a, 2006b and Smith and Toft 2005). 
 
Finally, the review of literature could have explored other areas, most notably 
identity and healthcare management, to facilitate broader contribution to 
knowledge.  However, whilst this could be viewed as a limitation, for two reasons, 
the author felt that this might diminish the strength of focus herein.  In the first 
instance, the author’s area of interest is organisational crises, specifically 
smouldering crises particularly those in healthcare, to broaden this work would, in 
the view of the author, have moved outside this area of interest.  In the second 
instance, the level of synthesis between knowledge concerning organisational and 
smouldering crises and error in medicine and patient safety was considerable.  
Whilst this has led to a wider contribution to knowledge in this work, there are 
equal synergistic benefits in so doing, both philosophically and practically.  
However, positioning this work in the body of knowledge concerning identity and 
healthcare management is identified in Section 9.6 as an area for further research.  
 
In the second instance, this study is an exploratory one and the findings are based 
on the views of participants within Sheffield Strategic Health Authority.  The author 
provided the reasoning for selecting this organisation as proxy in Chapter 4.  In 
addition, the author makes no claims that the sample is entirely representative of 
the population of Sheffield Strategic Health Authority since it was selected on a 
purposive sampling basis.  Furthermore, the final sample size of 20 interviews was 
relatively small.  The unit of analysis was the individual.  Accordingly, whilst the 
author exposed similarities and contradictions in aspects of the sample, the 
approach to the analysis was to build a picture of a healthcare professional, 
irrespective of their discipline.  The author recognises that, as a consequence of 





which Smith and Toft (2005) endorse in their suggestion that issues raised are not 
readily transferable from one context to another. 
 
Furthermore, whilst the research methodology was successful in eliciting and 
harnessing the views of grassroots level concerning workplace behaviours, there 
were challenges in establishing a valid and reliable study in the healthcare sector, 
principally in the area of access.  Whilst the author attempted to navigate the 
process of access with expediency, this was not always achievable and had a 
significant effect on the study timeframe.  Although the author adopted a contingent 
approach in ameliorating aspects of the research to overcome time issues, with 
improved prior knowledge of the process, some of these challenges could have 
been better anticipated and thus, better managed.  This is a learning point for the 
author and anyone else attempting research in the healthcare sector. 
 
Finally, in terms of the implementation issues, in adopting a working lives scenario 
strategy, the research did not aim to consider the role that personality 
characteristics had on behaviour.  However, the author acknowledges the 
significance that personality can have on an individual’s behaviour in their working 
life.   
 
Notwithstanding the above, the author is confident that these findings are valid in 
the context of this thesis and that a rigorous approach to the research study was 
taken.  As a consequence, the author feels that the findings are reliable and could 
be used as a basis for further research. 
 
9.6 Further Research 
 
Aspects of this study were grounded in the recognised need in literature for further 
research.  The author has, in developing the contribution to knowledge, partially 
addressed these needs.  However, and notwithstanding the research needs 





the author has recognised additional specific areas where further research would 
be appropriate. 
 
In the first instance and in terms of the generic approach to research in the area of 
organisational crises, the author is an advocate of adopting the inclusive approach 
found in this study in empirical research in the normative discourse.  This study has 
demonstrated the significant value of harnessing the views of grassroots level.  
This thesis is a testimony to the fact that there is much to be said for further 
research liberating the in-depth feelings of grassroots level to address the research 
issues identified above in order to develop a more holistic and deeper 
understanding of what is happening in the workplace and why. 
However, this should not be at the expense of disregarding the views of those who 
enact strategic and operational decisions, since an optimal understanding of 
organisational crises comes from the knowledge garnered from all levels of the 
organisation.     
 
In the second instance, it is argued that the nature of empirical investigation in the 
normative discourse in future research must embrace the dimensions of 
organisational climate that have been so notable in this study if knowledge 
concerning the containment of smouldering crises is to be realised.  Mutuality of 
goals, facilitation of performance and consideration of individual well being 
influence the motivation and behaviour of individuals in the workplace because 
they influence the working environment.  To negate to pursue these issues in 
future research, ignores aspects of an organisation which this study has identified 
as being significantly important in the incubation of smouldering crises. 
 
In the third instance, and as identified in Section 9.5 above, this work is positioned 
within the research on organisational crises and patient safety.   However, other 
areas particularly identity and healthcare management could have been 
considered.  In Section 9.5 above, the author reasoned why this has not been done 





knowledge in terms of identity and healthcare management through the concept of 
the ‘Three Faces of Self’ encapsulating professional identify seems to be a logical 
progression for this work. 
 
In the fourth instance, as the author outlined in the limitations in Section 9.5 above, 
these findings are conceptual rather than generalisable.  The author is confident 
that, in the context of the validity and reliability of this study, the research could be 
replicated using other Strategic Health Authorities.  In addition, this study has been 
contextually located in the healthcare sector.  Given the influence of organisational 
climate identified, the author feels that it would be worthwhile conducting research 
in other public sector organisations such as the fire service or more generally in the 
private sector. 
 
In the fifth instance and reflecting more specifically about aspects of the findings of 
this study, the research associated with this thesis has explored behaviour within 
the healthcare setting at an individual level.  Aspects of the analysis revealed 
stronger feelings from participants of some disciplines than others.  Therefore the 
author feels that further research should focus on probing aspects of the findings 
which were raised amongst one discipline, amongst others.  
 
Finally, in Chapters 1 and 3, the author identified an intent in the healthcare sector 
in the UK to better understand the incidence of human error.  Consistent with the 
observations made in section 9.3 above regarding the management implications of 
this study there is a case for aligning these research findings with research 
currently being conducted in the UK and, since this is not solely a UK 
phenomenon, globally.  However, and more specifically, this study raises 
significant operational issues in healthcare that inhibit the performance of 
professionals and are detrimental to patient care.  Firstly, professionals feel ill-
prepared to cope with changes in the social make up of the people that they serve.  
The sector and the managers within it need to investigate how it can address what 





that care has to be delivered across workplace boundaries, professionals feel that 
the divisions between peers are hindered by poor patient transition practices and 
the territorialism they engender.  Further research is necessary to explore how 
territorialism can be best overcome and establish how transitions can be effected 
in a more cohesive manner.  Thirdly, whilst professionals may be hostile to 
resourcing changes, what they are most critical of is the impact that these changes 
have on their capacity to deliver safe and effective care to patients.  There is a 
strong case, particularly in view of the present political and economic climate, for 
taking a fresh look at resourcing.  There are basic aspects of care which have to be 
absolutely right because they can become the source of dissatisfaction to 
professionals and patients alike.  There are also, however, aspects of care which 
can make a significant difference to the way professionals and their patients feel 
(Hertzberg 1968).   The distinctions between basic and other aspects of care will 
be different for particular groups of patients but exploring and investigating the 
dynamics of care will contribute to a better understanding of where resourcing can 
be efficient and where it must be effective.   
 
9.7 Personal and Professional Reflections 
 
Finally, this thesis has been an enormously challenging yet rewarding journey for 
me.  Prior to becoming an academic, I was a commercial researcher and I have 
battled my intuitive impulses, particularly when designing and implementing the 
research.  The doctoral journey has nurtured in me the rigour and discipline 
needed for academic research.  Each stage of the journey has presented great 
learning opportunities, delivered magical moments and in the words of Pearson 
and Misra (1997) ‘hyper-extended’ me.  I have, at times, had crises of my very 
own.  However, the tenacity and strong work ethic instilled in me by my parents 
and the not insignificant growth I have witnessed in myself as a professional 
academic and researcher has seen me through the difficult times and allowed me 
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Appendix 4.1 Topic Guide  
TOPIC GUIDE FOR PARTICIPANTS 
Introduction 
Introduce self and give thanks for attending 
 
Refer to information sheet 
- purpose of research and nature of output 
- confidentiality and anonymity 
- right to refuse to answer questions 
- respect fellow contributors confidentiality (as appropriate) 
- check for signed and returned informed consent 
- check timeframe 
- check whether people know each other/make introductions (as 
appropriate) 
- check OK to proceed 
 
As you know, I’m interested in trying to understand what happens in the NHS on 
day-to-day basis and why, particularly from the perspective of the individuals, 
like yourself, who work there. 
  
What I want to do now is to show you a scenario and get you to talk about it: 
 
I’m looking for you to specifically describe: 
 
- your role in the scenario 
- what you would do, when and why 
- what things can go right, how and why 
- what things can go wrong, how and why 
- at what points you would interact with others, who they are and what 
form the interaction takes 
 
So let’s take each of these in turn now and you just take me through the 
scenario as you see it. 
 
It might be helpful to you and me if you use anonymised examples from your 
recent working experiences. 
 
Probe each area as required 
 THE PARTICIPANTS WILL BE SHOWN PATIENT JOURNEY SCENARIOUS 




Thanks for that.  Before we finish, is there anything else anyone would like to 
either add to what they have said or check what they have said? OK.  Well, 

















Crisis Management in the NHS 
My name is Debbie Hill.  I am Senior Lecturer at Sheffield Hallam University.  
The above research is to be undertaken as part of my PhD and I am hoping that 
you will be prepared to participate in it. 
Before you decide if you want to participate it’s important to understand why the 
research is being done and what it will involve. So please read the attached 
information carefully and think about whether or not you would like to take part.  
If you would like to talk to me about the information contained in the pack before 
you make your decision, please do not hesitate to contact me on 0114 225 
5054.   
If you would prefer not to take part, then thank you for taking the time to read 
about and consider the study. 
If, having read the information, you would like to take part then please do 
complete the attached consent form and return it in the SAE provided (I will 
provide you with a copy of your signed consent form for your records).  It would 
be appreciated if you could post your reply back by <insert date>.  I will then 
contact you to arrange a mutually convenient time when I can come along to 











CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NHS 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully. Talk to 
others about the study if you wish.   Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you 
take part.    Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study.  
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if there is anything that is not clear or if 
you would like more information – my details are given at the end of Part 1.  
Please also take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
Part 1 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The study forms part of a PhD student research project.  The origin of my work 
lies in the notion that organisations can incubate crises by not properly 
understanding what affects the behaviour of staff whilst they are working.  Of 
particular concern to the study is what happens whilst a patient is undergoing 
treatment.  Sometimes the underlying individual and organisational behaviour 
has an impact on the patient’s experience.  The research aims to explore this. 
Why have I been chosen? 
The study involves exploring the pathway of a number of patient treatment 
scenarios.  You, and a small number of your colleagues, have been identified 
as having a role in some of these.   
Do I have to take part? 
No.  It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do, you will be 
given this information sheet to keep and will be asked to sign a consent form. 
You are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  A 
decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part, will not affect 
your role within the NHS. 
What will happen to me if I take part and what will I have to do? 
If you choose to take part in you will be asked to participate in either a paired in-
depth interview (this is a joint interview with another participant) or a personal 
interview.  The purpose of the interview will be to find out what you think about 
working in the NHS and more specifically your opinions on a treatment 
scenario.  The researcher will ask you a series of open-ended questions and 





with any other participants will also be recorded.  The researcher is interested in 
discovering your opinions whatever they may be.   
If you are asked to be involved in a paired in-depth interview and you feel you 
would like to participate in the research but would prefer not to do so in the 
presence of others, arrangements can be made for you to take part in a 
personal interview. 
After the interview, what you said will be transcribed. 
It is expected that the interviews will not last more than 1 and a half hours and 
will take place at a mutually convenient time before July 2008.  It is anticipated 
that, in most cases, it will be more convenient for participants to do the interview 
in a quiet place within their work environment. 
What are the other possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
The subject matter is potentially sensitive and could be quite emotive.  I hope 
the fact that I am a non-NHS research researcher will reassure you that I am 
only interested in your opinions in order to inform my research and for no other 
role-related reason.  The detailed information on how this will be handled is 
given in Part 2. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
This is an important, and so far largely neglected, area of study.  Any help you 
can give by participating in the research and offering your opinion, will be used 
to inform the experiences of patients in the NHS and crisis management as a 
subject discipline. 
What happens when the research study stops? 
The research is primarily expected to take place during 2008.  However, the 
researcher may contact you as a follow-up later on.  The data collected in the 
research will form the fieldwork element of a PhD thesis due for examination in 
2009. 
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on 
this is given in Part 2.   
However, in the event of a complaint you should contact through STH NHS 
Foundation Trust Research Department (0114 271 3887). 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
 
Yes.  All the information about your participation in this study will be kept 
confidential (subject to NHS terms and conditions of employment).  The details 











Faculty of Organisation and Management 
Sheffield Hallam University 
City Campus, Pond Street 
Sheffield.   S1 1WB 
Telephone: 0114 225 5054 or 07870819465 
 
This completes Part 1 of the Information Sheet. 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering 
participation, please continue to read the additional information in Part 2 before 




What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
 
You can withdraw from the study at any time but the information collected up to 




If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak 
with the researcher who will do her best to answer your questions (0114 225 
5054).  If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this 




Sheffield Hallam University’s standard public liability and professional indemnity 
cover will automatically apply.  
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
Recordings of interviews will be stored in a locked cabinet.  The researcher 
alone will analyse the information and it will be stored in password protected 
files.  You will be asked at the end of the interview if you wish to make changes 
to anything you have said.   
Your anonymity will be protected unless an expression is made otherwise.  You 
will be asked to maintain the confidentiality of the views of any other participants 
and you will be asked to consent to a discussion of the subject matter amongst 
your peers (in case of being asked to take part in a pair in-depth interview).   
However, anyone unwilling to take part will not be pressurised into doing so.  In 
addition, should the discussion become difficult for you, a follow up interview will 








What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
It is the intention to use the data collected only for this study although top level 
findings will be made available to academic journals, the Department of Health, 
NHS and the National Patient Safety Agency.  Your anonymity will be protected 
unless an expression is made otherwise.  The study will remain the intellectual 
property of the author and Sheffield Hallam University.  Any disclosures made 
by participants in the research will remain in the domain of the research 
(although the researcher and all participants are bound by NHS terms and 
conditions of employment).   
 
Who is organising and funding the research?   
 
The researcher, Debbie Hill, is the Chief Investigator and organiser of the study.  The 
study is sponsored by Sheffield Hallam University. 
 
 
Who has reviewed the study?  
 
This study has been given a favourable scientific and ethical opinion for conduct 
in the NHS  by Sheffield Hallam University, STH Research Department, 
Sheffield (North) REC, South Yorkshire Ambulance Trust and Sheffield Health 
and Social Research Consortium. 
A copy of this Information sheet should be retained by participants.  A copy of 
the signed consent form will also be provided to participants. 
 







Study Number: STH14602 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project: Crisis Management in the NHS 
Name of Researcher: Debbie Hill 
       Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
dated ......................... (version 2.1) for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these 
answered satisfactorily.                                         
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving any reason and without my employment rights 
being affected.  Although data gathered from me up to the time of 
withdrawal will be used in the study.                                       
 
3.   I consent to discuss my opinions amongst my peers (paired interviews only).  
 
4.   I will maintain the confidentiality of my peers (paired interviews only).   
 
5.   I agree to the discussion being recorded.   
 
6.   I agree to take part in the above study.    
 
____________________      ________________      __________________ 
Name of Participant               Date                              Signature 
______________________  Tel No.   __________________  EmailAddress       
 
Please give an email address and telephone number should there be a need to 
contact you 
__________________       _______________         ___________________ 
Researcher             Date              Signature 
 
When you have completed this form, please return it to Debbie Hill in the 
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